

SMALL FARMER AND RURAL WORKER
PRESSURE GROUPS IN BRAZIL

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PREFACE

Organized pressure groups play an exceedingly important role in the functioning of a political system.¹ Numerous writers have suggested the need of making studies of pressure groups² and a few interesting studies have appeared,³ but very little is really

¹David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (Twelfth Printing; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), pp. 47-51 and 403-524; Joseph La Palombara, Interest Groups in Italian Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 13-14 and 255-258; Harold Eckstein, Pressure Group Politics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), esp. pp. 7-39 and 151-161; Joseph La Palombara, "The Utility and Limitations of Interest Group Theory in Non-American Field Situation," Journal of Politics, Vol. XXII (February, 1960), pp. 29-49; and Roy Macridis, "Interest Groups in Comparative Analysis," Journal of Politics, Vol. XXIII (February, 1961), pp. 25-45.

²George I. Blanksten, "Political Groups in Latin América," American Political Science Review, Vol. LIII (March, 1959), p. 122; Gabriel A. Almond, "A Comparative Study of Interest Groups and the Political Process," American Political Science Review, Vol. XLI (March, 1958), pp. 270-282; Henry W. Ehrmann, Interest Groups on Four Continents (University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, Pa., 1964); Gláucio Ary Soares, "Interesse Político, Conflito e Pressões e Abstenção Eleitoral," Revista de Direito Público e Ciência Política, Vol. IV (January, 1961), pp. 58-82; George I. Blanksten, "The Politics of Latin America," in The Politics of Developing Areas, Gabriel Almond and James Coleman (ed.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 455-529; and Merle Kling, "The State of Research in Latin America: Political Science," in Social Science Research in Latin America, Charles Wagley (ed.) (New York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 168-213.

³Merle Kling, A Mexican Interest Group in Action (New York, N.Y.: Prentice Hall, 1961), Frank R. Brandenburg, "Organized Business in Mexico," Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. XII (Winter, 1958), pp. 26-50; Manoel Cardozo, "The Brazilian Church and the New Left," Journal of Inter-American Studies (July, 1964), pp. 313-323; Leonard D. Therry, "Dominant Power Components in the Brazilian University Student Movement Prior to April, 1964," Journal of Inter-American Studies (January, 1965), pp. 27-48.

known about the activities of pressure groups in general in Latin America and even less is known about small farmer and rural worker organizations.¹ It is especially important to study agricultural pressure groups in Brazil because

1. 50-60 per cent of the population is rural, and
2. It is a large and complex country with groups ranging from the Amazon Indians who are still at the level of the Stone or Bronze age to the urban inhabitants of São Paulo who live in the age of the electronic computer.

Of course it must be remembered that interest groups analysis is neither an exclusive nor a complete method of evaluating the decision-making process. Nevertheless, case studies do provide concrete data upon which further generalizations can be constructed which may buttress or qualify existing hypotheses. It is upon this premise that this study has been undertaken.

¹Among the earliest were John Powell, "Preliminary Report on the Federación Campesina de Venezuela, Origins, Leadership and Role in Agrarian Reform Programs" (Madison: University of Wisconsin, Land Tenure Center, 1964) (mimeographed); Richard Patch, "Bolivia, United States' Assistance in a Revolutionary Setting," in Richard Adams, et al., Social Change in Latin America (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1960), pp. 108-176, which discusses the participation of peasant groups in the post-1952 Revolutionary period, especially in Agrarian Reform; and Henry Landsberger and Fernando Canitrot, Iglesia, clase media y el movimiento sindical campesino (Santiago: Universidad de Chile, Faculty of Economics) (mimeographed); Neale J. Pearson, "The Confederacion Nacional Campesina de Guatemala (CNCG) and Peasant Unionism in Guatemala, 1944," unpublished Master's Thesis, Georgetown University, 1964, and "Latin American Peasant Pressure Groups and the Modernization Process," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. XX (1966), No. 2, pp. 309-317; and Anibal Quijano, "Contemporary Peasant Movements," Elites in Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 301-340.

The only descriptive and theoretical analysis of recent peasant

Ten Years of Agitation and Change

In Brazil, the Army, large landowners, bankers, industrialists, merchants, and the Roman Catholic Church were the principal pressure groups active in the political life of the Portuguese colony and nation until the twentieth century. Since World War I, organized urban workers have exercised some influence through their trade unions (sindicatos).¹ In the past thirty-five years, co-operatives of small farmers in the South have sometimes found means of protecting or advancing their interests at the local and state level, but organized groups of peasants² have been important at the national level only in the last decade.

Peasants and their problems first became an important subject of interest to the general public in Brazil after a series of articles

movements in Brazil is that of the Dutch Sociologist Benno Galjart, 'Class and 'Following' in Rural Brazil,' America Latina (Rio de Janeiro), July-September, 1964, p. 3.

¹For the beginnings of the Brazilian labor movement see the following books by Robert Alexander, Communism in Latin America (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1957), Chapter VII, and Chapters on Brazil in Labor Relations in Argentina, Brazil and Chile (New York: McGraw Hill, 1962), and Organized Labor in Latin America (Studies in Contemporary Latin America) (New York: The Free Press, 1965), Chapter VI.

²There is no standard definition of peasant for Latin America or any other part of the world. This writer accepts a part of Eric R. Wolf's definition that they are any kind of "rural cultivator" of low status who works on the land with his hands and has some consciousness of the regional or national economic and political order in which he lives. The definition does not cover those who practice slash-and-burn agriculture and who would most closely fit the folk or kinship community on a fold-urban community continuum. The definition also does not pre-judge that peasant surpluses are necessarily transferred to a dominant group of rulers. Wolf's concept, as expressed in Peasants (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1966), pp. 3-4, includes not only owners but also tenants, landless laborers, share-croppers, serfs, etc.

was published in the late 1950's about Francisco Julião Arruda de Paula, a hitherto obscure Pernambuco Alternate State Deputy, who helped organize Peasant Leagues in the Northeast.¹ Julião, who had switched from the Republican Party (PR) to the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), combined a moralistic indignation about legitimate grievances of Pernambuco peasants with an astute perception of the propaganda value of his real and alleged connections with various world leaders, including Pope John XXIII and Mao Tse-tung. This was the time when Fidel Castro made his great impact on Latin America, and United States officials worried about another radical revolutionary taking over in a much larger country than Cuba.² Most of the articles on Julião and the Peasant Leagues were polemical or laudatory in the extreme; only a small number of academicians and even fewer journalists tried to find out more about Julião's background and place in the context of traditional Brazilian politics.³

¹ Julião first gained nationwide attention in a series of articles by Antonio Callado in Correio da Manhã (Rio de Janeiro), September 10-23, 1959, which were collected in a book, Os Industriais da Sêca e os Galileus de Pernambuco (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1960).

Further controversy in the Brazilian Congress and the news media led to the publication of an article "A Revolução das Enxadas," Manchete (Rio de Janeiro), No. 398, December, 1959, pp. 84-86, which publicized the funeral of Antonio de Paula, "first martyr of the peasant leagues" without mentioning his kinship relationship to Julião.

First significant mention in the United States Press came in an article by Tad Szulc, "Brazil's Poverty Breeding Unrest," New York Times (October 31, 1960), p. 1.

² "Now There's Another 'Castro' to Worry U.S.," U.S. News and World Report (March 13, 1961), pp. 53-54, and "Fidel Front Organizes Impoverished Peasants," Life (June 2, 1961), pp. 82-88, are typical.

³ One of the few writers to understand the "manufactured crises"

In short, little scholarly attention was paid to the Peasant Leagues phenomenon although a great deal of literature was published.

At the same time, other politicians, and even plantation owners began to organize sindicatos and other organizations. The politicians organized the peasants as springboards for political advancement. The clergymen, in reaction to the demagoguery of many politicians, organized the peasants to alleviate their misery. And the large plantation owners and sugar mill operators organized the peasants to inhibit the growth of organized peasant interest groups making demands upon themselves. These groups seldom received or sought the publicity given Julião and the Peasant Leagues. In all of these groups, there were personal and ideological differences between actual and potential leaders over policies and tactics. It is also essential to view the growth and actions of peasant pressure groups in a context in which techniques varied from state to state and region to region. There were few monolithic patterns of behavior.

The emergence of the new groups was accompanied by violence and extra-legal activities.¹ But in the Brazilian context, it is

or "emergencies" of Northeast politics was Stefan H. Robock, "Fact and Fancy in Northeast Brazil," The Progressive, Vol. XXVII, No. 4 (April, 1963), pp. 37-40, and Brazil's Developing Northeast (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1963).

Anthony Leeds, "Brazil and the Myth of Francisco Julião," in Politics of Change in Latin America, Joseph Maier and R. W. Weatherhead (eds.) (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1964), p. 164, is one of the few articles which note Julião's origins as a member of the landed gentry in Pernambuco, although a "somewhat aberrant and individualistic but, not properly speaking, dissident faction of it."

¹James L. Payne, "Peru, the Politics of Structured Violence," Journal of Politics, Vol. XXVII, No. 2 (May, 1965), pp. 362-374, and Labor and Politics in Peru (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. viii-ix and 3-26, offers a model in the use of structured violence

impractical to view politics and peasant-landowner relations in many areas of the country in a constitutional framework, for constitutionalism, equal access to decision-makers for all groups, and the rule of law were not the model patterns of interaction.¹ Violence or power capabilities² in the form of strikes, armed invasions of plantations, destruction of bridges or telephone systems, assassination of a farm administrator or peasant--or fabricated reports of such incidents--are not aberrations or anomic behavior³ in the Brazilian scene but are "normal" in a purely descriptive sense.⁴

parallel to that of the traditional areas of the Northeast and West Central parts of Brazil.

¹Albert O. Hirschman, Journeys Toward Progress (Studies of Economic Policy-Making in Latin America) (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1963), p. 229, notes that the mechanisms for commanding attention of policy makers differ greatly from one society to another. For example, if the principal mechanism is the demonstration of discontent by violence, then it is clear that a great many problems which affect individual members of society will not be dealt with simply because they do not lend themselves to the staging of violent protest. "Once it has become clear that policy makers are responsive to threats of violence in one particular area, such threats will be delivered with increasing frequency" when it appears that "the State will only help those who make trouble."

²The term "power-capability" is taken from Charles W. Anderson, Political and Economic Change in Latin America (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand, 1967), pp. 90-91. Anderson's sections on political systems, the decision-making process and the administrative process are based primarily on the Spanish-speaking countries but much of what he says is valid for Brazil.

³La Palombara, Interest Groups in Italian Politics, pp. 82-83, notes: "With rare exceptions even the desperate peasants who forcibly occupy land, or the workers who refuse to leave factories, tack such anomic action because of the leadership provided by more than one [outside] group."

⁴"Sindicato do crime ainda existe em todo o Nordeste," Jornal do Brasil (April 6, 1965); "Questão de banditismo e atavica," and "Como, onde e porque se morre em Alagoas," Jornal do Brasil (April

They have happened frequently and they are politically significant.¹ Traditionally, politics in Brazil were conducted by an upper class which maintained control and preserved the traditional social order through a heavy reliance on conciliation, co-optation of new economic and social groups, and paternalism.² Peasants, isolated from the centers of decision-making, saw no real reason to involve themselves in politics. Elections had no ideological meaning for them. On the other hand, voting for the candidates of a "political boss" (chefe político or coronel) meant not only political protection from bandits or hired gunmen (cangaceiros) in the isolated interior where

7, 1965. The articles discuss "political banditry" in the Northeast, especially Alagoas, and its relationship with the assassination of Luis Augusto Castro Silva, State Secretary of Public Security, and an attempt on the life of State Deputy Robson Mendes in March, 1965. Other shootings also marked the July-September 1965 campaign for Governor.

¹Bonifacio Fortes, "Contribuição á história política do Sergipe (1933-1954)," Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos, No. 8 (April, 1960), pp. 86-133, indicates that all elections in Sergipe between 1950-1960 were held under Army supervision because of the violence accompanying previous elections.

Violence as a "legitimate technique" of pressure group activity is found in many societies. In the United States, for example, violence has been present in the labor movement and the civil rights movement. See James W. Vander Zanden, "The Klan Revival," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. LXV (March, 1960), pp. 456-462. In mid-1967, H. Rap Brown coined the phrase "violence is as American as cherry pie."

²James W. Rowe, "The 'Revolution' and the 'System': Notes on Brazilian Politics," AUFS Reports, East Coast South America Series, Vol. XII, No. 3 (Brazil), May, 1966, p. 7, indicates the term "o sistema" was popularized by scholarly journalist Oliveros Ferreira of O Estado de São Paulo to describe the remarkable stability of social structures, informal political institutions, and attitudinal patterns, and the "joint action by the elites . . . to maintain control and preserve "social peace!" This concept of "system" is not to be confused with the concepts of general systems analysis as used in the behavioral sciences.

the influence of the central or state government was minimal, but it also meant jobs and opportunity to rent land or to sell crops to the men who dominated commerce in the region.¹ The political emergence of peasant groups after 1955 brought about some changes in many of the traditional or transitional political sub-systems of Brazil.²

The 1964 Revolution apparently ended the "normal" political processes and activity of many leading politicians, including Juscelino Kubitschek, João Belchior Marques Goulart, Jânio Quadros, Leonel Brizola, and Francisco Julião de Arruda Paula. However, many peasant groups continued to function even though many political leaders were removed from the system.

¹ Jean Blondel, As Condições da Vida Política No Estado da Paraíba (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1957), pp. 37-72, is an excellent discussion of the social, economic, and political conditions of not only the state of Paraíba but also of the Northeast interior where balloting was seldom secret. Marcos Vinícius Vilaça and Roberto Cavalcanti de Albuquerque, Coronel, Coronéis (Rio de Janeiro: Edições Tempo Brasileiro, 1965) is a sympathetic portrait of four Pernambuco twentieth century "bosses" who were both sources of law and judges of proper social conduct: Francisco "Chico" Romão of Serrita; Jose Albilio de Albuquerque Avila of Bom Conselho; Francisco "Chico" Heraclio de Rego of Limoeiro; and Veremundo Soares of Salgueiro.

² Gabriel Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," Journal of Politics, Vol. XVIII, No. 3 (August, 1956), pp. 391-409; Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 540-541, and Edward C. Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1958), pp. 85-104, and Max P. Millikin and Donald L. M. Blackmer (eds.), The Emerging Nations, Their Growth and United States Policy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1961), pp. 21-26 and 84-90, have been used to create a set of typologies for eleven Brazilian states and Municípios with Pernambuco and Rio Grande do Sul which are contained in the appendix.

Goals and Hypotheses

This study attempts to do the following:

First, place the pre-1955 social, economic, and political system in context, especially in the ways it affected large landowners, small farmers, rural workers, renters, and other groups.

Second, identify some of the participants and groups responsible for a change in the outputs of the national political system and the state sub-systems insofar as they affected peasants and other groups with whom they interacted.

This will be done by case studies of the Ligas Camponesas, Sindicatos of Small Farmers and Rural Workers, and Cooperatives of Small Farmers in several states to show the relative importance of population distribution, education, social infrastructure, leadership availability and style, organizational structure, and the reaction of other individuals, groups, and institutions to peasant pressure groups.

In doing this, the validity of several major hypotheses will be tested:

1. The recently organized activity of peasants is a mixture of traditional Brazilian means of seeking relief or protection and of techniques used by pressure groups in all modern societies.

Traditionally, Brazilian peasants have followed those leaders who provided them with protection and benefits of different types. The newer peasant pressure groups also have learned to use radio, television, newspapers and other mass communication media to influence decision makers.

2. The greater availability of highways, railways, and other forms of communication within a given region and with other regions encourages and supports the formation of peasant pressure groups or other political groups using the peasants as a base or springboard for their own political or social advancement.

3. Although cooperatives and other associations may originally have been formed for non-political ends, a principal reason for their continued existence and/or growth is their ability to resort to political action.

4. Peasant pressure groups have survived and functioned in communities with a social infra-structure containing organized formal and informal groups and not survived or functioned in those communities and regions without these groups.¹

Formal groups include Church organizations, school boards, and agricultural associations. Informal groups include such institutions as the mutirão (cooperative work exchange similar to the barn-raising or corn-husking bees found in the United States).

5. Leadership of peasant pressure groups will come from outside the ranks of the peasantry in less-modernized states or regions although these leaders may have rural origins. In modernized or modernizing regions, leadership of such groups will be made up of both peasants

¹William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959), and Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man, the Social Bases of Politics, Anchor Book Edition (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1963), Chapter 11, are especially relevant for their discussion of the roles of intermediate or voluntary groups in contributing to more pluralistic and less authoritarian or totalitarian societies.

and other persons of higher status and education. One important corollary is that the nature and origin of these groups will greatly determine the recruitment of middle and lower level leaders from among the peasantry or urban middle classes.

In those groups organized by the communists or urban politicians, few or no peasants will determine policy; in those groups organized by the Church, priests, ministers, and laymen will play important roles in making policy.

6. A comprehensive radical or reformist ideology for these peasant groups will be created by urban intellectuals and not the peasants. The specific goals and grievances of peasants themselves will not normally be a part of the comprehensive ideology brought in by outsiders although these goals and grievances may be included later at a certain stage of the organizational process.

A radical or revolutionary ideology is one which calls for the abolition of the social and property structures of society. A reformist ideology seeks changes in the social, economic, and political structure or society but without abolishing the existing political or legal system.

7. A peasant pressure group is revolutionary or reform-minded depending on (a) the motives of the outsiders who ally themselves with peasants; (b) the conditions under which the help of outsiders is rendered; and (c) the style and integration of the political sub-system under which a peasant group operates. In other words, it is necessary to examine the perceptions of important decision makers and influentials

in the sub-system and the access given newly emerging political and social groups by decision makers.¹

Methodology

In order to examine the structures and functions of small farmer and rural worker groups, and the development of such structures and functions, the writer reviewed the available published literature at the libraries of the University of Florida, the Inter-American Regional Labor Organization (ORIT) in Mexico, and the Inter-American College of Agriculture and Social Sciences at Turrialba, Costa Rica. He then conducted brief periods of field research on peasant groups in Mexico, Costa Rica, Peru, Bolivia, and Argentina prior to pursuing nine months of field research in Brazil. In conducting this study, he sought to examine the variables mentioned in the original guiding hypotheses plus other variables and influences which developed in the course of this study, and which are discussed in the concluding chapter.

The writer sought to identify those factors which were important to the survival and effectiveness of these pressure groups. In particular, the writer based many of his research techniques on the previous work on interest groups and intermediate voluntary groups by David Truman, Joseph La Palombara, Gabriel Almond, Robert Alexander, Willian Kornhauser,

¹Henry A. Landsberger, "The Labor Elite: Is it Revolutionary?" in Lipset and Solari, op. cit., pp. 268-269, notes the "organized pressure through economic and/or political channels" of a large sector of society to "improve its living and working conditions" for the first time, "in itself constitutes a revolution." See also Lipset, Political Man, pp. 77-90, for his discussion of the "ways in which different societies handle the crisis of the 'entry into politics' of new social groups."

and Seymour Lipset, which have been referred to above. In addition, the writer utilized the lessons learned in studying monolithic local power elites in the work of Floyd Hunter,¹ the work by Robert Dahl² on pluralistic power structures in which specialized groups influenced local government decisions and activities in specific issue areas, and the work by Gladys Kammerer, John DeGrove, Alfred Clubok, and Charles Ferris³ on competitive cliques in Florida cities. A mimeographed interview schedule was developed with structured closed end and unstructured open ended questions in order to gather background data on the political influentials and problems involved in this study. This formal interview schedule was discarded, however, because of the general reluctance of Brazilians to respond to written questionnaires. Instead, other techniques were used to gain interviewee confidence and to elicit the information for which the interview schedule originally was designed (see pp. 275-278). Over the course of time, information was sought on the age, education, birthplace, religion, occupational history, organizational experiences, and power relationships.

The writer determined fairly early in his research that the federal system of Brazilian government might be an important contributing factor in determining the relative importance of different variables in different settings. He therefore decided to select a few sample states

¹Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (Garden City: Anchor Books, Doubleday and Company, 1963).

²Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).

³Gladys M. Kammerer, et al., City Managers in Politics (University Monographs in the Social Sciences, No. 13) (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1962).

and municípios in each region and also to spend as much time as possible in rural areas because of the great quantity of published material in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo on political conditions and "peasant groups" in Pernambuco and the relative lack of material on other states such as Rio Grande do Norte, Paraná, São Paulo, and Rio Grande do Sul. Several municípios were selected in six states on the basis of their similar and differing characteristics such as area, population, colonization and/or settlement processes, ethnic, religious, and economic make-up, literacy, and the existence or absence of functioning pressure groups and political parties. Although the writer was not able to follow his original schedule of travel for various reasons, he utilized his time as follows:

- Rio Grande do Sul (three months, principally in Porto Alegre, Caxias do Sul, Gramado, Nova Petrópolis, Santa Cruz do Sul, Venâncio Aires, Santa Maria, and Lajeado)
- Sao Paulo (one month, principally in São Paulo, Jabotícabal, and Bragança Paulista)
- Guanabara and the State of Rio de Janeiro (one month)
- Bahia (one week at a meeting of the National Executive Council of Catholic Agrarian Youth (JAC) at Itaparíca Island, plus three days in nearby Salvador)
- Pernambuco (two months, principally in Recife, Jaboatão, Vitória de Santo Antão, Bom Jardim, Cabo, Palmares, and Afogados de Ingazeira)
- Paraíba (two weeks, principally in Joao Pessoa)
- Alagoas (ten days, principally in Colonia Pindorama, near Penedo)
- Rio Grande do Norte (ten days, principally in Natal and São Paulo Potengi)

The writer sought to determine political party and pressure group power structures and relations with other power holders by interviewing formal power holders and knowledgeable in sindicatos, federations, co-operatives, political parties, churches, newspapers, Ministries, Army Headquarters, landowner associations, universities, urban trade unions,

and the catalytic organizations such as SAR, SORPE, and FAG, and by attempting to identify the major participants in certain selected critical decisions. (The names of these influentials and knowledgeable are listed in the bibliography.) The writer also collected information on several elections in order to make possible correlations between voting and pressure group behavior. After his return to the United States, a reading of James L. Payne's Labor and Politics in Peru and several Brazilian novels helped give the writer a conceptual framework in which to place the role of the structured violence he had observed in many parts of Brazil. And finally he prepared numerous tables, maps, and charts, many of which are contained in this study in order to test the validity of the hypotheses in this study.

All interviews were conducted by the writer in Portuguese or Japanese with the exception of several interviews with Americans in English and several German-speaking persons in Rio Grande do Sul in which Emiliano Lemberger was of help in interpreting answers to questions.

All translations are by the author unless otherwise stated.

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BUT NOT QUITE

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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS FOR INTEREST
GROUPS, GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, AND
POLITICAL PARTIES IN BRAZIL

- Ação Popular - Popular Action, a Catholic Action group of the 1960's.
- ARENA - National Renovating Alliance or Aliança Renovadora Nacional
Note-The pro-government political party organized from the top down in late 1965 out of members from the previously existing political parties which were abolished by Institutional Act No. 2 of October 2, 1965. See MDB also.
- CLT - The Consolidated Work Laws or Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho, promulgated by the government of Getulio Vargas as Decree-law 5,452 of May 1, 1943, which is still the basic labor code or law of Brazil.
- CRB - Brazilian Rural Confederation or Confederação Rural Brasileira, the organization at the apex of the pyramid of rural landowner groups in Brazil; below it are the Rural Federations (Federações Rurais) of the individual states which consist of the Rural Associations in one or more Municípios.
- CONTAG - The Confederation of Agricultural Workers or Confederação de Trabalhadores na Agricultura, formed December 1963.
- DRT - Regional Labor Delegate or Delegacy; the DRT is the Chief Representative of the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare in each State or a group of States.
- FAG - Gaucho Agrarian Front or Frente Agraria Gaucho; the interest group sponsored by Catholic church leaders in Rio Grande do Sul.
- FARBA - The Rural Federation of the state of Bahia.
- FARESP - The Rural Federation of Sao Paulo
- FARSUP - The Rural Federation of Rio Grande do Sul
- IAA - The Sugar and Alcohol Institute or Instituto do Açúcar e Alcool, a government autarchy or agency designed to regulate the production and sale of sugar and alcoholic products produced from sugar.
- IBRA - The Brazilian Institute of Agrarian Reform or Instituto Brasileiro de Reforma Agraria, organized from the SUPRA and several other agrarian reform and development agencies in 1964.

- IGRA - The Gaucho Agrarian Reform Institute or Instituto Gaucho de Reforma Agraria, established in 1960 by the state government of Rio Grande do Sul.
- IRGA - The Rice Growers Association of Rio Grande do Sul or Instituto Rio Grandense de Arroz, a producers interest group.
- JAC - Catholic Rural (Agrarian) Youth or Juventude Agraria Catolica, the arm of Catholic Action among rural youth.
- JUC - Catholic University Youth, the arm of Catholic Action among University students.
- MASTER - Movement of Landless Agricultural Laborers or Movimento dos Agricultores Sem Terra in Rio Grande do Sul.
- MDB - Brazilian Democratic Movement or Movimento Democratico Brasileiro, the opposition political party formed in late 1965 when previously existing political parties were abolished.
- MRT - Movimento Trabalhista Renovador. Renovating Workers Movement or Movimento Trabalhista Renovador, the political party founded by Fernando Ferrari of Rio Grande do Sul, when he broke with PTB leader Joao Belchor Goulart.
- MTR - Movimento Tiradente Revolucionario. Revolutionary Tiradente Movement or Movimento Tiradentes Revolucionario, an urban political movement founded by Francisco Juliao in 1961.
- MEB - Basic Education Movement or Movimento de Educacao de Base, a Catholic Church-sponsored and Brazilian Government financed organization involved in literacy campaigns and leadership training.
- MTPS - The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare.
- PCB - The Brazilian Communist Party which split in late 1961, over the Sino-Soviet dispute and the Cuban Revolution. This group is pro-Moscow and led by Luiz Carlos Prestes, a man with considerable prestige due his leadership of the famous insurrectionary "Prestes Column" in the interior of Brazil in the 1920's after he and a group of fellow junior officers (tenentes) attempted a coup d'état.
- PCdoB - The Communist Party of Brazil, the Peking-oriented faction of the Communist Party led by Joao Amazonas, Pedro Pomar, and Mauricio Gabrois, all of whom had been downgraded for being "Stalinists" after the Twentieth Congress of the Russian Communist Party.

- PDC - Christian Democratic Party--of minor importance nationally but important in several states, including Sao Paulo, Paraná, and Rio Grande do Sul.
- PR - The Republican Party, an unimportant minor party with an electoral apparatus "for rent."
- PRP - Party of Popular Representation, a far-right party of some importance because of its ideological coherence.
- PSB - Brazilian Socialist Party or Partido Socialista Brasileiro, a minor party which had its roots in the UDN and PTB but was personalistic and interested in patronage, not ideological coherence and discipline.
- PSD - Social Democratic Party or Partido Social Democratico, one of Brazil's three major parties from 1945 to 1965, created out of a coalition of traditional rural oligarchs, state-machine politicians, bureaucrats from the Estado Novo period, and a smattering of industrial nouveaux riches.
- PTB - Brazilian Labor Party, or Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, one of Brazil's three major parties, 1945-1965, based on a coalition of Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare bureaucrats, middle-class trade union leaders, large ranchers from the South such as Joao Goulart and Leonel Brizola, and sugar interests in the Northeast and Sao Paulo, represented by people like José Ermirio de Moraes.
- SRB - Brazilian Rural Society or Sociedade Rural Brasileira, a civil association which aggregates Brazil's largest landowners, important coffee and cotton exporters, and livestock producers. It does not have any constituent bodies in the several states or municipios. Its headquarters is Sao Paulo.
- SUDENE - The Northeast Development Agency or Superintendencia do Desenvolvimento do Nordeste.
- SUPRA - The Superintendency of Agrarian Reform or Superintendencia de Reforma Agraria, organized in 1963 out of the National Institute for Immigration and Colonization (INIC), the Rural Social Service (SSR) and several other previously existing rural development or welfare agencies. It was re-organized into the IBRA in 1964 after the April 1964 change of government.
- UBES - The Brazilian Secondary Student Union or Uniao Brasileira de Estudantes Secundarias, the organization at the apex of the pyramid of secondary student organizations.

- ULTAB - The Brazilian Union of Agricultural Laborers and Workers or Uniao dos Lavradores e Trabalhadores Agricolas do Brasil, a PCB-dominated organization of peasants, functioning principally in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo states from 1954 to April 1964. It is now defunct.
- UDN - National Democratic Union, one of Brazil's three major parties, 1945-1965, originally an anti-Vargas "united front" of urban middle class, professionals, banking interests, moralists, intellectual liberals and moderates, and a part of the traditional agricultural interests in the North and Northeast. It also had some clergymen and labor leaders in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.
- UNE - National Student Union or Uniao Nacional de Estudantes, the apex organization of the pyramid of Brazilian University students, composed of representatives of State Federations or Unions, which, in turn, were made up of representatives in each School or College (Faculdade) forming part of a University.

GLOSSARY OF FOREIGN TERMS AND PHRASES

(The definitions and explanations given are those which have a direct relation to matters treated in the text. Some of the words and phrases have other connotations as well, but no attempt has been made to include them. If a word does not have a general public meaning, the definition used is from a glossary of terms given in Smith, Brazil, pp. 626-640.)

Agregado--in colonial times a free man of low social status who placed himself under the protection of the master of the casa grande or the mansion that formed the seat of a large estate, thus becoming one of his "men" or retainers; used now in parts of Brazil as a designation for an agricultural laborer who lives on the estate (see Engenho, Fazenda, and Usina).

Agreste--the name used in northeastern Brazil to designate the zone which lies between the well-watered coastal plain (mata or varzea) and the semi-arid interior (sertão or backlands); much of it is hilly, rocky, and covered by scattered, scrubby timber or spiny vegetation known as catinga.

Associação--association, the name used for various organized groups, who may or may not be formally inscribed in the Civil Registry in accordance with Brazilian Law which prescribes such registration in order for a group to be recognized by public officials.

caboclo--name first applied to domesticated Indians, later used to designate a crossbreed of white-Indian stock, and now generally used to mean any lower-class rural person, often with connotations of ignorance such as "hay seed" or "hillbilly." (see caipira)

cachaça--a low-grade rum made from the juice of sugar cane or molasses.

caipira--the man or woman who lives outside of an urban community, who lacks education or social graces, who does not dress well or present a good appearance in public. It is a widely used term for lower class, rural Brazilians along with caboclo.

Camara--Council or Chamber, generally used to describe the legislative council in the municipio made up of vereadores, councilmen; also used to describe Chamber of Commerce (Camara de Comercio).

cambão--the obligation imposed on sharecroppers, tenants, and resident workers (moradores) to work gratuitously or at lower than the normal wage one or more days per week, or per month, in order to cultivate a plot of land for oneself; it may also allow an individual and his family to occupy a dwelling on the plot of land. It is a term used mostly in the Northeast.

- campanha--the name used in southern Brazil to designate the plains of Rio Grande do Sul, running from the Atlantic Ocean into Uruguay and Argentina. It is principally a region of cattle ranches and rice plantations near rivers.
- campones--peasant, a rural inhabitant, generally with connotations of low status.
- capanga-cangaceiro--terms used for the bad men or bandits of the North-east; it is also used for hired guard or gunmen who have been hired for the purpose of intimidating or killing one or more people.
- casa grande--the big house or mansion that forms the seat of a large landed estate (see engenho, fazenda, estancia, and usina). On very old estates, there was also a senzala (slave quarters) and engenho.
- colonia--a name used to describe a settlement of small farmers in South Brazil, the workers' village on a fazenda in central Brazil, or the region settled by small farmers in south Brazil.
- colono--a small farmer in south Brazil; a laborer who obligates himself to work on a one-year contract in the care and obligatory harvest of a certain number of coffee trees or of a certain area of cotton or of other crops such as sugar cane, rice, and beans in Sao Paulo.
- Coronel--colonel, a political boss in a municipio or region of a state; it is often used synonymously for a large landowner who is active in politics or who has political connections similar to the Kentucky Colonel or Tennessee Major.
- Cruzeiro--the unit of exchange in Brazil.
- Dom--a religious honorific given generally to Bishops and Archbishops of the Brazilian Catholic Church.
- Dispositivo--the name given to the military security arrangements upon which any government depends.
- engenho--an old-fashioned sugar mill; also used to designate the entire sugar plantation.
- erva-mate (yerba mate)--Ilex paraguariensis, the leaves of a tree of low to medium height which grows in the south and from which tea, sometimes called Paraguayan tea, is made.
- Estado N^ovo--the "new state" established by President Getulio Vargas in 1937 and which was terminated in 1945. It was modelled in part on the Corporate State of Italy during the regime of Benito Mussolini.

estancia--the common designation for the large cattle ranch of Rio Grande do Sul or any large landed estate of that state, Uruguay, and Argentina; similar in origins and social arrangements to the fazenda or hacienda.

fazenda--a large estate; the equivalent of hacienda in Mexico, Colombia, and Peru.

fazendeiro--the owner-operator of a large landed estate.

feira--public market; the weekly fair of a neighborhood or region where people gather to buy, sell, and exchange goods, services, animals, and entertainment.

foice--the hook or cutting blade attached to a long wooden handle and generally used for cutting sugar cane or fruit from trees.

foreiro--synonym for morador or resident worker on a landed estate who generally has to pay foro (a type of rent or cambao) similar to cambao or pay in kind for the privilege of cultivating or working a piece of land.

fornecedor--sugar-cane producers who lack milling facilities and must sell their sugar cane to a sugar usina.

gaucho--a native of Rio Grande do Sul.

hectare--a metric measure equal to 10,000 square meters or 2.471 acres.

Impôsto Sindical--the Union Tax imposed on all wage- and salary-earners (established by the Estado Novo at one day's pay per year) for supporting an officially arranged system of sindicatos, federations and confederations.

Interventor--The chief executive of a state, municipio, government agency or Sindicato appointed by the President as his direct agent. During the Vargas period, all states were governed by such appointees, although the appointee in Minas Gerais, an exception, was known as "Governor."

Irmão--a religious brother or clergyman belonging to an order.

jagunco--name applied to the gunmen or the bad men of the Sertao or^b backlands (see also capanga and cangaceiro).

latifundio--a latifundium, or a large landed estate giving employment to over 12 workers and much of which may not be farmed at present levels of technology, often held for speculation or status, and whose workers may be under-employed or unemployed significant portions of time during the year.

ligas camponesas--peasant leagues, the peasant organizations generally associated with Francisco Juliao de Arruda de Paula of Pernambuco but sometimes the title assumed by a traditional landowning coronel for himself and his peasant following in the 1960-1964 period; originally it was given to the abortive attempt of the Communist Party (PCB) to organize peasant groups in 1940-1945.

mata--the well-watered coastal plain of Northeast Brazil which is used principally for growing sugar-cane; in Paraíba, it is called the varzea.

meieiro--an agricultural laborer who receives one-half of the crop in lieu of wages, or a farm tenant/sharecropper who pays one-half of his product crop as rent. A sharecropper who paid one-third of his product would be known as a terceiro.

mineiro--a native of Minas Gerais.

minifundio--a farm of a size inadequate to give full, year-round employment at present levels of technology and resources to two people. Generally this writer considers thirty hectares (seventy-two acres) or less as being the upper level of which a single head of household would move from minifundio category to family-farm status, although a small farm of twenty hectares which was well-irrigated and close to a market center might give its owner a reasonably good level of living.

morador--a squatter who stops where he pleases and clears the land in order to plant subsistence crops such as corn, beans, and mandioca; also used in Northeast Brazil to designate a resident worker who cultivates a plot of land in return for a share of the product or a wage.

município--an administrative subdivision of the state comparable to the county in the United States which consists of a both urban and rural areas. A city is the seat (sede) of the município. Cities as such have no separate legal or political status as in the United States. Its executive head is a Prefeito (prefect) and its legislative body is a Camara de Vereadores (chamber of councilmen).

nordestino--a native of northeastern Brazil.

operários--skilled workers, generally found in a factory but also including such workers as railroad men.

"O sistema"--"the system," a term not to be confused with the concepts of general systems analysis used in the behavioral sciences, but denoting the several elites which have dominated Brazilian political machinery during several successive governments and their patterns of joint action to maintain control and preserve "social

peace" through heavy reliance on conciliation, paternalism, and anticipation of the demands of new individuals or groups seeking admittance into the decision-making processes of various levels of government.

padre--priest

panelinha--the kinship or informal social structure which generally consists of a large landowner, a customs official, an insurance man, a lawyer or two, businessmen, an accountant, a municipio vereador, a state or federal deputy, and a banker with his bank. Each one mutually needs the services of the others in order to overcome various complications of the legal, political, or economic "system" or "sub-system" in which they find themselves.

passeata--a name used for a parade by which its organizer hopes to impress political office- or power-holders and the general public with his power-capabilities, be it in terms of worker, peasant, or student followers, or any combination of people, trucks, weapons, and so forth.

pau-a-pique--a type of construction in which poles are placed on end, sometimes with reeds or other shrubbery intertwined horizontally and with adobe covering, used to make the walls of the poorest huts, generally constructed by moradores or posseiros (squatters).

pelego--a name derived from the sheepskin used by cowboys and horse-men in south Brazil but which is generally used to describe corrupt sindicato or union leaders who are more dependent on the government than on their own worker or laborer following for their position and status.

populismo--A term used in Latin America to describe a political position which connotes an interest in and defense of the common people, their sufferings, desires, and so forth, as opposed to support of minority interests or oligarchies.

Prefeito--the administrative or executive head of a municipio whose equivalent in the United States is Mayor and Prefect in France; he is generally elected to the office although state governors and the President may appoint them in special circumstances including intervention by the state or federal government.

rapadura--a brown sugar from which none of the molasses has been extracted made by the old-fashioned sugar engenhos; equivalent to the Spanish-american panela.

Recôncavo--designation for the fertile coastal region embracing most of seventeen municipios surrounding the city of Salvador, Bahia.

relatório--report or annual message of a government agency or office.

roça--a small, burned-over patch of ground in the midst of a forest or scrub land in which are planted subsistence crops such as corn, beans, and mandioca.

secretaria--a department in state government. For example, the Secretaria de agricultura is the equivalent of department or office of agriculture in a North American state government.

sede--seat, the city in which the government of a municipio is located.

senhor de engenho--traditionally, the aristocratic master of a sugar plantation and the casa grande which forms its nucleus.

senzala--the slave quarters generally found on a large landed estate in the past, often near the casa grande, and at the present time, often furnishing the dwelling space for resident workers or laborers.

sertanejo--the common man who lives in the sertao of northeast Brazil.

sertão--(plural, sertões)--the great northeastern interior, a semi-arid area, covered with sparse, spiny vegetation, and sparsely populated. Occasionally, it is cut by a temporary stream and infrequently by a large river such as the São Francisco, which provide water for a narrow band of farms along its edge. The setting for Euclides da Cunha's great Brazilian classic Os Sertões, which has been translated into English as Rebellion in the Backlands.

sindicato--an association of employers, workers, or professions which performs interest group functions similar to a trade union or professional association in the United States, e.g., American Farm Bureau Federation, American Dairy Association, National Agricultural Workers Union, United Automobile Workers, Fraternal Order of Police, National Education Association, and American Medical Association. Brazilian law, influenced by the Corporate State ideas of Italy under Mussolini, limits these groups to one per occupation, branch or endeavor, or category per municipio or group of municipios in a region. Two or more sindicatos of employers or employees or doctors, for example, cannot function in the same municipio. Sindicatos form the lowest level of a pyramid-like officially sponsored arrangement above which are found federations at the state level and confederations at the national level. All of these groups have to be officially approved or recognized by one or more relevant Ministries of the Federal government in order to function legally. Financially, this officially sponsored arrangement of organizations is supported by the Imposto Sindical although sindicatos may levy additional dues on their members.

sitiante--a small farmer, the proprietor of a sitio or plot of land; in Northeast Brazil, it is sometimes used to describe a squatter.

tarefa--task; used widely as a measure of land or to describe the obligatory amount of work to be performed by a rural laborer for a given salary or wage.

trabalho--work or labor; the phrase, "Trabalho é para cachorro e negro" (Manual labor is for the dog and the Negro) describes traditional upper- and middle-class Brazilian attitudes towards peasants or anyone who works with his hands.

usina--the modern sugar refinery and plantation; in the Northeast, the machinery of such a sugar refinery, however, may be forty years old.

vaqueiro--cowboy.

varzea--the present flood plain of a river; in particular, it is used to describe the low coastal plain of Paraíba in northeast Brazil.

Figure 1.--Political Map of Brazil, showing places visited
in this study, 1964-1965



CHAPTER I

AGRICULTURE AND AGRICULTURAL LABOR IN ITS HISTORICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL SETTING IN BRAZIL

Introduction

In Brazil, the institutions of government, by and large, have been used to defend and advance the interests of an elite whose power was based on the ownership of large amounts of land.¹ Beginning as an essentially agricultural country, Brazil developed in the past fifty years a mixed industrial and agricultural economy.² As this took place the upper class agricultural and professional elites admitted industrialists and financial leaders into the decision-making process at the national level and a middle class came to exert a strong influence in several states and many local governments

¹ Among the writers who discuss the power of this landed elite are Anyda Marchant, "Politics, Government and Law," in Brazil: Portrait of Half a Continent, T. Lynn Smith and Alexander Marchant (eds.) (New York: Dryden Press, 1951), pp. 359-362. James W. Rowe "The 'Revolution' and the 'System': Notes on Brazilian Politics," AUFS Reports, East Coast South America Series, Vol. XII, Nos. 3-5 (Brazil), esp. pp. 6-14 of Part I, "Seeds of the 'System.'"

² See Robert Alexander's Chapters on Brazil in Labor Relations in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile (New York: McGraw Hill, 1962); Organized Labor in Latin America (New York: The Free Press, 1965), and Prophets of the Revolution (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962); Frank Bonilla, "A National Ideology for Development," in Expectant Peoples, Nationalism and Development, K. H. Silvert (ed.) (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 232-264; and Harry W. Hutchinson, "Cultural Change in Brazil: An Analytical Model," Journal of Inter-American Studies (July, 1964), pp. 303-313.

in the South.¹ The country has undergone a spectacular series of changes in formal governmental structures since the 1930's at the national level from dictatorship to elected president, to parliamentary government, to an elected president once again, and then to a quasi-dictatorship which utilizes the forms of democratic government to mask military control.²

Whatever the form of government, the low status agricultural groups generally did not exercise any influence of power within the political system. This was due to their lack of education, isolation from and poor communication with the centers of economic and political influence and because the country's traditional system of man-land relations put the peasant in a subordinate and dependent situation. At the local level, peasant cooperatives have been important for about forty-five years in the South where there was colonization of several regions by small farmers or where conditions were such that an "agricultural ladder" to provide upward mobility for peasant

¹For a consideration of the role of the middle class in Brazil, see Charles Wagley, "The Brazilian Revolution: Social Change since 1930," in Social Change in Latin America, Richard Adams, et al. (eds.) (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1960), p. 223; L. C. Bressner Pereira, "The Rise of the Middle Class and Middle Management in Brazil," in Revolution in Brazil, Politics and Society in a Developing Nation, Irving Louis Horowitz (ed.) (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1964), pp. 232-242, and J. V. Freitas Marcondes, "Social Legislation in Brazil," in Brazil: Portrait of Half a Continent, T. Lynn Smith and Alexander Marchant (eds).

²Kenneth F. Johnson, "Causal Factors in Latin American Political Instability," Western Political Quarterly, XVII, No. 3 (September, 1964), pp. 432-446, considers that the maldistribution of land ownership, entrepreneurial deficiencies, urbanization, and over-population contribute to this political instability but "do not necessarily tell us when it can be expected to occur."

laborers to become members of a rural small proprietor middle class was established. But their influence was a limited one.

During the 1950's, the low status agricultural population, especially in the Northeast, finally began to be organized. To understand how this change came about and how new contenders for power developed, claiming to represent the agricultural low-status groups, it is necessary to review the following: the origins, myths, and reality of the latifundio or large landed estate, the systematic attempts to drain as much income and energy as possible from peasants, the effects of nineteenth century immigrant colonization, and the socio-economic changes and pressures in rural areas since the 1930's.

Origins of the Large Estate and Latifundio¹

The systems of landownership and control established by the Portuguese in Brazil represented a sharp break with the traditional small-farm agricultural pattern of Portugal. From the beginning, land was given in large grants called sesmaria or appropriated by "adventurers from the lower and even the upper segments of the nobility who migrated in order to restore depleted fortunes."² For the most part, ordinary citizens (homens do povo) or "plebeians" came only in later years, after the discovery of gold and diamonds

¹The best treatments of the origins and effects of concentrated landholding patterns in Brazil are T. Lynn Smith, Brazil: People and Institutions (rev. ed.; Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963), pp. 245-246; and Inter-American Committee for Agricultural Development (CIDA), Land Tenure Conditions and Socio-Economic Development of the Agricultural Sector, Brazil (Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union, General Secretariat, Organization of American States, 1966), passim.

²Smith, op. cit., p. 319, is paraphrased and quoted for this first paragraph.

and the country's economic development made a place for small manufacturing and trading enterprises. In addition, as Oliveira Vianna points out, lands were granted only to persons who could convince the authorities that they were from "good" families and had the slaves, finances and other requisites to develop sugar plantations, mills, and cattle ranches.¹ In no other Latin American country have such huge blocks of land been owned by such a small group of people who dominated agriculture in almost every part of the country, regardless of climate or major type of land use. Many of the largest properties were acquired illegally or fraudulently.² Two major types of irregularities have continued to the present time, not only in the old sugar or cacao regions of the Northeast but also in the new frontier regions of Paraná, Mato Grosso, Goiás, and the Federal District of Brasilia:

1. After federal or state agencies announce plans to colonize "public lands," private individuals appear claiming title to all or parts of this land, whereupon these newly discovered "owners" are given a concession of land or their "private title" is recognized and the land is purchased by the federal or state government concerned. The Northeast Development Agency (SUDENE) has been victimized frequently by this practice as have the state governments of Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul.
2. Once public lands are settled and land values rise, speculators on adjacent properties move their boundary lines or discover that their "titles" cover part of or all of the cleared or

¹ *Ibid.*, citing, Oliveira Vianna, "O Povo Brasileiro e sua Evolução," Recenseamento do Brasil, 1920, Vol. I (Rio de Janeiro, 1922), pp. 284-285.

² Graciliano Ramos, São Bernardo (Seventh edition; São Paulo: Livraria Martins Editora, 1961), pp. 41-50; and Jorge Amado, Gabriela, Clove and Cinnamon, trans. James L. Taylor and William L. Grossman (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Crest Book, 1964), pp. 68-82, are two famous Brazilian novels which deal with, among other things, the use of violence to acquire and protect land in Alagoas and Bahia, respectively.

cultivated lands. In many cases, the speculators used hired gunmen to eject the colonist. This practice has taken place frequently in the 1960's in Paraná, Mato Grosso, Goiás, and the new Federal District of Brasília.¹

Throughout Brazil's history, many of Brazil's leading families have obtained land in this fashion or fought off attempts by rivals to acquire their land. Throughout Brazil's history, the names Albuquerque de Barros, Bezerra, Cavalcanti, Mello, Maranhão, Queiroz, Lima, Coelho, Wanderley, Monteiro, Oliveira, Pessoa, Bulhões, Magalhaes, Cabral, Campos, Borges, Lina, Coutinho, and Guimaraes appear over and over again. Throughout Brazil's history, indigo, sugar, cotton, coffee, cacao, lumber, and livestock have been produced for export on a large scale in response to the demands of foreign markets.

In addition, two other points need emphasis: (1) the Catholic Church never acquired the large amounts of land which have made it famous elsewhere in Latin America,² and (2) a system of small farms or "shelter belt," protecting the plantations from the natives, as in the case of the United States, never developed in the hinterland.³

Even before its independence in 1822, Brazil was a nation with a high concentration of landownership, much unused land, a backward agriculture, and "many poor families wandering from place to place, following the favor and caprice of landowners and always lacking the

¹CIDA, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

²Smith, op. cit., p. 322, points out that a royal letter of February 23, 1711, stipulated that no "concessions of land in the State of Brazil" shall pass "by any title to the dominion of Religions," quoting Joaquim da Silva Rocha, Historia da Colonização do Brasil, Vol. I (Rio de Janeiro, 1918 and 1919), p. 158.

³Smith, op. cit., p. 320.

means of obtaining some ground on which they could make a permanent establishment."¹

There was little sub-division of the old concessions anywhere. The proprietors of the interior surrounded themselves with a population of sharecropping tenants, renters, and squatters living in "almost feudal" relationships to a few fazendeiros, "at whose nod they are subservient and bowed, in order not to be ejected from their miserable ranchos [thatched huts] where they live and from the roça or engenho where they work to gain their daily bread."²

Except in the South, where a program of colonization was started in the nineteenth century, Brazil entered the post World War II period as a nation in which the landed estate with large amounts of unused land or latifundia ruled supreme.³ Few changes appear to be occurring in the size of Brazilian farms except in the very largest estates of 100,000 hectares (247,000 acres) or more which increased in number from 37 in 1940 to 60 in 1950.⁴ The concentration of land in a

¹ Ibid., p. 324, quoting a statement by Gonçalves Chaves in Ruy Cirne Lima, Terras Devolutas (Porto Alegre, 1935), pp. 33-44.

² João Cardoso de Menezes e Souza, Theses sobre Colonização no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, 1875), p. 309, quoted in Smith, Brazil, p. 300.

³ As noted in the Glossary of terms, estates generally over 500 hectares (1,200 acres) fall into this category.

⁴ Smith, op. cit., pp. 336-337, indicates these large establishments were found as follows in 1950 in the following states: Acre (16); Amazonas-Rio Branco (4); Para-Amapa (7); Bahia (3); Paraná (2); Mato Grosso-Guapore (16); Maranhão (1); Piauí (4), Santa Catarina (1), and Goiás (2).

Unfortunately, the census does not indicate the names of the owners of these tracts. In addition, João Goulart's acquisition of many large tracts of land in several states while President was not a significant departure from the traditional Brazilian phenomenon of

relatively small number of families is shown by the 1950 census in which only 14.6 per cent of all farm establishments occupied 83.4 per cent of all the land in farms; conversely 85.4 per cent of all farms establishments--those less than 100 hectares--occupied only 16.8 per cent of all the land in farms.¹ (See Table 1.)

The importance of low wage agricultural labor in several states with large amounts of unused land is seen in data on the distribution of tractors and plows in ten states. The more advanced states of the South have mechanized much of their agricultural regions in contrast to the North and Northeast. (See Table 2.)

Although some subdivision of land through inheritance or tax pressures is occurring in Minas Gerais, São Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul, and the Northeast, it is important to remember:

individuals trying to buy up land in different municípios or states for status, tax, or investment purposes.

¹Not every source agrees that the maldistribution of land in Brazil has had bad effects. W. H. Nicholls and Ruy Miller Paiva, "The Structure and Productivity of Brazilian Agriculture," Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. XLVII, No. 2 (May 1956), p. 361, affirm that "Brazil owes a substantial debt to those large landowners who are active in settling, developing and improving the nation's agricultural resources." They argue that the higher labor productivity of the larger farms is "probably a net social advantage so long as Brazil is so short of adequate farm job opportunities." Of course, similar claims were made by the supporters of the slave system in the United States as a reason for maintaining the slaveowners' dominant position of power.

CIDA, op. cit., p. 83, is among the sources which note that the absence of or limitations of available statistics make it extremely difficult to compare the productivity and levels of living possible from a ten-hectare farm in a valley near Rio de Janeiro or São Paulo with a latifundio of over 500 hectares or 12,000 acres in Rio Grande do Sul or Minas Gerais. In any case, in this writer's opinion, the absence and limitations of agricultural statistics are a reflection of the satisfaction of the landed elite with the existing distribution and productivity of land.

TABLE 1

NUMBER AND AREA OF FARM ESTABLISHMENTS
ACCORDING TO SIZE - 1950^a

Size of Holding in hectares	Number of Establishments		Area of Establishments	
	Total	Per Cent of Total	Total hectares	Per Cent of Total
Less than 10	710,934	34.5	3,025,372	1.3
10 to 99	1,052,557	50.9	35,562,747	15.3
100 to 999	268,159	13.0	75,520,717	32.5
1,000 to 9,999	31,017	1.5	73,093,482	31.5
10,000 and more	1,611	.1	45,008,788	19.4
Undeclared	364	0.0	-- --	----
	2,064,642	100.0	232,211,106	100.0

^aSource of data: Manuel Diégues Junior, População e Propriedade da Terra no Brasil (Washington, D.C.: União Pan-Americana, Secretaria Geral, Organização dos Estados Americanos, 1959), p. 253.

TABLE 2

DISTRIBUTION OF TRACTORS AND PLOWS ACCORDING TO
PRELIMINARY RESULTS, AGRICULTURAL CENSUS
SEPTEMBER 1, 1960, SELECTED STATES^a

State	Agricultural Work Force	Tractors	Steel Plows
Maranhao	928,801	41	118 ^b
Piaui	355,187	59	1,403
Rio Grande do Norte	296,494	246	304
Pernambuco	879,844 (1950) ^c	142 (1950) ^c	3,902 (1950) ^c
Minas Gerais	2,076,829	5,024	93,040
Rio de Janeiro	240,853	1,469	12,314
Sao Paulo	1,683,038	28,101	286,580
Paraná	1,276,854	4,996	82,324
Rio Grande do Sul	1,071,404 (1950) ^d	---	312,001 (1950)
Goiás	492,745	1,299	6,388
Mato Grosso	184,340	997	5,386
Federal District of Brasilia	2,385	7	23

^aCompiled from "Censo Agricola-1960, Resultados Preliminares," Revista Brasileira dos Municipios (Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, Conselho Nacional de Estatistica), Ano XVI (July-December, 1963), pp. 168-192, and Smith, op. cit., pp. 331 and 387.

^bIn 1950, the Sixth Agricultural Census found 180 plows in Maranhao, an increase over the seventy-one found in 1940. The writer has no information on the decline in number of plows unless the preliminary statistics gathered by the 1960 Agricultural Census were inadequate.

^cThe IBGE had not published data on Pernambuco, but the writer thought it would be useful to present Smith's 1950 statistics which show the low rate of mechanization in the Northeast, the reliance on hoe culture, and dependence on fire or slash and burn agriculture in many regions.

^dSmith, op. cit., p. 331.

The mere subdivision of a large fazenda among the numerous progeny of a deceased owner does not result automatically in the change from a system of large-scale agricultural exploitation to a well-rounded system of small farming. . . . On the contrary, such a manner of subdivision is likely merely to mean that each heir receives insufficient land to enable him successfully to carry on the type and scale of agricultural enterprises with which he is familiar, to live in the manner that he feels is the right of a member of his family and social class, and to carry on the type of rural life that he considers to be the mainstay of the nation.¹

Moreover, the lack of a system of primogeniture which keeps property intact and passes it on to a single heir as in England or the United States, makes it difficult for the many owners or donos of a single property to agree on how it should be managed, much less improvements made.²

In the coastal sugar regions, the introduction of more modern processes and of twentieth century machinery has reduced the status of many senhores de engenho to that of suppliers (fornecedores) of cane to the sugar mills (usinas) who used their greater financial power to buy up sugar, cotton, and coffee land in order to lessen their dependence upon the fornecedores. The giant sugar mill corporations, with an absentee ownership, took over the land and many of the functions of the former sugar landed aristocracy, which at least lived on the land and maintained a paternalistic relation in many cases with its slaves and free workers living on the estate.

In the twentieth century, the introduction of modern machinery and processes has reduced the status of many senhores de engenho in

¹Smith, op. cit., p. 338. Italics mine.

²Ibid., Smith notes on p. 341 that "it is not unusual to find an estate whose ownership is vested in hundreds of persons representing as many as five generations. And even this is not the extreme."

the coastal Northeast to that of suppliers (fornecedores) of cane to the giant sugar mills (usinas)¹ operated by absentee owners.² The usinas have used their greater financial power to take over much of the land and social functions of this landed aristocracy which lived on the land in many cases and maintained a paternalistic relationship with its slaves or free workers.³

The Myth and Reality of the "Ideal-type" Fazenda

The most sympathetic description of the traditional Brazilian estate known as the engenho, fazenda, or estancia (as it was known in the South) is that of Gilberto Freyre who called it the "most stable type of civilization . . . found in Hispanic America."⁴ In its ideal form, the fazenda was a large agricultural establishment

¹See Smith, op. cit., pp. 306-308, for a description of this process including quotations from A. P. Figueiredo, editor of the Recife newspaper, O Progresso, in 1846.

²Harry W. Hutchinson, Village and Plantation Life in Northeastern Brazil (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1957), pp. 7-8, found "a maximum of family traditions and paternalism" in the ownership and operation of many usinas in the Recôncavo region northwest of Salvador, Bahia.

³The writer observed this process taking place in the municípios of Guariba, Jaboticabal, and Jardinópolis, São Paulo, in visits to regions northwest of the state capital of São Paulo on November 28-29, 1964.

See also CIDA, op. cit., pp. 518-519, which notes that over 46 per cent of the total sugar cane harvest in Pernambuco came from land owned by the mills. Almost all of the remaining cane was raised by 2,870 who were contracted by nearby mills to process their cane. An additional portion of sugar cane is still processed into rapadura (brown sugar cakes) by ox-driven or bagasse-powered steam engines for distribution to the inhabitants of the Sertão.

⁴Gilberto Freyre, The Masters and the Slaves (Abridged Edition), trans. from the Portuguese by Samuel Putnam (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), p. 7.



Figure 2.--A "temporary" one year old hut of squatters, Colonia Pindorama, near Penedo, Alagoas, July 14, 1965.



Figure 3.--A "traditional" sugar plantation between Maceio and Penedo, Alagoas, July, 1965. On the left, a chapel; in the center, the Casa Grande; on the right, the sugar mill; and scattered about are other smaller buildings housing workers or livestock.



Figure 4.--Engenho Bento Velho, Municipio of Vitoria de Santo Antao, Pernambuco, near the paved highway between Recife and Vitoria de Santo Antao. Engenho Galileia is about one-half mile to the right over a dirt road. An administrator manages Bento Velho for Usina Bulhoes.



Figure 5.--A "barracao" or "company store" operated by a Senhor de Engenho on the dirt highway between Goiana and Tambe, Pernambuco. Second from the left is Joao Jordao da Silva, Treasurer of the Federation of Rural Workers of the State of Pernambuco, July 2, 1965.



Figure 6.--The homes of sugar plantation workers lining one of the roads leading out of Ribeirao Preto, Pernambuco, July 19, 1965.



Figure 7.--One of several barracks-style homes for the families of workers, Engenho Gallo, District of Xexeu, Municipio of Agua Preta, Pernambuco, July 10, 1965. The Engenho belongs to the family of Senator Francisco Pessoa de Queiroz, also a major stockholder in Jornal do Comercio, a radio station, and two television stations.

inhabited by the owner, his family, and a number of more or less fixed tenants or wage laborers who were allowed to cultivate a piece of the land and repaid the owner in a variety of ways. The fazenda was:

A locality group; isolated, to a greater or a lesser degree from similar groups by the bad roads, the lack of other means of communication and the sheer extension of the lands. Often such a locality group had its own service-providing sector: a shop, a school, a chapel, and in some cases even an incipient armed force.¹

In order to meet their own need for an adequate and dependable supply of labor, latifundio and plantation owners often entered into arrangements with nomadic squatters who were permitted to clear and work land on the fringes of the latifundio as a means of substantiating or extending the owner's control over a piece of ground.² In their everyday relationships with tenants, laborers, and squatters, the plantation owners astutely adjusted the terms of employment or land use to meet their own needs and to protect themselves against the rights or claims of peasants against the land or against the landowner. Peasants were deliberately kept disoriented so that they would not threaten the existing land structure.

The Systematic Attempts to Drain as Much Income
and Energy as Possible from Peasants

Large monetary returns from inherited landed properties were and still are possible because of the unlimited supplies of labor and land.

¹Galjart, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

²"Squatting" as a phenomenon is related to many of the politically inspired reports of "invasions" of plantations, cattle ranches, and other rural properties in the 1960's--a phenomenon which is dealt with in several later chapters.

This is because agriculture was extensive and not intensive. Many of the latifundistas did not seek to increase the yield per acre but sought to get by with as little managerial or capital investment as possible. Their earnings were often channelled into commerce and industry where the returns on cash investment have been traditionally much higher than in agriculture.¹ In turn, savings or profits from commercial and industrial enterprises--which improved the credit position of the estate owner--would often be used to purchase new land when it was available as a hedge against inflation and to improve total farm returns, thus increasing their wealth and prestige.²

The large landowners also received an income from peasants who borrowed money, patronized landowner-owned stores, or sold their agricultural produce to the landowner. Peasants were considered good borrowers, customers, and "sellers," because high interest rates, high prices, and high rentals could be levied against them and they could be forced to work off any debts they owed. Many estates have been so large that a peasant could not buy such essentials as coffee, salt, or

¹CIDA, op. cit., pp. 565-567, is an extensive discussion of the "economic double life" of the large estates.

²This writer discovered many large landowners in Rio Grande do Sul, Sao Paulo, Pernambuco, and Rio Grande do Norte, who lamented the lack of rural credit facilities and complained of the bureaucratic "red tape" necessary for agricultural credit. On the other hand, the writer found that these men generally did not invest agricultural loans, whether from private or state banks and agencies in their agricultural enterprises but in urban housing, commercial ventures, or in short-term or long-range business ventures in South Brazil if they were Northeastern landowner-merchants. In an interview July 9, 1965, Cid Sampaio, sugar industrialist, landowner, and former Governor of Pernambuco, asked this writer if Americans would invest in a local agricultural enterprise if they could obtain higher rates of return by investing funds in a business in other parts of the United States!

clothing anywhere except in the stores (barracões) operated by the landowners or their administrators. In other cases, landowners inhibited their peasants from using nearby public markets (feiras) by paying them in script (vales) which could be redeemed only in the barracões. The vales shown below for 200 and 500 cruzeiros (11¢ and 27¢ respectively, in July 1965) were issued to laborers on the Engenho Gallo, part of the Santa Terezina Sugar Mill, Xexeu District, Municipio of Agua Preta, Pernambuco,¹ which belongs to the family of Senator and communications media owner Francisco Pessoa de Queiroz.²




Table 3 illustrates the prices of selected consumer goods in representative stores in Pernambuco in July 1965 when rural worker salaries in the sugar zone ranged between 1,000 and 1,730 cruzeiros per day (U.S.\$.55-.90). Table 4 illustrates the effect of deductions

¹On July 10, 1965, this writer talked with nine male heads of family in a group of 25 persons at the Engenho barracks in which these people lived. Five could read and write their names; only one could write anything more. Thirteen men and boys worked the previous week for 1,100 cruzeiros (60¢) per day if the tasks assigned were considered fulfilled by the plantation administrator. Many individuals on the Engenho were paid only 550 cruzeiros (or approximately 30¢) per day.

²Senator Pessoa de Queiroz also owns the Nossa Senhora de Carmo Sugar Mill in Amaraji Municipio, two radio stations, a television station, and is principal stockholder of two newspapers in Recife.

TABLE 3

PRICES OF SELECTED CONSUMER GOODS IN REPRESENTATIVE
 COMPANY STORES, PUBLIC MARKETS, AND A PEASANT
 COOPERATIVE, PERNAMBUCO, JULY, 1965

Commodity (per kilo 2.2 lbs)	Company Store		Peasant		Vitoria de S. Antão		Usina		Jaboatão	
	Eng. Gallo	Água Preta	Bom Jardim	Coop.	Public Market	Eng. Bento Velho	Piragi Palmares	Public Market	Usina Bulhões	
Butter (Tin)	--	--		2,400	--	--	--	--	--	--
Bread-roll	50	--		--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Cachaça (Rum)	600	--		--	500	--	--	--	--	--
Canned Beef-Pork	2,000	--		--	500	750	775	500-600	700	
Dried Beans	800	--		--	400	500	900	550	650	
Dried Soda										
Crackers	1,500			700	700	1,000	575	650	800	
Unroasted Coffee	800			240	280	100	270	140	160	
Kerosene (liter)	--			--	200	200	360	135	200	
Mandioca Flour	250			--	200	1,000	200	190	300	
Matches (pack)	25			20	20	--	18	20	20	
Oleomargarine	2,500			--	--	--	--	--	--	
Rice	--			300	350	400	600	250	380	
Salt (coarse)	320			150	170	200	220	150	180	
Soap (P & G style)	--			320	350	--	400	190	300	
Soft Drinks	150			--	--	--	--	--	--	
Sugar	320			280	270	300	290	250	300	
Vinegar	140			180	--	--	--	80	110	
Xarque (sun-dried meat)	2,200			1,700	1,700	--	1,840	1,600	1,700	
Sardines (200 gram tin)	--			200	350	720	--	--	--	
Spaghetti (dried)	--			--	--	--	--	250	275	

Source: Statistics gathered by the writer.

US\$ 1.00 = 1,850-2,000 cruzeiros

TABLE 4

DIFFERENCES IN WAGES PAID VARIOUS TYPES OF WORKERS AND
LEGAL MINIMUM WAGES, FOR SPECIFIED STATES, 1957

State	Average Actual Monthly Wages		Difference between Legal Minimum Wage and Actual Wage Paid ^a		Average Monthly Wage Less Rent to Male Field (Hoe) Workers				
	Paid Workers		Male Field Workers		Actual				
	Male Field (Hoe) Workers	Cane Cutters	Cruzeiros	Per Cent	Wage Paid	Deduction for Rent	Authorized Deduction		
					Cruzeiros	Per Cent	Cruzeiros	Per Cent	
Ceará	1,210	1,270	- 590	- 31	-	- 29	856	48	30
Paraná	1,220	1,340	- 580	- 31	-	- 26	760	42	27
Pernambuco	1,290	1,460	- 710	- 36	-	- 27	851	43	27
Minas Gerais	1,660	1,680	-1,190	- 42	- 1,170	- 41	1,467	51	28
Espírito Santo	1,730	1,860	- 770	- 31	-	- 26	1,105	44	31
São Paulo	2,460	2,640	- 740	- 23	-	- 18	1,178	37	33
Paraná	2,440	2,500	140	6	200	9	367	16	24
Rio Grande do Sul	2,660	2,750	- 240	- 8	-	- 5	1,041	36	24

Source: CIDA, Land Tenure Conditions, Brazil, p. 299.

^aThe difference is computed from the lowest minimum legal wage prevailing in each State, hence underestimates the true difference between legal and actual wages. Exchange rates went from 66-73 cruzeiros per U.S.\$ 1.00 during the year. Using 70 cruzeiros per dollar as a basis, Pernambuco male field hoe workers were averaging U.S.\$ 18.00 per month in annual wages while rent of approximately \$12.10 per month was deducted from the authorized minimum wages they were to receive.

for rent and non-payment of minimum wages in eight different states in 1957. This extra exploitation further irritated many peasants and their leaders in the last decade when peasants began to organize peasant sindicatos and cooperatives.

The Concentration of Property Ownership
and Political Activism in a Small
Number of Families

The ownership and management of Brazilian business enterprises has been dominated by family enterprises,¹ the philosophy of the "robber baron,"² a paucity of real joint-stock companies, a heavy degree of economic concentration,³ and a disproportionate amount of industrial development in the state of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and a few areas around the state capital of Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte, Salvador, and Recife.⁴

¹Alexander, Labor Relations, pp. 45-48.

²W. Paul Strassman, "The Industrialist," in Continuity and Change in Latin America, John J. Johnson (ed.) (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 174.

Anthony Leeds, "Brazilian Careers and Social Structure: A Case History and Model," in Contemporary Cultures and Societies of Latin America, Dwight B. Heath and Richard N. Adams (eds.) (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 379-401, describes the kinship and other informal social links such as the cabide de emprego and panelinha found in developing areas of Brazil.

Alexander, op. cit., pp. 48-50; Strassman, op. cit., pp. 168-174.

³Mauricio Vintras de Queiroz, "Os Grupos Economicos no Brasil," Revista do Instituto de Ciencias Sociais da Universidade do Brasil (July-December 1962), pp. 157-169; the state of São Paulo accounts for over 65 per cent of Brazilian industrial production.

⁴Rio Grande do Sul has developed a rather diversified industrial base in many small landholding regions of the state.

John J. Johnson, "Introduction," in Johnson, op. cit., p. 52, and Robert Alexander, op. cit., pp. 52-54.

To some extent, the reluctance of Luso-Brazilian families to save and invest in industry accounts for the dominance of immigrant or first generation ownership of industry in the southern states.

Native investment capital has historically reacted against industrial development. Safer and less risky investments in land or housing have been preferred. Large landholders seldom invested in industry, other than those types which processed agricultural crops, such as sugar, coffee, and cocoa. In Pernambuco, it was discovered that at least 29 of 46 sugar mills functioning in 1965 were landowner family-operated corporations.

Moreover, unlike São Paulo and other modernizing areas of Latin America where new industrial or business groups formed the bases of new political groups,¹ the new business sectors of the Northeast continue to be dominated by the old landowning elite.² As a consequence, the "old traditional families" have monopolized the decision-making processes of these sub-systems. In Pernambuco, for example, the 29 inter-related families controlling forty-six usinas each had a family member or close relative in the State Assembly and the Federal Congress in the 1960-1965 period. At the Município level, local Prefeitos and/or Councils seldom opposed the large landowners in those few instances in which these men did not belong to the kinship or clientele structure of the usineiro or fazendeiro.

¹Merle Kling, "Toward a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. IX, No. 1 (March 1966), pp. 33-34.

²The generous fiscal incentives offered by Article 34-18 of the SUDENE law brought in approximately \$200 million in private Brazilian funds between 1961-1965, which will undoubtedly introduce new political ideas and structures in time.

The Effects of 19th Century Colonization

In the nineteenth century, private companies and federal and state governments attempted to establish communities of small independent farmers in Pernambuco, Bahia, Sergipe, São Paulo, Paraná, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul.¹ Large properties were sub-divided, families placed on farm plots, and aid and supervision extended in many cases. In the Northeastern states, most of these projects failed.² In the South, more success was achieved and a new agricultural civilization based on small farms was created in the thinly populated regions which had produced hides, dried meat, and timber. As a result, the principal regions of small family proprietors include:

1. The Colony (a colonia), a zone west and north of Pôrto Alegre, and two municípios around Pelotas, in Rio Grande do Sul.
2. The plateau west of Curitiba, Paraná.
3. The Itajai and Tubarão Valleys of Santa Catarina.
4. Western São Paulo.
5. The so-called "Triangulo Mineiro" of Southwest Minas Gerais.

¹Zempati Ando, Pioneirismo e Cooperativismo (São Paulo: Fundação Escola de Sociologia e Política de São Paulo, 1961), is a good description of the history of Japanese colonization in Brazil in general and of the Japanese who formed the Cotia Cooperative in April, 1927, in particular.

In the Município of Tambos, to the east of Pôrto Alegre, RGS, the German colonists have undergone a process of degeneration (caboclicização) whereby their cultural level is much more akin to that of lower class Luso-Brazilians of the Northeast. Writer's notes.

²Carlos Alberto de Medina, "A Estrutura Agrária Brasileira: Características e Tendências," América Latina (January-March, 1964), pp. 71-90, contains data on Espírito Santo, where several German colonies

These regions are significant not only in terms of a more diversified agriculture, increased production of foodstuffs and fibers for processing into other products such as shoes and textiles, but also for the creation of a rural and small town middle class which helped bring about economic and political change.

The communities founded by German, Italian, Polish, Dutch, or Japanese small farmers differ very much from the Luso-Brazilian communities described by Gilberto Freyre and others. The former are much more articulate, integrated, capable, and willing to enter into joint action on behalf of the community.¹ If one notes the existence of tension in their relationships at election time these tensions have little effect on other social relationships.²

In fact, many small farmers in the Colonia region around Caxias do Sul northwest of Pôrto Alegre (in which average farm size is 18.7 hectares or 44.9 acres)³ refer to themselves as "colonos" or "colonists"

in the nineteenth century degenerated within the lifetime of the colonists; Ernst Wagemann, "A Colonização Alemã no Estado do Espírito Santo" (tradução de Reginaldo Santana), IBGE-Rio de Janeiro, 1949.

¹Emilio Willems, "Brazil," in The Positive Contributions by Immigrants, A Symposium prepared for UNESCO by the International Sociological Association and the International Economic Association (Second Impression; Paris: UNESCO, 1960), p. 134.

²CIDA, op. cit., pp. 546-547.

³Land distribution and farm sizes for the seven geographic regions of Rio Grande do Sul may be found in Comissão Especial de Reforma Agraria, Bases e Diretrizes para Um Programa Estadual de Reforma Agraria (Porto Alegre: Instituto Gaúcho de Reforma Agraria, 1963), Table II on unnumbered page facing p. 11-3.

and not as peasants (camponeses) because of their relatively high levels of well-being and status.¹

In contrast to the absenteeism of the large landowners found in much of Brazil, many writers have observed that the immigrants in the small farm regions and their Brazilian-born offspring did not acquire land only as an investment opportunity or as a source of prestige (although there is a clear consciousness of the status that ownership implies). Rather, land was "acquired fundamentally and principally as a means of livelihood" by people who wanted to remain associated with the neighborhood in which they grew up even if this is not always possible for the younger members of a family for whom the community may offer little or no employment because land and job resources have become scarce.

A visitor to one of the areas inhabited by small farmers is almost always surprised by the large number of voluntary cultural groups and religious organizations which function there. The following,

¹Various small farmers with only 15-20 hectares of land in the geographic zones known as the Encosta Inferior Nordeste, Encosta Superior Nordeste, and Alto Uruguai, emphasized this fact to this writer in his discussions with them in 1965.

The writer does not know if this self-concept of being a "colono" and not a "campones" has always existed in this region or if the self-concept was developed as an outgrowth of the publicity given the Peasant Leagues of the Northeast and a desire on the part of many Gaucho small farmers not to associate themselves with the Julião-inspired groups.

²CIDA, op. cit., p. 547, discusses the problem of out-migration in the Santa Cruz region of Rio Grande do Sul where 95 per cent of farm properties are less than 100 hectares and the average farm size is 65.9 hectares.

with their German, Portuguese, or Japanese names, were encountered by this writer:¹

Dramatic societies (Theatervereine), bowling clubs (kegelklubs or clubes de boche), rifle clubs or hunting societies (Schutsenvereine or Clubes de Tiradores), Choral societies (Gesangvereine); dance circles or dance halls (Tanskranschen or Saloes de danças), school societies (schulevereine or sociedades de padres), young men's associations (seinendan or clubes de jovens), cooperatives (cooperativas and among the Japanese, mutual-help associations or kumi).

In April 1965, while staying at the combined rural school and home of Ladyr Rech, President of the Gaucho Agrarian Front or FAG for the Diocese of Caxias do Sul, this writer participated in the following series of events on a Sunday:²

Attended the second of two morning masses in the village Church of Fazenda Souza.

Attended a meeting of local small farmers to discuss contributions to the Social Security Fund created by the Rural Worker Statute but which the Federal Government was reluctant to establish--in effect, forcing government to act by making deposits in local banks to the Social Security Fund of the Rural Worker Statute.

Visited the stables and gardens of the Catholic Seminary for Boys operated in the Village of Fazenda Souza.

Gave a lecture on the United States to about fifty boys who attend the Seminary.

Attended a Soccer match between the Seminary Team and a team from another village in the Municipio of Caxias do Sul.

Table 5 lists several types of voluntary associations by states in Brazil for 1959. With the exception of Bahia, Minas Gerais, and Ceara, voluntary-group activity is much higher per capita and per municipio in the southern states where there was foreign colonization.

¹Willems, op. cit., p. 134, also discusses this phenomenon.

²On the other hand, the writer never found such a wide range of activities in a Northeast village or town.

TABLE 5

MEMBERSHIP IN VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS, 1959

State	Municipios December 31, 1959	Artistic		Athletic		Rural		Religious	
		Literary Associations ^a Total Capital	Scientific Associations ^a Total Capital	Recreational Associations Total Capital	Associations Municipio Groups Members	Associations Municipio Groups Members	Catholic	Protestant	
Rondonia	2	2	2	16	9	2	172	14	3
Acre	7	-	-	10	5	5	608	53	3
Amazonas	44	7	7	69	39	26	2,454	279	32
Rio Branco	2	-	-	9	7	1	109	10	4
Pará	60	20	8	176	21	39	3,367	471	24
Amapá	5	-	-	26	14	5	400	27	7
Maranhão	91	9	9	21	10	83	9,564	386	50
Piauí	71	9	5	29	10	61	3,362	212	19
Ceará	147	21	12	73	21	116	8,547	1,299	37
Rio Grande do Norte	83	8	3	41	12	75	3,860	370	57
Paraíba	88	15	9	61	11	61	3,953	449	123
Pernambuco	102	73	17	181	29	95	6,893	982	443
Alagoas	56	25	14	49	19	30	1,311	309	45
Sergipe	62	14	7	52	21	53	2,537	223	42
Bahia	194	127	26	278	44	119	7,270	1,007	336
Minas Gerais	485	140	27	883	99	255	24,707	4,309	784
Espírito Santo	40	26	14	130	30	30	2,593	1,146	475
Rio de Janeiro	61	93	13	642	63	61	13,617	1,142	877
Guanabara	1	42	--	303	--	12	4,318	908	552

TABLE 5 (cont.)

State	Municipios December 31, 1959	Artistic		Athletic		Rural		Religious	
		Literary Associations ^a	Total Capital	Recreational Associations	Total Capital	Associations Município	Groups Members	Catholic	Protestant
São Paulo	504	199	34	1,850	490	187	32,353	5,725	1,604
Paraná	162	38	24	422	99	161	14,313	1,414	395
Santa Catarina	102	45	12	374	28	72	25,422	1,096	193
Rio Grande do Sul	150	235	40	1,703	120	109	37,096	1,871	885
Mato Grosso	64	6	3	98	11	16	1,726	309	112
Goiás	179	7	5	54	10	60	3,540	482	174
Totals	2,763	1,163	337	7,550	1,525	1,734	214,092	24,493	7,276

Source: Anuário Estatístico, 1961, pp. 390, 391, 398, 400 and 413.

^aIncludes Academies of Letters, Writers' Associations, Scientific and Technical Groups.

Bahia's literary tradition undoubtedly contributes to the large number of literary societies in that state, especially in the Ilheus-Itabuna regions of which Jorge Amado has written. Minas Gerais and Ceara have a long religious tradition--that of southern Ceara having been supported by the many religious groups created by followers of Padre Cicero in his memory.¹ The Rural Associations, the principal formally organized pressure groups of large landowners in most Brazilian states, are discussed in greater detail in Chapter III.

Since there was no public school system to speak of in the early days of colonization in the nineteenth century, the German and Italian immigrants organized their own schools, whose quality was gradually improved through "summer school" teacher training courses of the "People's Union" (Volksverein or Uniao Popular) in Novo Hamburgo, Rio Grande do Sul, and other areas colonized by Germans, Italians, Slavs, and Japanese.² In addition, teachers frequently were sent to Europe or Japan for additional training or brought over to teach from the motherland--the local community paying all or a sizeable proportion of their salaries and living expenses. The consequences of this peasant interest in schools is reflected in the high level of literacy, large number of small town newspapers, and large number of hospitals in the South in 1959. (See Table 6.)

¹ José Fabio Barbosa da Silva, "Organizacao Social de Juazeiro e Tensoes entre Litoral e Interior," Sociologia, Vol. XXIV, No. 3 (September, 1962), pp. 190-191.

² Willems, op. cit., pp. 134-137, discusses the impact of the two World Wars, the differing values of Luso-Brazilian majorities, and state and federal legislation designed to bring schools, co-operatives and religious and recreational associations under Brazilian control.

TABLE 6

INDICATORS OF FUNCTIONAL LITERACY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
IN BRAZIL EXPRESSED IN NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION AND HOSPITAL
AVAILABILITY, 1959

State or Territory	Literacy Per Cent		Daily Newspapers			Hospitals		Persons per Hospital
	1900	1950	Total Capital	Circulation		Public	Private	
				Total (1,000)	Readers Per Copy			
Rondonia	--	--	2	2	85	4	-	42
Acre	--	34	-	-	--	4	6	116
Amazonas	41	43	6	30	24	2	18	36
Rio Branco	--	45	-	-	--	1	1	29
Pará	41	49	6	79	20	4	13	90
Amapá	--	44	-	-	--	2	2	34
Maranhao	34	25	6	17	147	7	10	147
Piauí	25	26	1	3	421	6	7	97
Ceará	28	31	9	47	75	15	54	48
Rio Grande do Norte	29	32	6	14	82	5	38	26
Paráíba	26	29	5	13	155	16	24	50
Pernambuco	27	32	6	148	30	41	42	50
Alagoas	26	24	4	15	84	4	34	33
Sergipe	30	34	2	1	760	5	22	28
Bahia	29	32	7	121	49	24	85	55
Minas Gerais	34	44	23	208	74	39	314	23
Espírito Santo	41	47	3	15	79	10	39	26
Rio de Janeiro	32	56	17	79	72	17	105	28
Guanabara	63	85	18	1,125	3	63	106	19

TABLE 6 (cont.)

State or Territory	Literacy Per Cent		Daily Newspapers			Hospitals		
	1900	1950	Total Capital	Circulation		Public	Private	
				Total (1,000)	Readers Per Copy			1,000 Persons per Hospital
Sao Paulo	34	65	77	1,392	9	49	493	24
Paraná	35	53	16	101	41	8	208	13
Santa Catarina	36	64	6	28	76	16	107	16
Rio Grande do Sul	47	66	19	312	17	12	330	13
Mato Grosso	37	51	7	14	65	5	30	26
Goiás	29	33	6	22	89	5	75	24
Distrito Federal	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
National Average of Total	35	48	184	3,924	17	207	395	37

Source: Compiled and computed from data in Anuário Estatístico, 1961, pp. 300, 359, 367, 392, and 413. and Marcondes, First Brazilian Legislation Relating to Rural Labor Unions, p. 48.

^aIt is difficult to accept the accuracy of literacy statistics for the northern states and territories of Acre, Amazonas, and Pará, when only 0.06%, 0.6%, and 10% of the total populations respectively of those states and territories attended school in 1960. In short, educational statistics outside of the southern states leave much to be desired. See Smith, Brazil, pp. 41 and 496 for data on population and student enrollments.



Figure 8.--The town house of a traditional cattle rancher (estanciero), Pelotas, Rio Grande do Sul, February 27, 1967.



Figure 9.--From left to right: the rural school-and-home of Ladyr Rech, President of the FAG Regional Department, a neighborhood chapel, and a neighborhood or community recreation center under construction, Fazenda Souza zone, District of Ana Rech, Municipio of Caxias do Sul, Rio Grande do Sul, February 7, 1965.

Table 7 compares the population and school facilities of two German-Brazilian municípios in Rio Grande do Sul (Santa Cruz--which is a commercial and industrial center--and Venâncio Aires--which is predominantly rural) with Jaboatão--an industrial and sugar-producing Luso-Brazilian município--outside of Recife, Pernambuco.

This table supports a subjective judgment that the school systems in the small farm regions of Rio Grande do Sul are much larger for the area and population than the school systems in Pernambuco; rural children in Rio Grande do Sul appear to have a much greater chance to go to school than do rural children in Pernambuco.

The Role of Immigrant Groups in Political Change

In Brazil, no politically organized body of immigrants or "political minorities" have ever actually competed for power with existing parties.¹ European and Japanese immigrants who came to Brazil did not establish political parties, programs, or ideologies as did Italian immigrants to Argentina who helped found the Radical and Socialist Parties in the late 1800's. Nevertheless, historical experience and the economic need for stability for those immigrants engaged in agriculture, business, and industry taught these settlers that revolutions and political unrest meant property confiscation, destruction of crops and livestock, plunder, and bloodshed. The growing participation and influence on the Brazilian-born population of recent European extraction, particularly on the município and state

¹The writer is referring to groups which would correspond to the Irish-American, Slavic Democrat, or German Republican Clubs so prominent in the United States.

TABLE 7

A COMPARISON OF SCHOOL FACILITIES, TEACHERS, AND DAILY ATTENDANCE IN RIO GRANDE DO SUL MUNICIPIOS OF SANTA CRUZ DO SUL AND VENANCIO AIRES WITH THE PERNAMBUCO MUNICIPIO OF JABOATÃO, SELECTED YEARS, 1938-1964

	Area Sq. Kms.	Urban Pop.	Rural Pop.	Density Per Sq. Km.	School Bldgs.	Certified Teachers	Children 7-1 years old	
							In School	Not in School
Santa Cruz do Sul (1964)	1,618	22,026	54,828	47.5	1938-140 1964-166	195 299	6,157 11,113	not available
Venâncio Aires (1962)	732	8,260	31,671	54.5	1962-99	326	6,553	1,856
Jaboatão (1964)	234	105,261	84,689	449.8	City-45 Rural-65	198 191	10,964 6,094	3,872 1,250

Sources: Laudelino T. Medeiros, Educação na Área Rural de Santa Cruz do Sul, unnumbered, p. 69, and Adelita Medeiros, "Santa Cruz do Sul" (Pamphlet), Coleção de Monografias, Series B, No. 60, Diretoria de Documentação e Divulgação do CNE (Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 1965); Clecy de Campos Azevedo, Presidente, and Evaldo João Schenkel, Agente de Estadística, Relatório, Censo Escolar 1964, Venâncio Aires: Interview with former Prefeito of Venâncio Aires, Alfredo Scherer, April 25, 1965, and Diário Oficial (Recife, Pernambuco), May 1, 1965, p. 3002.

level, has helped other Brazilians to change some of the traditional political patterns. In particular, the political monopoly of the old family oligarchies was destroyed and fraud and armed force are rarely used in the South although still quite common in the Northeast.¹

The Effects of Colonization on Legislative Representation

One would presume that one indication of the assimilation of recent groups into Brazilian society would be the appearance of non-Luso or non-Portuguese names in the State Assemblies or the Federal Congress--especially in view of the oft-repeated statement that "Brazil is a racial democracy."² However, when one examines the names and background of legislators in the states of Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Sul, and São Paulo--one finds a differential treatment accorded these groups.³ With one possible exception, the 83 State Deputies

¹Willems, op. cit., p. 139, notes that peasants of German, Italian, and Polish origin established armed militias in the southern states during the "revolutionary" campaigns of 1924-1925 which protected the "colonia" of Rio Grande do Sul and other regions from the various armed groups in the region, including those of Luis Carlos Prestes. In recent years, the parades of "hunting" or "shooting" clubs to celebrate the anniversaries of various communities are a reminder to the communities themselves and to state and national leaders of the capacity of these small farmers to defend themselves.

²Gilberto Freyre has been the greatest exponent of this lyrical view of the assimilation of many ethnic strains. See for example, his "Perspective of Brazil," Atlantic Monthly (February, 1956), pp. 8-12, in which he notes the case of Lauro Muller, born in Santa Catarina, who "became one of the most astute and influential politicians in Brazil" . . . "David Campista, the Brazilian son of a German Jew . . . who became the Minister of Finance."

A more cautious appraisal is rendered by Charles Wagley (ed.), Race and Class in Rural Brazil (Paris: UNESCO, 1952), esp. pp. 7-8, 140-144, and 154-155.

³By and large, students of Brazilian politics, Brazilian or foreign, have not made behavioral studies of the ethnic, occupational,

and 24 Federal Deputies from Pernambuco in 1962-1965 were of Luso-Brazilian origins. On the other hand, a substantial proportion of the state and federal deputies from Rio Grande do Sul and São Paulo were of non-Portuguese or non-Luso ancestry. The data are shown in Table 8. Unfortunately, there is little occupational data to construct a Table showing differences in the economic strata represented. Nevertheless, one would be safe in presuming that the large number of small farmers of German, Italian, and Japanese descent in the southern states would have access to these state and federal deputies because these deputies were elected on the basis of votes from small-farming regions.

Moreover, the writer thinks a significantly different political style is indicated by the fact that all Gaucho Municipio Councils which this writer visited met weekly, in contrast to the Councils in Pernambuco which seldom met more than four or five times a year in 1964-1965 with two exceptions. In three Gaucho municipios--Caxias do Sul, Santana do Livramento, and Venancio Aires, the Council frequently met twice a week to discuss município, state, and national affairs.

educational, and political backgrounds of council, deputies, senators, and autonomous agency similar to that of David R. Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), or John R. Wahlke and Heinz Eulau (eds.), Legislative Behavior (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959).

Although the West European and Japanese migration to the Northeast has been small, the genetic contributions of Northwest Europeans can be observed in the faces of the rural workers of Vitória de Santo Antão, Pernambuco, shown in Figure 20, p. 145.

TABLE 8

NATIONAL ORIGINS OF MEMBERS OF STATE ASSEMBLIES
AND FEDERAL DEPUTIES, SELECTED BRAZILIAN STATES
1963-1965, COMPARED TO IMMIGRATION TO
BRAZIL, 1884-1957 (PERCENTAGES)^a

National Origin of Deputy or Ancestors	Pernambuco		Sao Paulo		Rio Grande do Sul		Immigration 1884-1957 (4,765,113) ^b
	State (n=85)	Fed. (n=24)	State (n=119)	Fed. (n=54)	State (n=79)	Fed. (n=28)	
Portuguese	96%	100%	50%	59%	39%	64%	30.6%
Italian	1%	--	20%	15%	25%	7%	31.7%
German	--	--	2%	2%	18%	25%	4.0%
Japanese	--	--	3%	4%	--	--	4.0%
Middle East	--	--	10%	5%	3%	--	.8% ^d
Mixed or Indeterminate	<u>2%</u> ^c	<u>--</u>	<u>15%</u>	<u>15%</u>	<u>14%</u>	<u>4%</u>	<u>28.9%</u> ^e
Total	99%	100%	100%	100%	99%	100%	100.0%

^aNational origins of members of the State Assemblies were determined from voting lists and other data obtained by the writer in the Electoral Tribunals of each state in 1965.

^bSmith, Brazil, p. 126. Unfortunately, there are no statistics on the foreign immigration to each state.

^cOne of these Deputies, Diogenese Gabriel Wanderley, is the scion of a wealthy landowning family whose Dutch ancestors married into Pernambuco families during the brief period of the Dutch conquest. The other non-Luso name represented was that of Aureo Howard Bradley, whose family origins are not known.

^dThis 0.8% is derived from the 37,439 Syrian and Lebanese immigrants who have gone to Brazil. Several thousand other immigrants have come from Iran, Iraq, and Egypt, but precise figures are not available and it is necessary to recognize that border changes in the Middle East in the past eighty years make the task of assigning national origins more difficult.

^eThis 28.9% of the immigrant population is made up of persons from more than thirty countries, the largest contribution being 657,744 persons from Spain or 13.8 per cent.

A Model of Differential Output of Funds for
Medical Facilities and Land Distribution

In order to determine if there might be a correlation between the distribution of property in a state and the allocation of public funds for a public purpose, this writer combined available data on land distribution by municípios with data for the numbers and types of medical facilities in Rio Grande do Sul to make Map in Fig. 10. An examination will show that municípios with 95 per cent or more farm holdings less than 100 hectares (247 acres) have significantly higher quantities of health facilities than the Campanha zone along the Uruguayan frontier in which 15 per cent or less of farm holdings are less than 100 hectares. In fact, the three geographic zones with small farm holdings had more hospital beds in 1960 (9,116) than each of the states of the North, Northeast, East, and Central West, except for Pernambuco, Bahia, and Espírito Santo--which would also lag behind if it were not for the hospital facilities in their state capitals.¹

If one compares the state and municipal government structure of Rio Grande do Sul and São Paulo with Pernambuco, one not only finds greater outlays for education and health services, but also governments which have formally created Departments of Labor and Cooperative

¹Based on a comparison of the totals listed on Fig. 10 with data appearing in Anuário Estatístico, 1961, pp. 302-303.

Only one município with 95 per cent or more of its properties less than 100 hectares--Candelaria to the west of Santa Cruz do Sul--had a strong politician who dominated politics in recent years. In Candelaria, "Coronel" Albino Lenz, named first Intendente by Governor Getulio Vargas in 1925, won re-election for the third time on the ticket of the PSD on October 7, 1962. In this município, the southwest portion covers part of the Central Depression plain and is made up of a few very large cattle ranches and rice plantations.

Figure 10. --Widespread property distribution (95 per cent or more of farm properties are less than 100 hectares) leads to a greater distribution of medical and public health facilities, Rio Grande do Sul, 1960.

The shaded municípios have 84 or 142 medical centers (54 per cent); 222 of 364 hospitals (60 per cent); and 9,116 of 26,614 hospital beds (34 per cent) in the state. Porto Alegre, the state capital, has 25 hospitals (6 per cent) and 8,664 hospital beds (30 per cent). The large landed property municípios of the state have 46 per cent of the medical centers, 34 per cent of the hospitals, and 34 per cent of the hospital beds.

Source: Comissão Especial, Bases e Diretrizes para Um Programa Estadual de Reforma Agrária, pp. 111-7 to 111-9.



Development Agencies within the state government--frequently headed by persons of non-Luso origin. In 1965, for example, Benedito Matarazo, son of the Italian immigrant who built up one of South America's largest industrial empires, succeeded Antonio Morimoto, son of a Japanese immigrant farmer as Secretary of Labor in São Paulo. In Pernambuco, on the other hand, although Miguel Arraes (1962-1964) was the first Governor to assign an Assistant Secretary to keep him informed about labor-management problems, no formal state office with responsibility for matters dealing with urban or rural workers exists in this or any Northeast state.

Socio-Economic Pressures and Changes since the 1930's

Until recently, a majority of Brazil's population was made up of peasants who worked the land in a variety of land tenure and labor-management systems ranging from "squatting" to highly productive family and commercial farms similar to those encountered in Northwest Europe, the United States, or Japan. In the past, there were advantages for a peasant who lived on a fazenda rather than in a neighboring village or town in terms of his opportunity to win the confidence of an influential landowner and thus rise on the social scale. But this ideal-type relationship was not always ideal nor was it a relationship based on law.¹

¹This writer interviewed several peasant sindicato leaders in Pernambuco who previously had been administrators but allegedly were fired for transmitting complaints from tenants or day laborers to the plantation owner. If a fazendeiro lost a court case over non-observance of minimum wage or social welfare legislation, his administrator was seldom penalized--after all, he was only doing his job as the fazendeiro perceived it.

Since 1930, when Getúlio Vargas came to power, a series of changes have taken place which may be summarized as follows:

1. Many landowners have left the fazendas and estancias for nearby towns, the state capitals, and the big cities, leaving administrators in charge of the land or their small agricultural processing operations. The administrators are peasants themselves, psychologically unequipped to assume the protective roles of the owners, and have only a limited power to make decisions which cost money.

2. The increasing industrialization of many parts of the country, bringing about higher wage levels in factory areas plus the establishment of labor and welfare legislation, which were resisted by the landowners, attracted many peasants away from rural areas. Seasonal and permanent migration to the industrial or harvesting areas in other parts of the country was often encouraged by the landowners or administrators who did not want the burdens of under-employed tenants;¹ this further weakened the traditional paternalistic bonds between the peasants and the landowners who may spend a "rustic weekend" at the old Casa Grande but whose families no longer want to live there full-time.

3. Putting workers on a straight-wage basis meant a change in their spatial distribution. From being spread over the plantation, they were agglomerated in hamlet-like settlements alongside the roads.

¹In the Northeast, a great amount of sugar cane is harvested by migratory workers from the Sertão; in Rio Grande do Sul, rice is harvested by unemployed cowboys dismissed from cattle or sheep round-ups or wool-shearing jobs or migratory sharecroppers from densely populated parts of the state. Unfortunately, statistical data is unavailable on this phenomenon which has its counter-parts in the United States.

This, as Furtado remarks, made for easier communication among them, for the rapid spread of ideas and what has come to be called the "revolution of rising expectations."¹

4. The individualism of landowners inhibited the formation of cooperatives or regulatory groups to benefit all producers and not just the financially strongest.

5. Although farm prices rose much more slowly in recent years than the index of consumer prices for agricultural products, many producers are also middlemen and earn an important part of their income as merchants. Insistence on a flexible minimum-price policy for producers would force landowners who are also middlemen to pay increased prices for agricultural products to other landowners, something which they are not yet willing to do, in part because this would reduce their profit margins and, in part also, because it would affect their ability to compete in foreign markets with other overseas suppliers of the same products.²

6. Landowners, under the influence of the Corporate State ideas propagated by Vargas, organized themselves into pyramid structures of Rural Associations, Federations, and Confederations which were to

¹See Juarez R. B. Lopes, "Some Basic Developments in Brazilian Politics and Society," in New Perspectives of Brazil, Eric N. Baklanoff (ed.) (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1966), pp. 68-75, for an excellent discussion of the "progressive dissolution of the patrimonial order."

²Galjart, op.cit., p. 11, citing Julian M. Chacel, Preços e Custos Na Agricultura Brasileira (Mimeographed) (Rio de Janeiro: Centro Latino Americano de Pesquisas em Ciências Sociais), pp. 3-4.

A Rural, journal of the Brazilian Rural Society or SRB, São Paulo, June, 1964, pp. 34-36, contains advertisements for warehouse and export firms in Santos and São Paulo whose owners are also substantial landowners and SRB officers.

work with a series of autarchies or institutos, similar to the Commodity Credit Corporation in the United States, in an attempt to ease the problems of excess supply and inadequate consumption of sugar, rice, peanuts, wheat, cotton, beans, and yerba mate.¹ The Institutes which exist outside the regular channels of the Ministries and Departments, are headed by boards or cabinets of government and producer representatives, and are often financed by a tax on these products or a government subsidy.²

7. While the institutes promised to buy crops at a fixed minimum price or to finance the harvest or marketing of crops, the minimum prices have been subjected to manipulation by powerful commercial groups--which some landowners belong to--and by uncontrolled inflation. Moreover, in some cases such as sugar, if the Institutes do not pay upon delivery, the sugar mills may pay the independent plantation suppliers (fornecedores) only after the expenses of the mills have been paid.³ Independent planters therefore find it difficult to remain

¹Phyllis Peterson, "Brazil, Institutionalized Confusion," in Political Systems of Latin America, Martin Needler (ed.) (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1964), pp. 492-493.

La Palombara, op. cit., pp. 252-348, offers parallel clientela and parentela relationships for Italian bureaucrats and agricultural-industrial interest groups.

²In Florida, for example, the Governor appoints a Citrus Commission made up of members who represent various facets of the industry to regulate its marketing and quality standards, contract advertising, inter alia, whose work is supported by a tax on each crate of citrus shipped out of the state.

³Interviews with Francisco Falcão and Benjamin de Moraes Cavalcanti, and meetings of the Sociedade Auxiliadora da Agricultura de Pernambuco and the Associação de Fornecedores de Açúcar, Recife, August 9, 1965.

financially independent unless they have commercial or banking links through an informal panelinha or kinship network.¹

In the face of these pressures, many landowners have reacted violently to demands for improved arrangements from their peasant tenants, employees, or the allies of peasant groups.

Given this violence, it is necessary to examine in the next chapter the political and institutional structures in which landowner pressure groups function and in which peasant pressure groups and their allies were to develop.

¹See Leeds, op. cit., pp. 383-384, and 393-401, for a theoretical model of the panelinhas which generally consist of one or more landowners, a customs official, an insurance man, a lawyer or two, businessmen, an accountant, a municipio vereador, state or federal deputy, a banker, and hopefully, a middle- or upper level official in one of the Institutos regulating the marketing of an agricultural crop produced in the area.

CHAPTER II

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM WITHIN WHICH RURAL PRESSURE GROUPS FUNCTION

Introduction

As noted in Chapter I, Brazilian elites have developed a "system" of conciliation and paternalism that persisted even with the introduction of the federal principle of government because disciplined political parties with a continuing commitment to principles or ideology never developed.¹ Because the parties did not aggregate interests, many strong interest groups financed candidates for office who were friendly to their interest in the National Congress, State Assemblies, and the agricultural Institutes whose principal task was to obtain subsidies and protection for these groups.²

Brazil never had a tradition of liberalism in the Lockean or Spencerian/Darwinian sense. Even when the governmental machinery was weak, the state pursued an "interventionist" or mercantilist tradition in economic matters, uninhibited by laissez faire dogma. In James

¹Theodore Wyckoff, "Brazilian Political Parties," South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. LVI (June, 1957), pp. 281-298; Peterson, op. cit., pp. 463-509; Themistocles Cavalcanti and Reisky Dubnic, Comportamento Eleitoral no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1964).

²Peterson, op. cit., p. 493; William W. Pierson and Federico G. Gil, Governments of Latin America (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957), p. 358.

S. Rowe's words, "the characteristic tendency of private interests in Brazil has not been to resist the state but to seek its favors."¹

Getúlio Vargas linked old and contemporary Brazil through his ability to conciliate the growing industrial interests without a major struggle with the landowners, while at the same time accommodating the new urban labor force and not having a major confrontation with industry. In Rowe's words,

These accommodations, accomplished without political parties or the free social process involving autonomous interest groups, depended on the state's role, not as a mere arbiter, but as an active participant in the affairs of each class. Paternalism was ingeniously transplanted from the countryside to urban, middle-class, and industrial activities . . . The swelling ranks of urban labor were presented with a ready-made union organization, copied from Italian Corporate State legislation of 1926 which was created and controlled by the Ministry of Labor. Organizationally weak but financially powerful by virtue of a mandatory union tax levied on all workers, the unions did not serve as collective bargaining agents but as social welfare agencies, brokers in the patron-client relationship established between government and worker.²

In the post 1945 period, a formal structure of representative democracy was revived and improved to some extent but nothing was done to modify the social structure or the balance between agricultural

¹Rowe, "The 'Revolution' and the 'System,'" Part I, p. 8.

Alexander, Labor Relations in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, pp. 43-44 blames the lack of a sense of social responsibility among the population on attitudes inherited from the past of a paternalistic large-landholding system; Vargas governed Brazil as if it were one big plantation and blocked social reform and change as much as he stimulated it through economic development.

Marvin Harris, Town and Country in Brazil (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), notes the population of Minas Velhas, in Bahia, looked upon the Federal or State governments as a "Boss of super proportions" whose task is "to give a push for progress" (O Governo tem que dar impulse) rather than local government assisting local agriculture and industry, health, and education.

²Rowe, "The 'Revolution' and the 'System,'" Part II, pp. 3-4.

and industrial interests. Key features of the "system" remained intact.

Among the most important was the [Consolidated Work Laws or CLT of 1943]. It provided not only a code of working conditions similar to that found in industrializing countries eight-hour day, minimum wage . . . and social security institutes for several categories of workers, but also . . . a parallel structure of employer and employee organizations--a pyramid rising from sindicatos [unions or associations] at the local level and state federations to an apex of national confederations, all linked to the Ministry of Labor.¹

Although the presidency of Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira (1956-1960) was characterized by an industrial expansion and economic growth that temporarily obscured reliance on the "system's" impediments to rational modernization, no basic re-arrangements of political forces or unsettling ventures into agrarian reform or widespread public education were undertaken.² In order to gain support for his Brasilia project, Kubitschek coddled industry in the South and offered a new development agency, SUDENE, to the Northeast, originally viewed by many politicians and observers as little more than a vast new gravy train of public works for private individuals to supplement the construction projects of DNOCS.³ In implementing his development program, Kubitschek preferred to work outside the regular bureaucracy and party channels, creating new autarchies and administrative agencies thus avoiding the immobilism of the "system" without confronting it.⁴

¹Rowe, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

²For example, Article 166 of the 1946 Constitution indicates "primary schooling is obligatory and shall be administered only in the national language . . . is free to all; the official schooling beyond primary schooling, shall be free to whoever proves lack or insufficiency of means."

³Robock, Brazil's Developing Northeast, is probably the best source of information on the origins and history of these agencies.

⁴Rowe, op. cit., p. 12.

Following the spectacular resignation of his successor, Jânio de Silva Quadros, in August, 1961, the eventual assumption of the Presidency by João Belchior Marques Goulart ushered in a period of recurrent crises and conspiracies which lasted until the April Revolution of 1964. There was much talk and some legislation and presidential decrees, yet the problems inherited from previous regimes--inflation, wage demands, agrarian pressures, commitments assumed under the Alliance for Progress and trade deficits--were greater than before. The "system" came under serious and sustained pressure both from internal contradictions and external attack by various groups.

On the left especially, several radical student movements, Castro supporters, the PCB and PC do B factions of the Communist Party, and independent nationalist revolutionaries altered their subordinate relationships with Goulart's Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) which had been part of the "system." While each had tried to use the other for its own ends prior to Goulart's assumption of the presidency, these militants increased their bargaining power almost to that of an "equal" whether "inside" the "system" as PTB Labor Ministry bureaucrats or "outside" through the defiant organization of strikes and disorders which Goulart did not want.¹ At the same time, various radical and moderate reformist peasant groups began to act independently of Goulart and the "system."

In examining the political system and sub-systems in which land-owner interest groups function and in which peasant pressure groups

¹Rowe, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

were to develop, it is necessary to examine the following in greater detail to supplement what has already been said above: (1) the traditional politics of the municípios, (2) the effect of the federal structure on decision-making; (3) the structure and functions of the Ministry of Labor, and (4) the nature of rural labor legislation.

The Traditional Politics of the Rural Município

Locally the município corresponds to the county in the United States but, unlike the county in the United States, the Brazilian county seat (*sede*) and other cities within a município, have no separate corporate existence. Political life, prior to the assumption of power by Vargas in 1930, was based on a series of alliances and conflicts between big landowners, each with his following of peasants, laborers, and cowboys who frequently voted irrespective of ideology, programs, or laws restricting the voting to those who could read and write.¹ Occasionally, a few families came to dominate a state so thoroughly that their influence lingers on today.²

Relations between the government and the local political boss (chefe político) were based on compromise. If the boss supported the

¹Smith, op. cit., pp. 569-582, and Blondel, op. cit., pp. 57-72, discuss the bases of these alliance and enmities on kinship clans, real or imagined affronts, and competition for power and land. Blondel, pp. 73-100, discusses the differing techniques used to register illiterate voters, electoral fraud, and election costs to chefes políticos in the late 1940's.

²"A Campanha Eleitoral de 1958 no Piauí," Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos, No. 8 (April, 1960), pp. 33-34, points out all but one of 32 members of the State Assembly in Piauí were linked by family or political ties to the great landed proprietors of the state, especially the Pires Ferreira.

winning party at the federal or state level, he could expect to influence (1) the appointment of people to the federal or state administrative posts in the município, e.g., police, revenue officials, judges, and teachers; (2) the construction of a road, bridge, or other public works which increased the value of his property or that of his friends; (3) the allocation of agricultural credit; and (4) the maintenance of the status quo.

A change in the status quo most frequently came if other landowner-bosses were linked to the dominant state or national government coalitions or if groups of peasants and laborers gathered around charismatic leaders such as Antonio Conselheiro of Os Sertões fame¹ or Padre Cicero of southern Ceará who promised and delivered betterment of their lot. If the latter groups reached a certain size, settled somewhere and cultivated the land, they sometimes became a nuisance to the landowners in the region because they not only made potential labor scarce but because they also withdrew it from their former employers. In this case, landowners or bosses would attempt to influence the state or federal government to disperse or liquidate these groups. Therefore it was important to be on good terms with the dominant bosses of a region or a state if one's own power position was threatened by competing landowners or aspiring landowner-bosses. Padre Cicero, unlike Antonio Conselheiro, was never molested by government troops because he already had intimate personal connections with the government of the state and because he was a very powerful local boss and

¹Euclides da Cunha, Rebellion in the Backlands, trans. Samuel Putnam (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1944), is an English-language translation of this story.

landowner in his own right who did not threaten the dominance of other bosses in other parts of Ceará, Piauí, or Pernambuco.¹

The Effect of the Federal Structure
on Decision-Making

Interest group theorists writing of the tactics of influence in the governmental process have recognized, at least implicitly, the importance of localization and expansion strategies when they speak of locating, developing, and improving "access"; Truman writes:

Access to one or more key points of decision in the government . . . becomes the facilitating intermediate objective of political interest groups . . . and includes efforts to exclude competing groups from equivalent access or to set up new decision points access to whatever institution of government we observe interest groups operating, the common feature of all their efforts is the attempt to achieve effective access to points of decision.²

And even though David Easton indicates that systems theory assumes that "the producers of outputs are unified and undifferentiated," he recognizes the possibility that a federal system or one with "plural authorities" increase "significantly the probability of heterogeneity of outputs."³

¹Galjart, op. cit., p. 8, and Barbosa da Silva, op. cit., pp. 181-194.

Vilaça and Albuquerque, op. cit., pp. 62-63, discuss the 1911 Alliance of the Coroneis by which "possible reciprocal invasions of the redoubts" by different Northeastern bosses was ended because of the work of Colonel Floro Bartolomeu and Padre Cicero.

²Truman, op. cit., p. 264.

³David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), pp. 452-453.

On p. 119, Easton indicated that demands "may move from and through one of these subsystems to another, depending on the demand's particular career," although he does not define what he meant by

The federal structure of Brazil offers many opportunities for contestants in economic and political conflict to realize their goals even though the formal structure has changed several times in the last thirty-five years. With respect to the behavior of actos in rural conflicts since 1955, it appears useful to posit the following model:

1. Losers in a political conflict fought on one level are not content to accept negative decisions if there is a possibility of becoming winners or of losing less by expanding a conflict to a higher level of government.¹
2. Winners make every effort to localize a conflict at a level where their advantage is maximized, even though they may continue to be winners as the conflict expands, i.e., expansion is a calculated risk which they do not wish to assume, and
3. Where one chooses to articulate interests and make demands in a hierarchy of governmental authority can make a difference in the outcome of a conflict.²

Thus, landowners, agricultural-industrialists, and rural sindicato leaders sought to have controversies resolved at the level of authoritative decision-making which they perceived as most favorable to their

"subsystem" in this instance.

Louis H. Masotti, "Intergovernmental Relations and the Socialization of Conflict: Interest Articulation in the Politics of Education," a paper delivered at the 1967 Midwest Conference of Political Scientists, Purdue University, Lafayette, Indiana, April 28, 1967, p. 15, footnote 15, notes that Easton's examples of "subsystem" or "demands" are confusing.

¹E. E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960), p. 3, argues that the most important strategy of politics is concerned with who gets involved and who makes decisions. On pp. 67-68, he states "he who determines what politics is about runs the country, because the definitions of the alternatives is the choice of conflicts and the choice of conflicts allocates power."

²Adapted from Masotti, op. cit., p. 6.

own preferences. Rural sindicato leaders are unable to mobilize as many factors of power such as attitudes, violence, bureaucratic expertise, time, and money, as landowners. Therefore they have tended to seek outside help from the DRT or President of the Republic much more frequently than the landowners or sugar industrialists who make efforts to maintain the existing favorable power ration. There is nothing inherently good or bad about the particular level at which a conflict is fought or resolved:¹ it depends on whether the participants are willing to accept decisions at that level, what their chances are for getting more favorable treatment or fewer losses at another level, and what resources are available to various participants to either expand or localize a conflict.²

Interest Group Activities and Administrative Decision-Making

Pressure groups have multiple formal access points to administrative agencies plus innumerable informal access points through kinship, panelinha, and clientele links.³ Landowner pressure groups

¹For a discussion of the process and forms of conflict resolution or accommodation, see Joseph S. Vandiver, "Accommodation, Assimilation, and Acculturation," in Rural Sociology, Alvin L. Bertrand (ed.) (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1958), pp. 320-333.

²See Masotti, op. cit., p. 6.

³Peterson, op. cit., p. 493, suggests that "most groups make their demands directly upon the administrative branch of government rather than channeling them through the political party system and the legislature."

Norman Blume, "Contemporary Brazilian Pressure Groups; A Case Study," paper presented to the Ohio Association of Economists and Political Scientists, Worthington, Ohio, April 1967, unnumbered pp. 12-13, found the following in a 1956 organizational chart of the Brazilian government: 12 Ministries; 24 organs not ministries but

such as the SRB, CRB, and crop associations have used various approaches with the Ministries or Institutes dealing with agricultural or rural concerns, e.g., Ministries of Agriculture, Labor, or Finance, the Sugar and Alcohol or the Rice Institute, and the Bank of Brazil. A preferred method of pressure groups is to place their members on the work groups that develop proposed legislation (projetos de leis).¹ With a shortage of qualified people knowledgeable in the subject matter, access to these working groups is not difficult for interest groups with technical knowledge. Later, they attempt to place members or family relatives in the key power centers within an agency, especially around the Minister or President of an Instituto. If at all possible, the pressure groups direct themselves to the Minister for it is he who is the chief "signal caller" for the major plays or policies of an agency. Reasons for this are two-fold:

1. Brazilian bureaucrats are by tradition reluctant to accept responsibility, and,
2. The policies of the Minister of Institute President control the promotional and career patterns of the civil servant within an agency.²

The preferred technique is personal contact. Access is facilitated if the political views of the group and the minister are similar,

responsible to the President; 6 national corporations such as Petrobras; 48 autarchies, 4 of which are directly under the President; 20 mixed public-private economic entities which are directly responsible to the President, 4 foundations, and 9 mixed agencies designed to facilitate international agreements.

¹ John Rood and Frank Sherwood, "The 'Workhorse' Group in Brazilian Administration," Perspectives of Brazilian Public Administration, Vol. 1, the Comparative Series in Brazilian School of Public Administration, Getúlio Vargas Foundation, Rio de Janeiro, and The School of Public Administration, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, June, 1963, pp. 47-56.

² ibid., and Blume, op. cit., p. 13.

but access is also managed by inviting the minister to a luncheon meeting of the group leadership, to be the major speaker before a meeting of the general membership, to be a panel discussant at a conference sponsored by the group, or to be one of the lecturers in courses given by or sponsored jointly by the group.¹ In the more traditional areas of the country, pressure is also brought upon a minister or one of his subordinates by a demonstration (passseata), which also involves a risk that group posture can be undermined if the demonstration is not big enough.² The Congressional friends of an agency are cultivated over a period of time, beginning with some form of informal social contact if no kinship or panelinha links are available. Once a friendship is started, through the years it is solidified, reinforced, and enlarged as an agency performs sundry types of favors for a Congressman and vice versa including Congressional help for administrators in difficulty.³

The Ministry of Labor and Labor Disputes

Labor-management disputes have been the responsibility of the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare created by Vargas as his first act in office on November 23, 1930. The Ministry is organized into a series of departments which deal with the legal and technical aspects

¹Blume, op. cit., pp. 13-14.

²Peterson, op. cit., p. 493, notes "groups do from time to time come to the Congress to demonstrate, but this is a rather sporadic type of pressure." Actually, the technique, albeit sporadic, is also used at the State Assembly and Municipio level.

³Blume, op. cit., p. 16.

of management-labor conflicts and has a series of Regional Delegates for each or a group of states. It is among the largest of the fourteen ministries because of its control over the Social Welfare funds created by the Vargas regime.¹ Although probably not created as a presidential agency for the settling of political disputes as opposed to labor disputes, it also has come to perform this function, and to become a desirable prize because of the numerous patronage possibilities for members of the coalitions supporting a winning President.²

The Regional Delegates operate in a changing political framework and have to be attuned to the dominant political configurations of a given moment. Although a labor movement has existed for many years, collective bargaining has not been institutionalized in Brazil as it has in the United States or even in Peru.³ The Regional Delegates, or DRT's, in theory function to promote harmonious worker-management relations but in practice their activities in the rural sector have developed only since the organization of rural sindicatos in the 1960's. The Ministry and the DRT's prefer to avoid as much direct responsibility as possible not only because of the political feedback which could

¹Anuário Estatístico, 1961, p. 417, indicates 40,609 persons occupied positions in Institutes and autarquias controlled by the MTPS out of a total 87,410 persons working for such autarquias in the federal government.

²Rowe, "The 'Revolution' and the 'System,'" Part II, p. 5, criticizes the "right of the Ministry to approve--and even to make--appointments of union leaders, leading to an aristocracy of pelegos (union leaders more dependent on the government than on their own labor following)."

³Ibid., and Alexander, Labor Relations in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. For a comparison, see Payne, Labor and Politics in Peru, pp. 56-75, which discusses the highly centralized Peruvian system.

endanger their career and promotional possibilities, but also because of the limited resources of the DRT's who fear the burden of the Ministry's work.¹

Urban or rural worker interest groups cannot function without formal recognition by the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare (MTPS).² This gives the Minister or his DRT considerable power in regulating sindicato policies and leadership composition. Although the Ministry's role is highly political, most DRT's and upper echelon Labor Ministry officials like to maintain a fiction that objective criteria and not political criteria are the bases for decisions in an agricultural or industrial conflict. If a dispute involves wage demands, officials present their decisions as based on a rise in the cost of living over a recent period of time and the "real needs" of the workers. However, since not all workers receive the benefits of these decisions or their enforcement, this reasoning is flimsy indeed.

Although collective bargaining was common in some urban labor-management situations, collective bargaining was not common in conflicts involving rural sugar, coffee, or cacao workers until 1963 when the Rural Worker Statute was promulgated.

¹ Interviews with Haroldo Veloso Furtado, DRT, Recife, June 4, 1965 and Amadeus Barreto, DRT, Salvador da Bahia, May 19, 1965. Barreto has been DRT in Bahia for more than five years because of his friendship with Juracy Magalhaes, former Interventor, Governor, and federal Minister--as well as UDN party leader.

²Alexander, Organized Labor in Latin America, p. 72, and Freitas Marcondes, "Social Legislation in Brazil," pp. 382-399.

Rural Labor Legislation

The gradual extinction of slavery which culminated in 1888 with the freeing of the slaves by the Lei Aurea (Golden Law) and their subsequent flight from agriculture, created an acute need for new rural workers and sources of food commodities. These two needs gave rise to the current of immigration of the last one hundred years. Most of the laws affecting rural labor were ineffectual or not respected until the Consolidated Work Laws (Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho or CLT) were promulgated on May 1, 1943.¹ Although Vargas excluded rural workers and small family farmers from most Estado Novo legislation under a bargain with large landowner leaders,² certain CLT provisions are expressly applicable to rural workers: minimum wage legislation was extended to rural areas (Article 76-129); the right to annual vacations (Article 129-147); the right to prior notice of dismissal or termination of a labor contract (Articles 487-491); and payment in kind was modestly regulated by Article 506. Nevertheless, many

¹J. V. Freitas Marcondes, First Brazilian Legislation Relating to Rural Labor Unions (Gainesville: School of Inter-American Studies, University of Florida, June, 1962), discusses Decree 979 of January 6, 1903, and Decree 6,532 of June 20, 1907.

See also Robert E. Price, "Rural Unionization in Brazil" (Madison: University of Wisconsin, The Land Tenure Center, August 1964) (Mimeographed), pp. 3-12, for a chronological description of such legislation.

²Note the similarity in the United States. See Robert D. Tomasek, "The Migrant Problem and Pressure Group Politics," Journal of Politics, Vol. XXIII, No. 2 (May, 1961), pp. 302-303, who indicates that the American Farm Bureau Federation joined with the National Grange and specialized farm groups to prevent application of social security and social welfare legislation to migrant domestic and Mexican labor. In fact, even in 1967, most migratory farm laborers are not covered by the provisions of minimum wage or social security legislation.

observers have acidly criticized the Ministry of Labor and the social security institutes for not enforcing these provisions in many cases.¹

Although the CLT and other legislation brought short-run benefits to the 1,500,000 organized workers in a labor force of about 25 million persons, the overwhelming mass of rural and urban workers were not represented in the national government or by trade unions of one type or another.²

In early February 1954, João Belchior Marques Goulart, then Minister of Labor, promulgated a decree (No. 7038) to establish rural sindicatos which met with heavy opposition from the CRB. As Mary Wilkie points out:

They sent a memorandum on the matter to the National Security Council stating among other things 'that apart from political reasons there is nothing to justify rural syndicalism' . . . 'the rural proletariat is not sufficiently mature to understand the political rights that Minister João Goulart wants to grant them' and 'the Minister of Labour's action is imprudent.'³

Facing opposition also from substantial portions of the military officer corps and the middle class because of a proposal to raise the minimum wage 100 per cent from 1,200 cruzeiros to 2,400 cruzeiros per month, Goulart resigned on February 22, 1954.⁴

¹Price, op. cit., pp. 7-8, and Rowe, "The 'Revolution' and the 'System,'" Part II, p. 5.

²Rowe, op. cit., p. 5.

³Mary Wilkie, "A Report on Rural Syndicates in Pernambuco," Rio de Janeiro, Centro Latinoamericano de Pesquisas em Ciencias Sociais, April 1964 (mimeographed).

⁴Goulart was appointed in June, 1953. Both he and War Minister Santo Cardoso resigned after manifestations of dissent from middle-level officers and university graduates especially who felt their status threatened by Goulart's wage proposals. Some officers also felt Goulart was making preparations to stage a coup which would continue

Nevertheless, a few groups of small farmers and rural laborers managed to gain recognition over the next decade.¹ The biggest advance came with the Rural Worker Statute or ETR of 1963.

The Rural Worker Statute of March 2, 1963

On March 2, 1963, Congress passed Law 4,212, the first legislation specifically applicable to peasants, which some persons called the Ferrari Law after the Gaucho Deputy who had pressed many years for legislation to benefit rural laborers and small farmers.² Its content and structure resemble the CLT and other urban worker legislation but it specifically provided rural laborers, sharecroppers, and tenants with the following:

1. Weekly rest period (paid Sundays) which was not applicable, however, to sharecroppers (Article 42).
2. Paid vacations (Articles 43-48).
3. Advance notice of dismissal and compensation based on the period of time worked (Articles 90-94).
4. Individual Work Contracts were formalized in a work book (Carteira Profissional Rural) which would register wages

Vargas in office under a type of regime similar to that of Juan Perón in Argentina. See Skidmore, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-142, for an excellent discussion of events which ultimately led to the suicide of Vargas on August 24, 1954.

¹In 1955, Belmonte, Bahia; in 1956, Barreiros, Pernambuco; and in 1957 a joint sindicato of small cacao farmers in Ilheus and Itabuna, Bahia. See Price, "Rural Unionization in Brazil," p. 60, and SUPRA, "Sindicatos Rurais-Relação No. 1," Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Promoção e Organização Rural, September 1, 1963.

²J. V. Freitas Marcondes, "O Estatuto do Trabalhador Rural," Cuadernos Brasileiros, No. 4 (July-August, 1963), pp. 55-59, discusses many provisions of the ETR, noting inter alia that Ferrari's original 1951 bill contained only 64 articles in contrast to the 183 articles in the final version passed in 1963.

and other facts relating to the rights and obligations of their holders. (Articles 2, 11-21, 29-38.)

The CLT and ETR could have played an important role in improving peasant working and living conditions but their corporate state foundation, which presumes an economic system only of employers and employees, emphasizes wages, omits land tenure questions, and fails to include the large number of small independent family proprietors, tenants, and sharecroppers who control a small plot of land. In this respect, the CLT and ETR helped a further "proletarianization of rural labor" and demonstrates a satisfaction with existing patterns of land distribution.¹

Given the nature of the administrative and political structures of Brazil, it is also necessary in the next chapter to examine the principal landowner organizations and the non-agricultural forces against which peasant groups had to contend.

¹CIDA, op. cit., pp. 329-332.

CHAPTER III

THE BIG LANDOWNER PRESSURE GROUPS AND NON-AGRICULTURAL FORCES AFFECTING AGRICULTURAL AND PEASANT POLICIES

Given the nature of the administrative and political structure in which peasant pressure groups would have to operate, it is necessary to examine the principal landowner organizations and the non-agricultural forces which attempted to modify not only existing rural wage arrangements but also existing land tenure arrangements.

The two most important big landowner organizations are the Brazilian Rural Confederation or CRB and its often more powerful parallel civil counterpart, the Brazilian Rural Society (Sociedade Rural Brasileira or SRB).¹

The SRB and CRB have played an important role in determining agricultural policy, especially in the selection of high officials for the Ministry of Agriculture, and state Secretaries of Agriculture in São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Paraná, and probably several other states. Briefly put, there is a close clientele relationship between the administrative agencies of the government and these two interest groups. In effect they are the natural expression and representatives of the

¹Alexander, Labor Relations in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, p. 7, argues that often the parallel civil counterparts of management or employer groups are often more powerful than the occupational Sindicatos or their Federations. He, however, does not examine the SRB, CRB, or other agricultural interest groups.

rural sector and thus the natural target or reference point of these agencies.¹ Pressure from the SRB has contributed to the high turnover of Ministers of Agriculture. In the past 100 years there have been more than 100.²

The most important non-agricultural forces affecting agricultural and peasant policy in the past fifteen years has been the Brazilian Communist and Socialist parties, several university and secondary school

¹La Palombara, Italian Interest Groups in Italian Politics, pp. 262-263, indicates Italian economic and industrial groups provide the Ministries "with special studies, memoranda, a mass of data which is useful, even essential in the making of policy" and "one might possibly view the various branches of Italian public administration as the feudal holdings of the various major groups of the society." Although no similar studies of the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture have been published, it is this writer's feeling that a similar relationship exists between the SRB-CRB and the Ministry of Agriculture at the national level and the various Federations at the state level although in Rio Grande do Sul and São Paulo, the Gaucho Agrarian Front (FAG) and the Cooperative Cotia, respectively, also influence state agricultural and cooperative policy.

The U.S. is not immune to some of the characteristics and problems of Brazil: Robert D. Tomasek, "The Migrant Problem and Pressure Group Politics," op. cit., notes the owners of farms employing migrant labor "often live in cities and regard their property more as a business than as a way of life" (pp. 295-296), and "the Department of Agriculture is more receptive to the concern of the richer than the poorer farmers" (p. 307).

²The exact number, now misplaced, was given to this writer in July, 1965, by the Director of the Agricultural Experiment Station of the Ministry in Rio Grande do Norte. Nevertheless, since April 1, 1964, there have been five Ministers in the period of three years: Oscar Thompson Filho (SRB member from São Paulo); Hugo Almeida Leme (also a SRB member) named on June 17, 1964; Ney Brage, outgoing Governor of Paraná, October, 1965 to mid 1966; and Ivo Arzua Pereira, named by incoming President Costa e Silva, on March 16, 1967.

student groups, and the Roman Catholic Church. Each of these will be briefly discussed.¹

The Brazilian Rural Society or SRB

Founded in 1919, the SRB is probably the wealthiest, best-organized, most powerful, and most conservative organization of landowners in Brazil. It occupies a position in Brazil somewhat similar to the Rural Society (Sociedad Rural) or Jockey Club of Argentina, although the SRB's 16th floor offices in a downtown São Paulo office building are less plush than the two-story former mansion occupied by the Rural Society in downtown Buenos Aires.

The SRB publishes a monthly magazine, A Rural, now in its 42nd year of publication, which is distributed only to its members and not sold to the general public. The magazine carries notices of SRB meetings, declarations of policy, and statements or descriptions of groups friendly to the SRB or its policies, specialized sections on agricultural and livestock development, and a women's section.²

The principal public demands of the SRB contained in A Rural and the press³ are greater aid for agriculture through increased federal expenditures for the Ministry of Agriculture, removal of foreign exchange controls on coffee exporters who receive only about

¹There is a great lack of published material on all these groups. Cardozo, op. cit., and Therry, op. cit., for example, are the only useful analytical materials on the Church and student groups respectively.

²Based on a survey by this writer of all issues of A Rural for 1963-1964.

³Ibid., a survey of newspapers purchased in Brazil, and the Lux-Jornal clipping service for 1963-1965.

40 cents for every dollar they earn,¹ and opposition to agrarian reform, rural wage increases, and social welfare legislation.

The SRB apparently had more difficulty in arranging audiences with President João Goulart than with President Castelo Branco.² On the other hand, the SRB has made no secret of its sharp differences with Castelo Branco over agrarian reform and rural worker legislation.³

The SRB, like many American pressure groups, publishes the votes of Federal Senators and Deputies on contemporary legislation--adding the following paragraph, for example, to the names of those voting against a Constitutional Amendment providing for compensation in bonds and not cash for expropriated land in conjunction with the Estatuto da Terra or Land Statute of 1965:

The Senhores Parliamentarians who voted against the amendment, on the first reading (or discussion), demonstrated absolute attitudes of coherence, and, therefore, merit the consideration of the Brazilian people.⁴

¹A Rural and newspaper articles, however, do not discuss some of the stratagems used by coffee producers and exporters to avoid this compulsory tax of sixty cents which include falsification of export invoices and the purchase of agricultural machinery in barter arrangements.

²"Audiença do Sr. Presidente da Republica A.S.R.B.," A Rural, July, 1964, p. 5, is a statement by President Almeida Prado on the occasion of an interview with the President.

³"Reafirmada na SRB a Posição da Classe Agrícola no Tocante a Reforma Agraria," op. cit., p. 18; "A SRB apela ao Marechal Castelo Branco para que preserve a filosofia da revolução, a tranquilidade e o bem-estar do povo," A Rural, June, 1964, p. 5; and "A Ilegalidade dentro da Legalidade da Emenda Constitucional ao Estatuto da Terra," A Rural, November, 1964, pp. 8-9, are typical statements of SRB positions.

⁴"A Ilegalidade dentro da Legalidade," A Rural, November, 1964, p. 8.

The Brazilian Rural Confederation or CRB

The Rural Association had their origins in the late 1930's in several voluntary associations of landowners. Legal status--and a measure of governmental control was granted these groups by Decree-Laws 7,449 of April and 8,127 of October 24, 1945--the latter establishing federal subsidies for these groups.¹ The legislation initially aimed at improving rural life through improved agricultural extension services and investment of capital and other resources by state and município governments in rural areas. Because Rural Associations were not created in most of the country, the original intent of these laws was never fulfilled. For example, in 1951, there were only 150 Rural Associations and only three Rural Federations (Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul, and São Paulo).² João Cleofas, a Pernambuco sugar mill owner and politician named Minister of Agriculture in 1951, helped organize over 500 new Rural Associations and Federations in a majority of the states through the use of federal subsidies to pay portions of the salaries of Association or Federation officials or to purchase agricultural implements, insecticides, and fertilizers for re-sale at cost plus a small markup.³ Nevertheless, if Cleofas'

¹ João Cleofas, Reforma Agrária no Brasil (Collection of a series of speeches and articles by the former Minister of Agriculture) (Recife: Instituto Joaquim Nabuco de Pesquisas Sociais, 1960), p. 4.

² Ibid., pp. 43-44.

³ See Jornal dos Municípios (Pôrto Alegre), April 27, 1965, for a list of Federal Government budgetary expenditures for six Rio Grande do Sul Municípios which includes Rural Associations in Bom Jesus, Bom Retiro do Sul, Caxias do Sul, and Cacapava do Sul.

hopes of improving rural life were genuine and not wishful, federal subsidies to the CRB, Federations, Rural Associations, and município governments generally have not been used for rural development outside of the município sede but have been used as instruments of political patronage for the Minister interacting with Prefeitos, Senators, and Federal and State deputies. For example, all but two of nine Rural Associations visited in Rio Grande do Sul (5), Sao Paulo (1), Pernambuco (2), and Rio Grande do Norte (1), were nothing more than business establishments selling implements, insecticide, seed, fertilizer and other goods at slightly lower prices than nearby private commercial firms. In several other municípios, the Associations visited were little more than paper organizations or instruments used to mobilize votes for a município political boss.

In Chapter I, the low rate of voluntary association membership outside of the South was illustrated. There are three reasons for the low number of organized rural groups. First, there is the apathy of many landowners who fail to perceive that a voluntary functional group may be a useful means to defend or advance their own individual interest. Second, this low rate of association reflects the use of informal links with decision-makers in the state and national capitals.¹ Finally, many landowners are aware of the lack of a sense of public-mindedness or group mindedness by association leaders who use their

¹Table shows 4,318 members in the Rural Association of Guanabara in 1959. Considering the fact that Guanabara has little or no farm land outside greater Rio de Janeiro, one can only conclude that many of these members must be absentee landowners from other states whose association membership was held in the then capital city.

positions to improve their own financial,¹ social, or political status.² A decision not to join, therefore, may be quite rational.

The various state Rural Federations are paralleled by civil groups which do not come under direct government control or influence. The Rural Federation of Pernambuco (FARPE), for example, has the Pernambuco Cane Suppliers Association (Fornecedores) and an Agricultural Welfare Society (Sociedade Auxiliadora da Agricultura) and the São Paulo FARESP has parallel Federations of coffee growers and livestock producers. These societies join the Federations in pyramiding resources and influence on governors, legislators, the President, and administrative agencies on issues of subsidies, agrarian reform legislation, differential rates of foreign exchange for agricultural exports, and the nomination of technicians or officials for federal and state agricultural positions.

The large landowners then have had various means to influence government decision-makers. In the past, they also had the support of the Roman Catholic Church in upholding a neo-feudalistic concept of a two-class society.³ In the next section, the changing role of

¹Ultima Hora (São Paulo), May 5, 1965, p. 7:1-2, carries an article on charges by FARESP President, Luiz Emanuel Bianchi that one Gil Ferreira de Araújo, President of a "phantom rural association" and Director of a "commercial firm in which the FARESP was a minority stockholder" had been dismissed from the FARESP because he "prejudiced the elevated status . . . which the organization enjoyed in economic, social, and political circles."

²For example, in 1965, in translating for the Alliance for Progress projects of three Rural Associations in small-holding municípios in Rio Grande do Sul, this writer observed that two of the projects would be used as political weapons at the Município level even if the project had merit in itself and would benefit most small farmers in the município.

³Louveira também é contra o Estatuto da Terra," A Gazeta (São

the Catholic Church will be discussed.

The Brazilian Catholic Church's
Changing Role in Political Life

The Roman Catholic Church apparently has not played as important a political role in Brazil as it has played in other Latin American countries.¹ In the traditional society described by Gilberto Freyre, the large landowner dominated everything, including the Church.²

Paulo), January 19, 1965, p. 15, is an excellent example of how FARESP leaders pyramided their resources.

Nearly 200 landowners of Louveira at the Ninth Grape Festival issued a manifesto asking Brazilian agrarian legislation to conform to principles of a book Reforma Agrária, Questão de Consciência and the "Declaration of Morro Alto," while seeking a fundamental change of the Land Statute promulgated by the Castelo Branco government in November, 1964.

The list of signers was headed by Luiz Emmanuel Bianchi, President of the FARESP who also "applauded the attitudes of the Brazilian Society for Defense of Traditions, Family, and Property" and called on Brazilian to "use the means which the Constitution confer to limit the disastrous effects of the Land Statute and to prepare conditions of a fundamental reform of the law."

The document was to be channelled to Professor Plinio Correa de Oliveira, President of the National Directory of the Society--who incidentally was one of the four writers of Reforma Agrária, whose principal author was the very conservative Archbishop of Dimantina, Minas Gerais, Dom Geraldo de Proença Sigaud, a publication which will be discussed in the section on the Church.

¹For general works see Roger Bastide, "Religion and the Church in Brazil," in Smith and Marchant, op. cit., pp. 334-355; Frank Bonilla, "A Franciscan Bishopric in the Amazon, Some Contemporary Problems of Brazilian Catholicism," AUFS Reports, East Coast South America Series, Vol. XIII, No. 5 (Brazil), who feels the "union of Church and State proved to be catastrophic for the Church," although the Church is also a "solidly entrenched national institution with ramifications into every sphere of life;" and François Houtart and Emile Pin, The Church and the Latin American Revolution, trans. from the French by Gilbert Barth (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), esp. pp. 145-163.

²Freyre, op. cit., pp. 7 and 13.

Although no studies have been made of the ramifications and extensions of Church power into secular affairs, many informal links have existed through the years between religious, economic, and governmental power, as is perhaps inevitable in a country in which an overwhelming majority shared the same faith.

Many rural areas are without a priest. Rural parishes are larger in terms of population and geographic size than the city or national average. For example, in 1956, the number of inhabitants per rural parish was 14,000, while it was 11,800 in city parishes.¹ Moreover, with the exception of the South, almost all of the 51.1 per cent of persons going into the priesthood from rural areas and small towns of less than 10,000 came from the families of large landowners; only 5.9 per cent came from the families of salaried rural laborers.²

In many parts of the Northeast and São Paulo, the landowner still determines whether or not a priest says mass in a chapel on a fazenda or engenho.³ The priest-landowner-politician such as Padre Cicero,⁴

¹Houtart and Pin, op. cit., p. 151.

²Ibid., pp. 148-149; unfortunately no publishing data are given for these figures which were based on a study of Seminarians in Columbia and Brazil.

³Interview with Dom Acacio Rodriguez Alves, Bishop of Palmares, Pernambuco, July 4, 1965, in which he noted that his diocese, when it was created in 1962, had only three jeeps to cover 21 municípios. In comparison, the Rural Sindicato dominated by the Communists had three also for its work. One of his first tasks, therefore, was to organize a campaign to "motorize the clergy," that is, to buy jeeps and other vehicles so that they could attend to their religious and other duties.

Frequently in mid-1965, this writer observed priests being carried by a Senhor do Engenho to mass on an Engenho or Usina in Pernambuco.

⁴Barbosa da Silva, op. cit.

Vilaça and Albuquerque, Coronel, Coronéis, pp. 62-63, indicates

is still active, although there are no statistics or studies to show the extent or types of political participation.¹ Sermons from the pulpit of opposition to a candidate or a policy do occur and make an impact.²

The Church is one of the few institutions in Brazil which has a network of representatives throughout the country. It is also the only institution which penetrates other key sectors of the population such

the importance of Padre Cicero in bringing together the Pernambuco Coronéis to sign the Pact of Cariri of 1911 by which they agreed to stop invading one another's redoubts of control. On p. 65, they relate the story of Padre Vicente Alexander of Petrolina, Pernambuco, who lost a political battle with Chico Romão in Sitio dos Moreira, a district of the Municipio of Serrita. The Padre would not have been able to act politically there if he did not have relatives who were also landowners.

¹In the 1960's, one could find priests in several State Assemblies, the Federal Chamber of Deputies, and Senate, and in the leadership of various state parties. For example, Padre Antonio Viera of Juazeiro, Ceará, was one of the two MDB candidates for Federal Senator in 1966 while Padre Calazans (formerly a member of Adhemar de Barros PSB) sought election under the MCB banner also. In Rio Grande do Norte, Monsenhor Walfredo Gurgel of a politically important landowning family in the Sertao Municipio of Caico was a Federal Senator until 1965 when he defeated Dinarte Mariz, a traditional Coronel, for the Governorship of Rio Grande do Norte. In Pernambuco, Monsenhor Arruda Camara was a Federal Deputy between 1962 and 1965 and President of the Christian Democratic Party organization in the State until that party was abolished along with all other parties. Monsenhor Arruda Camara then joined the government's ARENA party.

²In 1960, Cardinal Don Jaime de Barros Camara of São Paulo urged voters not to support Joao Goulart who was "allegedly a Communist." In 1962, the clergy helped form coalitions in Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Pernambuco against candidates whom it considered were too close to the Communist Party line, including Leonel Brizola, running for Federal Deputy in Rio de Janeiro, and Miguel Arraes, running for Governor in Pernambuco.

See Cavalcanti and Dubnic, Comportamento Eleitoral no Brasil for 1962, passim.

as the armed forces, business, landowners, urban labor,¹ students, and peasants.

Whatever its past record, several sectors of the Church, during the 1950's, cast off a traditional conservatism in political and social action² to provide ideological and organizational underpinnings for groups which sought to modernize Brazilian society through reform or revolution--the latter meaning overthrow of the existing economic, political, and social order.³

¹Timothy Harding, "An Analysis of Brazil's Third Labor Congress," HAR, Vol. XIII, No. 8 (October, 1960), pp. 567-572, indicates the following labor groups had a "Catholic" orientation: Movimento Renovador Sindical (Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo); Movimentação de Orientação Sindicalista (Guanabara, Rio Grande do Sul, Minas Gerais, and São Paulo), Frente Nacional de Trabalhadores (São Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul, Rio Grande do Norte, and Sergipe).

In 1931, Catholic Leaders in Rio Grande do Sul organized the first Workers' Circle (Circulo Operario). Largely a confessional organization which conducted catechism classes and sponsored consumer and credit cooperatives among urban workers, the Circles were later organized in other states. A National Confederation of Catholic Workers (CNCO) was created in 1950 which transformed itself in July, 1964, into the Brazilian Confederation of Catholic Workers or CBTC. Early in the 1960's, the CNCO began organizing trade union leadership classes as well as rural sindicatos. Manual do Circulo Operario (3a Edição; Rio de Janeiro: Confederação Nacional de Operarios Catolicos, 1963), pp. 29-40, discusses the history of the CNCO to 1962 when it claimed 408 circles in 16 state federations and 435,000 members.

"Os Cristãos e o Sindicato na Cidade e no Campo" (São Paulo: Edição Saraiva, 1964), is a good example of the literature published by the reformist Federation of Workers' Circles of São Paulo under the direction of its adviser, Frei Celso Maria, OFM, a Capuchin monk.

²Although there is some correlation between changing attitudes towards the Church's involvement in political and social action and attitudes towards liturgical and organizational changes within the Church, one must not equate the two.

³Thomas E. Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 217-284, et passim is an excellent discussion of the various left-wing groups active in the post World War II period.

One sector, commonly called the Catholic Left or Catholic Action has been quite active in the last ten years.¹ Like Catholic groups in other Latin American countries, it was a hearty consumer of European ideas and practices,² especially in the universities which imported, adapted, and propagated many of the ideas of Jacques Maritain, and Fathers L. L. Lebreton, Emmanuel Mounier, and Teilhard de Chardin.³ In

¹For a general discussion of the European roots from which the Brazilian Catholics absorbed much in the way of philosophy and techniques, see Dante L. Seimener, "Two Types of Recent Christian Political Thought," Journal of Politics, Vol. XXI, No. 3 (August, 1959), pp. 455-486; Samuel H. Barnes, "The Politics of French Christian Labor," Journal of Politics, Vol. XXI, No. 1 (February, 1959), pp. 105-122; and John T. Marcus, "Social Catholicism in Postwar France," South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. LVI, pp. 299-313.

See Tad Szulc, "Communists, Socialists, and Christian Democrats," The Annals, Vol. CCCLX, July 1965, pp. 99-109, for a discussion of Christian Democratic parties in Latin America.

²Manoel Cardoso, "The Brazilian Church and the New Left," op. cit., pp. 313-323, places considerable emphasis on Friar Carlos Josephat and the polemical weekly-newspaper Brasil, Urgente!; Therry, "Power Components in the Brazilian Student Movement," op. cit., pp. 32-33, and the magazine Ação Católica Brasileira (Rio de Janeiro) which began publication in early 1962. Josephat was also associated with an Agrarian Front of which little is known.

³Some of these publications include: L. J. Lebreton, Princípios para a Ação (Principles for Action), Suicídio ou Sobrevivência do Ocidente? (Suicide or Survival of the Western World?), published in São Paulo by Duas Cidades, 1960; and Dimensões de Caridade (Dimensions of Charity), no publishing data available; Emmanuel Mounier: Personalismo; Sombras de Medo Sobre o Século XX (Clouds or Shadows of Fear over the Twentieth Century), and Introdução ao Existencialismo (Introduction to Existentialism).

Yves Lacoste, Os Países Subdesenvolvidos (The Underdeveloped Countries) (São Paulo: Difusão Européia do Livro, Coleção Saber Atual, 1961).

Teilhard Chardin, O Fenômeno Humano (The Human Phenomenon).

Jacques Maritain, Christianismo e Democracia (Christianity and Democracy); Humanismo Integral (Integral or Full Humanism), and Rumos de Educação (Educational Trends).

Frei or Padre Cardonnel (he was called both) and Padre Henrique Vaz published a book Christianismo Hoje (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Universitaria, 1962), which was the subject of much controversy. According

addition, a liberal French Dominican, Friar Cardonnel, was very well received by many student audiences while lecturing for eight months in Brazil in 1961. A prominent Brazilian Jesuit intellectual, Father Henrique Vaz, popularized progressive Catholic thought with articles on Christianity and Marxism. The general trend was toward Mounier's acceptance of collaboration with all political currents, including communism, in order to affect social justice.¹

Padre Alipio de Freitas, a native of Portugal who first settled in Maranhão in 1958, and later was active in João Pessoa, Paraíba, in 1963, reportedly went so far in condemning capitalism and calling for a change of the structure of society in his writing² and speeches that his right to celebrate the mass and perform other religious functions was taken away by his Bishop.³

to some reports, Frei Cardonnel was called home by his superiors because he and the book were exploited so much by Brazilian communists.

¹ Leonard D. Therry, op. cit., pp. 32-33.

² Padre Alipio de Freitas, "Adesão ao evangelho obriga as posições revolucionárias" (Adhesion to the Gospel obliges revolutionary positions), O Metropolitano (June 16, 1962), p. 6.

Another extreme left-wing priest, Padre Francisco Laje Pessoa, often appeared on the platform with Julião before peasant groups. "Palavras aos camponeses" (Words to the Peasants), O Metropolitano, (November 11, 1961), p. 5, is reportedly the text of a speech Laje made to the First National Peasant Congress, Belo Horizonte, November 11, 1961.

³ Interview with Padre Luiz Ferracine, Sociedade Brasileira de Cultura, São Paulo, August 18, 1965.

Cardoso, op. cit., p. 318, says that the religious "faculties" of Freitas in the Archdiocese of Rio de Janeiro were suspended but does not explain what he means by "faculties."

Padre Bernardo Bastos Avila, founder of the Institute of Political and Social Studies of the Catholic University (PUC) of Rio de Janeiro, was the reformist voice of the center. He attacked equally liberal capitalism, neo-capitalism, and communism as proposed solutions for Brazil's problems.¹

Traditional conservative elements within the Church did not remain silent. Dom Geraldo de Proença Sigaud, Archbishop of Diamantina, Minas Gerais, Bishop Antonio de Castro Myer of Campos, Rio de Janeiro, were joined in 1960 by two prominent laymen in writing a book highly critical of agrarian reform proposals² and issued The Declaration of Morro Alto in November, 1964, criticizing the Rural Land Statute promulgated by the Castello Branco government:

Catholics are not able to receive land eventually expropriated by public powers without grave transgression of Christian morality. And if they accept this land, they will be in the moral condition of persons receiving stolen goods and not able to receive the Sacraments of Confession and of the Eucharist or the Sacrament of the Sick without resolving to restore the [stolen] goods to their legitimate owners.³

¹ Padre Fernando Bastos Avila, "Realidade Brasileira," Painel Brasileiro (Rio de Janeiro), Ano IV, No. 38 (July 1962), pp. 5-10.

Two important articles by the reformist Rio de Janeiro and Recife Archbishop Helder Camara are "The Program of a Bishop of the Church," CIF Reports (Cuernavaca, Mexico, Inter-cultural Center of Documentation-CIDOC), April 16-30, 1964, pp. 3-4, and "Brazilian Bishop's Emergency Plan," same issue, p. 5, which quotes part of the 1962 Plan of Emergency of the General Assembly of Brazilian Bishops.

² Dom Geraldo de Proença Sigaud, Antonio de Castro Mayer, Plinio Correa de Oliveira, and Luiz Mendonça de Freitas, Reforma Agrária, Questão de Consciência (São Paulo: Editora Vera Cruz, 1960).

³ "Reforma atingira o país em crise de consciência," Folha de São Paulo, 2a Edição, November 9, 1964.

The factionalism within the Catholic Church over its "proper" role in society was reflected in the political activities of many university and secondary student groups.

University and Secondary Student Groups

Secondary and university students have been important pressure groups because of the relatively small size of the trained elite which has governed the country in the past.¹ Student leaders often asserted to this writer that the national student movement has exercised "a decisive influence on national politics" and cite incidents ranging from independence in 1888 to their role in popular protests against President Goulart's proposed state of siege of October, 1963. Not all students are political activists but the 36-60 per cent who have an interest in political questions frequently articulate positions for the rest who are apolitical or apathetic.² One often finds some of the most well-informed and militant individuals among these students and their professors.

Student groups, especially those affiliated with the Catholic Left and the National Student Union (UNE) often were far more influenced by politicians and government officials than these politicians

¹For general works on University students in politics, see John P. Harrison, "The Confrontation with the Political University," The Annals, Vol. CCCXXXIV (March, 1961), pp. 74-83; Silvert, op. cit., and Therry, op. cit. For a more specific work on Brazilian University students and Octavio Ianni, "O Jovem Radical," Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais, Vol. 11, No. 2 (July, 1962), pp. 121-142.

²L. Ronald Scheman, "The Brazilian Law Students: Background, Habits, Attitudes," Journal of Inter-American Studies, July, 1963, p. 349, found 36 per cent of the law students sampled participating in politics; 59 per cent did not.

Pesquisa sobre o comportamento político dos estudantes da

and government officials were influenced by students.¹ Nevertheless, many students and their organizations were especially important in the 1960's because they advocated reform and revolution.² Students became leaders in Peasant Leagues, peasant sindicatos, the Federal government's Agrarian Reform Agency (SUPRA), and the Basic Education Movement (MEB). Students were also active in the political organizations of such persons as Governor Miguel Arraes de Alencar, Leonel Brizola, Carlos Lacerda, and Adhemar de Barros. The UNE formed part of the so-called Popular Mobilization Front (Frente de Movilização Popular or FMP).³ Control of these organizations therefore provided

Faculdade nacional de filosofia (Rio de Janeiro: Universidade do Brasil, Faculdade do Filosofia, 1963), cited by Therry, op. cit., p. 29, found 59 per cent of the students of the Philosophy School expressing an interest that student organizations participate in political questions.

¹Sonia Seganfredo, UNE, Instrumento de Subversão (Rio de Janeiro: Edições GRD, 1963), is one of the more critical books about UNE since its founding in 1937.

²Two examples may suffice. (1) In early 1961, Pernambuco university students invited the mother of Ernesto "Che" Guevara to address them in Recife. When the Dean of the Law School banned the meeting, riots ensued, and troops were sent in to restore order. Shortly thereafter, Law students at the University of Sao Paulo, 2,000 miles further south, supported their colleagues at Recife by breaking street lights and dumping garbage cans. See Karl M. Schmitt and David D. Burke, Evolution or Chaos, Dynamics of Latin American Government and Politics (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 173. (2) Pastor Paulo Evers, founder and Director of the Ginasio Bom Pastor, Linha Brasil, Nova Petropolis, RGS, intercepted mail from UNE to student leaders of his school which urged them to "denounce principals and teachers and to subvert academic discipline." Interview January 6, 1965.

UNE officers were also active on the editorial staffs of numerous periodicals and published a weekly newspaper, Movimento in Rio de Janeiro.

³Other groups in the FMP were the National Parliamentary Front of FPN and the General Labor Command or CGT, an official and non-legal

opportunities for patronage, income, and a springboard for further personal or group ambitions.

The activist students of the left in the late 1950's and early 1960's believed that the techniques for development of Brazil existed but that the political parties and government refused to implement the corrective measures suggested by the analyses of what was "wrong" in the social and economic structure.¹ In Timothy Harding's words, students felt they were "the brains of the masses" and this entitled them to "make a revolution for the rest of the population."²

national labor central organized by PTB, Communist, and some former pro-Quadros labor leaders in late 1961. Also represented in FMP rallies or meetings were the non-commissioned officers (Sargentos) and a Women's Front (Frente Feminina).

See Therry, op. cit., p. 30.

Timothy Harding, "Revolution Tomorrow; The Failure of the Left in Brazil," Studies on the Left, Vol. IV, No. 4 (Fall, 1964), pp. 44 and 52, and Victor Rico Galan, a Mexican Leftist labor leader and intellectual, "The Brazilian Crisis," Monthly Review, Vol. XV, No. 12 (April, 1964), pp. 657-674, interviewed several FMP participants among whom the best known probably was Leonel Brizola. Galan felt FMP strength was "still limited at present."

¹ See Frederick Pike, "The Catholic Church and Modernization in Peru and Chile," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. XX, No. 2 (1966), pp. 272-288, for several incisive passages about priests and laymen in those countries whose naivete and rudimentary knowledge of economics have led them to advocate utopian and irresponsible solutions to complex and enormous socio-economic problems which may undermine the long-term effectiveness of the Church's position in those countries.

² Harding, op. cit., p. 51.

Important to all the student or youth groups of a reformist or radical nature was a vague concept, conscientização which was defined by different groups in a variety of ways ranging from a rational and planned politicization of the rural or urban masses to others who used it in the sense of a "planned revolution of rising expectations." The former meaning was still used in 1965 by leadership training programs of groups associating with JAC and the rural worker sindicatos of the Northeast.

See Therry, op. cit., p. 35, for further discussion of this concept.

Prior to the April, 1964, Revolution, two student groups struggled for control of the secondary and university student organizations: Catholic University Youth (Juventude Universitaria Catolica or JUC) and Popular Action (Ação Popular or AP).¹ Three outside Marxist groups also sought to capture the student groups: the Moscow-oriented faction of the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), the Revolutionary Tiradentes Movement (Movimento Revolucionario Tiradentes or MRT formed by Francisco Julião), and Workers' Politics (Política Operaria or POLOP).²

Conservative student groups apparently were never able to organize themselves nationally.³

¹There was a hierarchy of student groups. Each Faculdade (autonomous School or College) had an Academic Directorate (Diretorio Academico) or Council; these were united in State Student Unions which were in turn united at the national level by the National Student Union (Uniao Nacional de Estudantes or UNE).

Since April, 1964, this structure was changed in an attempt by the Castelo Branco government to reduce student political activity. It is difficult to determine whether the revised structure brought about by the Lei Suplicy (named after Education Minister Suplicy Lacerda) will have lasting effects or be modified by the Costa e Silva regime.

²Victor Rico Galan, op. cit., interviewed Luis Carlos Prestes who claimed "the Communist Party has great influence" in UNE; Galan, however, did not interview UNE or any other student leaders.

³Leonard Gross, op. cit., pp. 117-119, interviewed two students who were members of the Front of Democratic Youth (Frente da Juventude Democratica); in this writer's opinion the Frente had little influence and little organization outside of Rio de Janeiro or Sao Paulo. One of these students, an economist named Eduardo de Carvalho, said "a majority of Brazilian students really want a 'third solution,' not capitalism or communism . . . we must think of new ways of arranging the economic system. There are not just two systems. Somehow, we should find a way of combining both and creating a new economic system." See also Gerald Clark, The Coming Explosion in Latin America (New York: David McKay, 1962), pp. 48-54, for interviews with three conservative students at PUC, Rio de Janeiro, and Aldo Arrantes, the UNE president from July 1961-July 1962, who called himself a "socialist."

JUC was founded in 1951¹ as a confessional group with the mission of "instilling the teachings and doctrine of the Church into university youth."² Theoretically, JUC was forbidden to participate directly in university politics. In reality, however, JUC at one time was a central factor in university politics. The united front or Grupão, formed with Communists in the late 1950's, successfully controlled UNE and most of the state Student Unions and Student Councils (Diretórios Acadêmicos) or other governing bodies in each college (Faculdade) or school.³

AP was formed after a series of meetings in 1960-1961 by several JUC militants who wanted to be independent of Church control,⁴ and to

¹This writer also has seen a source giving 1937 as the founding date; the discrepancy probably involves a decline and re-organization in 1951.

²For a discussion of JUC and its worker counterpart, JOC, in France, see Barnes, op. cit., pp. 106-107, and Marcus, op. cit., pp. 304-310. A worker-priest movement never developed in Brazil similar to that in France although a close approximation is the Frente Nacional do Trabalho e Ação Católica of São Paulo. The Frente had various religious brothers, sisters, laymen lawyers, and university students working in factories and the countryside. Its principal spokesman has been a São Paulo lawyer Mario Carvalho de Jesus. Two of its publications are D. Alfred Ancel, Bishop of Lyon, France, Para Compreender a Mentalidade Operária (São Paulo: Editora Prelúdio Ltda., 1961) and A Primazia do Trabalho sobre O Capital (The Primacy of Work over Capital) (no author or publisher given for this booklet which was published in 1962).

In addition to reading Papal Encyclicals such as Mater et Magistra, Rerum Novarum, and Pacem in Terris, JUC members also read works by the former SUDENE Director and Minister of Planning, Celso Furtado, such as A Pre-Revolução Brasileira (Rio de Janeiro: Fondo de Cultura, 1962) and "Brazil: What Kind of a Revolution?" Foreign Affairs, Vol. XLI, No. 3 (April, 1963), pp. 526-535.

³Therry, op. cit., p. 33.

⁴A parallel Christian Democratic Youth (JDC) group was created within the Christian Democratic Party or PDC in the 1960's. JDC claimed 10,000 members in 1963.

assume JUC's role of cooperation with Communist groups in controlling UNE and the state Student Unions. AP spokesmen explained that this alliance was necessary if the "progressive forces" were to marshal the necessary strength to overcome those in power.¹

Some spokesmen described the alliance as "only an ephemeral and tactical pact of convenience" and affirmed their awareness that the Communist Party had its own interests in such an alliance; they further affirmed their plan to sever the united front at an opportune moment, "either shortly before or after taking power." The weakest point in the AP position, as Therry points out, is they did not seem to have thought beyond the taking of power, while one may be sure that the PCB had considered with great care what to do after the revolution.²

JUC and AP members in SUPRA and MEB programs helped organize peasant sindicatos in Bahia and the Northeast.³ AP members also combined with the Communist-dominated Union of Agricultural Laborers and Workers or ULTAB to defend the candidates of the Church-sponsored sindicatos in the elections for the first Executive Council (Diretoria) of the National Confederation of Agricultural Workers or CONTAG in December, 1963.⁴

¹Therry, op. cit., pp. 37-38.

²Ibid.

³Relatório Anual do Movimento de Educação de Base, 1962, and Ary Guimaraes, "Notas Previas sobre a Sindicalização na Bahia," typed manuscript, 1965, pp. 2-3.

⁴Therry, op. cit., pp. 38-39, and information on the makeup of members of the Diretorio contained in this writer's files. The differences

AP collaboration with the Communists brought a reaction from the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops in 1963. At that time the Bishops directed a letter to Dom Candido Padim, the head of Catholic Action in Brazil and Ecclesiastical Assistant of the JUC organization, calling on Catholic Action to "free itself from the incompatibility of certain ideological currents in vogue among the lay society":

In the concrete circumstance in which we live the militants and Catholic organizations should not enter into a united front (frente unica) with movements which arise from Marxist or liberal capitalist ideology. In receiving support [from them] there should be the greatest prudence, in order to avoid serving the infiltration of their purposes and tactics. Regarding random collaboration of persons in transitory circumstances, we will bear in mind the principles of Pacem in Terris. In vital and personal tactical positions, good preparation (boa formação) and adequate information on the part of our militants becomes indispensable in order not to compromise on questions of principle on the pretext of conquering power.¹

Nevertheless, this council did not deter AP leaders from their course. After the April 1964 Revolution, Catholic Action and Popular Action were drastically re-organized and moderate to conservative elements began working in Pernambuco, São Paulo, and other states to offset the influence of left-wing groups in the student movement.²

between the Circulos Operarios groups, headed by Jose Rotta of São Paulo, and AP-oriented groups in the Northeast, were still present in the April, 1965, elections for the Directorate of the CONTAG.

¹ Jornal do Brasil (December 28, 1963), quoted by Therry, op. cit., p. 40.

A similar tone was expressed by the moderate reformist Archbishop of Porto Alegre, Dom Vicente Scherer, in "Progressismo Inadmissivel," pastoral letter published in Correio do Povo (Porto Alegre), July 6, 1965, and Diario de Pernambuco (August 10, 1965), p. 4.

² For example, see A Decisão (São Paulo), Special Edition, August 16, 1965, which recommends candidates in 35 different Faculdades, Escolas, and other university bodies in the São Paulo area. On p. 2, is contained an editorial which says the following inter-alia: "We are Brazilians. We are young and we believe we can pioneer (desbravar) our

At the present time, the Church remains divided over the utility of collaborating with the Communists, Socialists, and "progressives." Nevertheless, the newer Catholic Action groups in Brazil have not approached the degree of organization, cohesion of ideology, or influence of their counterparts in Italy or France.¹

PCB Activities in the Student Sector

The Brazilian Communist and Socialist Parties are no exception to the statement that Brazilian political parties depended more on personalismo and patronage than on issues and party discipline.² In spite of Marxian doctrines, their penetration of organized labor and the working classes was minimal with some exceptions. Throughout the years the party has been split into several groups and was most affected

own roads, without the tutelage of anyone, whomever it might be: Peking, Washington, Moscow, or Paris." On p. 8, or the last page, it prints a number of slogans and warnings in orange and black colors: "University Student, Don't Enter into Games, Stop, Look, Listen; The Vote is Your Great Weapon against the 'Owners' of the University Students Don't be Guided by Someone Else (Nao Seja Teleguiado)."

¹ La Palombara, op. cit., pp. 291, 315-339, 404-411, and Barnes, op. cit., discuss the influence of Catholic Action groups in the government and political parties of Italy and France, respectively.

² Robert Alexander, Communism in Latin America, p. 93. Alexander's chapter on Brazil, pp. 93-133, is the best work available in English on the PCB as of 1954.

Vamireh Chacon, Historia das Ideias Socialistas no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1965) is a history of socialist ideas on Brazilian thought from its "historic roots" in the Equalitarianum of the Conspiracy of the Tailors (Alfaiates) in 1798 through its first formal discussion by Joaquim Nabuco and Antonio Pedro Figueiredo in the late 1840's to 1963. There is no real discussion of Marxist or Socialist in the trade union movement or political parties. For example, "Marxism continues in Brazil as a catalytic agent above all urban, in spite of the tentative efforts of the PC to carry it to the countryside and notwithstanding the activities of socialist such as Francisco Julião" (p. 337) is the only mention of Julião or PC activities in the 1960's.

by factionalism in 1961 when a Peking-oriented group (PC do B) broke away from the Moscow-oriented groups which followed Luiz Carlos Prestes, ostensibly over the Sino-Soviet Dispute but equally over the Cuban Revolution.¹

Aided by widespread apathy and lack of opposition, the PCB obtained control of the National Student Union or UNE during World War II and maintained this control until democratic forces regained control in 1952.² Democrats controlled the principal state student unions, the UNE, and Brazilian Union of Secondary Students (UBES) until 1956 when the Communists captured control of UNE. JUC-affiliated students took over between 1959-1961 and AP-affiliated students controlled UNE from 1961-1964.³ Since 1965, the student federations have been reorganized in an attempt to make their control by any politically-affiliated or Catholic Action group impossible.

¹Leonard Gross, "How Red is Brazil," Look (May 21, 1963), p. 113, notes the following:

"The Communists' greatest strength is in labor unions. Of five federations, they dominate three--industrial workers, bank workers and river, maritime, and air transport workers. . . . In 1940, the party had 200,000 members. By the 1950's membership dwindled to 6,000 following a court-order ban on Communists running for office. Today, Communists number 35,000 in a country of 74,000,000 . . ." See also "President João Goulart and Brazil," The Antioch Review, XXIII, No. 3 (Fall, 1963), pp. 313-330.

²Therry, op. cit., p. 46.

³Harding, op. cit., pp. 51-52, says UNE was controlled "by a coalition of Communists and Popular Action (Ação Popular or AP), a left-wing Catholic group." AP's humanistic leftist position was considered by Harding to be "the most radical of any Christian Democrat movement in Latin America and was encouraged by Christian Democrat Paulo de Tarso a PDC Federal Deputy and sometimes Minister of Education, and Prefeito of Brasilia in the 1960's and the small group of priests that work with peasants and slum dwellers."

A third Marxist-oriented group which is of interest for this study is the revolutionary group known as Política Operária (Workers Politics or Policy or PÓLOP) after an irregular periodical of that name which began publishing in 1961.¹ This small group of young people, who formerly belonged to the PTB, the PSB, the PCB, and independent Marxists published several valuable articles on peasant groups and four of its members participated in a romantic venture in Pernambuco in 1963 which led to the death of two of them.²

Communist Party Actions in the Rural Sector

In 1954, the PCB founded the Union of Agricultural Laborers and Workers or ULTAB in the hopes of increasing its influence among the rural laboring class. Its leaders, Lindolfo Silva and Nestor Vera, two factory workers, worked closely with the Ministry of Labor and SUPRA in 1963, leaving the bulk of their organizational work to Jose Portela Alves, a Rio de Janeiro naval factory worker, who headed the Sao Paulo Federation of Agricultural Workers.³ In the 1960's ULTAB also worked closely with an Agrarian Front (Frente Agrária) headed by a radical Catholic priest, Friar Carlos Josephat, who directed

¹Harding, op. cit., p. 52.

²Callado, Tempo de Arraes, pp. 104-108.

³Robert Price, op. cit., p. 58, notes that the Federation held "a convention in 1963, attended by 221 delegates and 69 directors of rural unions" which "approved resolutions in favor of a constitutional amendment which would enable the federal government to issue bonds for land expropriation, the transfer of the rural land tax from the county to the federal government, a limitation on the concession of public lands to 500 hectares, and the legal regulation of rental contracts," citing Folha de São Paulo (September 9, 1963).

the polemical journal Brasil, Urgente!¹

Nevertheless, the PCB never devoted much energy to peasant sindicatos.² During the "First National Congress of Agricultural Laborers and Workers," in Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais, November 15-18, 1961, Lindolfo Silva, ULTAB president, advocated a two-stage revolution for Brazil: first, all "progressive forces" needed to join together in a nationalist united front "to throw out imperialist influences," the second stage would have a specifically "socialist character" although he never explained what this meant.³ This view differed greatly from other radical and revolutionary Marxist and Catholics attending the Congress. Francisco Julião spoke for these persons who felt "the revolutionary process" was "an overall phenomenon [which] uses the different contradictions of Brazilian society to propel itself" into a situation like Cuba "where an anti-imperialist

¹Padre or Friar Carlos Josephat appeared at several peasant Congresses to make fiery speeches denouncing the Brazilian agrarian and political structure. The absence of information about the Agrarian Front's activities probably indicates that Josephat was a much better public speaker than an organizer of groups which needed bureaucratic structure and local leadership to function.

²Lloyd A. Free, Some International Implications of the Political Psychology of Brazilians (2d printing; Princeton: The Institute for International Social Research, September, 1944), pp. 45-46, discovered only 8 per cent of the rural public expressed the opinion that Communists would work for the best interests of Brazil. In addition, 54 per cent of the rural public "didn't know," and "37 per cent expressed the opinion the Communists would work for Russia and Communism." In contrast, 53 per cent of the urban public expressed an opinion the Communists would work for the interests of Russia and Communism, while 36 per cent didn't know. Overall, if there was "a danger zone, it lies with the lower groups in the big cities." Hence, the PCB and ULTAB may have been allocating their resources in a reasonably rational manner.

³As duas faces do congresso camponês," O Metropolitano (November 25, 1961), p. 8.

struggle has to unfold immediately¹ into an effort of socialist construction. These two elements act as inter-dependent forces."¹ In effect, there was division among the left which was to continue through the April 1964 Revolution.

The Socialist Party in the Rural Sector

The Brazilian Socialist Party was never a European or Argentine Socialist-type party with ideological and leadership roots in the working or peasant class.² PSB candidates won in most cases because they were traditional landowner-politicians with peasant following³ or industrialists⁴ with funds and personal followings. And once in office as Governors, Federal Deputies, or State Deputies, PSB members or PSB-supported officials were never responsible for any significant social welfare or other legislation nor for enforcement of existing

¹ Ibid.

² Peterson, op. cit., pp. 84-87, discusses the origins of the party in 1945-1946 as a split of UDN members. Its principal leaders through the years were Francisco Mangabeira of Bahia, his son Joao, Hermes Lima, a labor lawyer from São Paulo, Osorio Borba, and Mario Pedroso.

Antonio Callado, Os Industriais da Sêca, p. 36, characterizes the PSB as a "party of cultured people, intelligent but without the slightest idea of what to do politically with itself." From a doctrinal point of view, all possible causes had already been taken by the PCB, the PTB, and UDN.

³ The Mangabeiras fall in this category. In Pernambuco, Barbosa Lima Sobrinho ran on the PSB ticket in 1947 with the aid of the Northeast's most famous colonels, Chico Romao of Serrita and Chico Heraclio de Rigo of Limoeiro. See Vilaça and Albuquerque, Coronel, Coronéis, p. 111.

⁴ See Fortes, "Contribuição a Historia politica de Sergipe," p. 102, for data on Sergipe author-industrialist Orlando Viera Dantas, a UDN-left-wing leader whom the PSB nominated as candidate for Governor and Federal Senator in 1947.

legislation in favor of urban workers or peasants; rather they were interested in patronage for their followers.¹

Summary

Of the various pressure groups active in rural areas in the 1950's and 1960's, it can be seen that the large landowners had greater unity and better organization than any of the other groups. The overall weakness of radical Church, university, and Marxist-oriented groups manifested itself March 31-April 1, 1964, when their leaders could not compose their longstanding personal and ideological differences to resist the civilian and military groups which wished to overthrow the Goulart government.

The reader may thus have a greater appreciation of the obstacles facing anyone or any group which wished to organize a peasant pressure group.

¹HAR, Vol. XVI (March, 1963), p. 82, indicates Joao Mangabeira resigned as Minister of Justice and Francisco Mangabeira, his son, resigned as President of Petrobras following rumors of corruption and malfeasance in the Petrobras organization.

CHAPTER IV

THE LIGAS CAMPONESAS AS A PRESSURE GROUP

Introduction

Agrarian reform was a topic of general concern to few Brazilians until the 1960's because the subject, until then, had been ignored except by a few scholars and political activists.¹ However, in the late 1950's, interest in agrarian reform was aroused by the activities of Francisco Julião and the Peasant Leagues.

In the Northeast, peasants traditionally had followed those leaders who secured benefits for them; the Ligas grew because Julião and other leaders secured specific benefits for their followers. But because the organization was dependent on Julião's personal leadership and did not develop any other leaders--except in Paraíba--who could assume responsibility, Julião lost control of the movement he unleashed.²

In order to understand the growth and impact of the Peasant Leagues as a pressure group, it is necessary to include the following:

¹José Artur Rios, "Introdução," Recomendações sobre Reforma Agrária (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Brasileiro de Ação Democrática, 1961), pp. xii-xiii, discusses the history of agrarian reform proposals in Brazil. Smith, Agrarian Reform, Chapter VI, is a translation of Rios' work.

See John F. Santos, "A Psychologist Reflects on Brazil," in Baklanoff, op. cit., pp. 259-260, for comments which include, inter-alia, "the lack of interest of many urban Brazilians in knowing more about their own country, especially the interior. They are fascinated by the people but are fearful and suspicious of them . . . The rural areas . . . represent another world of realities and values, another way of life which should best remain in the past, to be talked about but not experienced."

²For a discussion of the importance of controlling the "scope"

(1) the political background and appeal of Julião; (2) establishment of the first Liga at Engenho Galileia, Município of Vitoria de Santo Antão; (3) the personalistic nature of many of the Northeast Ligas; (4) the myths and realities of peasant "invasions," and (5) the impact of the Ligas on intranational and international politics.

Francisco Julião's Family and
Political Background

Francisco Julião de Arruda Paula rose rapidly to national attention in 1959-1961. There was nothing particularly unique in his rapid rise to prominence--ther well known Brazilian politicians such as Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira, Jânio Quadro da Silva, Leonel Brizola, and João Belchior Marques Goulart had similar meteoric rises to power.¹ Julião was a member of a landowning family with at least two medium-sized properties in the Município of Bom Jardim as a source of income,² who differed little from other well-known landowning

and "contagiousness" of conflict as a determinant of who gets involved and who makes decisions in politics, see E. E. Schadtschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People, pp. 3, 20, and 67-68.

¹All went from councilman upward without losing an election: Kubitschek from councilman to Prefeito of Belo Horizonte to State Governor of Minas Gerais to President; Quadros from Councilman to Prefeito of São Paulo to State Governor to Federal Deputy in Paraná to President; Brizola from councilman to Prefeito of Porto Alegre to Governor to Federal Deputy for Guanabara (greater Rio de Janeiro); Goulart from Prefeito of Uruguaina, RGS, to Minister of Labor (1952-1954), and Vice President in 1956 and 1960.

²The Arruda de Paulo owned two old-fashioned sugar plantations called Cova de Onça and Esperança. They were not, however, very active in Município religious, business, social, and political life. See Mario Souto Maior and Moacir Souto Maior, Roteiro de Bom Jardim (Limoeiro; Pernambuco: Antonio Vilaca, 1954) for an interesting account of the Município and its leading personalities since the first

politicians from Bom Jardim such as Oswaldo Lima Filho, Sylvio da Motta Silveira, Manuel Gonçalves Souto Maior, and Francisco "Chico" Heraclio de Rego.¹ However, Julião discovered how to successfully sway peasant groups, university and secondary students, urban workers, and journalists through the use of demagogic appeals filled with imagery and the "radical" symbolism associated with the names of Karl Marx,² Fidel Castro,³ Mao Tse-tung, and other world

Church was established there in 1757. Of several hundred persons mentioned only two appear related to the Arruda de Paulo family prior to 1954; Heliodoro Gonçalves de Arruda, a leader in the St. Vincent de Paul religious society in the early 1900's and Jose Severino de Paula Filho, one of fifteen merchants in 1954. Francisco Juliao is not mentioned at all as a prominent personality.

Irving Louis Horowitz, Revolution in Brazil (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1964), p. 21, is in error in stating that Juliao "was born of a family of small tenant farmers, with an earning power that was slightly better than average."

¹Oswaldo Lima Filho, a PTB Federal Deputy was Minister of Agriculture for President Goulart in 1963; Lima Filho's son, Oswaldo Lima Neto, was elected Prefeito in October, 1962.

Sylvio da Motta Silveira, PSD leader and Prefeito 1951-1954, was an old-style aristocratic coronel of the style written about by Gilberto Freyre or Vilaça and Albuquerque, Coronel, Coronéis, although not as well known as Heraclio Rego, whose power and economic base was in the neighboring município of Limoeiro.

Souto Maior was a two-time PSD Prefeito, one of whose two sons Moacyr ran unsuccessfully for State Deputy in October, 1962, on the ticket with João Cleofas.

Julião apparently was no different than the above men in attempting to buy votes with gifts of shoes, shirts, beer, rum (cachaça) and using trucks and automobiles to transport rural voters to town at election time.

²Gerald Clark, The Coming Explosion in Latin America (New York: David McKay Company, 1962), pp. 206-297, interviewed Antonio Callado who doubted that Julião ever had read a "book on Lenin or even Marx." Callado added "He is no fool, of course. He reads papers and knows what is going on in Russia and Cuba. But I am sure it doesn't bother him if a North American newspaperman pays a visit and rushes away labelling him a 'Communist.' The publicity only builds him up."

³Lloyd A. Free, Some International Implications of the Political

figures to transform himself from a typical politician with a limited peasant following¹ responding to traditional appeals and techniques²

Psychology of Brazilians, pp. 50-51, found Castro was least known in rural areas (only 6 per cent were able to identify him compared to 50 per cent in cities over 500,000) and less well-regarded in rural areas than in any other population area (2.7 on a scale ranging from zero at the bottom to ten at the top; 4.3 in cities over 500,000, lower than any other prominent leader on the list).

The use of the Castro image thus may have had a negative effect among the rural masses as well as large landowners although it probably pleased many leftist nationalists.

¹Julião's vote-gathering ability is listed below:

1945-As a Republican Party (PR) candidate for Federal Deputy, he received approximately 500 votes in losing.

1947-As a PR candidate for State Deputy, he received about 400 votes in losing.

195 -As a Socialist Party (PSB) candidate for State Deputy, he received about 400 votes which, under the peculiarities of the state's proportional representation system, was enough to make him an Alternate (Suplente) Deputy for the PSB.

1958-As a PSB candidate for State Deputy, he gained 3,216 votes and was named State President of the PSB shortly thereafter.

1962-As a PSB candidate for Federal Deputy supporting part of the PTB and the PCB in the Basic Civic Alliance (Aliança de Base Cívica or ABC) to elect Miguel Arraes Governor against João Cleofas, candidate of the PSD and UDN in the Democratic Popular Front (Frente Popular Democrático or FPD), Julião received 16,266 votes, second to Waldemar Luiz Alvarez who was the principal ABC candidate (16,266 votes).

²Callado, Os Industriais, pp. 113-121, Leda Barreto, Julião, Nordeste, Revolução, pp. 76-77, and Julião, Que Son las Ligas Campesinas?, pp. 34-43, describe in part how Liga meetings were conducted, especially giving credit to the troubadours of the Northeast (viroleiros or cantadores) for making the Ligas and Julião well known.

The NET television program, "Brazil, The Troubled Land" (1963) is one of several television documentaries which also showed the troubadours participating in Liga meetings.

Nevertheless, this writer seriously doubts that the songs and verses of the troubadours increased the political activism of Northeast peasants although the songs may have increased the number of peasants seeking favors from Julião and the Ligas. In a similar vein, this author was the object of verses by troubadours in the Independencia Plaza, Recife, and in the interior município of Lajedo, Pernambuco. However, the author seriously doubts that his presence had much impact on local political activity although it may have contributed something to political folk-lore just as the songs of Joan Baez, Pete Seeger, or the cartoon strips "Little Orphan Annie," "Li'l Abner," and "Dick Tracy."

into a charismatic leader with an urban base responding to modern publicity and propaganda techniques.¹

Many of Julião's speeches and writings were ambiguous and vague even on the topic of agrarian reform.² On one occasion, he told a sympathetic writer, "I am a radical but not a sectarian," who responds

¹In October, 1962, Julião founded a newspaper, Liga, in Rio de Janeiro. In mid-1963, he founded two new political movements, the Urban Leagues (Ligas urbanas) and the Revolutionary Tiradentes Movement (Movimento Revolucionario Tiradentes or MRT). The alleged goal of the Ligas Urbanas was to force rents down, provided more "popular housing"--probably meaning more housing for the poor, and "organization of the poor in Rio de Janeiro" so that they could "defend their own interests." The MRT was an organization designed to recruit university students to administer the peasant and urban ligas and to build a bloc of voters in other than the Northeast. Leadership of both these groups also depended on Julião.

For a discussion of the MRT, see Leonard D. Therry, "Dominant Power Components in the Brazilian University Student Movement Prior to April, 1964," p. 32.

Horowitz, op. cit., p. 21, is a typical example of writers in the United States who presumed Julião was a long-term Socialist. Horowitz states that Julião suffered "electoral defeats in 1945 and again in 1950," finally succeeding "in 1954 and also in 1958 in gaining sufficient electoral support from the literate elements" in Recife "and the surrounding provinces (sic.) to be elected to the Brazilian Congress.

Mario Souto Maior told this writer that some people suggest that Julião switched to the Socialist Party in order to get votes from the railroad, textile, and sugar mill workers in Jaboatão, called "Moscouzinho" (Little Moscow) by many Pernambucans. Julião himself has never discussed his earlier Republican Party candidacies.

²Even at the First National Congress of Peasants (or Agricultural Laborers and Workers) in Belo Horizonte, November 15-17, 1961, Julião never specified what "radical agrarian reform" really meant. See "As duas faces do congresso campones," O Metropolitano (November 25, 1961), p. 8, for a discussion of Julião's speech.

A copy of the "Declaration of Belo Horizonte" listing twelve measures which would contribute to the "realization of agrarian reform" is contained in Julião, Que Son las Ligas Campesinas?, pp. 95-97. Surprisingly, Julião's speech to the Congress is not contained in this Spanish-language publication. This writer does not know if the Belo Horizonte Declaration is contained in the Portuguese-original; it is not contained in the collections of Horowitz or any other writer.

and appeals to the "mysticism of the peasant."¹ In fact, he would have been more accurate had he stated that he appealed to the "ignorance of the peasant."

Julião's speeches seldom appealed to the intellect. He used simple language, parables, references to Jesus Christ and various world leaders, denunciations of the United States and the large landowners, and encouraged the peasants to have a sense of dignity and importance. In addition, Julião's speeches in the State Assembly, the legal defense work of Peasant League offices in Recife and João Pessoa, Paraíba, the news of the expropriation of Engenho Galileia, and his handouts of clothing and medicine, all attracted numbers of peasants and other persons who wanted to associate themselves with a man who might become a great political leader in the future and thus appeared to offer greater opportunities for political advancement to his associates than any other Northeastern political leader. By 1960 the Ligas Camponesas had gone beyond the "takeoff stage" and were in a self-sustaining spiral of growth: for the greater the number of persons flocking to Julião's banner, the greater the number of legal cases to present to the courts, and then the greater the number of handouts which led to a greater number of persons flocking to his banner, and so forth.

One of his most widely quoted speeches or writings is entitled "The Charter of Liberation of the Peasant," published in April, 1961,

¹Leda Barreto, Julião, Nordeste, Revolução (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1963), p. 55.

Figure 11. --Francisco Julião addressing a meeting at Engenho Galiléia, Vitória de Santo Antão, Pernambuco.

Source: "A Fidel Front Among Impoverished Peasants," Life (June 2, 1961), p. 89.




Figure 12.--An example of Julião's use of Fidel Castro as a Symbol. Photograph of a political rally in Recife, Pernambuco, following the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. The portrait of the Cuban leader is by Abelardo da Hora, a "Revolutionary artist."

Source: Life (June 2, 1961), pp. 82-83.



Red Chinese agent, who came on a Cuban plane carrying propaganda, was detained by police. He explained he wanted to "aid and counsel" Uruguayan trade unions, and was freed.



Anti-Castro agent—working for U.S.—Cuban liberation movement—sits in cafe of Cuban embassy and uses copies of identity to keep track of arriving Castro



which contains many of the themes used by Julião after he became a "peasant leader":¹

You and your brothers make up almost all of Brazil. It is you who kill [sic.] our hunger. And you die of hunger. It is you who clothe us. And you live in rags. You give the soldier to defend the fatherland. And the fatherland forgets you. You give the hired killer to serve the latifundio. And the hired killer terrorizes you. You give alms to the Church. And the Church asks you for resignation in the name of Christ. But Christ was a rebel. And for that reason he ascended the cross. And like Christ and the good St. Francis of Italy, I also stand by your side. And two who are still alive, Mao Tse-tung of China and Fidel Castro of Cuba. All of them were victorious because they were with you and you with them.

.....
The latifundio is cruel. It shields itself with the police and hired killers. It elects your worst enemies. And to win your votes, it uses two formulas: violence and guile (astucia). The latifundio provokes fear in you with violence and deceives you with cunning. Violence is the hired killer and the police. It is the threat to drive you from the land. To destroy your home. To uproot the crops you have planted in the fields. To kill you with hunger. To call you a Communist and to tell you that God will punish you. As though there could be a greater punishment than that you already are living under, chained to the latifundio. In the name of a liberty that is not your liberty. And of a God that is not your God.

And the greatest cunning is to treat you as a godfather (compadre) To enter your house gentle as a lamb, with claws concealed, with poison hidden. And to offer you a flask of medicine. And a car

¹Francisco Julião, Que Son las Ligas Campesinas?, pp. 75-77 and 84. The original reportedly appeared as "A Alforria do Camponês," O Semanario (Rio de Janeiro), No. 253, April, 1961. Probably the best translation into English of the Portuguese original which is difficult to obtain is that by Frank Bonilla in "Rural Reform in Brazil," AUFS Reports, East Coast South America Series, Vol. VIII, No. 4 (October, 1961), pp. 8 and 10.

Horowitz, op. cit., pp. 46-52, contains a translation of the "Charter" under the title "letter from Recife," however, several words are translated differently by Danielle Salti than by this writer or the Bonilla text, i.e., capanga (hired killer, gunman, or body-guard) is translated in the Horowitz text variously as "sheriff" or capanga.

Another speech which gained a great deal of publicity for Julião is one made to a university student gathering in Ouro Preto, Minas Gerais. It appears as "Brazil, A Christian Country?" in Leo Huberman and Paul Sweazy (eds.), Whither Latin America (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1963), pp. 108-110.

to take your wife to the hospital. And a little money as a loan. Or a note for credit at the company store (barracão). And to catch you unaware at election time to say, 'Compadre, get your ballot ready. If my candidate wins, things will change.' And if they change, they change for the worse.

.....

What kind of democracy is this that watches your assassination in cold blood as a spectator, that sees your blood soaking into the soil you conquered with your axe and does not come to your aid? That democracy is not yet yours. It belongs to the gunman. How many rivers of blood have to run through this immense Brazil before democracy realizes that no gunman's claim ought to prevail over your title which is your own life? The law depends on your union because Democracy depends on your union. It is necessary that you unite, then as cement unites a wall so that Democracy feel your force and the law is made in your favor.

We therefore should not find it particularly unusual for a plantation with the symbolic name of Galileia to attract Julião's interest.

Engenho Galiléia, Home of the First Liga¹

As indicated in the Preface, few people have studied the growth and impact of the Ligas with objectivity or in the context of Northeast politics. To appreciate the impact of the Ligas Camponesas, one must know something about the growth of the first Liga at Engenho Galileia, which many people claim to know but which few people have actually visited.

¹Antonio Callado, Os Industriais da Sêca, pp. 33-44 and Tempo de Arraes, pp. 39-61, and Correia Andrade, A Terra e o Homem no Nordeste, pp. 241-251, are the principal sources for much of the material on the first Liga. Callado, however, is not specific about the dates of many events.

Julião, Que Son las Ligas Camponesas?, pp. 23-29, briefly discusses the Galileia Liga.

This writer visited the Engenho and its peasant sindicato June 14 and July 4, 1965, and the Municipio of Vitoria de Santo Antão on four other occasions.

Engenho Galileia occupied 500 hectares (about 1,200 acres) of rocky and hilly land in a município which straddles the Mata and Agreste zones of Pernambuco. The family of Oscar Beltrão de Arruda (possibly a far-removed relative of Francisco Julião de Arruda Paula) owned the engenho on which approximately 140 families lived in 1954-1955. In 1965, at least four other engenhos in the municípios were owned by sons or close relatives of Senhor Beltrão:¹

Engenho Amparo - Abelardo Beltrão
 Engenho Solidade - Abelardo Beltrão
 Engenho Brasil - Antonio Bacelar de Arruda
 Engenho Cachoerinha - Jaime Beltrão

The Beltrão family had not lived in the Casa Grande for many years after it stopped producing sugar cane in competition with the usinas in the 1930's.² Instead, it rented small plots of five to fifteen acres to truck farmers who produced cassava flour (farinha de Mandioca), vegetables and bananas. Normally, one of the family members collected the heavy rents which had gone up from 220 cruzeiros to 1,700 cruzeiros in 1955 (approximately \$22.00 per month) from Jose Francisco de Souza, the Feitor (Administrator) of the Engenho since 1922.³ When the increased rent bore heavily on the moradores,

¹From a list of sixty two engenhos and their owners that the author compiled from files of the Sindicato of Rural Workers, Vitoria, June 14, 1965.

²Correia Andrade, op. cit., p. 243, indicates "the high prices of sugar and the construction of highways resulted in an increase of the potential output of the sugar factories." One consequence was the eviction of tenants in some regions who had grown coffee or fruits by owners who wanted to increase their sugar plantings.

³This writer does not know if sugar prices continued at a high level in the early 1950's or if the Beltrão's tried to increase sugar



Figure 13.--The Casa Grande, Engenho Galiléia, Município of Vitória de Santo Antão, Pernambuco, July 7, 1965. Members of the first Peasant League converted the house into a school. Teachers did not want to commute to or live in the countryside to teach peasants.



Figure 14.--Looking down from the porch of the Casa Grande-school, Engenho Galiléia, toward the hills in which the Engenho is located. Patches of sugar cane and bananas may be seen in the background.

José Francisco de Souza led them into organizing a mutual benefit society to protect those members who became ill or lagged on the rent (foro) payment. A lawyer¹ who specialized in the organization of mutual benefit burial societies to purchase coffins and bury the dead² formalized the group's aspirations into an organization with the somewhat pompous title of the Agricultural and Livestock Society of Pernambuco)³--a Brazilian equivalent of the Benevolent and Protective Orders of Elks, or Moose, in the United States.

plantings by evicting the tenants through increased rents. Os Industriais, p. 34.

Callado does not indicate a year or date when the rent was 220 cruzeiros per month. For example, in July 1947, the free market rate was 22 cruzeiros per U. S. dollar, 32 per U. S. dollar in July 1950, and 54 cruzeiros per U. S. dollar in January, 1954.

"A Revolução de Enxada," Manchete, No. 398, December 5, 1959, pp. 84-86, indicates peasants were paying 1,700 cruzeiros per month to rent land as foreiros along with one day of cambão. At 1959 exchange rates (170-189 cruzeiros per U. S. dollar), this means from \$8.00-11.20).

¹Callado, op. cit., does not discuss the intermediary role of this lawyer. Other writers also have ignored this man's role apparently accepting Callado's description of events that the Galiléia foreiros went directly to Julião for help.

Because of the nature of the conversations with Galiléia foreiros, the lawyer's name was not given or noted in the notes this writer made on his trips to the engenho.

²Callado, Os Industriais da Sêca, p. 41, lists several of these mutual benefit societies (mortuárias): Amor e Trabalho (Love and Work), Obreiros do Bem (Workers for Good) and the Sociedade Mortuária (Burial Society). All three functioned when this writer visited Vitoria in mid-1965. Monthly contributions were 100 cruzeiros (US\$.06) contrasted to the 10 cruzeiros (US\$.02) of 1960. One of the organizations had a sign above the door which read as follows: "Leave Politics Outside!"

³Clark, op. cit., pp. 203-204 and Josue de Castro, Death in the Northeast (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 7-21, attribute the organization of the first Liga at Galiléia to one João Firminio. However, this writer never heard this name mentioned in Vitoria de Santo Antônio nor does it appear in any of the literature on the Ligas with which this writer is familiar. De Castro, who wrote this book

Although the aging Oscar de Arruda Beltrão thought the idea was a good one and agreed to become Honorary President, his son João Beltrão opposed creation of the organization and asked the police to evict the moradores. The police refused, whereupon Beltrão sought a formal eviction notice from a Victoria judge "to modernize the property by converting it into a cattle ranch." The tenants' lawyer then guided them to Francisco Julião in November-December 1954.¹ Julião, who had just been elected an Alternate PSB State Deputy in the Pernambuco State Assembly, accepted the case. On January 1, 1955, he changed the legal status of the Galiléia mutual society to that of a Society for Philanthropic Ends (Sociedade para Fins Beneficentes) with headquarters in Recife but with the ability to create branches or delegacies in other parts of the state.

Nothing further developed in the legal case for four years but Julião was to propel the incident into statewide and national fame. One of the immediate actions contributing to this fame was an attempt to label the Galiléia groups as a "Communist-inspired attempt" to resurrect the abortive attempts to organize peasant leagues in

in Geneva, Switzerland, may in fact have used Clark as one of his sources in addition to Antonio Callado's articles which were gathered together in Os Industriais da Sêca and Tempo de Arraes in which the name of José Francisco de Souza is mentioned. De Castro's long-distance writing is weak on several other historical grounds, for example, when he states that "Julião turned to politics and was elected a deputy to the Pernambuco State Assembly" after he began the "legal struggle to keep the peasants from being driven out of Galiléia" (p. 17).

¹Several writers including Rubens Rodrigues dos Santos "A Sudene e a Revolução Nordestina," O Estado de São Paulo (Separata), April 28-May 7, 1963, p. 6:2, say the Beltrão family went to court and the peasants to Julião in 1960. In fact, events began as far back as 1954.

1940-1945.¹ In addition, Governor and General Oswaldo Cordeiro de Farias² ordered State Police to arrest Julião in Vitoria³ and to carry him to Recife where he was released after news of the first arrest in many years of an Alternate State Deputy leaked out.⁴

¹Julião, op. cit., p. 28, and Leda Barreto, op. cit., p. 110, briefly discuss this phenomenon although differing on the dates when this occurred during the 1940's, Julião saying that these "organizations were founded in 1945."

²General Cordeiro de Farias first gained public attention as a member of the Tenentes Revolt in 1924 with Luiz Carlos Prestes. In 1936 or 1937, Cordeiro de Farias was appointed by Getúlio Vargas as Interventor-Governor of Rio Grande do Sul. In this position, he later engendered feelings of indignation from German, Italian, and other non-Luso-Brazilians over the destruction by state police of foreign cultural enterprises including schools, churches and libraries, as well as organizing a system of spies to report on people who spoke German, Italian or other languages in public or their homes. To many Luso-Brazilians, these foreign groups were a "cultural cyst" which needed to be destroyed. The "nationalization of culture" in Brazil is analogous to the treatment of Nissei on the West Coast of the United States in 1941-1944. In the 1960's, the General was a "hard-line" anti-Communist, unsympathetic to any social reform measures.

³Carrying out the arrest was Captain Jesus Jardim, apparently one of the more important police officials engaged in harassing politicians in disfavor with Cordeiro de Farias. Vilaça and Albuquerque, Coronel, Coronéis, p. 127, note that Captain Jardim was also sent to Limoeiro between 1952-1954 to depose Colonel Francisco He-raclio de Rego. Vilaça originally was one of three men whom the Governor depended upon to aid Jardim in the conspiracy which ultimately failed.

⁴Julião was a member of a delegation led by Jânio Quadros who went to Cuba in the midst of his campaign for the Brazilian presidency and "left the impression he was sympathetic to Fidel's socialist experiment, although he protested, the misuse which he claimed the Cuban regime made of his public statements." See Skidmore, op. cit., p. 191. Julião, op. cit., p. 43, says nothing about Quadros' impressions but states that the trip "contributed to further the bonds of solidarity between the Peasant Leagues of the Northeast and that sister people."

Julião further cultivated the image of a "radical peasant leader" by visiting the Soviet Union in 1957, Cuba in March 1960 and May 1961-- after Fidel Castro came to power--¹ and Communist China.

After the incident with the police, Julião established branches or delegacias of the Liga Camponesa in several municípios in the coastal zone which contributed votes to the 1958 victory of progressive sugar industrialist Cid Sampaio over Jarbás Maranhão, the candidate of General Cordeiro de Farias.²

Final events surrounding the expropriation of the Galileia plantation and the two others in the immediate vicinity show a remarkable similarity to the traditional Brazilian phenomenon of politically inspired "invasions" and a high degree of collusion or curious coincidence of events involving Julião, Sampaio and other landowners.

¹"Cuba to Train Latins," New York Times (May 12, 1961), p. 6:4, is an inaccurately titled article about Julião's visit to May Day activities in Havana following the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion. While Castro reportedly invited Julião to send groups of peasants to Cuba for training, there is no evidence that any Northeastern peasants received such training although various peasants accompanied Julião and other Brazilian politicians on brief guided tours of the island.

²Julião, op. cit., p. 47, notes the Ligas supported the candidacy of Sampaio who, "once in power, turned against them and against the people, conspiring with General Cordeiro de Farias during the strike of Pernambuco university students in April, 1961, and with Carlos Lacerda, Governor of Guanabara, in the political-military crisis of August of the same year, when Jânio Quadros abandoned the Presidency of the Republic."

Sampaio won a majority of the vote in thirteen coastal municípios in which there was Liga activity between 1956 and 1960 while Jarbas Maranhão won a majority in only four of these municípios. On the other hand, in the interior where there were no Ligas, Sampaio won only thirty two municípios compared to fifty municípios won by Maranhão. Unfortunately, the absence of published material on the establishment of Liga groups in these municípios undercuts to a degree the high correlation between Liga activity and the vote for Sampaio.

In January, 1959, Julião staged a rally (parade) in front of the State Assembly with 3,000 peasants who were brought from the Julião family properties of Cova de Onça and Esperança in Bom Jardim and from Liga branches at Limão (near Jaboatão) and Miroeira (near Olinda and Paulista, just north of Recife). After a series of speeches, the crowd marched across the river to the Governor's Palace for another rally which several deputies and Governor Sampaio addressed.¹ Later that night, after the President of the Assembly, Antonio Alves, convoked several extraordinary sessions to consider expropriation bills, the Assembly passed a Decree-Law which Governor Sampaio signed.² Sampaio said that he had been informed that the Vitoria judge was going to order the eviction of the Galiléia peasants; Sampaio was not prepared to use force to remove the peasants or additional "agitators" whom Julião or others had encouraged to "squat" on the Galiléia property.³ Governor Sampaio stated that he

¹Callado, Os Industriais, pp. 132-135, and Julião, op. cit., p. 27, discuss the rally as if it were a spontaneous event. On the other hand, Callado, Os Industriais, p. 49, indicates that Julião "brought" 600 peasants to Recife on May Day 1956, and, in 1958, Julião "brought 3,000" peasants to the city for the First Congress of Foreiros and Rural Proprietors, one of whose events was a "march on the Legislative Assembly where there was a session dedicated to Agrarian Reform." Hence, it is not out of the realm of probability to consider this latter meeting as a "practice run" or a meeting whose organizational experience could be utilized for a meeting to "push" expropriation of the Galileia property.

²In the light of Julião's remarks in Que Son las Ligas Camponesas?, cited in footnote 2, p. 106 about the Liga's relationship to Sampaio, it would hardly appear as if Sampaio's signature of this bill constituted a "betrayal of the Ligas, although Sampaio may have turned against the Ligas or, more properly, Julião, later.

³Interview with Cid Sampaio, Usina Roçadinho, Pernambuco, July 9, 1965, and "As Ligas camponesas e os planos de reforma agrária,"

organized a State Land Sales and Colonization Company (Companhia de Revenda e Colonização or CRC) to "relieve some of the population and political pressures" in the coastal region of the state as well as to increase agricultural productivity and diversification.¹ In surveying the 500 hectare Galiléia property, the CRC discovered the impossibility of dividing it into 10 hectare plots for each of its original 146 families. The CRC therefore bought two nearby plantations, Engenhos Barra and Terra Prêta, which covered an additional 530 hectares. These two plantations were also over-crowded with 256 families. Consequently, a model cooperative with only fifty families was established on these two plantations and the Galiléia plantation left in the hands of its inhabitants who, as of mid-1965, had no title to their land but who also did not pay rent to anyone.² In this sense their organized group activity was beneficial although little additional government assistance has been rendered.³

O Metropolitano, September 23, 1961, pp. 2 and 8, indicate Julião resisted attempts of the Sampaio colonization agency, the CRC, to split up the Galiléia group--an attempt which, if successful, would destroy much of the symbolism of the Galiléia group.

¹ Interview with Sampáio, July 9, 1965.

² Interview with José Francisco de Souza, Engenho Galiléia, July 4, 1965.

³ The Galiléia peasants converted the Beltrão "Big House" into a school with two classrooms and housing for a teacher and his family. However, no teacher wished to live there. Three female primary school teachers who hitherto commuted to the Engenho to teach no longer came because one of their members who owned a jeep became "ill" in March, 1965. The other two members refused to make the trip which could be made by bus and a one-mile hike. In fact, it appears that women school teachers are most reluctant to teach in rural areas in Pernambuco especially if there are few opportunities to meet eligible bachelors of high status. City schools offer better teaching facilities, higher status, and greater opportunities for marriage.

In June, 1965, José Francisco de Souza and others showed this writer an electric generator which was used to power lights in the school at night and which reportedly had been given them by "President Kennedy." On the other hand, this writer read a newspaper report that military officers claimed they found the

In the 1959-1960 period, several persons and groups benefitted from the activity at Engenho Galiléia: (1) the resident peasants gained land and protection from Governor Sampaio; (2) Julião and other agrarian reformers or revolutionaries gained a symbol to manipulate; (3) Sampaio assured himself of continued support from Julião and the Ligas; and the Beltrão family and the owners and peasants of the Barra and Terra Preta plantations were rewarded in differing fashion by the state treasury.¹

The final events surrounding the expropriation of the three plantations are not unrelated to a traditional Brazilian phenomenon of politically inspired "invasions," by which landowners arrange to have their fazendas invaded in hopes that the state or the federal government will expropriate all or part of the property on behalf of the "invaders" or for some other use.² In fact, landowners may even arrange to have the land of political opponents "invaded" and attempt to persuade the state or federal government to expropriate the land in what is in effect a punitive action against one's opponents--a phenomenon which will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.

generator and a radio transmitter there in April, 1964, after occupying the Engenho when they heard reports about "armed guerillas" being trained there. The actual truth of the matter may never be known.

¹This writer was unable to satisfactorily determine the ownership of the Barra and Terra Preta properties or the amount of money paid them or the Beltrão family for these properties.

²Galjart, op. cit., p. 19, discusses this phenomenon in the 1960's in the state of Rio de Janeiro.

Although Julião sometimes urged his followers to resort to "invasion" of state-owned properties or was accused of inciting peasants to take over the land which they cultivated--his political opponents also used the technique against him. In one particular case, Ney Maranhão, a PTB Federal Deputy for the past fifteen years, was elected Prefeito of Moreno Municipio in 1959 with Liga support. However, once Julião began talking about "Radical Agrarian Reform" in terms of the expropriation of privately owned fazenda property, Maranhão broke with Julião. Maranhão loaded landless peasants into a truck and sent them to the Fazenda Espera property of the Arruda de Paula family in Bom Jardim, telling them:

The head of the Peasant Leagues ought to set a good example by distributing land of his own family which was unfarmed at the time.

Like those he had been attacking, Julião also called the police and took legal steps to prevent "outsider" peasants from occupying his family land.¹

The Myth and Reality of Peasant
League-Inspired "Invasions"

As noted briefly above the expropriation of the Galiléia property showed a remarkable similarity to a traditional Brazilian phenomenon of politically inspired "invasions."

¹Nathan S. Haverstock, "Brazil's Hungry Millions," Saturday Evening Post (October 28, 1962), p. 78, says "Julião lost face when opposition leaders organized a peasant league to take over Julião's own estate outside . . . of Recife" but does not identify the "leaders" or the "estate."

Mario Souto Maior confirmed Maranhão's role in the Espera "invasion" in a letter to this writer, December 1, 1965.

Figure 15. --"Politically Inspired Invasions or Not?" Pictures of squatters in the Municipios of Itaguai and Dúque de Caxias, State of Rio de Janeiro (August-September, 1961).

Source: From Frank Bonilla, "Rural Reform in Brazil," AJFS Reports, Vol. VIII, No. 4 (October, 1961), p. 6.



In view of the many accusations that the Ligas Camponesas incited peasants in many states to "invade" sugar plantations,¹ burn the cane fields,² or destroy crops and livestock, it is necessary to examine five traditional types of "invasions" with political overtones in Brazilian history:

1. Landowners who want to sell their fazendas or part of their properties but cannot obtain a favorable cash price or other terms on the open market, arrange to have them invaded in hopes that the state or federal government will expropriate all or part of the property on behalf of the "invaders" or for some other use.
2. Competing politicians may arrange to have the land of their political opponents "invaded" in an attempt to destroy, weaken, or intimidate them or their followers not only through squatter "invasions" harassment of tenants but also through attempts to persuade the state or federal government to expropriate the land in a further punitive action.³

¹Correia Andrade, op. cit., p. 250, notes that throughout "the years, notices appear of fire which devour hundreds and, at times, thousands of tons of cane, causing damages to the proprietors [of these fields] since "burned sugar cane" has to be grouped within two or three days and the sugar mills discount [about] 10 per cent of the value of the cane" [when it is burned]. It ought to be pointed out that many times the fires are provoked by sparks from the [Northeast] Railway or the sugar mill railroads or that many times the cane cutters themselves without any political motives set fire to a portion of cane in order to obtain a greater production; frequently, the proprietor or the sugar mill owner orders cane set on fire . . . in order to speed up the processing of his cane since the speeding up more than compensates him for the 10 per cent discount because it shortens the harvest period" in which he has to hire cane cutters and pay for other harvest costs without any income.

²Correia Andrade, op. cit., pp. 250-251, charges Diario de Pernambuco (Recife) with printing stories about fires being set by incendiaries dropped from airplanes or by arsonists in articles on December 21 and 28, 1961, and January 16-18, 1962, which were either fantasy or failed to link the Peasant Leagues with these fires.

³One example was the Rio de Janeiro, "invasion" of the Fazenda Tocaia in the Municipio of Magé, by a man who either had been the Prefect of Duque de Caxias (Jornal do Brasil, June 8, 1963) or had

3. Competing rural bosses may engage in the above behavior at election time in an attempt to persuade or intimidate voters in a given direction. On other occasions, the mere act of sending political lieutenants into a given município in an attempt to weaken the hold of a dominant political figure may be labeled an "invasion." Francisco Julião's electoral conflicts with Coronel Francisco "Chico" Heraclio de Rego of Limoeiro fall into this category.¹
4. Organized efforts of a group of peasants who wished to defend themselves against outside land speculators or persons discovering or claiming "title" to cultivated or cleared crop lands, who sometimes received orders and support from urban industrial unions and politicians.²

been beaten as a candidate for the Prefecture (Jornal do Brasil, February 21, 1964). One of this man's political adversaries organized an invasion of his land in October, 1963 ("Invasões no Estado do Rio de Janeiro," O Estado de São Paulo, October 8, 1963, p. 5).

A local judge, Nicolau May, Jr., ordered the police to expel the "invaders" on February 19, 1964. Then a representative of the Sindicato of Railway Workers in Duque de Caxias took the "invaders" to the Superintendent of SUPRA and threatened a strike of the railways if the case were not solved to his satisfaction. Shortly thereafter, President Goulart expropriated the fazenda by Presidential decree (Jornal do Brasil, February 29, 1964), cited in Galjart, "Class and 'Following' in Rural Brazil," p. 19). A Federal Deputy who was instrumental in organizing an "invasion" of the National Motor Factory in June, 1963, stopped a railway strike immediately after the change of government in April, 1964, which seems to establish an intimate connection between at least the Deputy and the President of the Railway Workers Sindicato.

¹Vilaça and Albuquerque, op. cit., p. 134.

Blondel, op. cit., pp. 27-28, discusses how different candidates of the same party divide up the interior of a state to avoid competition between themselves for the votes of that município.

²"Lavradores de Jacarepagua interrompem serviço com a notícia de reforma agrária," Jornal do Brasil (October 23, 1965), p. 5:7-8, related that laborers of the Fazenda Reitiro in a rural area of Guanabara went on a short sit-down strike because of the low pay or high rents charged by landed proprietors. They said it was useless to protest because the "proprietors were men of prestige, better known as Coronel than by their own names." The Regional Administrator said the best solution would be for Governor Carlos Lacerda to issue a decree expropriating the land rather than to wait for the agrarian reform bureaucracy of the Federal Government. An accompanying article "Decreto e ideia infeliz" indicated the Guanabara State Government was not happy about the idea. Owners of the lands in question were not specified.

5. Fabricated charges by landowners and sugar mill operators who had differences with peasants over non-payment of salaries, the 13th month bonus, or the norms of work to be performed. When peasant laborers or sharecroppers called upon the landowner, his administrator, or went on strike, the landowner called this action an "invasion."

All five types of "invasions" are traditional means of political action not only in Brazil but also in Bolivia, Guatemala, and Peru when large landowners seek to maintain an instability of rural property and land tenure relations because this benefits those who rule by force and power and not by law.¹

Francisco Julião and the Peasant Leagues participated in the first three types of "invasions" as can be seen in the events surrounding the expropriation of the Engenho Galileia and Julião's struggles to establish electoral bases in municípios dominated by other political figures.

The fourth type has its examples in the defensive efforts in the 1960's of pioneer-squatters in Goiás, Rio de Janeiro, Guanabara, Minas Gerais, and Espírito Santo, and the new Federal District of Brasília, where rural gansters (grileiros) often in collusion with the police, falsely claimed title to land in order to extort rent or portions of the crops raised by squatters.²

However, by 1963-1964, many of the "invasions" which carried the label or banner of the "peasant league" or a "rural laborer association," were actually attempts by politicians or speculating landowners

¹Pearson, "Latin American Peasant Pressure Groups," pp. 310-311.

²Frank Bonilla, "Rural Reform in Brazil," AUFS Reports, Vol. VIII, No. 4, East Coast South America Series (October, 1961), p. 7, although noting the formation of defensive groups called Associações de Lavradores in all these states, gives specific data only for those groups formed in the state of Rio de Janeiro.

to influence state governments or SUPRA to expropriate a fazenda or plantation property. In nearly all the cases which occurred in Minas Gerais,¹ Pernambuco,² the state of Rio de Janeiro,³ and Rio

¹"Minas Condenada a Pagar Indenizaciones por Deixar Invadir Terrenos particulares," O Globo (Rio de Janeiro), February 6, 1965, p. 6; a Belo Horizonte court decreed that the State of Minas Gerais pay the equivalent of U.S.\$ 60,000 to the Fayal and Lanha companies, who had suffered damages to eucalyptus trees in September, 1963, as the result of "disturbances" of a political and social order fomented by "extremists" whose acts were stimulated by the omission and indifference of state authorities. Controlling stockholder in the two firms was Deputy Antonio Luciano Pereira Filho.

²Interviews with Dr. Moacyr de Brito Freitas, President of the Fabrica Peixe, and Padre José Maria, Pesqueira, Pernambuco, July 20, 1965, and

"Camponeses de Pesqueira Ocupam Terras da União e Discutem com Autoridades," Ultima Hora (Recife), November 2, 1963, indicates sixty peasants participated in the action and the process of events was being closely followed by Deputado Gilberto Azevedo. Azevedo, a Bank Workers Sindicato Leader in Recife, was involved in an "invasion" in Barreiros. See next chapter.

³"Invasions" in Rio de Janeiro which received press coverage included the following:

1. HAR, XIV, No. 2 (February, 1962), p. 1136: Ligas Campone-
sas, headed by Spanish-born agronomist Mariano Besler, were organizing squatters near Cachoeira de Macacu, some 50 miles from Rio de Janeiro. This writer could find no further evidence of this movement.

2. Juan de Onis, "Peasants Seize Brazilian Lands," New York Times (June 23, 1963), p. 28, and "Brazilian Pledges Reform to 1,000 who took Estates," New York Times (June 25, 1963), p. 5:4, discuss the attempted expulsion from lands adjoining the National Motor Factory in Duque de Caxias by armed squatters and slum dwellers from lands claimed by the Factory and Land Development Companies. The second article indicates complicity of the Petrobras Oil Workers Union in raiding an arms store and a meeting of the squatters on June 16 at the Metal Workers headquarters in Duque de Caxias.

3. "Invasões no Estado do Rio de Janeiro," O Estado de São Paulo (São Paulo) (OESP), October 8, 1963, p. 5, is an account of the "invasion" of Fazenda Tocala, Municipio of Magé.

4. "Articuladores de Invasoes Presos Ontem," OESP (February 26, 1964), p. 24:6-7. Leader of an "invasion" in Vila Inhamirim, Municipio of Nova Iguaçu, was Simplício Rodriguez. No further reporting.

5. "Gondim," OESP, March 4, 1964, p. 32, discusses a meeting of 230 Fazendeiros in which they declared they were disposed "to take up arms in defending property from Invasions occurring in Municipio of

Grande do Sul,¹ there was a similarity of behavior. Urban slum dwellers, urban unemployed, their wives and children and perhaps a few legitimate peasants were brought in;² thatch and adobe shacks were constructed within a day's time; statements were made to the press

Barra do Pirai" by "agitators" of the Federal Agrarian Reform Agency, SUPRA. No further reporting.

6. "Invadiram a Fazenda," Visão (Rio de Janeiro), April 12, 1964, p. 16, indicated some "600 peasants from São Fidelis and other nearby municípios invaded lands of Fazenda do Imbé, property of the State of Rio in the past week, firing shots at Police Delegate Ivo Barroso Graça and gravely wounding investigator Carlos Moraes." The invasion had been prepared for a month by João Batista, an official of the Rio de Janeiro Electric Company (Empresa Fluminense de Energia Electrica).

After Governor Badger Silveiro ordered the police to "act against the invaders energetically without violence" [sic.], the police expelled the invaders who wanted promises that the occupied lands would be given them later--promises which were not given.

¹"Sao Francisco Virá 'Far West,' " Ultima Hora (Porto Alegre), August 6, 1963, p. 3, discusses invasion of a property, "Mato das Flores," Municipio of São Francisco, belonging to João Kieffer, who, in retaliation, hired eight gunmen (Jaguarcos) to expel them. The squatters were in close communication with Euzebio Franca, Secretary of MASTER and a SUPRA official at the same time.

²Padre Antônio da Costa Carvalho, an Executive official of the state agricultural agency and a long-term adviser to the Federation of Workers Circles of Rio de Janeiro, indicated that 222 "invaders" of five fazendas included twenty-two women, thirty-eight men who owned land elsewhere, and forty-nine others whose principal occupation was not farming or agricultural. (See Galjart, op. cit., p. 19). On March 4, 1964, Jornal do Brasil published an article which pointed out that 72 persons who had not participated in the original "invasions" were working as sharecroppers or laborers on plots given the original invaders.

Galjart, "Turnover of Farmers in a Land Settlement Scheme," America Latina, Ano 8, No. 2 (April-June, 1965), pp. 48-65, surveys a colonization project in Santa Cruz, São Paulo, 70 kilometers from Rio de Janeiro. No more than 5-10 per cent of the original colonists were left. Plots given to Luso-Brazilians had changed hands five or six times since the project was begun in the 1930's because colonists wanted to move to the big city and become, in effect, absentee land-owners collecting rents. Only Japanese Brazilians, whose value system supports fixed residence on the land, had a high tenure rate.

about "violently resisting" any attempts at expulsion, and arrangements made for a visit of solidarity by workers from nearby industrial or railroad sindicatos.¹ Actual armed resistance by these "peasants" was extremely rare. In every case for which this writer could obtain additional data, the "peasants" left without firing a shot when it appeared that the police really meant to expel them. In the light of the first three "traditional invasion techniques," it appears the "invasions" probably did not originate among a group of desperate peasants although peasants may have been used as actors in the drama. Rather, in nearly all of these incidents, the "invasion" was planned and controlled from a higher level.

The Personalistic Organization of the Ligas

The sparse evidence about the internal organization and organizational techniques of Julião and the Ligas is an appropriate commentary on the shallow nature of the Liga organization which depended solely on Julião for important policy decisions.² On one occasion, Julião told his every-sympathetic chronicler, Antonio Callado: "Mr.

¹ Especially active in the pre-April 1964 period were the Sindicatos of Metal Workers, Oil Workers, and Railway Workers of Duque de Caxias. See Item 2 of fn. 3, p. 114 and fn. 2, p. 116 for specific cases.

In another case, Galjart, "Class and 'Following' in Rural Brazil," pp. 19-20, found that on one occasion seventy workers used a company bus to visit a recently invaded fazenda which an institution of charity had rented from the federal government.

² "Chineses Presos Exerciam Espionagem," O Estado de São Paulo (May 10, 1964), p. 5, includes a statement by one of nine Communist Chinese arrested for espionage after the April Revolution that "Those responsible for the peasant movement in Pernambuco are politically backward. Francisco Julião has a fear of becoming a mere staff member. [His] work . . . is very important but he does not pay attention to organization."

Callado, agitation is beautifully easy (uma beleza). Organizing is the difficult thing."¹ And to Gerald Clark, Julião admitted the following in 1962: "The movement . . . has grown in a disorderly manner. It is only now that we are endeavoring to set up some kind of records. We are not even certain of the exact number of members."²

In the beginning agitation and meetings were easy. In a region where political campaigns were among the few free public entertainments, crowds would always gather to hear a speech. But action beyond this was often limited. Julião's organization founded a state headquarters in Recife which had loose ties with groups in Paraíba and Maceió, Alagoas, but only minimal ties with the Ligas in Rio Grande do Norte, Maranhão, Piauí, Rio de Janeiro, Ceará, and Goiás. In all of these states, except Paraíba and possibly Goiás, it appears that the Liga was nothing more than the peasant following of a local landowner-politician, operating in traditional ways, who, for the moment, labelled his group a Peasant League. Another indication of the minimal collaboration between these groups is shown by the lack of information about the Executive Council of the Federation of Peasant Leagues,⁴ whose membership, a group of little-

¹Callado, Tempo de Arraes, p. 58.

²Clark, op. cit., p. 209.

³Callado, op. cit., p. 58, and Correia Andrade, op. cit., p. 245.

⁴Clark, op. cit., p. 206, credits Julião with forty-nine North-east Leagues and 40,000 members in 1960; by 1962, Clark states there were over 100 leagues with 80,000 active followers. However, Mary Wilkie, op. cit., p. 7, credits the Ligas with 40,000 members in Pernambuco alone in 1963. Horowitz, op. cit., p. 22 says that "by May, 1958, Julião's Leagues could claim 3,000 hard-core followers, who represented perhaps 50,000 peasants. By 1960 the figure rose to

known persons listed below, was revealed only in March, 1964:¹

Adauto Rodriguez da Silva - President, Liga (later Sindicato) of Trabalhadores Agricolas, Goiana, Pernambuco.

Clodomiro Montes - no additional information available.

Luis Antonio Gabriel de Paula - Cousin of Francisco Julião and brother of the "first martyr of the Ligas," Antonio de Paula.

Luis Serafim - "Mentor" of the Ligas Urbanas of Pernambuco and leader of an "invasion" of the Engenho Serra, Vitoria de Santo Antão, February 22, 1964.

Professora Maria Celeste - Public School Teacher in Vitoria de Santo Antão.

Oligaria Guintino - No information available (NIA)

Mariano Sales - NIA

Guicillo Carico - NIA

Januario Vicencia - NIA

The Non-existent Peasant Leagues of
Rio Grande do Norte

The Roman Catholic Church pre-empted much of the possible clientele of the Julião organization in Rio Grande do Norte as early as 1949 when Dom Eugenio Sales de Araujo, then a priest, began organizing community development groups in Natal which later served as the basis for the organization of Rural Sindicatos in the 1960's. In addition, two prominent landowning politicians also co-opted possible Liga members

between 8,000-10,000 activists, who probably represented five to ten times their number."¹

The figures are meaningless in many respects because the Ligas as a whole, the Federation, or its Council, seldom acted as a unified body.

Neither Julião nor Liga, the newspaper founded in October, 1962, ever said much about the Federation or Council's activities.

¹"Instalou-se Federação das Ligas Elogiando Clima de Liberdade em Pernambuco," A Hora (Recife), March 21, 1964.

Figure 16. ---Location of Peasant Sindicatos in Rio Grande do Norte, 1965.

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
CONVENÇÕES

- Limite estadual
- Limite do Zóon fisiográfico
- Limite municipal
- Limite estadual
- CAPITAL
- Cidades
- Vila

ESCALA



Geografia - Instituto de Geografia e Estatística
 1:500.000 - Escala Nacional
 1:100.000 - Escala Regional
 1:50.000 - Escala Municipal



for their own political followings. In one astute move, Federal Deputy Odilon Ribeiro Coutinho (UDN-Paraíba) avoided possible "invasion" of his sugar plantations in Rio Grande do Norte by promising José Rodriguez, President of the Federation of Rural Workers of Rio Grande do Norte land for distribution to peasants.¹ However, this writer can find no evidence the wealthy Ribeiro Coutinhos ever distributed land to anyone, other than in the traditional sharecropping arrangements. In another case, Theodorico Bezerra, elected Vice Governor of Rio Grande do Norte in 1960, sponsored the creation of his own "Liga Camponesa" in 1963 through a brother or close relative, Deputy Floriano Bezerra, in order to further the former's campaign for Governor in 1965. In fact, the Bezerras were able to influence the State Assembly to give a subsidy of one million cruzeiros to Floriano Bezerra for this organization!² If Walmir Targino and other Deputies in the State Assembly opposed the creation of a Liga, it was also an opposition to the use of state funds by the Bezerras for their own traditional political organization.³

¹"Nordeste; Convenção contra o Latifundio," Brasil, Urgente! (April 28, 1963), p. 15.

²"Liga Potiguar Canha Subsídio: Um Milhão," Diario da Noite (Recife), November 23, 1963.

³Diario da Noite (Recife), November 26, 1963.

The writer wrote several informants in Natal about this matter after returning to the United States but he has had no response to this query. In 1964, Bezerra or his local cohorts painted many signs on walls on the Paraíba-Natal highway proclaiming his candidacy for Governor in 1965.

Moreover, in "Nordeste: Convenção contra o Latifundio," Brasil, Urgente! (April 28, 1963), p. 15, José Rodriguez, President of the Federation of Rural Workers of Rio Grande do Norte, said "Vice Governor Theodorico Bezerra, PSD President . . . is the greatest latifundiario" of the state.

Land Speculators and Squatters in Goiás

In Goiás, the construction of Brasília drove up the value of land in several nearby municípios, including Anápolis and Formosa. Speculators, with the aid of their own riflemen and state police, moved in to seize land settled and worked by squatter-pioneers.¹ If the squatters could prove legal rights to the land--always a costly process in any society but especially for squatters--they might retain it. However, in many cases, they were often removed if they could not prove a legal right to be on the land or if the speculators were in collusion with local judges. In Formosa, small farmers apparently formed a defensive organization which some persons called a "Liga" and which later became the basis for a large cooperative. On the other hand, in 1962, Peter T. White, a staff member of the National Geographic Magazine wrote about a "Peasant League leader," José Porfirio, who headed a "peasant league" of hundreds of families on more than a million acres of public land for which they had no title in the Serra Dorado region.² Porfirio and the Leagues were seeking support from Governor Mauro Borges to resist the encroachments of speculators and their hired gunmen (grileiros).

¹Harding, op. cit., pp. 48-49, discusses the phenomenon in Brasília in general and Formosa in particular. The writer was informed by a former North American missionary who founded a school to give agricultural and other training in a rural area near Anápolis that such "invasions" and manipulations of title were common in the thirty years he lived in the Anápolis region between the late 1920's and 1962.

²Peter T. White, "Brazil, Oba!" National Geographic Magazine, CXXII (September, 1962), pp. 314-318.

However, after piecing together several other newspaper and magazine articles, it appears that Porfirio was a State Deputy engaged in disputes with other landowner politicians seeking to stake out claims on public lands in several municípios.¹ In short, José Porfirio was a traditional landowner-politician who attracted squatters to his banner because he could offer them protection and benefits while also manipulating the modern symbols of the Julião organization.

The Ligas Camponesas of Paraíba

In Paraíba, two families have dominated the land-holding and political structures of the coastal zone for the past fifteen years: first, the Ribeiro Coutinhos who owned at least 30,000 hectares of land, five of the eight sugar mills in the state, three of the four sugar mills in Rio Grande do Norte, and an estate in Alagoas;² and

¹The New York Times (February 18, 1964), carried an article about a "Cuba-trained" State Deputy José Porfirio whose 30,000-member Peasant Leagues voted to seize all "unused" land in several municípios. Porfirio reportedly backed down when Governor Borges warned he would send troops to prevent land seizures.

HAR, Vol. XV (February, 1963), p. 1164, cited O Cruzeiro, n.d., as the source for a police story about a raid on a secluded farm near Dianópolis, Goiás, about 300 miles north of Brasília, which was allegedly the site of a guerilla training camp complete with small arms, machine guns, and ammunition. O Cruzeiro was said by HAR to have reported that twenty-six men had arrived in the region to distribute 10 million cruzeiros to peasants and to attempt to teach them Communist ideology and guerilla tactics. However, after Cecil Borer, the Chief of the government's Political Police (DOPS) in Rio de Janeiro, failed to present any further information or witnesses or even the date of events, another Rio de Janeiro weekly voiced its suspicions about the truth of the police story.

²Callado, Tempo de Arraes, pp. 14, 65, and 67.

Luiz Ribeiro Coutinho, elected a State Deputy in Alagoas several times in the 1950's was one of the fiercest landowner-politicians opposing the creation of the Pindorama Cooperative near Penedo. On

second, the Lundgrens who owned plantations in Paraíba, Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Norte, and the large textile mill, Casas Pernambucanas.¹

In June, 1965, the author drove west from João Pessoa, the state capital, through the fertile flat plain covering the municípios of Santa Rita, Cruz do Espírito Santo, Sapé, and Marí--much of which was planted in sugar cane, pineapple, and tobacco owned by the Ribeiro Coutinho's. The first Liga in this region was established on January 10, 1959, in Sapé by João Pedro Teixeira, an illiterate but intelligent peasant who learned about the Ligas Camponesas while working in Pernambuco. The professed initial aim of the Liga group was to prevent tenant rents from rising too steeply² and to abolish

various occasions, Ribeiro Coutinho employees tried to cut down trees on the Cooperative lands or to encroach on its boundaries and in one case, assassinated a Cooperative employee March 5, 1960. For a history of the development of this tract by René Bertholet, a former Swiss labor organizer, see "A Lesson Learned," Newsweek (January 13, 1964).

¹Callado, op. cit., p. 65. Mario Affonso Carneiro wrote an extensive report on SAPE for the Latin American Center for Research in the Social Sciences (CLAPSC), Rio de Janeiro, 1963, which is quoted extensively in CIDA, Land Tenure Conditions, pp. 97-98, 310-322, passim, but he does not identify the Ribeiro Coutinho, Lundgren, Veloso Borges, Frantz, Pessoa Queiroz, and Bezerra de Melo family holdings but discusses them variously as X, Y, U, M, and so forth.

Blondel, As Condições da Vida Política no Estado da Paraíba, used statistics for the 1945-1951 period but is still valid for any study of politics in the 1960's. The influence of the Ribeiro Coutinho's was obvious in the 1940's; that of the Lundgren's is less obvious because Blondel uses no names and this writer does not know if the Lundgren's owned only or both of the textile mills in Rio Tinto and Santa Rita.

²The reader will remember that the increase in sugar prices after World War II influenced many Northeast landowners to raise rents in many areas or cut down fruit trees in order to expel their tenants and plant sugarcane.




Figure 17.--Location of Peasant Leagues in Paraíba, 1960-1964.

cambao, the obligation imposed on sharecroppers, tenants, and resident workers (moradores) to work gratuitously or at lower than a normal wage one or more days per week, or per month.¹

The Ligas established themselves in coastal and agraste municípios,² not only because of their ability to find and develop leaders of local origin but because these leaders were able to render goods and services, including protection of a type similar to those furnished by traditional landowner-politicians. The principal difference was that the peasants were no longer placed in a serf-like relation to their protector. For example, the first President of the Sapé Liga was the owner of a 50 hectare (123.5 acres) farm but the principal

¹Correia Andrade, A Terra e o Homem, p. 251, cited a bloody conflict in early 1962 on the Miriri Plantation, owned by a man with 15,000 hectares of land. "The majority of the resident workers (moradores) gave one day of cambão per week as rental for a plot of land of a half hectare. Informed that one day of cambão per week was equivalent to fifty-two days per year and that at prevailing salaries this corresponded to 6,240 cruzeiros per year, a sum which in two years was the same as the value of the land which they worked . . . The residents requested the right to pay the rent in cash and to eliminate cambão. The owner did not accept the proposal and threatened to expel the moradores who were affiliated with the Ligas. On March 17, 1962, the divergencies between the residents and guards of the 'Coronel' resulted in a fight in which two capangas were killed by the sickle and/or cane knife (foice), one administrator was hurt; one guard disappeared with a bullet in his thigh and two workers were killed by .38 [calibre] shots."

²Five of these municípios were created after 1955, and one, Itapororoca, was a district of Mamanguape until some time between 1960-1964. Curiously, in the 1945-1950 period, when Biondel studied the political life of Paraíba, all eleven of the original municípios were dominated by either a UDN boss (4), a PSD chefe (4), or divided fairly evenly between the two parties. Only in Guarabira and Santa Rita was a third party, the PTB, important. Further west, with one or two exceptions, two or more families, rather than one family, disputed município politics. Hence, politics was a little more open and less subject to the whim of one or two individuals.

organizational activity appears to have been carried on by Pedro Teixeira who arranged to bring a dentist, a doctor, and ambulance services to Sapé peasants.¹

The Ligas also had some success in abolishing cambão although it is impossible to find out the extent to which this was accomplished because of the numerous civil suits instituted by peasants and landowners.² In any case many of these conflicts escalated into violence; many peasants were intimidated and attempts made to kill Liga leaders³ Pedro Teixeira, Pedro Fazendeiro, and State Deputies José Jofily and Agronomy Professor Assis Lemos of Areia, who was elected to the State Assembly in October, 1962.

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., pp. 318-319, indicates thirty to fifty claims were pending in the Judicial Registry of Sapé in 1963.

³Ibid., pp. 314-315. Unfortunately, Carneiro gives no dates. Therefore, one is not able to determine, for example, whether Assis Lemos was "attacked by latifundistas and their capangas" in the early stages of his assistance to the Ligas, in the 1962 campaign, or after his election as a State Deputy.

One of Carneiros informants indicates "U," the prefect of Itabaiana and "the greatest political hope of Paraíba," was "assassinated two months ago [no date] by a nephew of one of the 'Y's!" However, Carneiro also indicates on the same page that one of the 'Y's obtained the most votes of any of the candidates for the State Assembly and, therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that the assassination involved much more than the organization of a Peasant League in Itabaiana or neighboring Pilar Município.

"Sapé, lebrança sangrenta de uma época de sobressaltos," Jornal do Brasil (April 7, 1965), p. 22, column 8, indicates that Pedro Fazendeiro and João Alfredo were found dead September 9, 1964, on the highway between Campina Grande, Paraíba, and Caruaru, Pernambuco, two days after they had been released from prison.

Julião, op. cit., p. 44, says Pedro Fazendeiro was ambushed and shot twice in the leg after returning from Cuba, which he visited with Julião in May, 1961.

The Sapé Liga drew attention when Teixeira was murdered April 2, 1961, by local policemen dressed as cowboys and acting under orders from local and regional landowner-politicians including the Ribeiro Coutinhos and Agnelo Veloso Borges.¹ However, it also appears that Teixeira's father-in-law had been trying to eliminate him for several years as well as trying to expel him from the family property on which the Teixeiras lived. As Galjart points out, "although most sources mention only the political motives behind the murder, it seems probable that personal motives also played a part."² The widow, Elisabete Teixeira, refused to live a "respectable life" with her father, became President of the Sapé Liga Council,³ and ran for State Deputy in October, 1962.

Prior to the elections, however, President João Goulart went to João Pessoa, Paraíba, for the formal reason of addressing a political rally sponsored by the Paraíba Ligas. On this occasion, he proposed to Julião that the Liga groups be converted into rural

¹Callado, Tempo de Arraes, p. 67, and CIDA, op. cit., p. 313.

²Galjart, op. cit., p. 14.

Callado, Tempo de Arraes, pp. 66-67, indicates that Teixeira's father-in-law had been trying to persuade his daughter Elisabete to rid herself of João Pedro for twenty years on grounds the latter was a "communist." She refused. Finally, the father sold the plot of land to a Sapé merchant and Vereador, Antonio Vitor. Callado quotes Elisabete as saying the final ambush was planned in her father's home.

Carneiro, CIDA, op. cit., pp. 312-313, does not mention this family conflict but says the ambush was instigated by landowners Y and M.

³Galjart, op. cit., p. 14, indicates the new board contained three "non-agrarian labourers" while Carneiro, CIDA, op. cit., p. 313, says the new Council was composed of "10 members, all resident workers on farms."

sindicatos which would be recognized by the Ministry of Labor.¹ Julião refused, recognizing this arrangement would be a threat to his influence because of the past manipulation of Sindicato Tax funds and elections by the Ministry and Goulart--although it might give individual Ligas greater bargaining power at the local level. In the October, 1962 elections, Assis Lemos won over a thousand votes in Sapé, soundly defeating Elisabete Teixeira who was Julião's candidate and received only about 70 votes.² In particular, the following federal services with their patronage possibilities were established in the Sapé region with the assistance of Assis Lemos:³ seven medical clinics, each of which had seven doctors, four nurses, five drivers, one clerk, two servants, an ambulance, a jeep, and free drugs; ten stores of the federal Food and Welfare Service (SAPS) which sell selected basic commodities such as rice and beans at a very low cost; an Agency or branch of the Bank of Brazil which made

¹"Goulart Urges Unionization of Brazil Paraíba Peasant Leagues," New York Times (July 30, 1962), p. 3:1.

Antonio Callado, Tempo de Arraes, p. 60, says Julião felt Goulart was trying to make him a "pelego" or "hired Henchman." Julião refused and said Goulart stirred up the Roman Catholic Church, the Communist Party, the Brazilian Institute of Democratic Action (IBAD), and Governor Cid Sampaio to work against him--which is an inaccurate presentation of the facts and the chronology of events. In mid-1963, Julião's Pernambuco Ligas were given money by SUPRA and Governor Arraes to combat Church-sponsored Sindicatos in Igarassu and Goiana.

²Even more interesting was the fact that Odilon Ribeiro Coutinho, scion of the dominant landowning family, received over 2,000 votes in the município.

³Carneiro (CIDA, op. cit., p. 312) was told by one informant that these services were provided by an Emergency Plan of the Ministry of Agriculture, which allocated 308 million cruzeiros to the region in which the Paraíba Ligas existed.

it easier for renters and sharecroppers to obtain agricultural credit;¹ and ten tractors for rent to small proprietors. In addition, the Sapé Liga also rendered short-term financial assistance to several hundred members for personal needs such as funeral expenses.

It is possible that these benefits were not the direct result of Assis Lemos' activities but were due to an entirely different set of circumstances;² nevertheless, Assis Lemos appeared able to render many of the traditional services of the old "coronel" or protector of the peasants. Although the reader may have his own opinion about the value of the services provided by Assis Lemos compared to the possible greater benefits accruing to a well-organized bureaucratic Liga with its own peasant leadership, it seems that Sapé and other Paraíba peasants were much more interested in the possible immediate material benefits a candidate could dispense³ rather than the long-range organizational plans or promises about agrarian reform that involved violence directed at the large landowners.⁴

¹CIDA, op. cit., p. 318, indicates the new branch bank performed a variety of lending and other services costing 362,810 cruzeiros.

²Galjart, op. cit., p. 15, raises the interesting question of "how a state deputy could obtain so many federal favours."

³See Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man, pp. 115-120, for his observations on lower class attitudes which emphasize the "concrete and the immediate"; on pp. 12-122, Lipset discusses those conditions which predispose lower-class individuals "towards support of extremist movements," including "millennial appeals."

⁴Carneiro, op. cit., p. 314, was told by one informant that "Juliao wanted to make political capital out of the murder [of João Pedro] and used the widow to that end; [Julião] speaks only about violence, about land reform by law or violence," but then leaves the workers in the lurch."

Galjart, op. cit., p. 15, emphasizes Senhora Teixeira preached

After the 1964 Revolution, the services of the Sapê and other Paraiba Ligas disappeared. In Sapê, and several other municipios, Church-sponsored sindicatos, first organized in 1962, have never been able to compete with the Ligas from a welfare point of view, and have never had the political connections of the Liga group.¹

The Types of Peasants Who Joined the Ligas

Although one might think that the Peasant Leagues would have attempted to recruit every type of peasant, Juliao himself said that the renter, sharecropper, squatter, and cowboy were in a better condition to be organized "against the latifundio" than the salaried worker because of the greater economic security of the former in pursuing a strike or other types of legal action.² Salaried workers could be fired much more readily and had no real means of legally protecting themselves from eviction.

In plotting the location of functioning Ligas, one finds that the Ligas did not follow Julião's articulated criteria but were able to establish themselves only in the coastal and agreste zones of Pernambuco and Paraiba where tenant farmers and resident workers

violence after her husband's death but makes no mention of Juliao's possible advocacy of violence in this situation.

¹Based on conversations in Sapê with Paraiba Rural Worker leaders, Sindicato leaders, and a Peace Corps volunteer, June 19, 1965.

Carneiro, CIDA, op. cit., p. 315, was told by one informant that "the Vicar of Sapê was obliged to leave because he was opposed, in some instances, to the owners. He was labelled a communist. They threw a paving stone into the church."

²Julião, Que Son las Ligas Campesinas?, p. 43.

Figure 18. ---Location of Peasant Leagues in Pernambuco, 1960--1964.

predominated.¹ The Ligas made practically no impact in the areas where sisal production² or sugar factories dominated agriculture.³ Ironically, the Church-sponsored sindicatos have had their greatest success in the sugar-producing plantation regions, especially in Pernambuco, because of their ability to use the labor tax to employ lawyers and other professionals. In fact, the moderate-to-conservative Brazilian Institute for Democratic Action (IBAD) reportedly accused the Ligas in 1961 of "carefully avoiding hurting the interests of the large property owners and inciting the rural masses against areas of

¹Carneiro, CIDA, op. cit., p. 316, indicates that a majority of the membership in the Sapé region were owners with 6-12 hectares of land, although a great number of members were tenants, resident workers (moradores), and day laborers who commuted from town to the fields.

²"La Civilizacion Dorada," O Cruzeiro (Spanish-language Edition), May 16, 1965, pp. 29-35, describes the introduction, growth, and prominence of sisal in semi-arid parts of Paraíba, Ceará, Maranhão, and Rio Grande do Norte. Only one of the six Paraíba municípios mentioned in the article, Areia, had a Liga or Church-sponsored sindicatos, although the industry employs about 200,000 workers and is Brazil's third most important source of foreign exchange, the Northeast being the world's number one producer. Although workers and tenant farmers alike have little production under the law, the provision of continuing employment as opposed to the seasonal cycles of sugar may be a clue to why few sisal workers have been organized.

³Another possible instance of collusion between sugar-mill operators and Liga officials, or Julião himself--is indicated by the absence of functioning Ligas in Southwest Pernambuco around Palmares and Barreiros. In Barreiros, a rural worker, Moacir Pedro da Silva, was given a charter by the Ministry of Labor in 1956; Usina Trapiche paid da Silva to guarantee it peaceful labor relations--a condition which continued after da Silva affiliated his organization with the Ligas until 1963, when fights broke out over control of the Sindicato--a matter which is discussed in greater detail in Chapter V. See Callado, Tempo de Arraes, p. 98, and Hewitt, op. cit., p. 21.

low productivity and decadent management."¹ Moreover, the Ligas made practically no impact in the Sertão.² In part, this was due to the opposition of the traditional coronéis of the cotton and cattle culture of the region³ and in part to the dependence of the Ligas on lawyers⁴ and university students in the state capitals of Recife and João Pessoa. In the latter case, their range of activity was restricted to the distance they could travel by jeep or car to and from these state capitals in one day's time. In Pernambuco, this radius of activity extended west to Caruaru (three hours), north to Goiana (two hours on the road to João Pessoa), and northwest to

¹Correia Andrade, op. cit., p. 324, cites Fernando Bastos Avila, A Reforma Agraria; a Lei e o Plano em Recomendações sobre a Reforma Agraria, p. 217, as the source for this statement. However, this writer cannot find the citation in the IBAD report Bastos de Avila refers to.

²The one exception was a Liga group in Buique, Pernambuco, created by a politically minded cattleman who had connections with the PCB according to three different sources. However, this group apparently did little more than deliver votes for its leader at election time and, on one occasion, furnished members to participate in an "invasion" of a Ministry of Agriculture Fazenda in Pesqueira. Conversations with Padre Jose Maria, Dr. Moacyr de Brito Freitas, President of the Fabrica Peixe, Pesqueira, Pernambuco, July 20, 1965, and a former Peace Corps member who served in the Buique region, August, 1965.

³Vilaca and Albuquerque, op. cit., p. 121, contains a lengthy quotation by Juliao's long-term political opponent Francisco "Chico" Heraclio do Rego which includes inter alia the following: "The Peasant League is a shameful thing for Brazil. I consider it the greatest source of banditry. It lives to spread disorder, intransquility, and terror."

⁴Julião, Que Son las Ligas Campesinas?, p. 30, names Djaci Magalhaes, Jonas de Souza, Costa Pereira, Fagundes de Menezes, and Mario Cavalcanti as the most distinguished of the lawyers who aided the Ligas.

Orobo (three hours on the road to Campina Grande).¹ In Paraíba, Ligas were established only in those municípios which had direct daily bus or train service to João Pessoa.²

Julião's reluctance to create a bureaucratic structure with decision-making powers at the local or state level further weakened the ability of the Northeast Ligas to bargain on behalf of their members once he was elected to the Federal Chamber of Deputies, in October, 1962.³ Travelling more and more to Rio de Janeiro or Brasília--which offered new worlds to conquer from an agitational or publicity point of view--he was less able or willing to guide the strategy and tactics of these groups. In addition, once Assis Lemos was elected a PSB State Deputy in Paraíba, on the same day, Julião's influence in that state declined even further.⁴

¹Shepard L. Forman, "Las Campanas de San Jose de Surubim," Cuadernos (Paris), January, 1964, pp. 37-46, is the account of a visit to the município adjoining Orobo by a Liga team made up of a law student, architecture student, a young doctor, and two drivers. The Liga team met vociferous opposition in the town of Surubim, led by Parish Priest Jonas, who called Forman (then a Columbia University graduate student), a "Russian" and "Cuban Communist."

²Based on this writer's observation of the location of Paraíba Liga groups and bus and train schedules in Recife and Joao Pessoa.

³Blondel, op. cit., pp. 165-168, presents tables of percentages of voting for party candidates in 1945, 1947, and 1950. The Tables show PCB groups existed in the eleven municípios in which the Ligas were to organize in the 1955-1964 period. In 1950, the PSB had a following in these municípios plus twenty-one of the other twenty-five municípios existing in the state. By 1960, the PSB following in Paraíba was strong enough to elect three of the forty Deputies in the State Assembly (Anuario Estatístico, 1961, p. 459).

Nevertheless, the absence of electoral data by Municípios after 1950 makes it difficult to establish any valid correlations between these phenomena.

⁴Carneiro, in CIDA, op. cit., p. 312, indicates he was told by one informant that "Juliao's men who come from Pernambuco stay here

While the Paraíba Ligas reportedly acted independently to create their own statutes at the município level to meet differing local conditions,¹ the Pernambuco Ligas apparently followed or were guided by the one Constitution or Statute which Julião had made up in 1955 when he changed the Galiléia Mutual Benefit Society into a statewide Society of Philanthropic Ends. On the other hand, the absence of material on the statutes and by-laws of the various Ligas² leads this writer to believe that written statutes were seldom used as Liga guidelines. Rather, Julião himself or his assistants made the decision about organizational structure, personnel selection, and Liga policy. Only in Paraíba did the individual delegacies apparently have any freedom to act independently of the organization in the state capital.

The Apoqee and Decline of Julião and the Ligas

This high point of Julião's career from a national standpoint probably came November 15-17, 1961, at the First National Peasant

awhile, but do not leave a great impression."

"A Sudene e A Revolução Nordestina," O Estado de São Paulo, a collection of reprinted newspaper articles for April 28-May 7, 1963, p. 6, indicates that Assis Lemos followed a "line directed by Luis Carlos Prestes, diverging from that of Julião."

¹CIDA, op. cit., p. 312.

²The only published statutes of a Peasant League uncovered by this writer are those for the State of Rio de Janeiro which are included as Appendix C of the Uruguayan Spanish-language version of Que Son las Ligas Campesinas?, pp. 98-104. Effective power is placed by these Statutes in a Deliberative Council and a President who were to be elected by a General Assembly of the membership once every two years by a quorum of at least one-tenth of the dues-paying members. However, the absence of data on the Rio de Janeiro Peasant Leagues is a probable indication that the Statutes had little meaning and that General Assemblies were never held.

Congress (Congresso Nacional de Camponeses) which was sponsored by Julião's organization, the Communist-controlled ULTAB, and the Ministry of Labor.¹ Attracting many other politicians and even a few non-political large landowners, Julião emerged as a national figure whose position of a one-stage "global" revolution including a vaguely defined "radical agrarian reform" appealed to many people, especially radical urban students.² On the other hand, the Moscow-oriented faction of the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) and its ULTAB leader Lindolfo Silva called for a two-stage revolutionary process, the first of which emphasized the need for a united front of progressive student, labor, and peasant groups as well as the "national bourgeoisie" (burguesia) with whom it was possible to work out a satisfactory program of agrarian reform. Even vaguer was Silva's call for a second stage of "socialization."

Julião threatened to send 50,000 peasants to Brasilia to sit on the steps of the Congress until an agrarian reform bill was passed--a new version of an earlier 1959 threat to send an equal number of

¹ See "As duas faces do Congresso campones," O Metropolitano, November 25, 1961, p. 8, and "No Congresso de camponeses o assunto e reforma agraria," O Metropolitano, November 11, 1961, p. 4, in which Jose Tiago Cintra said Jânio Quadros, while President, had suggested the theme of Agrarian Reform for the proposed Congress and that the government would help finance it.

The Congress is dealt with in greater detail in Chapter VII.

² Ibid. and Timothy Harding, "Revolution Tomorrow," p. 49, who says "Julião emerged as the national peasant leader."

O Metropolitano never really spells out Julião's agrarian reform proposals while Harding said Julião called for "immediate expropriation of large properties" but did not define what was "large."

peasants to Recife to protest the rural situation in the Northeast.¹ However, he never carried out either threat; in all probability because the threats were a bargaining maneuver, because he did not have that many peasants in the Ligas, and because he could not muster the public or private funds necessary to transport that many peasants to Recife or Brasilia.

Julião's unwillingness or lack of desire to create a bureaucratic structure or organize self-sustaining sindicatos among the peasants further weakened the ability of the Pernambuco Ligas to bargain on behalf of their members. Nevertheless, Julião was useful to the Northeast and to the Brazilian government in its dealings with the United States.² On July 21, 1961, for example, Time magazine unwittingly reinforced the impression Julião had sought to create of being a "social revolutionary":

President Jânio Quadros has told his Cabinet that unless Brazil embarks on revolutionary reforms, some day, on some unknown hill-top, some unknown Fidel Castro will rise up to plague Brazil. A Brazilian would-be Castro has already appeared. Francisco Julião, a Socialist State Deputy . . . To fight Julião and the peasant leagues, Jânio Quadros is backing Celso Furtado and his plan for which Furtado went to Washington last week. He was at home with John Kennedy's New Frontiersmen.³

¹ Antonio Callado, Os Industriais da Sêca, p. 49, said that such a march would also be a "demagogic demonstration of force." Julião never indicated why he did not carry out this threat.

² Victor Alba, Alliance without Allies, pp. 31-32, discusses the support the demagoguery and political rhetoric of persons such as Julião gave "the oligarchy": "It is as if the bullet had been fired from the breach. The United States wanted to convince the oligarchies of the need of social reforms out of fear of Castroism, and now it is the oligarchies that are convincing the United States to give them money for phony and hypothetical reforms.

³ "Brasil," Time, July 21, 1961, p. 27.

Summary

Juscelino Kubitschek, Jânio Quadros, Cid Sampaio, Miguel Arraes, and João Goulart are astute politicians who apparently permitted Julião to go quite far in developing the Peasant Leagues as a political propaganda and voter-mobilizing force. They could use him for what they perceived as their own interests in dealing with other Brazilian pressure groups and in their relationships with the United States and international lending agencies. If Julião had not made his well-publicized international trips to the Communist bloc countries-- which any Brazilian government could have prevented; if Julião had not made frequent references to international symbols such as Fidel Castro and Mao Tse-tung, it is doubtful that the Northeast and SUDENE would have received as large an amount of funds.

Julião and the Ligas controlled the "conflict situation" before the entrance of other politicians, priests, and government institutions such as the DRT's and SUPRA. By late 1963 and early 1964, Julião and the Ligas controlled only a few groups of peasants. They had failed to control the "contagiousness" and "scope of conflict."

When it became apparent in mid-1962 that the Church-sponsored rural sindicatos would survive, the Ligas, Communists, Governor Miguel Arraes,¹ and President Goulart perceived the advantages of the priests' program. Sindicatos, legally recognized by the government and

¹ Arraes appeared much more willing than the Ministry of Labor to support the Ligas during the first year of his administration. Although the Brazilian Army immediately after the Revolution proved that Arraes sent over 80 million cruzeiros to the Liga headquarters of Adauto Rodriguez in Goiana, it is clear that Julião never accepted the authority of Arraes and, on occasion, the Ligas turned against the Governor.

thus subject to controls, were much more useful tools than the unstructured Ligas of Juliao. By the end of 1962, Julião instructed his followers in the Northeast to infiltrate the Sindicatos in an attempt to replace their leadership with Liga members.¹ In mid-1963, the Goulart government established SUPRA in an attempt to control the Church-sponsored groups. By late 1963, much of the countryside was in upheaval as various groups struggled with one another to organize rural workers, sharecroppers, tenants, and small proprietors. At this point, we turn to an analysis and description of the Church-sponsored groups of the North and Northeast.

¹Interviews with Lucia Sá Barreto, Treasurer of SORPE, Recife, Pernambuco, June 11 and August 9, 1965.

CHAPTER V

THE IMPACT OF THE CHURCH-SPONSORED LITERACY MOVEMENTS AND PRESSURE GROUPS IN THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST

Introduction

As the Peasant Leagues began to get publicity and grow in numbers, various groups aspired to lead the peasants and competed with one another to organize sindicatos. Of these groups, the Catholic Church, which began its activity with rural literacy programs, the Communists, state and federal government officials, and large landowners and sugar industrialists were the most important. The competition became so keen that some groups set up non-existent "paper" sindicatos in order to control the federations which the Church first sponsored.¹

¹Although the CLT, ETR, and Ministry of Labor regulations provide a series of legal steps which must be complied with by a group seeking recognition as a sindicato, Church-groups, Communists, and government officials on the scene often created fictitious groups using real and false names of individual peasants as members and officers which the organizers forwarded to the DRT and the Ministry of Labor. This writer is not aware of the exact methods used within the bureaucracy to insure the recognition of groups which existed solely on paper while the Ministry denied recognition to legitimate groups at the same time. Suffice it to say that the practice existed.

For example, "Unions Compete in Rural Brazil," New York Times (April 30, 1963), p. 5:3, notes the complaints of Catholic groups in Pernambuco and Rio Grande do Norte "about delays in the certification of their unions": "Governo fecha os sindicatos do peleguismo," Tribuna da Imprensa (RJ), March 30, 1965, notes that the Ministry of Labor considered 2,381 sindicatos and federations (recognized prior to April, 1964), as phantom or paper organizations.



Figure 19.--Bishop Dom Francisco Mezquita and four organizers of the SORPE-sponsored Sindicato and Cooperative of Rural Workers of Palmares, Pernambuco, once Brazil's biggest peasant sindicato--covering 32 municipios--and controlled by Gregorio Bezerra, a Communist, from 1962-1964. The picture was taken July 29, 1965.



Figure 20.--Rural workers waiting to receive spaghetti and dried milk from the Food for Peace program sponsored jointly by SORPE, USAID, and the AFL-CIO, Sindicato of Rural Workers, Vitoria de Santo Antao, June, 1965.



Figure 21.--The Municipal Plaza on Market Day, Bom Jardim, Pernambuco, July 23, 1965, following a mild rain storm. Peasant League organizer and Deputy Francisco Julião was born in this município.



Figure 22.--Pedro de Silva, President of the Sindicato and Cooperative of Rural Workers, Bom Jardim, Pernambuco, addressing members to discuss formation of the cooperative sponsored by SORPE, July 23, 1965. Other officers are seated behind Silva.



Figure 23.--Members of the Cooperative of Rural Workers of Bom Jardim, Pernambuco, listening to a talk on Cooperative principles and organization, July 23, 1965. The meeting is being held in a private school for girls operated by Roman Catholic nuns.



Figure 24.--Acacio Fernandes dos Santos, Treasurer and Tociyuki Takaki, Secretary, of the Federation of Rural Workers of the State of Rio de Janeiro, visit squatters in the Municipio of Mage, April 9, 1965. The truck in the background belongs to one of the Japanese-Brazilian squatters who has a highly productive plot of land on property reportedly claimed by Fazendas Americanas, a Sao Paulo business firm.



Figure 25.--One of the principal streets of Punto dos Carvalhos, 15 miles south of Recife on the road to Cabo, August, 1965. On the left is the Sindicato of Rural Workers and a nurse (in white) employed by the Sindicato to treat the illnesses of members.



Figure 26.--Members of the Sindicato of Punto dos Carvalhos enjoy showing off some of the dental equipment purchased with Imposto Sindical funds, August 1965. Fourth from the left is one of several university students helping Padre Antonio Mello administer the sindicato.

For an understanding of how the peasant movement developed in the Northeast, the history of these movements in Rio Grande do Norte and Pernambuco is the most important, because the organizations and ideology developed in these states established models followed by many of the groups in other states seeking to organize the peasants.

In addition, it is necessary to describe (1) the Basic Education Movement (MEB), which organized literacy programs and some of whose workers attempted to influence peasants to overturn the Brazilian social structure; (2) the current balance of forces in Pernambuco in which the politically structured use of violence by peasant groups has become a highly effective weapon; (3) brief case histories of the peasant movement in other North and Northeast states; and (4) the material benefits of organized peasant groups which perform an additional function of controlling peasant attitudes by limiting the cross-pressures which landowners historically applied.

The Rural Assistance Service (SAR) of Natal

In 1949, Dom Eugenio de Araujo Sales was appointed head of the Catholic Action program of the Archdiocese of Natal, Rio Grande do Norte. Shortly thereafter, SAR was established as a community-institution-building organization to organize literacy-training programs, maternity centers, dental clinics, ambulances, first aid services, cooperatives, and clubs for women and young people.¹ In

¹ Father Eugene Collard, "In Natal, a Young Bishop Mobilizes His People Against Misery," Translation of an article which was first published in Dimanche (A Belgian Catholic weekly), June 24, 1962, and reprinted in SAR Informative Bulletin, Publication No. 6, August, 1962, pp. 10-11.

1954, Sales was consecrated Assistant Bishop and assumed supervision of the Diocese because the Archbishop was ill. Bishop Sales then extended the SAR program to the two other dioceses in the state, Caicó and Mossoró. Among the most important agencies established to carry on this community institution -building was the Rural Education Broadcasting Station, popularly known as "Radio Rural."

The goal of "Radio Rural" was two-fold: (1) to teach peasants to read and write, and (2) to give them agricultural, economic, political, and religious training which would "promote the individual human being." In order that the radio might serve as a school monitors traveled to bring small groups of people to the one-channel radio receivers which were distributed in isolated farm homes, rural villages, and even the slum areas of Natal. Later, regional study meetings brought the monitors together to compare experiences, renew their enthusiasm, and inform the Natal leadership of problems encountered at the local level. After that, SAR developed "leadership training programs" for the natural leaders discovered by the "Rural Radio" schools or by local priests.

The Basic Education Program of MEB

The SAR literacy program was so successful that President Jânio Quadros promulgated Decree Law 50/371 on March 21, 1961, to authorize federal subsidies for a similar program by the National Conference of Bishops in under-developed regions of North, Northeast, and West Central Brazil.¹ This new nation-wide program, known as the Basic

¹Boletim da Ação Católica Brasileira (Rio de Janeiro), June, 1962, p. 17.

Albert O. Hirschman, Journeys Toward Progress: Studies of

Education Movement or MEB, also incorporated UNESCO experiences in Asia and Africa, and the Radio Schools of the Popular Central Action (Accion Cultural Popular) program in Cólombia, headed by Padre J. Salcedo of Sutatenza.¹

MEB-style programs were established in the dioceses of Bragança, Pará Crato, Sobral, Limoeiro, and Fortaleza, Ceará; Penedo, Alagoas; and, on a statewide basis, in Paraíba, Pernambuco, Sergipe, Bahia, Goiás, Mato Grosso and Minas Gerais.² While some Bishops or program leaders obtained free radio time from private Church-owned radio stations, many programs depended on federal budgetary support for salaries, literature, and radio time.

MEB programs taught people not only how to read and write but also gave them instruction in personal hygiene, public sanitation and basic instruction in farming and the crafts. The program also sought to transmit a sense of dignity to and respect for the peasants who worked in the fields. MEB programs sought to change peasant acceptance of the dominant value systems of the type found by Marvin Harris in his study of Minas Velhas, a town near Brumado, central Bahia:

Economic Policy-Making in Latin America (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1963), p. 85, discusses the First and Second Conferences of Bishops of the Northeast in 1956 and 1959, respectively, which received the sanction of President Kubitschek to undertake several community development projects in coordination with the São Francisco Valley Commission (CVSE), the National Public Works Department to Combat Drought (DNOCS), SUDENE.

¹ Ibid., p. 15.

² Skidmore, op. cit., pp. 406-407, interviewed Paulo Freire in Cuernavaca, Mexico, January 4, 1966, who said that there were four separate literacy campaigns underway in 1963: (1) the Paulo Freire groups; (2) the Church groups; (3) federal Ministry of Education programs; and (4) MEB, a "program partially sponsored by the Ministry of Education and staffed by volunteers who only began working in late 1963."

This writer heard no mention of the Paulo Freire groups in Rio Grande do Norte. In addition, there was no separation of MEB and Church-group literacy programs in Rio Grande do Norte or Pernambuco. Moreover, it appears that some MEB groups were functioning in late 1962.

While the townsman looks upon all manual labor as degrading, farming involves the greatest loss of status--much more than the manual labor of a blacksmith. The artisans of Minas Velhas habitually think of their work as involving more skill and brains than the sheer brawn and animal muscle thought to be sufficient for work in the fields.¹

MEB and Church-sponsored leadership training programs repeatedly emphasized the peasant's right to demand more from the political and economic system than he had been getting.

In July, 1962, the Central Commission of the National Confederation of Bishops stated:

No one disregards the clamor of the masses, martyred by the specter of hunger, . . . This is less serious than men who conform to misery, remaining passive. No, because of the aggravation of the many . . . crises . . . in the country, of the facility of communications and of the spreading of ideas and of the growing organization of the classes, if the poor of the cities and of the countryside do not begin to become conscious of the true causes of their condition, above all to understand their participation in institutional life and their own society, they will never be freed from the ignominious state they live in.²

MEB created little dissension or controversy among the traditional power-holders of the Northeast. However, by mid-1963, MEB teaching methods, devised by Recife University Professor Paulo Freire,³

¹Marvin Harris, Town and Country in Brazil, pp. 94-95.

²"Subversion Through Catholic Education," CIF Reports, April 16-30, 1964, p. 2.

This article is reportedly an English translation of the text of an article which was to appear in the April, 1964 edition of O Cruzeiro, Brazil's largest picture magazine, but was not published because of the Revolution. The article discusses the MEB program, the booklet Viver & Lutar (mis-translated as Live and Strive), and Bishop Tavora's letters to Governor Carlos Lacerda on the confiscation of the booklets by the Guanabara government, February 20, 1964.

³Callado, Tempo de Arraes, p. 28, explains the method. "The Paulo Freire method has as an objective to suddenly reveal the world to man. Instead of starting with [letters] as a basic unit toward a vocabulary, the illiterate absorbs entire words, these then are separated

and a new classroom booklet Viver é Lutar,¹ came under attack. The booklet not only taught illiterates such traditional words as "house" and "school," but also such concepts as "struggle" (luta), "community," "justice," "liberty," and "exploitation of Brazil by foreigners." Many local monitor-teachers began to irritate dominant status quo elements by emphasizing that such phrases as "a complete change is necessary in Brazil" meant a need to overthrow the existing social, economic, and political structures of society.²

into syllables and finally into letters. In this system, . . . exists something like the Peasant League: guarantee first the land and then later we are going to divide it into parcels (lotes).

With drawings and with entire words, the illiterate . . . learns to divide the world into that of nature and that of culture. A leftist existentialist Catholic, of the Gabriel Marcel group, Paulo Freire not only teaches the peasant to read. As everyone in Pernambuco is indoctrinating the backwoods ruffian (cabra), he uses the fastest possible means, explosive words of great socio-political connotation. With the folder of illustrations (letrume) . . . he seeks to locate the illiterate in the social struggle that the illiterate does not know about, that what ought to be given to the man that learns the idea of learning to read is learning to struggle to improve life."

¹MEB, Viver é Lutar (2a Livro de Leitura Para Adultos), Outubro 1963, was the second of several books used by MEB monitors. The first book, Saber Para Viver (Knowledge to Live), never aroused any controversy, probably because it had less political content.

HAR, XV, February, 1963, p. 1164, indicates USAID probably gave financial assistance for the first MEB booklet and the Paulo Freire method: "Education Minister Ribeiro, with the help of Sarah Gudschinsky and Dale W. Kietsman of the Summer Institute of Linguistics of Santa Ana, California, prepared a primer for the adult literacy campaign. Ribeiro had 4 million copies published in December, 1962, along with a teacher's manual."

²This writer does not know if Bishop José Tavora of Sergipe, head of the MEB program, knew Viver é Lutar was being used in this way in some local programs. Paulo Freire was warned by several rural sociologists--whom this writer knows--that his program was being taken over by people with different goals than himself or Bishop Tavares. Freire reportedly said that he did not believe such a thing could happen.

Although many democrats or liberals could justify the need for a change of values among illiterates, many of the dominant conservative elements--and even some peasants--considered the booklet was "subversive" to the existing social order.¹ Support for this view comes ironically from an article reportedly destined for publication in the April, 1964 O Cruzeiro magazine--which was not published there-- which said:

The Christian is between two fires. As with Christ, there were those who sought a pretext for condemning him: "Pilate then said to the priests and to the multitude: this man is guilty of no crime." They insisted, however, saying: "He is stirring up the people, teaching throughout Judea and beginning from Galilea even to this place." (Luke 25:4-5).

One should ask again: What is the meaning of "subversion"?

Maybe for some it is the social doctrine of the Church: Mater et Magistra applied to concrete situations and carried to its ultimate conclusions.

Thus the church is subversive; the MEB is subversive; and above all, the Message of the Gospel, announced over 20 centuries ago, continues to be subversive.²

The lessons which follow from Viver é Lutar illustrate the kind of material being propagated by the literacy program. Lesson 1 begins with the following verse on the left-hand page accompanying a photograph:

¹One Army Intelligence Officer in Fourth Army Headquarters, Recife, Pernambuco, told this writer in August, 1965, that the contents of Viver é Lutar themselves justified the April, 1964, Revolution.

One São Paulo peasant who visited Sergipe in late 1964 told this writer in early 1965 that many peasants in Sergipe felt the MEB "orientation was so violent . . . that rural workers were skeptical over [the utility] of joining a sindicato."

²"Subversion through Catholic Education," CIF Reports, p. 2.

I live and struggle (or fight)
 Pedro lives and struggles.
 The people live and struggle.
 I, Pedro, and the People, we live.
 I, Pedro, and the People, struggle.
 We struggle to live.
 To live is to struggle.

TO LIVE IS TO STRUGGLE.¹

The concept of group organization is introduced in Lesson 21 with a photograph of a group of men pulling in a boat or a net on the sea-shore and with a lesson about a "friend" or "companion" (companheiro)² founding a sindicato. The final verse is one similar to those found in trade unions around the world:

"The Strength of a Sindicato is Its Unity"
 (A União Faz a Força do Sindicato)

which also might be translated:

"In Unity is Strength"³

Lesson 27 discusses the attempt of "Xavier, Pedro and their comrades seeking to organize the people" in order to "participate in the government." The photograph used is that of the first Peasant League at Engenho Galiléia⁴ although this fact is not cited in the text.

Lesson 33, the final lesson, closes with phrases about the need to "struggle for a change":

¹Viver é Lutar, p. 2.

²Companheiro has no good English translation. A closer translation is "comrade" without the connotation of its being used by a Communist Party member.

³Viver é Lutar, p. 42.

⁴ibid., p. 54.

Companheiros!

Whoever came this far cannot turn back.

We know we are right.

We have to walk forward.

God wants our struggle.

What ought we to do?

Continue forward.

Continue until we bring about a change!¹

The final photograph in the booklet is one of Francisco Julião and some of his followers reportedly on their way to the "funeral mass of the first peasant martyr" in the Northeast, a photograph which first appeared nationally in a December, 1959 Manchete article. These facts are not mentioned in the MEB booklet. In this writer's opinion, most Brazilians familiar with politics would have recognized the picture. One therefore should not be surprised that MEB was considered an important target of the military and civilian power-contenders participating in the 1964 Revolution.²

¹ ibid., p. 63.

² "Brazil Cleanup Turns to Church," New York Times (April 23, 1964), p. 12:1, indicates that Juan de Onis wrote that the military cleanup campaign "reached into Ação Católica which focused on lay and worker activities."

Governor Carlos Lacerda assailed Most Reverend Helder Pessoa Camara, Archbishop of Olinda and Recife and Secretary of the Brazilian National Conference of Bishops as a "reformer who cultivates misery like heads of lettuce!"

"Several newspapers urged military investigators to look into Communist infiltration in the Ação Católica organization." In Recife, "the Archdiocese suspended MEB programs aimed at rural poor and families."

Archbishop Camara was scheduled to meet with President Castelo Branco Friday, April 24, 1963, to discuss relations between the Church and Military in the Northeast. Presumably the two men, who knew one another when Castelo Branco was commander of the Fourth Army in the Northeast, did hold the meeting. From time to time in the next year and a half, there was friction between Dom Helder and "hard-line" anti-communist military officers.

The Rural Sindicato Program of SAR

The success of the educational campaign stimulated SAR in 1960 to begin a campaign to organize rural workers, sharecroppers, renters, and small farmers into cooperatives and professional associations because of the difficulties of gaining recognition for peasant sindicatos.¹ On November 15, 1960, the first Rural Workers Association (Associação de Trabalhadores Rurais) was founded in the Município of Serra Caiada, about an hour's drive southwest of Natal, where sharecroppers grew long-stape cotton for SANBRA (Northeastern Cotton Company), the American textile firm of Coats and Clark, and local cotton giners,² and cowboys watched beef cattle. In the next two

¹ Julieta Calazans, "Cartilha Sindicato do Trabalhador Rural," Natal, Rio Grande do Norte, Edição do Serviço de Assistência Rural, 1961, p. 4.

Francisco de Castro Neves, Quadros' first Labor Minister, reportedly told Bishop Eugenio Sales in 1961 that the Ministry could not recognize the Church-sponsored groups as sindicatos because it would then have to recognize Communist-sponsored peasant sindicatos--which of course was not true considering the past political use of sindicato recognition by various Ministers of Labor. Interview with Dom Eugenio Sales, Salvador, Bahia, April 20, 1964.

²The writer heard different reports about the ownership and management of SANBRA and Coats & Clark. Some churchmen thought SANBRA was wholly American-owned; others told the writer it had a mixed Argentine-Brazilian-English ownership. In any case, both companies had a "poor image" in the Northeast, buying cotton at low prices and shipping it to gins and cotton seed mills in Recife and Natal and then shipping cottonseed oil and cake back at what local farmers considered unjustly high prices. Several Coats & Clark gin managers in the Northeast are Englishmen--which probably accounts for less anti-Americanism being directed toward that company.

Anderson-Clayton, considered by many as the world's largest cotton broker is not as visible in Rio Grande do Norte as in Paraíba or Pernambuco. It is called a truste (trust) in many parts of the Northeast. Wesley McCune, Who's Behind Our Farm Policy? (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956), pp. 123-124, and passim, discusses the influence of Anderson-Clayton and Coats & Clark in U.S. agricultural policy. McCune said Anderson-Clayton controlled 33 subsidiary companies which owned 369 cotton gins as well as factories making margarine, soap, and textiles.

years, associations were founded in every município of the Archdiocese of Natal on an inter-municipal basis, taking advantage of the SAR and MEB radio school structure. On May 13, 1962, anniversary of the abolition of slavery in Brazil, seven of these associations with jurisdiction over thirty-nine municípios were granted recognition¹ by Labor Minister Andre Franco Montoro² at the First Rural Workers Congress at Itabuna, Bahia.³ Twelve more sindicatos with jurisdiction in thirteen municípios were also recognized in the next year and a half. Outside of the Diocese of Natal, however, landowner opposition and reluctance on the part of many priests and laypeople to work on organizational teams hindered the establishment of sindicatos in other than Caico and Mossoro, Municípios in which two Bishops were located.⁴

SAR's ideological contributions were first published in a mimeographed document, "The First Primer of the Rural Worker" (Cartilha

¹"Carta de Principios e alavança de camponeses para Reforma Agraria," Jornal do Brasil (May 18, 1962), p. 4, indicated five sindicatos were also recognized in Ceara; five in Pernambuco, and one in Sergipe, covering five municípios.

²Franco Montoro, a São Paulo Christian Democrat, was Minister from September 9, 1961, to June 29, 1962. It probably is not coincidental that he resigned from office after recognizing eight Workers Circle-sponsored sindicatos in São Paulo on June 25.

³Itabuna and nearby Ilheus also had symbolic value as the location of one of the earliest peasant sindicatos recognized in Brazil, a Rural Employees Sindicato recognized October 4, 1957.

⁴Even in the Diocese of Natal, there was priestly opposition: "Nordeste: Convenção Contra o Latifundio," Brasil, Urgente! (April 28, 1963), p. 15, José Rodriguez, President of the Federation of Rural Workers of Rio Grande do Norte, said Padre Emerson Nogueiros of Santa Cruz fought the peasant organization "because he wanted to control everything in the Município."

Sindical do Trabalhador Rural) written by Dr. Julieta Calazans, one of the driving forces behind the SAR program. Goals and methods were not always separated in the Cartilha publication which stressed the following three goals for peasant sindicatos:

1. Teach and help the rural worker to obtain his rights as a person and a worker.
2. Work for the application of laws that bring benefits to the lives of the rural worker and for change of the laws that do not fit the rural area at the present time.
3. Work for agrarian reform.¹

Sindicatos were urged to use the following "methods":

1. Work for the common good and never for the benefit of only one person.
2. Work for a change through education and never through class struggle.
3. Work in an organized form with other groups.
4. A program of revindications ought to be established.
5. Look at the whole man and be idealistic.
6. A person should be free to join and not obliged to do so. We should remember, for example, that in Russia every worker is obliged to associate himself and to pay dues to a sindicato whether he wishes to do so or not. This is mistaken.
7. The Sindicato is a professional association, not a political one.
8. The direction of the Sindicato ought to be by persons of the class itself. There are many Sindicatos in Brazil directed by persons who have never worked, nor have the intention of working in a profession/or trade.²

Dom Eugenio Sales and Dr. Calazans wanted to create a movement which was dedicated to serving the best interests of their state and Brazil, and not one caught up in the ideological battles between the United States and the Soviet Union.³ Leadership training courses

¹"Cartilha Sindical," p. 5.

²ibid., p. 6.

³ibid., pp. 9-10. Although SAR was often accused of spreading socialist or communist doctrine, the Cartilha specifically said "Communism cannot bring improvements to man, because it does away with liberty, generates hate and vengeance, and is against God."

were organized and used material critical of the "neo-liberal capitalism" of the United States and Soviet Communism. Peasants were taught that they should run the Sindicatos and learn from their own mistakes and successes.

SAR attracted many young and middle-aged practicing Catholic layment from small towns and Natal to fill its organizing teams and staff. However, the SAR organization was highly dependent on Dom Eugenio for important policy decisions; when he was "promoted" away from Natal to become Apostolic Administrator of Salvador, Bahia, in September, 1964,¹ SAR lost much of its ability to attract financing, personnel, and political support.² His successor as Archbishop of Natal, Dom Nivaldo Montes, apparently had different ideas about the proper role of SAR and the Church in social action programs. Nevertheless, in 1965, many of the sixty-five peasant sindicatos in three federations³ were functioning reasonably well in the state's political

¹Sales' "promotion" took him away from political enemies in Rio Grande do Norte, while also enabling the Church to use his talents in attempting to establish similar programs in Salvador whose Archbishop also had been ailing for some years and unable to devote much attention to his work.

²"Ajuda Alemã," Visão (Rio de Janeiro), January 4, 1963, pp. 15-16, says that Sales obtained a US\$ 10,000 loan from Miserior, a fund of the West German Catholic Bishops, to be paid off in ten years without interest. He also had obtained donations from German Catholics of 300,000 marks, and 200,000 marks to help re-finance the re-equipment of the Radio Rural Schools, and 100,000 marks to help unionization in the Northeast. In addition, the Secretariat of the West German Christian Democratic Trade Union Federation donated US\$ 5,000.

³In January, 1965, the Rural Workers Federation had nineteen recognized sindicatos and thirty-one waiting legal status; the Autonomous Workers Federation had one recognized sindicato and seven waiting; and The Small Proprietors Federation was composed of seven sindicatos, none of which had been recognized. Sindicato officers in

context to obtain benefits as well as protect the members despite a variety of pressures.¹

Formation of Church-sponsored
Sindicatos in Pernambuco

The history of the Rural Sindicato movement in Pernambuco differed greatly from that of Rio Grande do Norte. The Ligas never made an impact in Rio Grande do Norte because of the work of SAR;² population density was three times greater in Pernambuco, and the sugar industry dominated many thousands of square miles of coastal land compared to the few valley regions in which sugar was grown in Rio Grande do Norte.³ Moreover, the Pernambuco region was much more

the state serve without pay in contrast to Pernambuco, where many sindicatos are paid the minimum monthly wage out of sindicato dues checked off rural worker wages. In Rio Grande do Norte, dues were 100 cruzeiros (about eight cents) per month in 1965; hence many leaders are genuine idealists.

¹"Paz Aqui, Luta Lá," Visão (January 24, 1964), p. 13, reported that "the first successful rural strike" in the history of the state by forty rural workers in Parnamirim, southwest of Natal, achieved the abolition of a cambão share-cropping arrangement and doubled their wages from 250-500 cruzeiros (US\$.25 to US\$.50) per day.

²After the April, 1964, Revolution, President Castelo Branco told Bishop Sales that the Church's work in the rural areas prevented the Ligas or Communists from establishing a foothold there. Interview with Dom Eugenio Sales, May 19, 1965.

³Perhaps due to the influence of Dom Eugenio Sales and perhaps due to the fact that Rio Grande do Norte never experienced the cut-throat competition for land that Pernambuco underwent, the four sugar mills in the state did not dominate the plantations, the dwellings of sugar mill workers were made of bricks and with tile roofs, tiled floors, and plumbing. In addition, workers were entitled to a piece of land where they could plant whatever crops they wished, which meant they could do much more than most Pernambuco, Alagoas, or Paraíba sugar mill workers to supplement their diets with fruit and vegetable of their own.

industrialized and had a highly developed transportation and communications network compared to the meager transportation system of the state further north. A peasant sindicato movement should therefore have had a different history.

Initiative for the organization of peasant sindicatos in Pernambuco came from the Catholic Agrarian Youth (JAC) and several young priests who were impressed by SAR's work in Rio Grande do Norte.¹ Padre Paulo Crespo, Vicar of the industrial and agricultural município of Jaboatão, expressed their feeling in a Resume of the movement:²

Petty politicians (politicoides) without any sense of social responsibility were seeking to exploit the phenomenon of the peasant leagues for personal advantage and not to solve the problems of the suffering peasant. Like sugar cane caught between the rollers of a mill, they were caught between the politicoides of the epoch.

On July 26, 1961, twenty-five priests from six dioceses and the Bishop-elect of the Sertao diocese of Afogados de Ingazeira appeared in Jaboatão.³ No representatives came from the southern sugar zone around Palmares, in part through the lack of encouragement from the Bishop of Garanhuns, and in part because of the close ties of priests to senhores de engenhos and usineiros of the region.

¹Mary Wilkie, "A Report on Rural Syndicates," pp. 7-8, attributes initiative to JAC members and the Bishop of Recife who appointed four priests to the mission of training "parish priests in syndical assistance and looking for peasants capable of leading syndicates." The Church in Recife is headed by an Archbishop, not a Bishop.

²"Pequeno Resumo do Movimento Sindical Rural em Pernambuco" (Recife, Pernambuco: SORPE, October 1, 1964), p. 1.

³Printed "Relatorio da Semana de Estudos, sobre a situação de nosso camponês," issued by Padre Paulo Crespo, Secretario do Encontro, July 29, 1961.

After representatives from the federal government's Rural Social Service (SSR),¹ ANCAR,² and DAC, and SAR discussed their work, the participants discussed three alternative programs:

1. Mutual assistance societies, which would offer medical and dental services, food and clothing.
2. Church-sponsored Peasant Leagues to compete with those led by Julião.³
3. Peasant sindicatos which would be legally organized.

The third alternative was accepted because it did not have the disadvantages of the first alternative which offered "only a temporary palliative and was no real solution" to the peasant problems, or the

¹"Relatorio da Semana de Estudos," The bills to create the SSR were introduced by Minister of Agriculture João Cleofas in 1951 but not passed by the Brazilian Congress until September 23, 1955, when the SSR was established by Law 2,613. Control rested in the Ministry, the CRB, and the state Federações de Associações Rurais. Initially it was to improve health, recreation, basic education, and home economics in the rural sector. It has remained a weak institution of the Brazilian government. See João Cleofas, Reforma Agraria no Brasil, pp. 49-52, for a discussion of its early history.

²ANCAR or the Northeastern Credit and Rural Assistance Association was established in Pernambuco, June 1, 1953, on the basis of American agricultural extension programs. See Plano Diretor Quinquenal (Rio de Janeiro: Associação Brasileira de Credito a Assistencia Rural, December 1960), for a discussion of the ANCAR program in the Northeast states.

³"Northeast Anti-Communist Activities," HAR, Vol. XVI, No. 4 (June, 1963), p. 406, is a typical example of Brazilian and North American confusion of SORPE-sponsored groups with Julião's groups. HAR cites Correio da Manhã (Rio de Janeiro) in an article on "Father Antonio da Costa Melo, Vicar of Cabo, Pernambuco, and founder of the Liga Crista de Campesinos." [sic.]

Horowitz, op. cit., pp. 24-27, briefly mentions "Catholic Peasant Leagues" and "communist-dominated Leagues in ULTAB" offering "direct competition" to the leadership of Julião. Unfortunately, Horowitz never examined either the Church-sponsored groups or the ULTAB groups to any degree in his chapters on "the Ideology of Peasant revolution" and "The Practice and Preaching of Revolution" in his book.

second alternative because many peasants would not be able to distinguish between the Church-sponsored and other peasant leagues.¹

In the next several weeks, Padre Crespo, Padre Antônio de Melo, Miss Lúcia Sá Barreto, and Dr. Djalmo Augusto de Melo, a former candidate for the priesthood and now inactive businessman, organized the Pernambuco Rural Orientation Service (Serviço de Orientação Rural de Pernambuco or SORPE) to create rural sindicatos and cooperatives.²

Following the SAR example, SORPE established organizational teams in each diocese and leadership training courses in parish churches or schools. The subject matter included the following materials which were presented at a very simple level for the many semi-literate or poorly educated peasants attending the courses:

Man's Dignity - which often started out with a discussion of why men were different than animals.

Church Social Doctrine - including quotations at a simple level from Mater et Magistra and Rerum Novarum.

¹"Pequeno resumo do Movimento Sindical Rural em Pernambuco," p. 1.

²"Serviço de Orientação Rural de Pernambuco, Ato Constitutivo" (Recife, Pernambuco, August 5, 1961) (hctographed).

John Gunther, Inside South America (New York: Harper & Row, 1966, pp. 92-95, is one of the few articles on SORPE activities in English-language publications other than an occasional reference in HAR. Gunther includes brief interviews with Padres Melo and Crespo and makes several references to the peasant groups organized by Dom Eugenio Sales in Natal, Rio Grande do Norte. Gunther, however, indicates that these Catholic groups were not only in competition with groups led by Juliao, Governor Arraes, President Goulart's "union" [sic.], and no fewer than three different Communist unions-- Chinese, Trotskyist, and Kremlin," but also among themselves in "representing the peasants in theory and asking for their support, in Pernambuco and the surrounding states." Unfortunately, Gunther is in error on several points, especially with respect to the "competition" between the several Catholic groups in Pernambuco.

Brazilian History
 Brazilian Labor and Rural Legislation
 Labor-Management Relations
 Comparative Political Philosophies--including discussions of
 "Capitalism," "Neo-liberal Capitalism," and "Communism."
Sindicato Organization and Leadership
 Cooperatives - their philosophy, organization, and benefits.

Mary Wilkie quoted one peasant who said:

I was a catequist for twenty years when Pope John's Mater et Magistra appeared. The priest told me about syndicates and I went on a course for leaders. The priests then explained syndicalism in basic terms, stating that the law permitted the organization of occupational groups to promote their professional and class interests, that the syndicate would provide the way for pressing for the application of the law and demanding justice, and that the syndicate in upholding the rights of the peasants would promote social peace and harmony as opposed to class war. The peasants readily accepted the ideals of syndicalism; as one leader said, "We didn't know what a syndicate was before the priest told us, but when he told us about it, we knew that was what we wanted."¹

SORPE encountered political obstacles to recognition similar to those faced by SAR. However, on May 13, 1962, five Pernambuco Rural Worker groups were given legal status by Labor Minister Franco Montoro at the Itabuna Congress.² For the rest of 1962, only one more Pernambuco group was recognized.³ By this time, Brazilian politicians and peasant leaders were engaged actively in campaigning for the

¹Mary Wilkie, op. cit., p. 8.

²"Carta de Principios," Jornal do Brasil (May 18, 1962), listed these sindicatos as (1) Lajedo, Canhotinho, Jurema, and São Bento do Una; (2) Bom Jardim (Julião's home base), João Alfredo, and Orobo; (3) Caruaru, Santa Cruz, and Riacho das Almas; (4) Vitoria de Santo Antao--home of the first Peasant League; and (5) Timbaúba.

³SUPRA, "Sindicatos Rurais, Relação No. 1" (December 31, 1963), pp. 5-9, includes the Rural Workers Sindicato at Palmeirinha, which was recognized September 24, 1962. After the Itabuna Congress, only five Paraíba Rural Workers and one Bahia cocoa cultivators sindicato were recognized in the Northeast states during the rest of the year.

October elections which would name not only all state and federal deputies but most município offices and Governors in Ceará, Pernambuco, Paraná, Rio Grande do Sul, and São Paulo.¹

The Struggle for Control of Rural Sindicatos

After his election as Governor in 1962, Miguel Arraes de Alencar joined President Goulart, the two factions of the Communist Party, and the Peasant Leagues, in a tacit if not formal agreement to destroy SORPE's influence in the Pernambuco sindicatos.² Their tactics included discriminatory police treatment, invasions or assaults upon SORPE-sponsored sindicato offices, manipulated announcements in the communications media, and attempted manipulation of sindicato leadership and finances by the Regional Labor Delegate (DRT) and the Ministry of Labor.³

¹Padre Melo actively supported Recife Prefeito Miguel Arraes de Alencar, a cousin of Cid Sampaio. Padre Crespo was not active in the campaign although supporting Arraes as a better candidate than Joao Cleofas, the traditional candidate of the traditional political forces in the state.

²Governor Arraes was one of the first populist politicians to capture a Governorship in the Northeast. He undoubtedly consolidated his position with the masses in his support for higher minimum wage regulations and with the nationalists in his termination of USAID contracts. Nevertheless, while consistently backing the PCB urban and rural labor leaders, he also consistently hindered the efforts of the reformist Church-affiliated leaders such as Melo and Crespo who originally supported him in his 1962 campaign for Governor. See Skidmore, op. cit., pp. 275-282, and 418, for an excellent discussion of Arraes' attempt to build up a presidential following for 1965.

³"Unions Compete in Rural Brazil," New York Times (April 30, 1963), p. 5:3, notes the complaints of Catholic groups in Pernambuco and Rio Grande do Norte "about delays in the certification of their unions" by the Federal Government despite statements by Labor Minister Almino Afonso, a leftist nationalist, who declared rural unionization to be "of greatest urgency."

Labor Minister Afonso signed recognition papers for fifty-three











Figure 27.--Groups Struggling to Control Pernambuco Peasant Sindicatos, 1963-1964.

-  SORPE-Affiliated Federation
-  Federation, Captured by PCB, Recaptured by Federation
-  PCB (Russian Faction)
-  Trotskyites
-  Federation, Captured by PC do B (Chinese Faction)
-  Palmares; Affiliated with PCB
-  Barreiros, Company Union, Peasant League, Captured by PCB, Recaptured by Peasant League, Intervened by DRT.

Three of the most important municípios in which those conflicts took place were Palmares, first organized by a PCB Deputy; Jaboatao, first organized by SORPE but taken over in late 1963 by a coalition of Liga, Arraes, and Chinese-wing Communist elements; and Barreiros, originally a company-type union which was ultimately taken over by the Regional Labor Delegate after several months of conflict between its Liga-leaning head and Communist elements.

The Palmares Case

Palmares is the commercial and transportation center of the Southwest Pernambuco and Northern Alagoas sugar region. In January, 1963, Gregório Bezerra, a former Communist Federal Deputy,¹ and a small group were given a Charter by the Ministry of Labor covering twenty-one Pernambuco municípios.² Bezerra established his influence in the region by bargaining for increased wage or other monetary benefits with the sugar mills and by furnishing medical, dental,

rural sindicatos during his tenure from January 23-June 7, 1963. Five Pernambuco rural sindicatos were certified on April 26, 1963: Cabo, Jaboatão, Moreno, Quipapá, and São Lourenço--all strong SORPE-groups. Probable reasons for the complaints was Ministry refusal to recognize Federations which Northeastern Church leaders had formed because three recognized Federations could form a National Confederation--which most likely would not be controlled by the Federal Government or Goulart, but by these Church leaders.

¹Callado, Tempo de Arraes, pp. 75-76, indicates that Bezerra was active in the PCB since 1935 and a Deputy in 1947 when Getúlio Vargas proscribed Communist Party candidates although not preventing the Party from otherwise being active in the campaign.

²The reader will remember that SAR and SORPE had established precedents for this practice when they created professional associations on an inter-municipal basis.

ambulance, and legal aid services to peasants at the Palmares headquarters--most of which were paid for by the Sindicato Tax (Imposto Sindical) deducted from wages by the sugar mill operators and turned over to Bezerra by the DRT, Enoch Saraiva.¹

Bezerra was aware of the importance of publicity and indoctrination of the peasants. On one occasion, Antonio Callado recorded the following speech by Bezerra to a group of peasants "in the fields":

You now have two families; that of yourselves and of the collective family, that is the Sindicato. Your own family merits from you that which it always merited. But in order to aid your own family, it is necessary to think about the family of the Sindicato, that is an organization that can improve your lives, arrange for better salaries and will not let the proprietor throw you out in the street. The Sindicato is the political family, that which gives force to you-all. [He also spoke about the class struggle.]

Take notice of that which is good for you and ruinous (ruim) for the sugar mill owner. The minimum wage is good for you, isn't it? But look how it costs the usineiro to agree to it. A brute strike was necessary to increase the salary, now wasn't it? The increase is good for you and ruinous for the sugar mill owner.²

In mid-1963, newly appointed Bishop Francisco Mezquita of Palmares began organizing SORPE leadership and indoctrination courses in the fringe municipios controlled by Bezerra. Although several new sindicatos were granted recognition by the Ministry of Labor, the SORPE-affiliated groups were never able to undermine Bezerra's control of the Palmares Sindicato or control of the Sindicato taxes which were

¹ José Pereira da Silva, one of Padre Melo's post-April 1964 interventors, told this writer that Bezerra's group received about ten million cruzeiros (approx. US\$ 10,000 in January, 1964, exchange rates), which were used for the purchase of jeeps and other equipment through the Imposto Sindical fund.

² Callado, Tempo de Arraes, p. 77.

collected by the DRT in the outlying municípios until after the April, 1964, Revolution.

The Struggle for Jaboatão

In Jaboatão itself, Communists affiliated with the Chinese wing of the Brazilian Communist Party (PC do B) were given control of the Sindicato after a four-month battle and the assistance of the DRT Enoch Sariva Mendes, Arraes' Assistant Secretary (for Labor Affairs) Fausto de Nascimento, who was a Communist, and Julião's Liga organization.

Jaboatão, although it is a heavily industrialized município with railroad shops, textile, and paper mills, also has a sugar industry employing 20,000 rural inhabitants. Because of its proximity to Recife, it has always been a ready source of demonstrators who could be transported in an hour's time by train, bus, or truck into Recife. Three sugar mills (Bulhões, Jaboatão, and Muribeca) occupied 10,054 hectares or 62.25 per cent of the farm land; another eighteen engenhos between 100-300 hectares occupied 4,357 hectares or 26.98 per cent of the farm land of the município.¹

Not only was Jaboatão the seat of Padre Crespo's parish church, it was also the scene of a município election scheduled for October, 1963, in which the Prefeito and several Vereadores--who were Liga-supporters--were running for re-election. Sindicato politics became involved in município and state politics. In the summer of 1963, José Evangelista Nepomuceno, a former Secretary of the Crespo

¹J. M. da Rosa e Silva Neto, Subsídios Para o Estudo do Problema Agrário em Pernambuco (Recife: Comissão de Desenvolvimento Econômico de Pernambuco, 1963), p. 28.

Sindicato and a Liga member,¹ sought to take over control of the Jaboatao organization. The DRT, Enoch Saraiva, allowed Evangelista Nepomuceno to collect the Imposto Sindical from the sugar factories.² In August, Clovis Campelo (Pernambuco PCB Secretary), Luiz Serafim (head of the Liga Urbana), Joaquim Ferreira, José Rais, some railroad workers, and students conducted a series of almost daily pre-election and anti-Crespo rallies. Crespo's requests for an investigation by the DRT were refused along with requests for police protection of the Sindicato against assaults by street gangs. On August 26, the DRT intervened, removed the Directory headed by João Batista and placed a DRT official in charge of sindicato business. A District judge declared DRT intervention illegal, whereupon additional demonstrations and counter-demonstrations between supporters of Evangelista Nepomuceno and Batista-Crespo filled the streets of Jaboatao. In protest against DRT and Arraes support for PCB or Liga infiltration of the leadership of other sugar zone Sindicatos, Crespo's supporters mobilized 150 trucks of peasants from the sugar zone for a parade into Recife on September 2.³ State Police turned them away at the city limits. Nevertheless, some 2,000 persons continued on

¹ Julião, Que Son las Ligas Campesinas?, p. 30, cites Joaquim Camilo, José Evangelista, and José Cacador as being among the outstanding peasant leaders who emerged from Liga Delegacies in Jaboatao and "Cova da Onça." It is therefore possible that José Evangelista Nepomuceno had worked for Julião on the "Cova da Onça" property in Bom Jardim prior to living in Jaboatao; in any case, Evangelista was active in Liga activity as early as 1962.

²"Pequeno Resumo," p. 3.

³"Agricultores em Marcha Pacífica sobre o Recife," Diário de Pernambuco (September 3, 1963).

foot several miles into the city for a rally against Saraiva and Arraes. Archbishop Coelho and Padre Melo defended Crespo over radio and television.¹ When Municipio elections were held several days later, the Liga-Arraes and PCB-supported candidates lost. Nevertheless, the city continued in turmoil with loudspeakers shouting propaganda and insults back and forth until November when new Sindicato elections were held. On the eve of the election, Padre Crespo withdrew his slate, anticipating defeat and conceding victory to the PCB-Arraes forces.² Shortly thereafter, the DRT also intervened in Cabo, eliminating Padre Melo's influence and appointing the President of the local Peasant League as President of a Junta to govern the Sindicato for the immediate future.³

The Barreiros Case

In 1956, a rural day laborer, Moacir Pedro da Silva, was given a Union Charter by the Ministry of Labor to organize a Sindicato in Barreiros, in the Southern coastal zone. In turn, he was given money by one or more of four Usinas to guarantee peaceful labor relations in the region:⁴

¹Padre Melo attacked Arraes as a "man dominated by hate, who does nothing else but hate" and said that the state authorities intended to eliminate the influence of the Church in rural unions. See Price, op. cit., p. 53, and 0 Estado de São Paulo (September 7, 1963).

²Interview with Lúcia Sá Barreto, Recife, June 11, 1965.

³Price, op. cit., p. 53, and Liga (February 19, 1964).

⁴Callado, Tempo de Arraes, p. 98, indicates the need for a more detailed study but reports that "Usina Trapiche gave money and a jeep to the Liga," and that Santana "who hitherto [had been] Juliao and the Usina's man began to accentuate his own personal leadership."

Hewitt, op. cit., p. 23, indicates da Silva was being paid 5,000 cruzeiros per month before Santana invaded the Sindicato.

Central Barreiros owned by the Bezerra de Melo Family
 Usina Cucau owned by the family of Armando Queiroz Monteiro--
 PSD-PSP Federal Deputy, third-place candidate for Governor
 in 1952, and a boss of the Agreste Municipio of Lajedo with
 Francisco "Chico" Heraclio of Limoeiro.
 Usina Santo Amaro - Ownership unknown
 Usina Trapiche - Ownership unknown

In the summer of 1963, Julio Santana da Silva, a former Liga Camponesa leader broke with Francisco Juliao and Usina Trapiche.¹ On July 7, 1963, he organized a meeting of a reported 5,000 sugar-workers who literally threw Moacir Pedro da Silva out of the Sindicato office on grounds he had been elected illegally a few days before.

A three-man junta, Manoel Tito (Barreiros), José Domingues (Serinhaem), and Santana (now "representing the Municipio of Rio Formoso"), appointed itself to guide Sindicato affairs until the DRT could arrange new elections.²

On July 13, a state police officer arrested Santana and took him to Recife. When a strike of a reported 25,000 sugar workers broke out the next day in the Barreiros region, the Arraes government released Santana--explaining he had been brought to Recife "for consultation purposes." Santana let the strike run on for five more days until July 20, when an agreement was signed by Santana, Enoch Saraiva, Rildo Souto Maior (legal adviser of the Ligas

¹Callado, op. cit., pp. 98-100, describes Santana as a "professional adventurer" or "first-class anarchist" who "would have had the greatest success back in the old days of few roads and lots of caatinga." He apparently presented a bizarre image as a "peasant leader": wearing khaki trousers and shirts, japanese sunglasses, and an inevitable three fountain pens in a shirt pocket.

²"Coluna Sindical," Ultima Hora (Recife), July 22, 1963.

Camponeses).¹ and Gilberto Azevedo (a state deputy, bankworker leader, and owner of 46,000 acres of land in Rio Grande do Norte).²

However, Santana's control over the organization was not permanent. Three months later, about October 3, Moacir Pedro da Silva organized another group of 8,000 sugar workers from the three municípios who then assaulted and bodily threw Santana and his cohorts out of the Barreiros headquarters.³

This victory was also short-lived.

On October 5, Santana, in an official DRT jeep, led a force of 300 which once again assaulted the Barreiros sindicato offices and "plundered its furniture and strongbox."⁴

In turn, on October 11, Santana was arrested by Lt. Nelson Lucena of the State Police, and placed in the Recife Detention House. Lucena then proceeded to Barreiros where he and his driver were captured

¹"Greve de Solidariedade a Campones Durou 8 Horas," Jornal do Comercio (Recife), July 21, 1963.

²Victor Alba, Alliance without Allies, p. 32, quotes Boletim of the SOCL (Caracas, Venezuela), July 7, 1963, as the source for the following: "The Communist [*sic*] Deputy Gilberto Azevedo admitted in the Recife Legislative Assembly that he is the owner of 46,000 acres of land in Rio Grande do Norte, where he also owns extensive salt mines. Azevedo was accused by several Deputies of increasing the valuation of his lands in order to sell them more advantageously. He apparently plans the sale of his land to avoid the political embarrassment of being called a latifundista."

³"Barreiros sob o Dominio da Subversão," Diario de Pernambuco (October 8, 1963), p. 1, photograph caption.

⁴"Camponeses Protestam contra Santana," Diario de Pernambuco (October 8, 1963), p. 1, photograph caption.

"Central Sindical dos Trabalhadores Rurais de Pernambuco," Ultima Hora (Recife), October 11, 1963, indicates a denunciation by a newly formed CSTR of "gunmen at the service of Deputado Francisco Juliao and Usina Trapiche who cowardly assassinated peasant Severino Amaro of Engenho Rosario, Serinhaem.

in the middle of the night by a "student," José (Joca) Zeferino da Silva, and a "peasant," Antônio Joaquim de Medeiros--alias "Chapeau de Couro" a notorious bandit-gunman.¹ The lieutenant escaped in his underwear, an exchange of shots took place, several of the "peasants" and "students" inside the Sindicato office were wounded and finally surrendered.²

On the following day, DRT Saraiva intervened in all three sindicato branches in the region while Juliao's Peasant League was issuing an ironical protest over alleged DRT "violence" in apprehending Santana.³

SUPRA, the DRT, and the PCB Collaborate to
Move on the Rural Workers Federation

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Labor, SUPRA, and Governor Arraes, helped PCB and Liga members take over SORPE-organized sindicatos in Igarassu and Goiana, north of Recife.⁴ With Palmares, Barreiros, and Jaboatao also under his control in September, the DRT Enoch Saraiva could manipulate sindicatos with a total of about 60,000 of the 96,500 unionized workers of the coastal sugar zone in an attempt to replace the leadership of the Federation of Rural Workers

¹Callado, Tempo de Arraes, p. 108.

²Ibid.

³Ultima Hora (Recife), October 15, 1963.

⁴Governor Arraes furnished Adauto Rodriguez of Goiana with at least 80 million cruzeiros to do this task. Interview with Army Intelligence Officer in Recife and Goiana, Pernambuco, August, 1965, who saw Rodriguez's name on the receipt and observed his activities in the 1964-1965 period. See also Hewitt, op. cit., p. 24.

which SORPE had organized in late 1962 or early 1963 with a Labor Council of Workers (Conselho Sindical dos Trabalhadores or CONSINTRA). CONSINTRA officers issued public statements designed to discredit the Church-sponsored groups while also trying to show--at least in the communications media--that it could represent the peasants better than anyone else, i.e., SORPE. A typical statement was a September 11, 1963 "Official Notice" denouncing the "crooked and anti-patriotic employer classes" for their hostility toward Governor Arraes and the DRT who were seeking to "bring about a respect for the law by everyone--rich and poor alike."³

In turn, although SORPE and the Federation did not mention CONSINTRA always by name, they denounced "agitators, professional vagrants (banderneiros) and armed assailants" who were seeking to

¹"SUPRA e Ministerio do Trabalho Vão Sindicalizar 17 Milhoes de Camponeses," Ultima Hora (Recife), August 19, 1963. A budget of 150 million cruzeiros had been allocated for the initial stages of the work to be carried on by the National Commission of Rural Syndicalization made up of technicians of the Ministry of Labor, SUPRA, the Ministry of Agriculture, and sindicato leaders belonging to the CGT.

²"Clelio Lemos visitou Fed. dos Trabalhadores Rurais," Diario de Pernambuco (August 24, 1963).

Clelio Lemos, Director of the Department of Rural Promotion and Organization of SUPRA paid a call on the Federation prior to a meeting on the following Tuesday, August 27, in which the CONSINTRA would choose two persons to coordinate a campaign of organization of Rural Sindicatos. The article's tone indicated that the Federation would not participate and that Lemos' visit was a courtesy call.

"Pe. Crespo repele ingenieria do Consintra na Sind. Rural," Diario de Pernambuco, and "Coluna Sindical," Ultima Hora (Recife), August 14, 1963, contained statements by Padre Crespo that "the peasant ought to be led by peasants themselves and that "city workers could never find means of integrating themselves into the dynamics of agrarian problems." His opening phrase reportedly was a trenchant "Basta de pelegos!" ("Enough of hired henchmen!").

³"Nota Oficial," Jornal do Comercio (Recife), September 11, 1963.

"throw peasant against peasant" and to take over SORPE-sponsored sindicatos. If public authorities did not take "proper measures" against the "invasions" of these non-peasant "outsiders," Federation affiliated sindicatos would counter violence "in the manner in which they were provoked."¹

CONSINTRA faded from the scene as did a short-lived successor, the Labor Central of Rural Workers (Central Sindical dos Trabalhadores Rurais or CSTR).² By December 1963, it was apparent that the SORPE-sponsored peasant sindicatos and their Federation could not be defeated or undermined by the traditional methods the DRT's and the Ministry of Labor were using to break up or control trade unions.³ At this point, then, the DRT issued an administrative order (Portaria) which divided the Federation of Rural Workers into three Federations based on the types of workers different Sindicatos were supposed to represent: Small Proprietors, Sharecroppers (Trabalhadores Autônomos Rurais), and Rural Workers--using the argument that three federations could represent the peasants better than one could.

¹"Manifesto dos Trabalhadores Rurais de Pernambuco," Diário de Pernambuco (October 10, 1963).

²"Central Sindical dos Trabalhadores Rurais de Pernambuco," Última Hora (Recife).

³"Aprovados 30 Milhões para que Secretaria Atue na Zona da Mata," Jornal do Comércio (Recife), November, 1963 (clipping does not indicate day), notes that Arraes Secretary for labor affairs, Fausto de Nascimento, was allocated 30 Million cruzeiros to help the CSTR organize rural workers in the sugar zone.

See also "Um Grande Passo na Organização do Movimento Camponês," Frente Operária (Rio de Janeiro), November 14, 1963.

³In addition to the "invasions" and denunciations in the press, the DRT also refused to deliver the Federations' share of the Imposto Sindical deducted from rural worker wages as long as the Federation was under SORPE-influence.

shortly before this event, the SORPE-sponsored Federation organized a successful three-day strike of a reported 90 per cent of the rural workers in the sugar zone on November 18, 1963--the first massive strike of rural workers or peasants in contemporary Pernambuco history. In the first collective contract ever signed between peasants and leaders of the Sugar Mill Operators and Plantation Owners Associations, wages were to be increased 80 per cent, a thirteenth month bonus paid at the end of the year, work norms were standardized, strikers were not to be penalized, and were to be paid for the period of the strike.¹ The agreement ultimately would mean increased funds through the checkoff system for whomever controlled the Federation.

In effect, therefore, creation of three new federations did several things: (1) it reduced the influence of the non-communist Church-affiliated peasant groups in the new DRT-dominated Rural Workers Federation; (2) the sindicato leaders of the Agreste and Sertão, in turn, could not count on the bargaining and financial support by new

¹Hewitt, op. cit., pp. 30-31, and "Coluna Sindical," Ultima Hora (Recife), November 24, 1963, discuss the strike and the unprecedented collective contract. In addition, Lawyer Rioldo Souto Maior, counsel of the Ligas and a self-styled promoter of a Federation of Sugar Workers for Pernambuco, Alagoas, and Paraíba, felt the strike was "going to unite the peasants" for a long period of time. While the strike had this effect temporarily, it failed to create a strong sense of unity among both Pernambuco peasants and their leaders who were deeply divided over ideological and policy objectives.

Sugar Industry and Plantation Owners (Fornecedores) leaders signed the agreement with the understanding that their compliance depended upon the agreement of the Sugar and Alcohol Institute (IAA) to raise the price of sugar. The price of sugar was raised, in fact, shortly thereafter.

Rural Workers Federation leaders who were not disposed to help SORPE-affiliated sharecropper and small proprietor groups;¹ and (3) the non-communist peasant groups could not control Pernambuco participation in the selection of leaders for the National Confederation of Agricultural Workers or CONTAG which was to be formed December 20, 1963, in Rio de Janeiro.²

In early 1964, little more of importance took place other than a series of wildcat strikes on individual plantations over non-payment of the thirteenth month bonus for 1963. These strikers were paid after the owners were paid by the IAA for sugar purchases which it reportedly had not sold.

¹Sindicatos in the Agreste and Sertão were dependent principally on the individual contributions of their members who were mostly renters, tenant farmers, sharecroppers, of small independent farmers and did not have a steady income or disposition to contribute dues; the sindicatos in the coastal zone, on the other hand, could count on a guaranteed income each month through the automatic checkoff of the Imposto Sindical by owners and administrators of the large sugar plantations and sugar mills.

²Negotiations began among various peasant federations in October, 1963, for the positions of leadership in the CONTAG. In return for his "election" as first vice president of CONTAG, Manoel Gonçalo Ferreira, President of the Federation and a Popular Action (AP) member, agreed to "modify" the directorate of the Pernambuco Federation, making Antônio Guedes, the Communist President of the Igarassu sindicato, First Vice President of the Federation and José Eduardo de Lima Filho of Palmares, Secretary of the Federation. As Hewitt, op. cit., p. 28, points out, Ferreira was not able to carry out his promise to the Communists. Padre Crespo, who was always reluctant to collaborate with the Communists, denounced the proposed bargain to the Presidents of the Sindicatos in the Federation, who subsequently refused to accept the commitment made by Ferreira.

The Multiple-Purposes Served by Real
and Fabricated Incidents of Violence

In both May¹ and October, 1963,² Pernambuco plantation owners and sugar mill operators presented petitions of protest to Governor Arraes and President Goulart, respectively, asking them to take appropriate action against peasant leaders whom they alleged were fomenting labor indiscipline, disharmony, class tension, and jeopardizing the future of the agricultural-industrial economy of the state.³ Both petitions had the objective of (1) convincing public opinion that peasant leaders were acting irresponsibly and in a "subversive" fashion; (2) convincing the federal government that it ought to grant higher sugar prices and process applications for loans in the Bank of Brazil which were temporarily frozen until the producers could show that they would be used for agricultural and not other commercial or industrial ventures; and (3) embarrassing Arraes in the eyes of many

¹Wayne S. Smith, an American Foreign Service Officer assigned to the Consulate General, Recife, in 1963, gave this writer a copy of the May, 1963, letter, in New York, September 5, 1965.

²Produtores Acusam Arraes de proteger os agitadores, "O Estado de São Paulo (October 23, 1963), and Price, op. cit., pp. 53-54.

³Callado, Tempo de Arraes, pp. 90-92, says he discussed the complete police file of cases registered from February to October, 1963, with Fausto de Nascimento, the Assistant Secretary of Governor Arraes, Callado said:

"Some of the typical conclusions of police investigations" which he presented included different interpretation of two of the incidents reported by the fornecedores and the sugar industry plus nine other "invasions" or incidents which were not included in the petitions. "That which the usinas called 'invasion' of the property by peasants is, in general, a meeting of the Syndicate that at times presents its complaint to the proprietor . . . or a pacific strike due to the fact that the Usina was not paying its employees according to the organized and accepted schedule."

supporters that he would not or could not protect them against the large landowners, their administrators, and political allies.

This writer placed the twenty-one incidents listed in the May, 1963, petition plus ten others reported between January, 1963, and April, 1964, on a map of the state and found they clustered in ten municípios in two definite areas: (1) between Jaboatao and Vitoria de Santo Antao--on the central highway due west of Recife; and (2) in a region composed of Goiana, També, and Igarassu Municípios north of Recife. There were no incidents in the Barreiros or Palmares sugar zones which were controlled by the DRT and the Communists respectively. With the exception of També, where a small self-styled group of Trotskyite romantics functioned briefly,¹ Cid Sampaio and Arraes won a majority of the vote in these ten municípios in 1958 and 1962, respectively. In almost every case where this writer could determine ownership of a plantation or sugar mill, the owners were quite active in state and federal politics. For example, the following politicians and their known 1965 agricultural properties are listed with an asterisk if their property was reported as being "invaded" in 1963 or 1964:

Antonio Martins do Albuquerque, a former Federal Senator--Usinas Jaboatao* and Bulhoes

Alarico Bezerra, a former State Secretary of Public Security--Engenho Serra

¹Callado, Tempo de Arraes, pp. 104-106, and Frente Operária (September 1 and 16, 1963), discuss this group, one of whose leaders, a São Paulo printing trade worker, Paulo Roberto Pinto, was killed in an ambush organized by Oscar Veloso and others on Engenho Oriente.

Armando Queiroz Monteiro, a PSD Federal Deputy in the late 1950's third-ranking candidate for Governor in 1962--Usinas Cucau* and Aripibabe, and the Minister of Agriculture in 1961 or 1962.¹

José Lopes Siqueira, a former Deputy - Usinas Dom Jesus* Estreliana* and Cachoeira.²

In seventeen out of the thirty-one cases, the Fornecedor or Usineiro had not reported the incident to the local or the state police, or pursued any further course of action. In eleven cases, the workers went on strike because the employer had not paid back wages or the thirteenth month salary bonus; in three cases they were on strike to have their wages raised from 500 cruzeiros per day (about \$.60 in late 1963) to 600 or 700 cruzeiros (U.S.\$.70-.75 in late 1963). In two cases, plantation owners or their administrators attempted to drive away tenants by allowing cattle and horses to pasture in cultivated fields; when the peasants tried to remove the animals, the owners cried that the peasants were trying to "slaughter the animals." A March 11 incident on the Usina Jaboatao involving dismissal of a field foreman ("substitution for administrative reasons") was reported on two different Usina Plantations; in one instance, a letter of inquiry on the matter from the President of the Sindicato was re-interpreted by the authors of the letters as "direct interference in plantation management."

¹Queiroz Monteiro also known as Armando Monteiro Filho was elected to the Federal Senate in October, 1966, after replacing MDB incumbent Senator Barros de Carvalho who died in September, 1966.

²Callado, op. cit., pp. 91-92, discusses the killing by Lopes Siqueira and several gunmen of at least five unarmed Usina Estreliana peasants who had gone to him to ask for payment of the thirteenth month bonus for 1962.

In some cases it is quite probable that rural workers met plantation owners or their administrators with their sugar scythes (foices) in hand in order to give an appearance of determination and-- since all of the reported cases took place during the harvest season-- of their willingness to work. But prior to examining the post-April, 1964, structured use of violence in Pernambuco and the Northeast, it is useful to examine briefly the rural sindicato movements in Alagoas, Paraíba, Ceará, Maranhão, and Piauí.

The Rural Sindicato Movement in Alagoas

In Alagoas, a Rural Orientation Service (Serviço de Orientação Rural de Alagoas or SORAL) was established by Archbishop Dom Adeldo Machado on the SAR and SORPE models. Leadership and literacy training and sindicato organization courses were sponsored on much the same basis as in Pernambuco and Rio Grande do Norte. Although SORAL had considerable success in organizing thirty-eight rural sindicatos-- compared to four PCB-organized rural groups--only two SORAL sindicatos were given recognition by the Ministry of Labor prior to the April 1964 Revolution--one in Rio Largo, recognized August 27, 1963, and one in the state capital of Maceió, recognized September 11, 1963.¹ One Federation of Rural Workers of approximately thirty sindicatos was formed in sugar and rice producing municípios along the coast; however, the Federation of sharecroppers and renters in the Agreste region around Palmeira dos Índios has been inactive since the Revolution. Neither was recognized by the Ministry of Labor as of August, 1965.

¹These forty-two sindicatos covered seventy-one of the 102 muni-
cípios in the state.

SORAL also tried to organize cooperatives among the peasants but most of these attempts were failures because of political interference from large landowners who perceived threats to their commercial and political dominance.¹

Unlike the situation in Pernambuco, the DRT, Milton Loureiro, and the SUPRA Delegate, Dr. Jose Clovis de Andrade, were apparently much friendlier to the interest of the Rural Landowner Federation (FORAL) headed by "Major" Alba and the Sugar Mill Operators Association than to the peasant sindicatos or SORAL.²

Several small strikes were organized against landowners who did not observe the minimum wage or the thirteenth month bonus provisions of the CLT or ETR but no massive strike or collective contract was signed although wage levels were lower and the IAA paid the same price to Alagoas sugar producers as it did to those in Pernambuco.³

¹"A Lesson Learned," Newsweek (January 13, 1964), p. 37, discusses the harassment of Colonia Pindorama, near Penedo, organized by Swiss-born Rene Bertholet and aided by Penedo Bishop Jose Terceiro de Souza who was influential with Governor Luiz Cavalcanti, a long-term political opponent of Luis Ribeiro Coutinho who sought to take over the colonization project.

A PC do B view of the Alagoas situation in "Governo Ibadiano de Alagoas Impede a Sindicalização," Classe Operaria (November 1, 1963), charged Governor Cavalcanti with impeding rural unions.

²Interview with a Priest in Maceió, Alagoas, July 16, 1965, who was closely associated with the sindicato and cooperative movement in the state.

Major Alba in fact helped organize several company-type sindicatos of sugar mill and plantation workers which have remained under his control. José Benedito, named Interventor in the Federation of Rural Workers, is considered by some Alagoas and outside peasant leaders as a "loafer" who has been told to "leave things as they are."

³ibid.

The Paraíba Rural Sindicato Movement

The Church-sponsored peasant sindicato movement in Paraíba also had a different history than any of the other Northeast states discussed up to this point for several reasons:

1. The Church in the coastal zone was under the direction of an aged and ailing Archbishop who was not as committed to the idea of the Church's being involved in social or political action as Archbishop Coelho of Recife, Pernambuco, nor the Bishops of Campina Grande (Agreste) and Cajazeiras (Sertão) of Paraíba who strongly supported the JAC and MEB rural sindicato/cooperative programs in their dioceses.¹ In fact, a catalytic organizing institution similar to SAR, SORPE, or SORAL, was never created; the Workers' Circle movement being about the only coordinating institution available for priests and laymen in the state.

2. The social infrastructure of the state was underdeveloped. Peasant sindicato leaders wanted to carry out programs with as little outside financial, organization, or priestly help as possible but did not have the religious fraternities (cofradias), rural schoolteachers, or other organized groups to draw upon as a source of peasant or small town middle-class leadership.²

¹The Bishop of Patos in the Agreste-Sertão region was not interested in any of these programs.

²Interviews with several JAC leaders from Paraíba at Itaparica, Bahia, May 15-19, 1965, and with Sindicato and Federation leaders in Joao Pessoa, June 3, 19-20, failed to turn up one instance of someone who lived in a rural area with a rural primary school, a rural recreation or soccer club, a cofradia, or even the voluntary cooperative activities of rural persons known as "mutirão" or "de junta" whereby peasants built houses or did farm work on a reciprocal basis.




Figure 28.--Location of Peasant Sindicatos in Eastern Paraíba.

3. The Peasant Leagues associated with Assis Lemos were relatively successful in providing various benefits to many peasants who might have joined the Church-sponsored sindicatos for material reasons.

in 1962 alone, eight sindicatos, covering twenty-three municípios in the Agreste and one sindicato in the deep sertão covering two municípios were recognized by the Ministry of Labor.¹ In 1963 and early 1964, not one additional rural sindicato in Paraíba was given legal status--a probable indication that Assis Lemos and his Peasant League groups, as well as landowner groups were successful in opposing the application of Church-sponsored groups at the state DRT and Ministry of Labor levels.² With the exception of Marí, which lies partially in the coastal zone, not one rural sindicato was recognized in the coastal or Mata zone of Paraíba prior to 1965.

Rural Sindicatos in Ceará

In 1960, Ceará had more Rural Associations, more Religious Associations, more schools supported by the município government than any other state in North or Northeast Brazil. It also had more voluntary associations and secondary or middle schools than any other

¹SUPRA, "Sindicatos Rurais, Relação Organizada por Oton Monteiro de Deus," pp. 2-3.

The success of three sindicatos (1965) and one cooperative in the deep Sertão is apparently due to the dynamic leadership of a parish priest in Catolet da Rocha, also the seat of a diocese.

²Although Sindicatos were organized in Sapé, Santa Rita, Alagoa Grande, and Mamanguape in 1962, they did not gain recognition until after the April, 1964, Revolution. In Mamanguape, there was allegedly a collusion between the Liga and sugar mills in the Município to keep out a peasant sindicato sponsored by a local priest (conversations with Federação leaders and a DRT employee, João Pessoa, June 19, 1965).




Figure 29.--Location of Peasant Sindicatos in Ceará.

state in the region except Pernambuco. The Municipio of Crato in the South, in 1960, for example, had 231 primary schools (9,570 pupils), twelve middle schools (1,842 students and 171 teachers), and two University Branches (194 students and 47 professors), for its 29,308 urban and 30,156 rural inhabitants.¹ Its economy was a diversified one of industry, livestock, and agriculture--1963 agricultural production was valued at U.S.\$ 600,000, being divided among bananas (22 per cent), mandioca flour (17 per cent), cotton (12 per cent), sugar (9 per cent), oranges (7 per cent), rice (6 per cent), and others (27 per cent).² There was also a relatively strong Workers' Circle movement in several regions on which a peasant movement could be built. In short, the state had a social and educational infrastructure which offered opportunities for local leadership to develop among rural and small town inhabitants.

In 1961, the Archbishop of Fortaleza and the Bishops of Crato and Iguatu agreed to sponsor MEB, JAC, and other rural development programs. By May 13, 1962, two sindicatos covering twelve municipios were recognized at the historic Itabuna Congress; two weeks later, three more sindicatos covering fourteen other municipios were also recognized.³

¹"Crato, Ceará," a pamphlet issued by the IBGE-Conselho Nacional de Estatística, March, 1965, p. 13.

²Ibid., p. 6. Agriculture was not highly developed: in 1960, the agricultural work force of 9,167 persons owned only six tractors and twelve steel plows!

³"Carta de Principios," Jornal do Brasil (May 18, 1962), p. 4.

A Federation of Sharecroppers and Small Farmers (FALTAC) was formed December 17, 1963, by twenty-two sindicatos.¹ In February, 1964, the Ceará Federation reportedly counted upon 25,000 members in sixty municípios.²

The reader will notice on Figure 29 that the overwhelming majority of Ceará sindicatos are located in the Crato or Cariri region in the South. Although there is insufficient published material to indicate the attitudes of plantation or cattle owners, the DRT,³ or the Governor, there is an interesting correlation between the absence of Sindicatos in 1964 and a high density of nineteenth century slave-owning sugar plantations with many slaves, few of which were located in the southern Cariri region. (See Table 9.)

¹"ATO," December 17, 1963, signed by representatives of twenty one sindicatos, shown this writer by Luis Ernani Torres, Executive Secretary of the CONTAG, August 19, 1965. Torres was a former Workers Circle Instructor from South Ceará.

²Price, op. cit., p. 64, indicates FALTAC leaders merged their organization with the ULTAB organization but gives no dates or specifics. However, during the CONTAG elections of December, 1963, Jose Leandro Bezerra da Costa was named Second Vice President of the CONTAG. It is quite possible that Bezerra da Costa and Lindolfo Silva bargained among themselves to bring about FALTAC entry into ULTAB in return for Bezerra da Costa's election to the CONTAG directory.

"Padre Crespo em Fortaleza," O Estado (Fortaleza), July 10, 1965, and "Preparação de Operarios para o Sindicalismo Autentico," Unitario (Fortaleza), September 20, 1964, indicate that Padre Crespo and Torres were visiting the state to select persons for leadership training courses and to establish links with SORPE and the CNCO.

³Price, op. cit., p. 64, cites Jornal do Brasil (February 25, 1964), as the source for a statement by the DRT that there was little opposition to the sindicato movement from large landowners because "we [the DRT] direct our protests at a legal level.

On the other hand, an individual who has discussed sindicato matters closely with Ceará individuals told this writer that there was little activity at the state level since 1964, but that most of the organizational work was taking place in the Crato and Iguatu region.

TABLE 9

SUGAR ENGENHOS WITH SLAVES IN 1881 AND RURAL
SINDICATOS IN CEARA, DECEMBER 1963

Engenhos per Município (1881) ^a	Municípios in 1963 with same Names as in 1881	Municípios with Peasant Sindicatos 1963 ^b	Per Cent
0-99	10	5	50
100-199	13	3	23
200-299	4	0	0
300-399 ^c	2	1	50
400-499	0	0	0
Over 500 ^d	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>50</u>
	33	11	33

^aDjacir Menezes, O Outro Nordeste, Formação Social do Nordeste (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio Editôra, 1937), pp. 144-145, indicates there were 24,463 slaves on 7,436 engenhos in the state in 1881. In 1851 there were 28,546 slaves, but no indication of the number of engenhos owning slaves.

^b"Ato," December 17, 1963, signed by representatives of twenty-one Municípios forming the FALTAC, shown this writer by Luis Ernani Torres, Rio de Janeiro, August 19, 1965.

^cCrato, one of the two municípios in this group, had 363 engenhos with 644 slaves in 1881 or 1.7 slaves per engenho compared to the state wide average of 3.3 slaves per engenho.

^dMilagres, one of the four Municípios in this group had 645 engenhos with only 463 slaves, or .7 slaves per engenho, compared to the statewide average of 3.3 slaves per engenho.

Rural Sindicatos in Maranhão and Piauí

Few favorable conditions for the formation of rural sindicatos have existed in these two large states whose political sub-systems have been dominated by a few, old landowning families.¹ Although the Archbishops in both states have supported the rural development programs of MEB, JAC, and SUDENE,² both states also have been among the most needy in terms of priests available to staff parishes--in fact, the southern halves of both states have been organized into Missionary Prelacies, administrative units directly responsible to Rome, without any Bishops.³

Although many sindicatos of rural workers, autonomous workers, and small proprietors were created in both states before April 1964, most of them were created only on paper or had no continuing life after the initial organizational meetings.⁴

¹ Interviews with Vicente Costa of São Vicente Ferreira and São João Batista, Maranhão, and Sebastião Aloe Nepomuceno, Amarante, Piauí, at the JAC Council Meeting, Itaperica, Bahia, May 15-16, 1965; also Edson Vigal, newspaperman from Sao Luis, Maranhao, in Sao Paulo, November 27, 1964.

² "A Campanha Eleitoral de 1958 no Piauí," Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos, No. 8 (April, 1960), pp. 33-34, notes only one member of the State Assembly--a stevedore active in a Sindicato and the PTB--was not linked by family or political ties to the great landed proprietors.

³ Dom Avelar Brandão of Teresina, Piauí, formerly Bishop at Petrolina, Pernambuco for ten years, was one of the more active Bishops pushing rural development and change.

⁴ Frank Bonilla, "A Franciscan Bishopric in the Amazon," is a good discussion of the Prelacy of Santarem which extends over 210,000 square miles in neighboring Para State, as well as the staffing problems of the 30 Prelacies in Brazil.

⁴ For example, of the forty-five rural sindicatos reportedly organized in Maranhão prior to April, 1964, forty-two were abolished in early 1965; in Piauí, fifty-four of the eighty-seven peasant

Effects of the Revolution on Northeast
Peasant Sindicatos

The fall of the Goulart Government was the signal for countless reprisals by landowners and sugar mill operators against peasants and their allies who participated in the peasant movement prior to April, 1964. In Pernambuco and Alagoas, landowners ignored collective bargaining contracts. In many states, peasant leaders and MEB literacy workers were arrested, expelled from their land or jobs,¹ sometimes killed,² and otherwise harassed by landowners who circulated "black lists" of peasant activists.³ In Alagoas, Archbishop Dom Adelmo Machado reduced his interest in the Soral program. In Paraiba, a majority of the priests at the municipio level decided to act only in an indirect advisory capacity and to avoid acting in direct leadership roles. In Pernambuco and Rio Grande do Norte, on the other hand, several Bishops and priests spoke out in defense of the peasant movement.

sindicatos "organized" had their recognition papers cancelled. See "Governo fecha os sindicatos de peleguismo," Tribuna da Imprensa (Rio de Janeiro), March 30, 1965.

¹Professor Assis Lemos was fired from his position in the Faculty of Economic Science at Areia.

²"Sapé, lembrança sangrenta de uma época de sobrealtos," Jornal do Brasil (April 7, 1965), p. 22, indicates that Sape peasant leaders Pedro Fazendeiro (Secretary) and Joao Alberto (Orator) were found dead and mutilated September 9, 1965, on the highway between Campina Grande, Paraiba, and Caruaru, Pernambuco, two days after being reportedly released from prison by military authorities.

³In Alagoas, Sugar Mill Operators labelled the President of the Federation of Sharecroppers (Trabalhadores Autonomos) as a "Communist" and attempted to pursue him wherever he went.

In Paraiba, the parish priest of Pírrituba fled to Joao Pessoa in peasant clothing to escape landowner retaliation for his support of the Church-affiliated sindicato.

NOTA OFICIAL

O SINDICATO DA INDÚSTRIA DO AÇÚCAR, NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO, a ASSOCIAÇÃO DOS FORNECEDORES DE CANA DE PERNAMBUCO, a SOCIEDADE AUXILIADORA DE AGRICULTURA DE PERNAMBUCO e o SINDICATO DOS EMPREGADORES NA LAVOURA DE CANA DE PERNAMBUCO, em face do momento histórico de tamanha relevância que atravessa o Brasil, e principalmente Pernambuco, sentem-se no dever de dirigir aos industriais do açúcar, fornecedores de cana e dos demais agricultores do Estado, expressando o pensamento dessas entidades de classe, qual seja a fiel observância das tabelas que foram anteriormente elaboradas no Palácio do Governo e o acôrdo salarial homologado na Delegacia do Trabalho, na presença do ex-Ministro Amauri Silva, em data de 20 de novembro de 1963, bem como os acordos particulares que alguns estabeleceram, inclusive o integral cumprimento dos novos níveis salariais decretados em 24 de fevereiro p. passado.

Solicitam ainda de seus associados o máximo de compreensão para que não haja a menor dúvida de que nos prevaleçamos dêste angustioso momento da vida brasileira para exteriorizar recalques ou sentimentos menos nobres, colaborando, assim, com as autoridades hoje constituídas.

Apelam para todos trabalhadores e empregadores da lavoura em geral para que cumpram suas obrigações dentro de um clima de ordem e respeito a fim de que as relações entre patrões e empregados sejam mantidas de acôrdo com o espírito da Lei.

As entidades signatárias da presente estão dispostas a manter os melhores entendimentos com os órgãos sindicais dos trabalhadores legalmente constituídos e reconhecidos, e que, dirigidos por seus autênticos representantes, possibilitem um verdadeiro clima de paz, harmonia e trabalho em nosso Estado.

RECIFE, 3 de abril de 1964.

SINDICATO DA INDÚSTRIA DO AÇÚCAR NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO
Renato Brito Bezerra de Melo — Presidente

SOCIEDADE AUXILIADORA DA AGRICULTURA DE PERNAMBUCO
Ernesto Gonçalves Pereira Lima — Presidente

ASSOCIAÇÃO DOS FORNECEDORES DE CANA DE PERNAMBUCO
Francisco Falcão — Presidente

SINDICATO DOS EMPREGADORES NA LAVOURA DE CANA DE PERNAMBUCO
Francisco Falcão — Presidente

In all of these states, the top personnel of the Regional Labor Delegacies of the Ministry of Labor were changed; most of the new DRT's were not only more friendly to the large landowner interest groups, but also assumed an attitude of hostility to many of the Church-sponsored groups which had been non-communist all along. More important, however, was the decision of Fourth Army officers to enter into a much greater and continuous involvement in peasant-landowner relations.¹ This role began immediately on April 1 and April 3, 1964, when Fourth Army Officers circulated statements that rural sindicatos were not to be closed and were to be allowed to function normally.² However, these and other statements about the continued validity of the Pernambuco collective contract of November 1963,³ were not always heeded by local landowners or officials who

¹"Brazil Cleanup Turns to Church," New York Times (April 23, 1964), p. 12:1, is one of the first newspaper articles describing the increased attention military officers were to pay to Catholic Action, MEB, and peasant sindicato activities.

²"Nota Oficial," Diario de Pernambuco (April 1, 1964), and "Nota Oficial," April 3, 1964, distributed in leaflet form throughout the state, signed by Renato Brito Bezerra de Melo, President of the Sugar Mill Operators Sindicato; Ernesto Gonçalves Pereira Lima, President of the Agricultural Auxiliary Aid Society; Francisco Falcão, President of the Sugar Plantation Owners Association and the Sindicato of Sugar Cane Employers, which is included on the next page.

³"Cumprir a Lei Sera Grande," Jornal do Comercio (Recife), June 21, 1964, notes that Colonel Antonio Bandeira, head of the Intelligence Section of the Fourth Army, issued a statement that the Fourth Army, now headed by General Antonio Carlos Muracy "understood the seriousness of Pernambuco's social problems and recommended observance of existing legal and social legislation with respect to sindicatos and rural workers." Muracy was a member of the "Sorbonne Group of Technocrats" described by Rowe in "Revolution or Counter-revolution in Brazil," while his predecessor Justino Alves Bastos had been a member of the "Gorilla" or "hard-line" anti-communist group suspicious of all social reforms.

sought a return to the status quo ante 1955 and the rule of the powerful as opposed to a rule of law.¹

In Pernambuco, Alagoas, and other states, there were changes in the leadership of the Federations as Popular Action or MEB-affiliated leaders resigned their position and non-communist members of the Directories assumed their offices.² In Pernambuco, Padre Antonio Melo assumed an unofficial position as advisor to the DRT, recommending various university students, engenho administrators, and peasants who were his followers to assume the leadership of approximately one-third of the sindicatos in the sugar zone.³ There were no interventions in the agreste or sertao of any North or Northeast states so far as this writer knows.

In Pernambuco, which has been the focal point of rural unrest in the North and Northeast since 1955, a rather institutionalized process of peasant-landowner relations appears to have developed since the April 1964 intervention by the Military. Demands may be generated by either the peasants, the landowners, or the leaders of both groups, e.g., payment of back wages, improved housing, arbitrary changes in

¹In August, 1965, this writer visited a Fourth Army Officer in Goiana who had just arrested and jailed a local landowner for shooting a peasant who had complained about the former's attempt to re-impose pre-1964 work norms on his plantation.

²"Trabalhadores Rurais Tem Nova Diretoria e Traçam Alguns Planos," Jornal do Comercio (May 13, 1964).

³Interview with the DRT Haroldo Furtado Veloso, Recife, Pernambuco, June 4, 1965.

Although Brazilian labor law calls for elections after 90 days of intervention, many sindicatos in the sugar zone did not elect new officers until the last quarter of 1965--more than a year and a half later.

land tenure arrangements, or non-payment of the thirteenth month bonus.¹ In some cases, the articulated demand may not be the real demand that the group is interested in but rather a convenient starting point.² Both sides then attempt to bring in município or state authorities, Church officials,³ and associational interest groups into the conflict. In such conflicts, the Pernambuco, Rio Grande do

¹On June 29, 1965, this writer attended a testimonial dinner for Padre Melo in Cabo, Pernambuco, in which a group of Sindicato leaders led by Amaro José Bandeira, Interventor-President of the Governing Junta of Palmares threatened to call a strike even before the sugar harvest had begun in order to force compliance with the November, 1964, collective contract, especially the provisions governing payment of the thirteenth month wage for 1964, which was still not paid in many areas as well as the provisions governing work norms in the fields. Differences developed between Padre Crespo and Melo over the utility of such a strike at a time when many thousands of rural workers were out of work.

²"Padre: Usineiros do Nordeste Preparam Greve de Operários," Ultima Hora (Rio de Janeiro), August 20, 1965, contains a statement by Padre Crespo that fifty-six sugar mills in the Northeast were encouraging their workers to strike in order to pressure the Federal Government to continue subsidizing the industry--a plan which had the support of the DRT, State Governor Paulo Guerra--a landowner himself, and Padre Melo. Hitherto, the Castelo Branco government said it was going to refuse to continue agricultural loans to those sugar plantation owners or sugar mills who diverted these loans to other business enterprises or to pay off debts incurred by their other business enterprises.

³In August, 1965, Recife newspapers gave considerable coverage to the visit of Archbishop Dom Geraldo de Proença Sigaud of Diamantina, Minas Gerais (co-Author of Reforma Agrária, Questão de Consciência) to tomato and fruit grower-industrialist Moacyr de Brito Freitas in Pesqueira. Practically no coverage was given to conflicts over prices paid for tomatoes by the Fabrica Peixe and the support of local Priest José Maria for the Sindicato of Small Farmers. In addition, newspaper accounts, which this writer saw, did not indicate that the local Bishop or Padre José Maria were included among those attending a special luncheon or dinner held in the Archbishop's name by Freitas or that the visiting Archbishop even called upon the local Bishop!

Norte, and Ceara Rural Worker Federations appear to have an obvious advantage over the Paraíba and Alagoas Federations: the latter are hampered by their ideological insistence on keeping sindicato and federation control in the hands of peasants and not sharing it with priests. The peasant federations attempt to influence the DRT to issue an order in favor of the member, the sindicato, or the class in general. The landowners, if they cannot localize a conflict, attempt to bring in one of the autonomous Institutos or a friendly Ministry with whom they have a clientela or parentela relation, generally Agriculture, Industry and Commerce, or the Bank of Brazil. Of course, while this is going on, both groups have tried to establish and maintain friendly clientele relationships with other federal agencies, state departments, communications media, state and federal deputies, and local or regional military commanders.

If violence or work stoppages by the rural workers seem unlikely, the DRT will issue a modest resolution or order (portaria), which awards them much less than they wanted which is probably close to what the landowners were willing to grant. If violence seems most likely and on a wide-scale through a region-wide strike vote over non-payment of the thirteenth month bonus or some other legally required benefit,¹ the DRT will issue an order which awards the

¹On August 8, 1965, workers in eight Municipios under Padre Melo's influence voted 14,066 to twenty-four to strike to resolve the issue of minimum wage and thirteenth month payments; however, workers in nine other municipios either did not vote in favor of a strike or in fact refused to show up in large enough numbers so that a quorum could be considered to have appeared. "Falta de Quorum Pode Adiar Greve no Campo," Diario da Noite (Recife), August 10, 1965, and "Nove Sindicatos Rurais Não Tiveram Quorum para deflagrar Greve," Jornal do Comercio (August 10, 1965), indicated the strike

rural workers through the Federation a much more substantial increase than they thought they probably would get and one which the landowners or sugar mills are willing to grant if they can obtain higher minimum prices for their crops, easier bank financing, or greater government purchases of their products. If, however, either side has been able to bring in other power-contenders through the use of plantation-owned or Church-owned radio stations, newspapers, or other communications media,¹ the side which gains the least advantage by the expansion of the conflict will try to bring in the President or his close advisers.² In the meanwhile, peripheral threats of law suits or actual cases are filed against various participants.³ If serious social

vote of the Sindicatos in favor of a strike, but published no totals for those sindicatos in which a quorum was lacking.

¹Senator Pessoa de Queiroz's position as principal stockholder in Jornal do Comercio, two radio stations, and a television station obviously gives the large landowners and sugar mill operators an edge over the peasant federations of the Northeast, in issues affecting just these two interests. Diario da Manhã was the principal organ of the Fornecedores. Diario de Pernambuco supported the landowners and sugar industrialists, but also gave space to Padres Crespo or Melo who always provided suitable phrases good for headlines.

²During the week of June 9, 1965, Amaro José Bandeira, Interventor-President of Palmares, presented the "plight of the Pernambuco peasants" in an interview with President Castelo Branco. One or two Recife newspapers also reported that Bandeira had also reported on the "plight of the sugar industry," emphasizing its need for Banco do Brasil loans and an increase in sugar prices!

³"Interpelação Judicial da DRT na Justiça contra Padre Crespo," Jornal do Comercio (September 12, 1965), indicates a threat by the DRT Furtado Veloso he would bring a libel suit against Padre Crespo, who was calling for free elections in rural sindicatos to remove the interventors named by various DRT's and also trying to influence the DRT Furtado Veloso to release funds to the Federation which Sindicatos had collected under the Impôsto Sindical.

"Delegado do Trabalho interpela Padre Crespo sobre acusações," Jornal do Comercio (September 17, 1965), indicates Furtado Veloso had retained Boris Trindade, one of the Northeast's best criminal lawyers, to take a deposition with respect to statements by Crespo that the DRT ought to resign if he felt he did not have the authority to

disruption is threatened as in early 1964, November 1964, or August-September 1965, Army Commanders will also call in the leaders of the contending groups and give participants a maximum period in which to resolve their difficulties.¹ If the principal participants and their allies cannot resolve these differences, then the military commanders or the President, with their advisers, will establish the general guidelines and perhaps even particular details of a general agreement which will be signed in public with the presence of some high dignitary such as the Minister of Labor or the President.²

order the elections or turn the funds over to the Federation. In the long run, nothing came of these threats.

¹Various Pernambuco Sindicato presidents told this writer that Colonel Antonio Bandeira asked them to come in at least once a month to inform him of the socio-political situation in their Municipio.

In October, 1965, President Castelo Branco discussed the agricultural situation of the Northeast with several prominent plantation and sugar mill owners. When one usineiro protested that he could not compete with producers in Paraná and Sao Paulo, Castelo Branco is reported to have broken in abruptly and demanded why the usineiro didn't sell one of his usinas and use the money to rationalize the operations of the remainder and thus produce sugar more efficiently. There was no recorded answer from the usineiro--and no mills have been sold in the last three years.

²"Sussekind Convoca As Pressas Haroldo, Padre Melo e Federação Rural," Jornal do Comercio (Recife), September 16, 1965, indicates that Labor Minister Sussekind asked DRT Furtado Veloso, Padre Melo, and Rural Worker Federation leaders to come to Rio de Janeiro to discuss a means of avoiding a strike during the September sugar cane harvest.

"Sussekind Descre em Greve Rural, Diz Que Acordo é Bom e Açúcar Não Subira," Diario de Pernambuco (September 25, 1965), and "Aproximação dos Sindicatos com a Federal Rural, DRT Patrocina," Diario de Pernambuco (September 28, 1965), describe the new collective contract which was signed in President Castelo Branco's presence in Recife, September 25, 1965.

Probably the most important aspect of this contract was a recognition by the large landowners and sugar mills of their obligation to provide land to each worker with more than one year's employment in their service for the production of subsistence crops and livestock near their residence.

Violence is used in differing amounts by all of the principal actors without any sense of guilt, although leaders will attempt to justify to their own followers the use of violence through exclusive, partisan communications channels or to publicly "protest the immoral use of violence" by their opponents.

Peasant Sindicato Use of Welfare Service
to Influence Peasant Attitudes

In the case of the peasant sindicatos of Pernambuco and Rio Grande do Norte, their ability to operate and staff their own consumer-cooperatives (a species of grocery and drug store), medical and dental clinics, jeep or ambulance services for pregnant wives and the sick, and the ability to invoke religious participation with its overtones of divine sanctions--obviously provides many peasants with needed welfare services but it also enables the leaders to maintain a greater degree of control over the attitude formations and loyalties of members.¹ In Paraíba and Alagoas, landowners are much more able to control the flow of information to peasant renters, tenants, and day laborers because the Peasant Federation and its member sin-
dicatos are not able to provide the material or welfare benefits

¹See Truman, op. cit., pp. 157-178 and 203-217, and Seymour Lipset, op. cit., pp. 83-90 and 203-217, for theoretical models and discussion of the problems of group cohesion, cross-pressures and attitude formations in political conflict.

See Payne, op. cit., p. 368, for his comments on the links of the Aprista and other Peruvian parties with labor, students, and professional groups, especially the role of party newspapers.

La Palombara, op. cit., pp. 173-198, discusses the flow of information to members of Italian interest groups and clientele but does not discuss cross-pressures on attitude formation possibly because of the ideological cleavages of so many groups who are not predisposed to engage in bargaining compromise.

provided by the landowners or by the Pernambuco and Rio Grande do Norte peasant groups.¹ In this situation, the attitudes of the DRT's in Alagoas, Paraíba, and Rio Grande do Norte are quite understandable. The social and political pressures on them to develop clientele relationships with the Peasant Federations are much weaker than those of the Rural Federations or Federations of Sugar and Tobacco Growers and individual plantation or usineiro-politicians. In addition, the DRT has numerous urban labor management problems for which he has clientele relationships--and therefore, it is a positive advantage for him not to be involved in rural conflicts which are much more difficult to influence for the reasons discussed in Chapter II, especially the lack of communication and enforcement facilities.

Summary

In the North and Northeast, where there is a population surplus, severe unemployment for many peasants between agricultural harvests, and under-employment for most peasants, economic strikes would, in most cases, be undermined by the use of strike-breakers or replacements as happened in Pernambuco in 1963-1964. To demand that Brazilian

¹A typical tactic of landowners, including Moacyr de Brito Freitas, is to dismiss any of their rural workers or tenants who are known to participate in rural sindicatos or their consumer cooperatives. On July 20, 1966, this writer met with the President of the Rural Workers Sindicato in Pesqueira and arranged to visit his small farm in the country later in the afternoon. The only other persons present were Miss Cynthia Hewitt and three tenant farmers or sharecroppers who came into the Sindicato offices toward the end of our conversation to report on some difficulties with Freitas and other landowners. Within two hours, while this writer and Miss Hewitt were having lunch with Freitas, he casually remarked he knew I was going to visit the farm of the Sindicato president in the afternoon.

peasants use only collective bargaining and lobbying techniques and to refrain from the several tactics of violence--when their employers or landowners are not similarly restrained and command much larger financial resources--is tantamount to urging dissolution of the peasant movements in the regions. Higher wages, lower consumer prices, work norms which are easier to complete, and greater peasant participation in policy-making are found in Pernambuco and not in neighboring Alagoas or Paraiba because Pernambuco peasant groups have successfully mobilized pressure at various points in the hierarchy of governmental processes to achieve these goals. Until peasant sindicatos or Federations in other states in the region are able to organize a power-capability similar to that of Pernambuco--irrespective of the structure by which this is done--they will receive fewer benefits from the political and economic sub-systems of the region.

The next chapter will examine the Southern states, including the varied use of violence and other techniques of access.

CHAPTER VI

CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF SMALL FARMERS AND RURAL WORKERS IN THE SOUTH

Introduction

In Chapter II, this writer suggested that the structure and functioning of the political sub-systems of such Southern states as Rio Grande do Sul, Paraná, and Sao Paulo, developed differently from the Northeast and statistical material was given to show the different outputs of these sub-systems in higher rates of literacy, newspaper circulation, and availability of hospital beds per citizen. (See Table 6.) It was suggested the different outputs resulted from the different colonization processes of the South from the North and Northeast and the development and maintenance of a complex rural social infra-structure that included numerous organized voluntary groups. (See Table 5.) In fact, although one finds municipios and regions in the South in which "traditional families" dominate politics¹ and

¹"Bodas de Ouro," A Folha (Rio Pardo, Rio Grande do Sul) (early), February, 1965, p. 4, notes that "Coronel" José Saldanha Ferreira and his wife would celebrate their 50th wedding anniversary on February 11, 1965, in the residence of the "late Coronel Dario Lopes de Almeida," in which they had been married and was still the residence of his descendants. "Saldanha Ferreira, a fazendeiro in the Municipio, belongs to a traditional family and has long been active in the political, social, and economic life of the Municipio. For the last twenty years, he has occupied the Presidency of the Rural Association, with only two interruptions."

Rio Pardo is a Municipio of large-landholdings to the south of Santa Cruz in which cattle and rice are the principal crops.

violence is still found,¹ there are also regions where a small family farmer or rural middle class plays an important role in rural and small town life.² In fact, to reverse Banfield's description of the implications of a society of amoral familists,³ this writer found many public-spirited citizens who would act as follows:

1. Individuals will further the interests of the group and the community even if it is not to their private advantage to do so other than in terms of status approval by their peers or religious authorities.
2. It is not considered abnormal or improper for a private citizen to take a serious interest in a public problem.
3. Some office holders, professional, and educated people, have a sense of mission or calling and do not regard their special position or training as a weapon to be used against others for private advantage.⁴

¹São Francisco Virá 'Far West,' Ultima Hora (August 6, 1963), p. 3, is the account of the invasion of the property of Mato das Flores, Municipio of São Francisco, Rio Grande do Sul, by a group of squatters apparently acting in collusion with the MASTER organization of Leonel Brizola and the SUPRA government agency.

José Rotta, President of the CONTAG and the Rural Workers Federation of São Paulo, showed this writer in an interview May 8, 1965, a newspaper clipping from the December 21, 1964, São Paulo edition of Ultima Hora, which reported on the shooting of peasants, in Aracatuba, São Paulo, by gunmen who worked for a fazendeiro.

²As noted in Chapter I, it was often difficult to find a rural lower class separate from a rural middle class in the small farming regions of Rio Grande do Sul, where small farmers owning from five to ten hectares (ten-twenty-five acres), referred to themselves as "colonos" and not as peasants (camponeses). Although their farms might be no larger than the farms of "peasants" in the Northeast, the Gaucho farms generally provided a much higher level of living for the "colono" and his family.

³Banfield, op. cit., pp. 85-104.

⁴Ibid., pp. 91-92, contrasted the schoolteachers of Montegrano, Italy, who took no interest in the extra-curricular lives of village children to teachers from northern Italy who were described in phrases similar to those encountered by this writer in the German-Italian regions of Rio Grande do Sul: "During the summer vacation, a teacher

4. Individuals in small rural villages or neighborhoods will not refuse to follow the leadership of an outsider or member in outlining a course of action out of distrust that they may be doing this only for his private advantage; they may in fact presume he is motivated by a sense of public service or service to the group.
5. It is not always assumed that whoever holds power or public office is self-serving and corrupt.
6. Despite the willingness of many voters to sell their votes, there are strong and stable political machines which also have to concern themselves with consistent programs in order to obtain and retain votes and support.
7. Although some local "chefes politicos" or "cabos eleitorais" will sell their services to the highest bidder, they will not always change sides nor shift the votes they control or influence from election to election.

Whereas in the traditional regions of Brazil, including the Campanha (or Pampa) region of southern Rio Grande do Sul), power-holders seek to maintain a climate of uncertainty over land title and property limits, in the small-farm regions of The Colony or South, one finds municípios in which legal titles and property demarcations are well defined,¹ where the protection of the laws accruing to the large land-owner is also granted to small owners, farm workers, and their neighbors regardless of their social and economic status.

In particular, although conflicts for control of município and state governments have been intense in the last decade, it is useful to remember that:

. . . may hold informal classes. He will take the children on a hike into the country . . . The teacher is a part of the children's lives out of school as well as in."

¹Smith, Brazil, pp. 273-282, discusses the high degree of perfection in land surveys and titles achieved in the South.

1. opposing forces are not always disposed to employ violent methods to influence an incumbent of a political office.
2. politically structured violence is not always a highly effective weapon for those groups or individuals which can employ it.
3. civilian groups are not disposed to accept military intervention in agricultural and industrial politics with minor exceptions such as military commander seeking an audience for a civilian agricultural interest group, because of his connections with the two military men who have occupied the presidency in the last three years.

This chapter will discuss the following: (1) the clientele relationships, population pressure, and MASTER and FAG movements in Rio Grande do Sul; (2) the Cotia Cooperative of Sao Paulo, one of several cooperatives which are principally a marketing organization but which also perform an occasional pressure group function; (3) the rural sindicato movements of Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Paraná, created by different Roman Catholic and Communist groups, and (4) the changing nature of the agricultural and political scene which creates a need for bureaucratic expertise among peasant pressure groups.

This chapter will focus more on Rio Grande do Sul than the other states because it offered the best model of small proprietor group activity and because more published data were available.

The Clientela Relationships between Gaucho
Agricultural Groups, the State
Government, and Federal Authorities

In Rio Grande do Sul, local agricultural producer groups have exerted sufficient pressures over the last forty years on the State and Federal governments to establish "institutos" to regulate the pricing and marketing of meat, rice, Yerba Mate, wheat, tobacco, and

peaches.¹ The larger ranchers and landowners have probably benefited more from the clientele relationships set up between Institutes, Associations, and Sindicatos of producers of the crops although small family farmers have participated in the organizations regulating Yerba Mate and peaches.² The Institutes and the State Agriculture Department have established experimental farms in different parts of the states to improve the quality and productivity of crops. These generally are directed by professional agronomists who recognize the political climate in which they have to work in recruiting staff, obtaining budgets, publishing the results of their work, and distributing new varieties of plants and animals.³ Several State Institutes publish

¹Surprisingly enough, the small farmers in the region around Caxias do Sul who produce a great quantity of grapes and wines have not sought the creation of an Institute but have preferred to work through Cooperatives and lobbying with State and Federal Deputies with whom small farmer, cooperative, and Diocese religious leaders have a close clientele-relationship.

²"Acta de Fundação Arrozeiro do Rio Grande do Sul," Lavoura Arrozeiro (Porto Alegre: Instituto Rio Grandense do Arroz), Ano XVIII, No. 212 (November, 1964), reproduces the original Ato under which the Sindicato Arrozeiro do Rio Grande do Sul was founded June 12, 1926. Of twenty-two founding companies and individuals, seven had Luso-Brazilian names, fourteen had German names, and one--Carlos Salim--was of Middle Eastern origin.

³Based on discussions by this writer with Agronomists and other officials in Experiment Stations in Caxias do Sul, Pelotas, Santa Cruz do Sul, and ASCAR extension agents in Santa Cruz do Sul and Rio Pardo.

slick paper journals which inform members of technical developments and crop production in Brazil and the world, and channel communications to Federal and State authorities and their own membership.¹

Population Pressures and the
Land Tenure System

Nevertheless, despite a relatively high level of living and income, there was a heavy population pressure on the land in the small farming regions which led to further sub-division of farms and an exodus of people to the cities and other states such as Santa Catarina and Paraná, where the process of cutting down the forest and establishing new colonias was re-enacted.² However, population pressure was probably worse in the small cities and ranches of the plains regions of the Campanha and the Central Depression where there was none of the industry found in the Colonia region to absorb excess labor.

A process of heavy sub-dividing of small farm properties less than 20 hectares, accompanied by an increasing acreage of establishments over 10,000 hectares in size, took place between 1950-1960.³

¹Lavoura Arrozeira, first published in 1947, is a prime example. Its November, 1964, issue included articles on Agrarian Reform in Latin America, the Application of Lime to Rice production, Financing of Dams, Countries with high costs of rice production; the Harvest and Imports of Rice by Japan; Prices in Diverse Markets, and an Exposition of Programs (Motivos) directed September 30, 1964, to Federal Authorities.

²Smith, Brazil, pp. 144-198, discusses internal migration; pp. 183-194 contain a series of tables and maps on population exchanges between the several states.

³Comissão Especial de Reforma Agrária: Bases e Diretrizes Para Um Programa Estadual de Reforma Agrária, Tables V and VI, located between pp. 11-6 and 11-7. The Commission was established February

In 1960, 0.83 per cent of the landowners with tracts over 1,000 hectares (2,479 acres) owned 36.31 per cent of the land in the state; 7.27 per cent of the proprietors, with farms over 100 hectares in size, owned 67.61 per cent of all land. On the other hand, 92.71 per cent of all farms were less than 100 hectares in size and covered only 32.59 per cent of the land.¹

Although the 1960 census data are not completely clear on the numbers of heads of families and persons dependent on farming alone for their living, Governor Brizola, in the publication Reforma Agrária, Uma Realidade, said 242,313 families were landless or possessed an insignificant amount of land. The much more objective Comissão study estimated a total of 342,167 heads of rural households did not have plots of 30 hectares (84 acres) or more which it felt was the minimum necessary for an adequate level of income and living given the nature of the levels of technology; therefore they could be considered as living in needy or poverty-stricken circumstances.³

23, 1963, and is the basic and most objective source for data on land tenure and farm population both by region and Município in the state.

¹ Ibid.; Tables I and II located between pp. 11-2 and 11-3.

A more drastic contrast was painted by Instituto Gaucho de Reforma Agrária, Reforma Agrária, Uma Realidade no Rio Grande do Sul (Pôrto Alegre), Oficinas Gráficas da SIPA, 1962, unnumbered, pp. 3-4, which states "only 1.83% of the rural proprietors of the state detain . . . an area equivalent to 47.97% of its surface . . . Medium sized properties between 50 and 500 hectares that proportion reasonable conditions of life, cover only 28.03% of the rural area and are distributed only among 12.99% of the number of plots."

This writer prefers a cutoff point at 100 hectares or 247 acres as the bottom level for medium-sized properties.

² IGRA, op. cit., unnumbered, p. 4.

³ Comissão Especial, Bases e Diretrizes, Tables XI-XV, located between pp. 11-12 and 11-13, and pp. 11-24 and 11-25.

This group was made up of an estimated 63,860 heads of household who were employees or day laborers (empregados) in a variety of forms, an estimated 85,028 landless heads of household who rented, sharecropped or worked farm land in some other fashion, and an estimated 181,618 families with some land but less than 30 hectares of their own. The Commission also estimated that at least 18,000 new persons would join the agricultural labor force each year who would have little or no access to land and thus be forced to emigrate to other occupations, other states, or increase the pressure on those already unemployed or under-employed.

In the late 1940's, a small group of sociologists, agricultural extension agents, União Popular leaders, and small farm-region politicians such as Wolfram Metzler, Fernando Ferrari, and Alfredo Hoffman, began to discuss the necessity of reformulating the state agrarian structure to bring about a greater agricultural productivity.¹ Although several bills were introduced into the State Assembly, little further action was taken. The MASTER movement began within this context.

The Movement of the Agricultural Landless
or MASTER (1958-1963)

In the late 1950's--either 1958 or 1959 since no one was really certain in 1964-1965--a small group of twenty-thirty families of

¹ Interview with Padre João Sehnem, Provincial Head of the Jesuits and one of the founders of the cooperative movement of União Popular, Porto Alegre, February, 1965; see also Dr. Wolfram Metzler, Retten Wir Unsere Kolonien (Salvemos Nossas Colonias) (Porto Alegre: Edições "A Nação," 1953), which is a condensation in German of twenty articles published in 1952 in the German-language supplements of the Porto Alegre weekly, A Nação, by a distinguished Agronomist and PR state deputy.

landless day-laborers squatted on land, whose title was in dispute, some 70 kilometers from the city of Encruzilhada do Sul in a place which was described by one priest as "the end of the world."¹ In November, 1959, Milton Soares Rodriguez, Police Chief (Delegado) in the heavily German city of Santa Cruz do Sul during the Vargas period, was elected Prefeito of Encruzilhada. Soares Rodriguez apparently protected the squatters and informed Federal Deputy Rui Ramos and Governor Leonel Brizola of the possible political benefits as well as the political problems raised by "squattling incidents."

Brizola took advantage of the Encruzilhada movement² in three principal ways:

1. He dismissed PRP State Deputy Alberto Hoffman as Secretary of Agriculture and appointed a fellow PTB Deputy, Joao Caruso³

¹Much of this discussion of the origins of MASTER is based on an interview with Padre Arno Klein, Secretary to the Bishop, Santa Cruz do Sul, February 21, 1965, and Padre Ignacio Eidt, Parish Priest, Linha Arlindo, Municipio of Venancio Aires, February 16, 1965. Klein was a Parish Priest in Encruzilhada in 1941 and 1953-1959; Eidt visited Encruzilhada in 1960 or 1961 while Soares was still Prefeito.

²The IGRA publication, Reforma Agrária, Uma Realidade, unnumbered, pp. 4-6 implies the "Associações dos Agricultores Sem Terra" were first organized in the municipio of Sarandí with a photograph of a man in straw hat holding on (or pushing into the ground) a banner which says "Queremos Terra." (We want land.)

In addition, although Brizola often spoke about the Popular Mobilization Front (FMP), after his October 1962 election as a Guanabara Federal Deputy, he did not speak of the MASTER movement to visiting journalists such as Victor Rico Galan, op. cit., pp. 672-674, although discussing his speeches "to the people via Radio Mainrinque Veiga, his own radio station," "one of the most widely listened to stations in Brazil."

³Interview with Deputy Alfredo Hoffman, State Assembly, Porto Alegre, February 12, 1965.

Hoffman was a fifth generation German-Brazilian whose family moved west in succeeding generations: his great-grandfather being

2. In April, 1960, in Porto Alegre, Deputy Rui Ramos issued a Manifesto--"To the Rio Grande Agricultors and the People in General"--and Statutes for a Movement of the Landless Agricultors (Movimento dos Agricultores Sem Terra or MASTER).¹
3. On November 14, 1961, Governor Brizola issued Decree 12,812 which established the Gaucho Agrarian Reform Institute (Instituto Gaucho de Reforma Agraria or IGRA) out of several existing agencies working in the rural sector.

Several parts of the IGRA statute are similar to the MASTER Manifesto and Statutes drafted by Rui Ramos:

Article 2. IGRA will have the following fundamental objectives:

- a) Study and suggest projects, initiatives, bases and directives for an agrarian policy to the Government of the State . . . with the objective of improving the socio-economic conditions of the rural population, the establishment of a climate of social justice in the rural interior, and especially with respect to the use and property ownership of land.
- b) Promoting access to land and to the property of agricultors without land-sharecroppers, renters, and rural salaried workers--and of the marginal population which has left the countryside.
- c) Promote the organization of colonial nuclei and agricultural communities, within which modern techniques of colonization and production will be found;
.....
- e) Promoting the legalization of lands occupied by small agricultors, which contributed to the formation of minifundio;
- f) Combat all form of exploitations of rural work, defending the producer and production; stimulating productivity and the valorization of the country man by all means of protection (amparo) and assistance;
.....

born in Picada Cafe (Nova Petropolis); his grandfather in Taquara; and his father in Ijuí. The farms in all of these regions average seven hectares (15 acres) per farm.

¹"Aos Agricultores Riograndenses e Ao Povo em Geral," Porto Alegre, April 19, 1960, a photostatic copy of which is in this writer's possession. Padre Arno Klein thinks the Manifesto may have been issued in 1959; however, so little has been written about the MASTER movement that this writer cannot be sure of the dates.

- h) Incentivating the creation and organization of technical agricultural schools, centers of training and formation of skilled craftsmen.¹

In general, the MASTER Manifesto and its Statutes are reasonable: the only exceptions are Articles which allowed (1) persons with non-farm occupations into the membership and--presumably--the leadership of the organization, and (2) provided for establishment of the MASTER headquarters in the state capital or Pôrto Alegre. The latter fact assured the control from the top down by Ramos² and Governor Brizola³ rather than by the membership or local politicians such as Milton Soares Rodríguez, who may have wanted to improve the living conditions of these peasants, but who no longer controlled the organization.

Although there is little published material about the MASTER organization, its methods of operations, or how it functioned to solve local grievances, there are data which indicate that it was an instrument by which both Brizola and Goulart acquired land and votes for themselves. While clamoring for land reform for the landless, Brizola and Goulart used the traditional technique of the

¹Photostatic copy of "Decreto No. 12,812, de 14 de Novembro de 1961," in the possession of this writer. Translation by the writer. The complete texts of these two documents are included as Appendices 1 and 2.

²Ramos was a Methodist Minister in Alegrete, a cattle-ranching município near the Argentine border, until Getúlio Vargas asked for his help in the latter's political comeback in 1950. Ramos' ability to win votes through the skillful use of religious and political imagery contributed to his departure from the ministry to full-time political work. His political career was cut short by death in 1962 or 1963.

³There is little published data in English or Portuguese about the early political career of Leonel Brizola. Skidmore, op. cit., pp. 230-231, 280-283, et passim, and Victor Rico Galan, "The Brazilian Crisis," pp. 664-674, although brief, are among the better sources in English for data on Brizola's career as Governor and Federal Deputy.

"invasion" of state land or private land whose title and/or boundaries were in dispute to increase their own landholdings. The pattern of tactics included the loading of men, women, and children into state-owned or rented trucks which hauled them to a site.¹ It was especially important to have women and children with the invaders:

¹ IGRA, Reforma Agraria, unnumbered p. 14, has a photograph of a crowd of perhaps one hundred people on a dirt road in a forested area alongside of which several tents had been placed; in the background several sedan automobiles and trucks are parked. The caption reads: "The open highways crossing the countryside carry a new notion of his rights to the agricultor and awakened in him the anxieties of a better life. They began to experiment (encetar), uniting one to the other, in a long march on unproductive latifundios."

The next three pages had photographs, probably of the same group, in a rally "at the foot of the flag of the State . . . and the Cross of Christ," "raising an appeal [first] to God (o Senhor) and secondly to Governor Brizola who heard their appeal" and "personally informed himself of their anxieties of the indigent rural population, directing himself to the encampments raised by the agricultores without land."

On the next page he announced the constitution of a "team of technicians to study (equacionar) the problems."

Several unnumbered pages later after having given the first "brightness (brilho) of hope," the IGRA book shows a sketch of the site of Fazenda Pangaré, 119 kilometers southeast of Porto Alegre, which the Governor "personally destined for the solution of the problem" through the installation of an agricultural community of the "landless," one thousand acres of his own Fazenda Pangaré."

However, neither the IGRA nor the Comissao publications indicate Governor Brizola's sale of this land to the state. This writer does not know if the land originally was his or whether he acted as an agent for someone else. In any case, the IGRA publication wished to give an impression that the Governor "gave his own lands" to start a program of agrarian reform in the state.

After eighteen pages of photographs and captions dedicated to the Banhado do Colegio occupation and colonization, the IGRA publication returns to Fazenda Pangaré, in which twenty small buildings similar to family houses and two larger buildings, similar to a school or workshed are shown, with a caption that reads "Bacopari: A place situated on the Fazenda Pangaré, part of the property of Governor Leonel Brizola. The chief of the Gaucho Government gave the contribution of his family to the plan of social and economic redemption of the rural milieu (meio)."

An additional three pages are devoted to his "personal interest" in the "landless" of Fazenda Pangaré and his "personal delivery of

If only men were brought in, the police would have no trouble removing them or shooting them down; however, if there are sufficient numbers of mothers with babies in their arms, police and soldiers find it difficult to do anything, nor will the landowners on whose land they are encamped. They don't want anyone [i.e., women and children] to get hurt. There never was a situation of men only; women and children were always there.¹

Invasions were stimulated in municípios with both large and small landholdings, including the following:

Bagé - Urban marginal people led by a woman lawyer, Dona Elide, squatted on land of Ministry of Agriculture Experiment Station.

Cachoeira do Sul - no data available.

Camaquã - lands belonging to the state or with title in dispute from a region drained by the state, commonly known as Banhado do Colegio.

Casa Povo - no data available.

Nonoái - Fazenda Sarandí, which belonged to an Uruguayan family, and whose forested properties Brizola and Goulart wished to exploit.

Passo Fundo - no data available.

Soledad - no data available.

São Francisco - Fazenda Mato das Flores owned by João Kieffer May-June, 1963.

Torres - Fazenda belonging to Moises Velinho who lived in Porto Alegre in December, 1963.

The "invasion" of Fazenda Sarandí in Nonoái Municipio illustrates the techniques of punishing political or economic competitors while

titles of the "landless"; 20 of its 24 pages are devoted to Banhado do Colegio and three to the Colonia of Itapoa, near Pôrto Alegre, another alleged IGRA project, about which this writer could find no data and which the Comissão publication does not discuss in its breakdown of 1964 IGRA activities.

¹ Interview with Padre Eidt, February 16, 1965.

also benefitting oneself at the same time. Brizola and Vice President Goulart offered to buy or exchange other properties with its Uruguayan owners in order to exploit its timber resources. When the owners refused, the Prefeito of Nonoai, Jair de Moura Calistos--a follower of Brizola--led several groups of persons on to the land in muni-
cipio-owned or rented trucks.¹ Some of the squatters stayed; most left; nevertheless, Governor Brizola obtained some of the land which he, in turn, sold to the IGRA in 1962 when several thousand hectares of land were expropriated for IGRA colonization projects.²

In the past, Camaqua Município, south of Pôrto Alegre, con-
tained an area of 29-30,000 hectares which was periodically rendered useless to agriculture by flooding from nearby rivers or inadequate drainage, although cattle could sometimes pasture on the land. In 1951, the state of Rio Grande do Sul started a series of drainage and reclamation projects³ in the area which included one property

¹Interviews with an IGRA agronomist in February and April 1965.

²Comissão Especial, Bases e Diretrizes, pp. IV-26 and IV-27, indicate that 62 lots of about 25 hectares each and 16 plots of 250 hectares each had been laid out by 1963 for colonization. In addition, 97 lots in an adjoining State Forest Reserve also had been organized into what was called the João Carruso Nucleus.

"Seleção dos 'sem terra' para o Banhado e Sarandí vai começar," Diario de Noticias (Pôrto Alegre), March 25, 1965, indicates by implication that no one had been selected to colonize the Sarandí plots although colonization had been scheduled for February 1965.

³This writer is not able to determine what political pressures were behind the reclamation project in the first place. The only published matter on the project other than newspaper clippings is a brief mention in the Comissão Especial report, p. IV-27, and IGRA Reforma Agrária, Uma Realidade, publication, passim.

known as Banhado do Colegio, site of a former Convent. Titles and boundary limits of many surrounding landowners were often vague enough to permit them to extend their fences and claims onto the lands drained by the reclamation project.¹ When construction was nearly finished during the Governorship of Brizola, Odilon Silveira G.,² a barber and political ally of Brizola in the city of Camaqua, organized a Sindicato of Agricultores whose members proceeded to encamp periodically on the Banhado do Colegio site and--after several days of occupation--ride back to the nearby city in state or município-owned trucks.³

Finally, on June 27, 1962, a formal IGRA project was established on 3,000 hectares in Banhado do Colegio with the presence of several hundred persons and IGRA authorities.⁴ In late February, 1965,

¹Among the persons "buying land" or titles from others claiming landownership in the region were the Sul Arroz rice firm owned by heirs of Nestor Moura Jardim, the Santana, Corbetta, and Kroeft families.

²"IGRA Colonizara Glebas do Banhado," Ultima Hora (Porto Alegre), August 6, 1963, p. 3, names Espaminonda Silveira as "leader" of "one hundred Banhado do Colegio agricultores" who visited the newspaper to protest against statements that Brizola's measures "were nothing more than a hoax (embuste)."

³Interviews with IGRA Agronomists and Manager of the project, Banhado do Colegio, Camaqua, February 25-26, 1965.

In addition, following the "invasions," JUC groups from the PUC Catholic University and the State University in Porto Alegre went to Banhado do Colegio to render first aid and medical assistance to the "squatters."

⁴IGRA, Reforma Agraria, Uma Realidade, unnumbered, pp. 39-47. However, Eng. Agronomo Artigas, in charge of the IGRA project in Camaqua, told this writer that the State still does not have complete title to the land on which the project is located. Because it does not have title, it has not paid for the land.

134 families were in possession of 20-50 hectare plots of land in the area--including Odilon Silveira G. and other squatters who continued to live in Camaqua but who had sub-leased their plots to other persons or had shown little aptitude themselves for farming while there.¹

Shortly after the Sarandí "invasion," the Federation of Rural Associations (FARSUL) let it be known that it was organizing a campaign to defend its members against further invasions; there were rumors of arms being collected in 1962 and 1963 but the extent of these preparations is not known, especially among the big estancieros (cattle ranchers), who always have maintained supplies of arms and ammunition.

Governor Brizola then countered on March 10, 1962, with an "Appeal to the Great Landed Proprietors," that, "inspired by the principles of Christian Fraternity," they offer for sale to IGRA blocks of land "satisfactory for the cultivation of rice, with payment by the agriculturalists settled there under a minimum plan of ten years at modest interest."² Landowners could participate in the selection of up to half the future occupants of the lots. In

¹Visit by this writer to Banhado do Colegio, Camaquã, with the Director of the Site, Eng. Agronomo Artigas, and Eng. Agronomo Paulo Rabello of the IGRA staff in Pôrto Alegre, February 27, 1965.

"Seleção dos 'Sem Terra' Para o Banhado e Sarandí vai começar," Diario de Noticias (March 25, 1965), indicated that about fifty persons "settled" on the land were not going to be allowed to remain. Arms reportedly were collected and prepared for use but the extent is unknown.

²Photostatic copy of the "Apelo" in this writer's possession which was also published in Correio do Povo (April 3, 1962).

turn, under a proposal first suggested by Nestor Moura Jardim, a wealthy cattle rancher and rice grower (Sul Arroz, S.A.) of Guaíba, the FARSUL suggested that its members make 10% of their lands available to IGRA for purchase.¹

Under this plan, Governor Brizola was one of the first to sell 10 per cent of a farm property when he sold land on Fazenda Sarandí and 1,000 hectares (2,470 acres) from Fazenda Pangaré, 119 kilometers southeast of Pôrto Alegre.² There is no published data on IGRA purchases from any FARSUL members. In any case, the FARSUL offer was quietly dropped after the April, 1964, Revolution.

Although there are little published data on the links between MASTER and PTB party factions headed by Brizola and Goulart,³ statistics for the October, 1962, election show PTB candidates for

¹ Interview with Emiliano Limberger, Nôva Petropolis, Rio Grande do Sul, January 26, 1965. Moura Jardim reportedly began as a peao or day-laborer and through hard work and good fortune, ended his life with 3,000 persons working for him on several ranches and textile firms.

Jardim's social philosophy but not this land-grant proposal is contained in a small booklet: Fundação da Paz Social (Porto Alegre: privately printed, January, 1964).

² Interview with Padre Klein, February 21, 1965. Comissão Especial Bases e Diretrizes, p. IV-27, does not discuss the manner of sale; IGRA, Reforma Agrária, unnumbered p. 25, et passim, implies Brizola gave the land to IGRA.

Alba, Alliance without Allies, p. 32, notes that "Goulart announced in 1962 that he would give 10 per cent of his holdings to the agrarian-reform program" and Brizola "said that he would also donate one of his estates to be divided up among the peasants."

³ Leda Barreto, Julião, Nordeste, Revolução, p. 84, claims that "the tactics of peasant struggles are directed by the MASTER . . . which is also linked to the PC [Communist Party]" but she presents no evidence to support such a statement nor can this writer find any evidence to support such a statement. Galan, op. cit., p. 673, quotes Brizola on "the errors committed by the Communist Party and Juliao."

state and federal deputy won pluralities in fifty-four of fifty-seven municipios (93-94 per cent) in which MASTER was reported active at one time or another between 1961 and 1964,¹ compared to lower percentages of pluralities for PTB candidates (66-67 per cent) in the 100 municipios in which there was no reported MASTER activity in the 1961-1964 period. (See Table 10.)

Another link appears in three reported organizational attempts for which this writer has data. A Brizola aide tried to arrange for a Municipio PTB Chief to organize a Churrasco or Barbecue; at the Churrasco speakers promised land, tractors, and other benefits to those who would return for later meetings. However, in two of these cases, nothing further developed and the groups remained an organization only on paper.²

Moreover, once Brizola was elected a Federal Deputy for Guanabara (greater Rio de Janeiro), in October, 1962, the MASTER organization apparently had little secondary leadership to take over in his absence, especially after the death of Ruy Ramos in late 1962 or early 1963.³ In June, 1963, MASTER groups in the Municipio of Sao Francisco worked closely with SUPRA officials in organizing several "invasions." However, this writer does not have enough information to be able to comment in greater detail on the probable clientele relationship or inter-locking leadership of MASTER and SUPRA in the state.

¹Price, op. cit., p. 62, said MASTER was "reported to be active in at least ten municipios in mid-1962."

²Open meetings were held only once in Caxias do Sul and Rio Pardo. An attempt was made to hold a meeting in Venancio Aires but it failed despite the fact that a Goulart cousin, Salvador Stein Goulart, was PTB Chief and Prefeito from 1962-1967.

³Interview with Emiliano Limberger, February 26, 1965.

TABLE 10

PLURALITIES FOR PTB CANDIDATES FOR STATE AND FEDERAL DEPUTY COMPARED TO MUNICIPIOS WITH MASTER GROUPS, OCTOBER 7, 1962

	Municipios with Plurality for PTB Federal Deputies	Municipios with Plurality for PTB State Deputies
Municipios with MASTER Activity (1961-1964) n - 57	94%	93%
Municipios without MASTER Activity (1961-1964) n - 100	67%	66%

Source: Compiled from statistics for candidates in Rio Grande do Sul, Departamento Estadual de Estatística, Estatistical Eleitoral, Eleições Realizadas em 1962, Porto Alegre, 1962.

A probable indication that MASTER leaders aimed at recruiting individuals with few social ties to a community--cowboys, landless workers, migrant workers, and squatters--rather than individuals with community ties--small farmers, renters, and sharecroppers--is probably supported by the fact that forty-four of the fifty-seven municipios (77 per cent) in which MASTER activity was reported were over 1,000 square kilometers in size while twelve of the sixteen municipios (75 per cent) in which there was MASTER activity had very large farm holdings--more than 35 per cent of all farm properties were more than 250 acres in size. In contrast, MASTER groups were reported active in only eleven of the eighty-seven municipios (12 per cent) with very small farm holdings--95 per cent or more of farm properties were less than 250 acres. The small farm holding municipios with MASTER activity represented thus only 7 per cent of the total number of municipios in the state. (See Table 11.)

The Gaucho Agrarian Front (FAG) and Rural
Sindicatos in Rio Grande do Sul

While MASTER never really paid any attention to developing the leadership potential of its members, the Roman Catholic-sponsored Gaucho Agrarian Front (FAG) was strongly committed to leadership training and participation of the membership in the decision-making process. The initial planning for the FAG took place in December, 1961, after several Roman Catholic clergymen and laymen felt it was necessary to create an organization for the "forgotten, abandoned or exploited agriculturalists" of the state,¹ as well as to combat

¹"Frente Agrária Gaucha, Principais Datas Historicas," n.d., typed manuscript in this writer's possession.

TABLE 11

DISTRIBUTION OF MASTER GROUPS IN RIO GRANDE DO SUL
BY SIZE OF MUNICIPIO AND SIZE OF FARM ESTABLISHMENTS
1961-1964^a

Size in Square Kilometers	Number of Municipios in State	Percent with MASTER Groups	Percent of the Municipios with 95% of Farms less than 100 hectares	Percent of the Municipios with More than 35% of Farms Larger than 100 hectares
0-99	2	--	--	--
100-199	3	--	--	--
200-299	7	14%	--	--
300-399	15	13%	--	--
400-499	5	20%	--	--
500-999	45	20%	4%	--
1,000-4,999	62	58%	18%	10%
Over 5,000	11	72%	--	72%
State Totals	150 ^b	38%	7%	75%

^a Compiled from data on Distribution and Size of Farm Establishments in IGRA, Bases E Diretrizes, Table XI, between pp. 11-12 and 11-13, and from data on distribution of farm establishments according to the area covered in Municipios included in a booklet, Contribuição ao Zoneamento Agrícola do Rio Grande do Sul (Porto Alegre: ASCAR, Divisão de Informação Rural, 1964, unnumbered p. 5.

^b Seven additional municipios were created between 1961 and 1965. Although the writer does not have data on the new municipios, this does not materially affect the applicability of the data to the municipios which existed in 1960 on which farm size and distribution is based.

Brizola, whom they felt was more interested in demagoguery than agrarian development.¹ On January 9, 1962, a group met to draw up the Statutes of the FAG and established eleven Regional Departments to carry on a program modelled after that of SAR and SORPE. On February 12, 1962, the Statutes were published in the Diario Oficial of the state government.²

¹Several small farmers, seminar discussion, FAG Third State Congress, Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul, January 15-16, 1965.

²Earlier, in 1958, various priests were given leave by their Bishops to organize a Christian Democratic Party to combat PTB attacks on the Church.

"Frente Agraria Gaucha, Estatutos," Chapter IV, indicates the founders were:

Arno Schilling, married, lawyer for the State Savings Association, Archbishop Vicente Scherer, single, of Porto Alegre
 Ruy Cirne Lima, Lawyer, from Porto Alegre, Secretary of Economics for Governor Meneghetti in 1963
 Salvador Canelas Sobrinho, married, farmer, resident of Glorinha, Municipio of Cai
 Miss Dionisia Brod, Farm woman, resident of Arroio do Meio
 Auxiliary Bishop Edmundo Luiz Kuns, aide to Archbishop Scherer
 Miss Renita Graeff, farm woman from Arroio de Meio
 José Eli Rocha de Souza, single, farmer in Barro Vermelho, Municipio of Gravataí
 Miss Oliva de Asambuja Sampaio, of Porto Alegre
 Fernando Costa Gama, married, agronomist of Porto Alegre
 José Mariano Beck, married, lawyer from Porto Alegre
 Ary Burger, married, economist from Porto Alegre
 Egydio Michaelson, married, FARSUL lawyer from Porto Alegre, who was active in PTB and ran second to Meneghetti in October, 1962, Gubernatorial election
 Werter Faria, married, lawyer from Porto Alegre
 Aloysio A. Kunsler, married, merchant from Porto Alegre
 Galeno Vellinho de Lacerda, married, professor in Porto Alegre
 Loris José Isatto, married, economist from Porto Alegre.

Power was vested by the statutes in a self-perpetuating Executive Council (Conselho Deliberativo) of seven members:¹

1. José Ary Grebler, a young farmer from Bom Princípio, Município of Cai, active in JAC, who later became President of the Federation of Rural Workers
2. Miss Iloni Seibel, a young woman active in JAC also from Bom Princípio
3. Fernando Costa Gama, an Agronomist from Pôrto Alegre
4. José Mariano Beck, a lawyer, university professor, and PTB candidate for Prefeito of Pôrto Alegre in 1965
5. Ary Burger, an Economist active in the PDC who was named President of the State Economic Savings Association (Caixa Economica Estatal)
6. Werter Faria, Pôrto Alegre lawyer and University professor
7. Auxiliary Bishop Edmundo Luiz Kunz of Pôrto Alegre, aide to Archbishop Vicente Scherer on social action matters.

The FAG, like SAR and SORPE, mixed ideology and organizational techniques in rapidly building a strong structure in the small landholding regions of the state. The following is taken from Article 1 of the FAG Statutes:²

The FAG is a civil Association without economic purposes . . . with offices in Pôrto Alegre . . . that proposes to improve, develop, and diffuse the spirit of solidarity and christian social doctrine which both country and city men may realize in action.³

Sole Paragraph: Specific finalities of the FAG are:

- a. The promotion of investigations and studies about the agrarian question in the state and nation.
- b. The foundation and maintenance of schools and permanent or periodic courses, and the realization of congresses, seminars, and conferences for the formation of rural leaders and the basic education of the farmer (agricultor) and the rural worker.

¹Article 4, Statutes.

²Capitulo 1, Estatutos, FAG.

³A Bishop active in starting JAC in Brazil and the FAG told this writer in April 1965 that "We don't think in terms of a class struggle or changing the structure of society--and our structure is different from that of the Northeast. Many CONTAG people, including President

- c. The protection (amparo) and stimulus of sindicatos and any other kind of association of farmers, owners of small properties (detentores), and of rural workers, as well as groups of economic initiatives, among them, those of a cooperative nature and the promotion of an assistance and cultural nature (ordem assistencial e cultural).

Roman Catholic doctrine on "human solidarity" as opposed to a doctrine of "class warfare" is shown, for example, in the following excerpts from the official FAG newspaper, O Arado, printed after the FAG-sponsored Second State Congress of Rural Workers in August, 1963:

1. The FAG unites, awakens, educates and supports the Christians who desire to . . . construct a new rural world incarnating the message of Christianity.
2. The FAG realized an extraordinary work of politicization since its method of action (Seeing, Judging, and Acting) aids the farmer to be conscious of his dignity and of the problems that impede him from realizing it.
3. The FAG channels the march of the farmers for a communitarian civilization of the rural world adapted to the Gaucho reality since: the action that it executes is a communitarian group action on common problems and its action is an action of free persons who determine it by themselves (se autodeterminam) and not a collective action pre-determined and imposed by outside forces on the group.¹

The FAG was able to build a widespread organization using the cooperative network and spirit fostered by the União Popular² and

José Rotta of São Paulo and Northeast leaders don't like us because of this."

¹"FAG e Seu Metodo de Agir," O Arado (Official Organ of the FAG) (Pôrto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul), No. 4 (August, 1963), p. 5.

²The FAG was most successful in the Dioceses encompassing the small land-holding regions of the state. Although Dom Augusto Petro, Bishop of Vacaria, established a Regional Coordinator for his Diocese, the Coordinator had a great deal of trouble, in establishing FAG nuclei and Sindicatos in the diocese, principally because of the large land-holdings in the Diocese and lack of a complex social infra-structure providing local leadership training opportunities.

the Roman Catholic and Lutheran church structures.¹ Policy action was not dependent on the Porto Alegre leadership, although regional (Diocese) and Sectional (Município) leaders generally kept the capital city leadership informed of developments.

It is appropriate to look at the FAG leadership and structure from the top down, because the organization was built this way.

In Porto Alegre, the FAG was headed by President Arno Schilling, a Catholic University (PUC) professor; State Deputy Adolfo Puggini, publicity chief;² Jose Ary Grebler, a former JAC activist, and Miguel Dario, a Marist brother, who shared administrative and unionization responsibilities.³

Regional Departments were created in nine Dioceses in January, 1962, with a priest and layman in charge, a five-member Executive

¹The União Popular was the World War II transformation of the Volkverein established on February 26, 1912, on the basis of an earlier Sociedade of Agricultores Rio Grandenses which was founded in 1900 in Feliz, Rio Grande do Sul, among German-Brazilians in the southern states of Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, and Paraná. For a good summary of its activities see Anuário Agrícola da União Popular, Vol. 1, 1965.

The Brazilian Cooperative Movement had its beginning when Padre Theodore Amstad founded the first Caixa Rural in the village of Linha Imperial, Nova Petropolis, November 23, 1902. By 1965, the Rural Savings Associations of the Raiffeisen-type federated in a Central Cooperative of Rural Savings Association (Caixas Rural) numbered fifty-seven in Rio Grande do Sul and five in Santa Catarina, with nearly 55,000 associates. See "Monumento de Solidariedade Num Mundo de Egoismo e Ambições," Anuario Agrícola da União Popular, 1965, pp. 17-20.

²In 1964-1965, the FAG published a monthly newspaper and produced several weekly radio programs.

³In addition, Dr. Doris Mueller, an architect, and Loris Jose Isatto, helped Grebler and Dario frequently. After the April 1964 Revolution, Isatto was named Secretary of Labor by Governor Meneghetti.

Council, and five-member Board of Consultants who were to maintain liaison with the work in each município.¹ Sectional Departments, created in February, 1962, were headed by a President and a three-member Deliberative Council. All of these groups were made up of laymen, although occasionally a parish priest was made a Council member.

From April to July numerous meetings were held and Sindicatos of Rural Workers or Small Farmers organized in many regions. On July 24-25, the First Rural Workers Congress was held in the Catholic University (PUC) in Rio Grande do Sul, on the 25th, fourteen Sindicato Charters were given to FAC groups in different parts of the state, principally in the Caxias do Sul region.² Organizational work of FAG nuclei, sections and Sindicatos continued with rural unionization and leadership training courses for Regional and Sectional leaders in a Viamao Seminary.³ In turn, participants held courses in their own regions and at the município level.⁴ By July, 1963, the

¹For example, the Caxias do Sul Regional Department organized sixty-eight Sectional Departments in twelve municípios in March-April, 1962.

²Paulo Lacerda was the Minister of Labor signing the Charters although he had been removed by President Goulart and replaced by the PSB labor lawyer Hermes Lima on July 16, 1962.

³FAG, "Principais Data Historicas," p. 2.

Speakers are not listed and the writer did not know about the training sessions until after his departure from Brazil.

⁴Ibid. For example, on February 15-17, 1963, the Department of Caxias do Sul gave a rural leadership training course in the Murialdo School in the Ana Rech District of the Município of Caxias do Sul for forty-five persons; on April 3-5, it gave a course for 105 persons in the Carvaggio District of the Município of Garibaldi. Source: "Relatório das Atividades do Departamento de Caxias do Sul" (typed manuscript), December, 1963.

FAG structure included organizations in 93 municipios--a number which declined slightly after the 1964 Revolution. See Table 12.

The regional and município organizations varied as the following examples, taken from the writer's notes, will show:

The FAG Regional Department for Caxias do Sul supervises the work of 12 Sindicatos of Small Farmers (Proprietarios), 13 Sindicatos of Rural Workers (Trabalhadores Rurais), and 70 Sectional Departments and Nuclei or cell groups which are found among the 524 rural communities in the Diocese of Caxias do Sul.¹

Two rural schoolteachers and an accounting student are full-time workers in the offices which the FAG and the Sindicatos of Small Farmers and Rural Workers share in ground floor offices of the Cathedral. Heading the office is Ladyr Rech, a rural schoolteacher from Fazenda Souze, a dispersed community in the District of Anna Rech. Rech, who helped found the PDC in 1958, lost his first race for Vereador in 1959, but won in 1963. All three men commute by bus daily from their rural districts to the city.

Both Rech and Walter Bridi were on one year leave of absence because of the influence of Auxiliary Bishop Dom Edmundo Kuntz. In April, 1965, the State Secretary of Education, a PSD member, indicated he expected Rech and Bridi to return to their teaching duties at the beginning of the new school year in June, 1965.

Each day, approximately 70 persons came to the office² to ask for advice on problems with local and state officials, to find out whether or not the FAG had made any progress in securing payment by the National Commission on Agricultural Insurance for crop losses incurred in February, 1964,³ or to register with the FAG that they were going to sell grapes and other produce at the annual Grape Festival (Festa da Uva), in February.⁴

¹Based on visits February 3-7, and April 20-22, 1965.

²Based on examination of a Record Book signed by visitors.

³The FAG was informed in February, 1965, by the Banco do Brasil that two billion cruzeiros were to be forwarded to its branch in Caxias do Sul to pay for hail losses.

⁴Previously, farmers had to go through a great deal of paperwork with the State Revenue Service (Colheteria Estadual) in order to obtain permission to sell grapes, wine, and other products, at the Festival.

TABLE 12

DELEGATES TO THE SECOND (JULY, 1963) AND THIRD (JANUARY, 1965)
FAG CONGRESSES, BY DIOCESE, MUNICIPIO, AND SECTION*

Diocese (Regional Dept.)	Municípios		Sections		Delegates	
	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965
Pôrto Alegre	28	22	49	41	130	100
Caxias do Sul	12	13	40	35	86	74½
Vacaria	--	--	8	--	30	--
Passo Fundo	18	14	33	16	80	34
Santa Cruz do Sul	8	8	16	22	56	54
Santa Maria	18	12	35	15	75	37
Frederico Westphalen	--	7	--	8	29	61
Santo Angelo	5	4	5	4	9	6
Pelotas	4	3	7	3	13	11
Bagé & Uruguaiana**	--	--	--	--	--	--
Totals	93	83	172	144	528	377

** Bagé and Uruguaiana are large-landholding regions along the Uruguayan and Argentine borders in the Campanha region. There was little small-farmer colonization. Although Bagé sent a Regional Coordinator in 1963, neither diocese sent a representative in 1965, probably because local bishops had lost interest in further supporting the FAG once Goulart and Brizola had gone into exile.

Source: Compiled from data included in "Carta de Reivindicações de Ação Dos Agricultores Gauchos, III Congresso Estadual de Trabalhadores Rurais" (Mimeographed), January 17, 1965, unnumbered pp. 7-8.

The Regional Department of Santa Cruz do Sul has no full-time employees.¹ The FAG and Sindicatos share office space in a small building behind the Rural Savings Association (Caixa Rural). President of both the Caixa Rural and the FAG is Leopold Mersch, founder and Dean of the Accounting School, one of the directors of the Gazeta do Sul newspaper, and a PSD militant. Most of the FAG's work is carried out by Pedro Avelino Junges, a middle-aged Caixa Rural Accountant and Orlando Scafer, a young farmer and President of the Sindicato of Rural Workers. Delegates from the FAG nuclei and Sindicatos in the Diocese meet the second Monday of every month in the FAG offices.

The most vexing problems of these small proprietor farms are (1) delays in the payment of the milk and tobacco they deliver to the state-operated milk company and privately owned tobacco companies that sometimes last six to eight months; (2) low classification of their tobacco leaf by the tobacco companies; and (3) delays in the implementation of rural social welfare measures.

Three examples are probably sufficient to describe different Municipio groups.

1. The Sindicato of Venâncio Aires has about 1,200 members.² It uses the offices of the Yerva Mate Cooperative which has been in bankruptcy the past two years. President of the Sindicato is Otavio Klafke, 58 years old and father of eleven children. Klafke, an earnest, simple man with only five years of schooling, recognizes the lack of education of himself and those of his fellow farmers. Five of his seven sons rent or share-crop his 150 hectare farm, 35 hectares of which are in rice, 50 hectares in pasture, and the rest in woodlands. Klafke has had difficulty keeping the Sindicato out of partisan politics because of the influence of Willibaldo Ertel, Secretary of the Rural Association. Ertel is also President of the Metzler Rural Technical School Board and a PRP Cabo Eleitoral. Ertel apparently has used his influence to speed the admission of students whose fathers delivered votes to him at election time and has also tried to influence the local Regional Agronomists to help farmers who were friends of his rather than letting the Agronomists themselves do the selection.

¹Based on visits February 13-19 and March 21, 1965, and interviews with Pedro Avelino Junges, Orlando Schefer, Padre Ignacio Edit, ASCAR officials, and Annual Reports (Relatórios) of the Sindicato of Small Rural Proprietors of Santa Cruz do Sul for 1964-1965.

²Based on visits February 16 and 21, March 24-27, 1965, and interviews with Otavio Klafke, Willibaldo Ertel, Agronomist Robert Riegel, former Prefeito Alfredo Scherer, Willibaldo Lentz, Osmar Gutierrez Carvalho, Lauro Diehl, João Vargas, Padre Ignacio Eidt, and the Lutheran pastor Wilfred Buchweitz.

2. The most influential man in Gramado's FAG and Sindicato organizations is Gentil Bonato, chief of rural education of the município government and a former rural school teacher in Linha Nova. The Sindicato meets once a month. In February, 1965, Bonato arranged for four one-year scholarships to the Institute of Rural Education in Chile for Gramado JAC members. I attended several afternoon and evening meetings with rural community leaders in private homes and neighborhood recreation centers to discuss selection and partial financing of their passages. While I was there, both FAG and sindicato groups sent telegrams on local and state problems to President Castelo Branco, Governor Meneghetti, and several party blocs in Brasilia and Porto Alegre, the state capital. It appears that FAG and Sindicato pressures were helpful in obtaining the services of a full-time agronomist for the município to help local farmers and in influencing city hall (the prefeitura) to begin full-time motorized scraper maintenance of rural roads rather than leaving their upkeep to the neighboring inhabitants which was the case in the past.¹

3. The Sindicato of Small Farmers of Candelaria² held its first formal meeting as a legally recognized group of February 18, 1965, in the Community Hall (Salão) of Passo Sete, a dispersed village community three miles outside of Candelaria. Eighty-seven persons, including five women, attended the meeting which had been organized by the Passo Sete Cooperative Manager and a local rural schoolteacher also active in the MTR. Many persons considered the Sindicato organization of the Sindicato as a "revolutionary" development since the Município has been dominated for such a long time by "Colonel" Albino Lenz, a rice grower and livestock producer. Outside of the cooperative and the rural school organizations, formal social groups have been few and weak since the Nationalization of Culture period (1937-1945) when German and other non-Portuguese languages were prohibited. About twenty of the men arrived late, coming on feet or horseback from as far as 25 miles away after hearing about the meeting over the Candelaria radio station earlier in the afternoon during a round-table discussion of farm problems.

Although the writer does not have enough data to prove the point without a doubt, it appears that the tendency of the FAG and its rural sindicatos to place increased responsibility in the hands

¹Based on visits January 20-27, January 29, February 4, and interviews with Gentil Bonato, Prefeito Perrini, Padre Luis Manes, Agronomist Goldschmit, Accountant Bruno Riegel, and various small farmers, especially Angelo Tomazi, Antonio and Felipe Meinherz.

²Based on visits February 18 and 23, 1965.

of small farm proprietors and rural workers was reflected in the increased number of these occupations among the delegates who attended the Third State Congress in January, 1965, compared to the occupations of those who reportedly attended previous Congresses. (See Table 13.)

The rapid growth of the FAG-sponsored organizations¹ set off a competitive battle in Rio Grande do Sul only partially similar to the struggle taking place in the Northeast. In both cases, although the Regional DRT played an important role, the competition in Rio Grande do Sul assumed more of a legal and paper form than the violent forms employed in Pernambuco. Because many municípios of small farm holdings had very few rural workers or day laborers, the FAG used the sons of small farmers to create Sindicatos of Rural Workers to foil or pre-empt MASTER-SUPRA maneuvers to create Sindicatos with jurisdiction over one or more municípios.² In addition, the MASTER and SUPRA groups were never able to create a structure as well organized as the FAG structure. In part, the FAG-sponsored organizations probably counted upon a greater access to state government officials and state deputies after 1962³ than the MASTER-SUPRA

¹All twenty-four sindicatos recognized by the Ministry of Labor in 1962 were FAG-sponsored groups. No MASTER or SUPRA groups were recognized until June, 1963.

²Interview with Ladyr Rech, Fazenda Souza, Caxias do Sul, February 7, 1965, who told this writer the DRT was given authority in late 1963 to organize or recognize 100 Rural Sindicatos by the end of the year, and interview with Orlando Schaeffer, Santa Cruz do Sul, February 1, 1965.

³Although FAG or Sindicato leaders did not use the term "access," it would appear that the phenomenon was present in

TABLE 13

OCCUPATIONS OF DELEGATES TO THIRD FAG CONGRESS, PORTO
ALEGRE, JANUARY 15-17, 1965

Occupation	Number	Percent
Farmers (Agricultores)	275	73
Rural Teachers	41	11
Clergymen	16	4
Lawyers	7	2
Rural Merchants	6	2
Rural Industrialists	5	2
State Employees	2	1
Municipal Employees	2	1
Agronomists	1	-
Accountants	2	1
Bankers	1	-
Students	12	3
Cooperative Managers or Employees	7	2
	<u>377</u>	<u>102%</u>

Source: Compiled from data included in "Carta de Reivindicações e De
Ação Dos Agricultores Gauchos, III Congresso Estadual de
Trabalhadores Rurais" (mimeographed) January 17, 1965, un-
numbered pp. 7-8.

group, which depended upon Federal Deputy Leonel Brizola's influence over federal officials to prevent or hinder DRT recognition of the FAG-organized Sindicatos.

The comparable success of FAG and MASTER groups in organizing small farmers, sharecroppers, or renters, and day laborers, is shown in Table 14.

The available data also seem to indicate that MASTER tried to organize sindicatos in twenty-three of the fifty-seven municipios in which it was reported active (40 per cent), while the FAG tried to organize sindicatos in 78 of the 152 municipios in which it established a section (51 per cent). Moreover, as noted earlier, MASTER tended to operate in Municipios with very large landed properties, especially the southern half of the state where sixteen FAG groups were ineffectual or could be organized only in municipios with a resident Bishop--Bage and Uruguaiiana.¹ On the other hand, FAG was much more successful than MASTER in creating rural sindicatos in the municipios with small farm holdings. (See Tables 15 and 16.)

observing attendance at the closing session of the July, 1963, Second FAG Congress which included the following persons.

MTR Deputy Candido Norberto, President of the State Assembly
 Dr. Arnaldo Costa Prieto (PDC), Secretary of Labor--who incidentally was still holding his post in mid-1965, longer than any Meneghetti Secretary--a demonstration of his administrative and political competence.

Dr. Adolfo Fetter, Secretary of Agriculture

Dr. Eno Dias de Castro, Representative of the Pôrto Alegre Prefeito

An un-named representative of the FARSUL

In January, 1965, the FARSUL did not send a representative to the Third FAG Congress. On the other hand, a colonel representing Third Army Commander Alves Bastos was present, unlike the situation in 1963, when no military personnel were present.

¹In Table 12, for example, it was emphasized that the Dioceses of Bage and Uruguaiiana sent no delegates to the Second or Third FAG Congress.

TABLE 14

SINDICATO ORGANIZATION IN RIO GRANDE DO SUL BY THE FAG
AND MASTER, 1961-1965

Organizational Group Functioning in Municipio	Municipios	Municipios w/Recognized Rural Sinds. Dec. 31, 1963	Municipios w/Sindicatos Organized 1962-1965	Municipios w/Sindicatos Functioning April 1965	
				Small Farmer	Rural Worker
Only FAG Groups	98	17	40	29	15
Only MASTER Groups	3	2	2	2	0
Both FAG and MASTER Functioned at one time or another	54	8	39	23	13
Neither FAG nor MASTER	2	0	2	0	0
Total in State	157	32	86	54	28

Source: Compiled from IGRA Maps for 1962 of FAG Sectional Groups, MASTER Associations, Rural Sindicatos; SUPRA, "Sindicatos Rurais-Relação No. 1, December 31, 1963," pp. 15-16, Departamento Estadual de Estatística, Estatística Eleitoral, 1962 for a listing of Municípios by regions, and Divisão do Trabalho, "Relatorio Geral das Atividades Da Divisão do Trabalho no Ano de 1964," Pôrto Alegre, Secretaria de Estado dos Negocios do Trabalho e Habitação, January 8, 1965, unnumbered pp. 7-8 of typed manuscript which lists functioning Sindicatos in the State in December, 1964, plus notes taken by this writer.

TABLE 15

ACTIVELY ORGANIZED OR FUNCTIONING FAG AND MASTER GROUPS
BY MUNICIPIOS ACCORDING TO THE SIZE OF FARM ESTABLISH-
MENTS, 1961-1964

Municipios with	FAG Active in Municipio	MASTER Active in Municipio	Neither Group Active
95% or more of farm properties less than 100 hectares (n = 102)	98%	14%	1%
65-94% of farm properties less than 100 hectares (n = 36)	94%	78%	8%
Less than 65% of properties less than 100 hectares, or 35% or more of farm properties are larger than 100 hectares (n = 17)	88%	82%	6%

^a FAG Sectional Groups in 14 of the 15 Municipios in the Campanha and Southeast Litoral area were little more than paper organizations; the FAG group in Uruguaiana was the only group which really functioned to any degree.

Source: Computed using data aggregated for Table 20 and applied to a map showing the distribution of farm establishments according to total area in Rio Grande do Sul municipios, included in Edmundo Gastal, Contribuição ao Zoneamento Agrícola do Rio Grande do Sul (Pôrto Alegre: ASCAR, Divisão de Economia Rural, 1964), unnumbered p. 5.

TABLE 16

SUCCESS OF THE FAG AND MASTER IN ORGANIZING RURAL SINDICATOS WHICH WERE FUNCTIONING IN APRIL, 1965, BY MUNICIPIO, ACCORDING TO THE SIZE OF FARM ESTABLISHMENTS

Municipios with	Only FAG Organization Activity		Only MASTER Activity		Both Active	
	Small Farmer	Rural Worker	Small Farmer	Rural Worker	Small Farmer	Rural Worker
95% or more of properties less than 100 hectares (n = 102)	29	15	1	0	11	9
65-94% of properties less than 100 hectares (n = 36)	9	1	1	0	9	6
Less than 65% of properties less than 100 hectares; or 35% or more of properties are more than 100 hectares (n = 17)	0	0	0	0	3	0
Total	38	16	2	0	23	15

The FAG effort was much more successful than MASTER in terms of the lasting effect of creating groups to represent the small farmer or rural worker. The close links between MASTER and Brizola¹ meant the demise of all but a few MASTER groups after April, 1964.²

The Cotia Cooperative, A Case Study of A
Cooperative as An Occasional Pressure Group

Legitimate cooperatives of small farmers have been strongest in Rio Grande do Sul and São Paulo. In the former state, they were part of the cultural baggage brought over from Germany and Northern Italy. In São Paulo, cooperatives have been organized longest and most efficiently among Japanese Brazilians who organized themselves into the Cooperativa Cotia.³

On December 11, 1921, eighty-three Japanese potato farmers in the district of Moinho Velho (Old Mill) of the Municipio of Cotia,

¹ In 1963, Brizola began organizing political cell-groups at the local level (Grupos de Onze), some of which were armed and some of which were nothing more than existing PTB groups, in part of an attempt to build a power-apparatus beyond the confines of Rio Grande do Sul; see Skidmore, op. cit., pp. 281-282. However, this writer is unable to determine the possible connections between MASTER and the "Grupos de Onze." A Brizola-founded newspaper, O Panfleto (Rio de Janeiro), March 23, 1964, p. 4, claimed the "Groups of Eleven" would number 100,000 by June, 1964.

² "Audiências de Castelo Começam as 16 Horas e Incluem as Federações de Trabalhadores," Jornal do Dia (Porto Alegre), March 13, 1965, p. 2. The Associação dos Agricultores Sem Terra was to be given a five-minute audience with President Castelo Branco; the FAG and its Rural Worker Federation group were given a 15-minute audience with the President and Planning Minister Roberto Campos; Interviews with Ladyr Rech and Emiliano Lemberger, April 7, 1965.

³ Zempati Ando, Pioneirismo e Cooperativismo, passim, is the best study of this group.

west of São Paulo, organized a Cooperative.¹ Some thirty-two years later, Cooperativa Cotia is the largest and most successful cooperative in Brazil with 11,117 members from more than thirty nationalities in over fifty municípios in São Paulo, Paraná, Minas Gerais, and Rio de Janeiro.² Leadership is still in the hands of Japanese-Brazilians, but luso-brasileiros,³ German-Brazilians, and Italo-Brazilians also hold positions of responsibility in the organization. It was probably inevitable that any organization which could show the following wealth for its members in 1963, would face criticism and political opposition designed to destroy or weaken it. (See List 1.)

The Cooperative's most difficult time probably occurred in 1934. Five or six foodbrokers, who sold cooperative potatoes to retailers in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, "secretly planned a boycott to force prices down and brought the vendors to their side."⁴ The middlemen placed anti-Japanese articles in the newspapers along with articles that the Cooperative "suspended deliveries in order to raise prices and refuse to sell to businessmen." Only two years previously, the State Assembly passed Sao Paulo's first Cooperative Law. The Cotia

¹Ando, op. cit., pp. 13-45.

²"Cooperativa Agricola de Cotia, Informações Gerais, 1963/1964." Typed manuscript given the writer by the Secretary of the President.

³Relatorio da Diretoria, Ano Social 1963/64 (São Paulo: Cooperativa Agricola de Cotia, July 25, 1964), p. XII: all but one of nine Directors was a Japanese-Brazilian; the tenth, Jarbas do Amaral Carvalho, was of Luso-Brazilian descent.

⁴Ando, op. cit., pp. 52-65.

LIST 1

MEMBERSHIP AND ASSETS OF COOPERATIVA COTIA 1963-1964

Member of:	Japanese Birth	6,378
	Brazilian Birth	4,282
	Others	<u>457</u>
	Total	11,157
Estimated Number of Persons in Cotia Families		80,937
Estimated Number of family members who work in the fields or in Cotia-related activities		30,918
Value of Property owned by Cotia Cooperative Members	Cr 228,915,964,600 (US \$108 million in 1963 exchange rates)	
Area of Property Owned by Members		902,824 hectares
Members who rent land from non-members		2,794
Members who own trucks or Willy Rural Wagons		4,170
Members who own tractors		7,270
Number of Cotia Employees in Offices and Distribution Facilities in São Paulo		1,848
Employees who work at collection points, sales centers, and experiment stations maintained by Cotia Cooperative		1,011

Source of Data: "Cooperativa Agrícola de Cotia, Informações Gerais 1963/64," typed manuscript given this writer by the Secretary to the President, Sra. Julia de Inoura.

conflict soon expanded into an attack on cooperatives in general, so that the fate of CAC would probably have repercussions on the State Cooperative Assistance Department or DAC. The Director issued a statement that CAC was not holding potatoes off the market; rather, it was the middlemen who refused to buy them. CAC itself asked the Japanese Consulate not to intervene in order to avoid the appearance of an international incident involving Japanese and Luso-Brazilians.¹ After a week's time, the middlemen capitulated and asked for an agreement.

In recent years, several Sao Paulo State Deputies have sought to restrict the DAC's activities or complained that various cooperatives engaged in improper business procedures²--and many cooperatives are organized simply to avoid payment of certain taxes--but this is not always the real complaint of these Deputies. Generally, their targets are the genuine cooperatives such as Cotia, the dairy cooperative of Dutch immigrants at Holambra, São Paulo,³ or the

¹ Ibid., p. 65.

In addition, the Cooperative disagreed with the Consulate General over CAC's educational activities; the Consulate General "probably wished the cooperatives of Japanese origin to educate their children under the control of the Society for the Diffusion of Education in Japan." In 1937, CAC leaders announced to enthusiastic applause at their annual General Assembly, that CAC "could live without the aid of third parties," and terminated its receipt of assistance from the Japanese government. Ibid., pp. 78-79.

² "Cooperativismo," O Estado de São Paulo (OESP), April 20, 1965, p. 4. State Deputy Alfredo Trindade claimed "cooperativism was being perverted"; favored with "various advantages, especially of a fiscal nature, cooperatives instituted true monopolies, imposing prices according to their exclusive convenience." As an example, he claimed the Cotia Cooperative dominated the fruit and vegetable markets.

³ John and Bini Moss, "Holland in Brazil," Americas, XI, No. 8

dairy-wine cooperatives of Gaucho small farmers.¹ Nevertheless, their opponents encounter two great obstacles in attempting to curtail cooperative operations: (1) the generally-admitted efficiency of these cooperatives in delivering low cost vegetables, fruits, dairy-products, and wine to urban markets; and (2) their clientele relationships with the DACS and several state deputies.

The Cotia Cooperative's principal public relations medium is a monthly magazine Coopercotia, founded in 1943 and similar to Time or Visão in format. In addition to Cooperative statements of policy on agricultural or related matters,² the magazine also carried articles on crop and animal improvement practices,³ the activities of youth groups, and women's circles,⁴ and other subjects discussed

(August, 1959), pp. 5-8, is a non-political treatment of this cooperative which had 553 Brazilian and 585 Dutch members in the Município of Mogi Mirim.

¹FAG, "Principais Dados Historicos," unnumbered p. 3, indicates that Gaucho small farmers participated in fixing the minimum prices to be paid for grapes for "the first time in history" in January, 1963. Hitherto, prices had been set by large wine manufacturers, wholesalers, and the Federal government.

²"Burocracia nao deixa batata sair," Coopercotia (São Paulo), October, 1964, p. 7, and "Alteradas normas de credito," Coopercotia (São Paulo), October, 1964, pp. 7 and 15, respectively, were typical editorials criticizing the SUNAB bureaucracy for slowing down or stopping a potential sale of 100,000 tons of potatoes to the city of Buenos Aires and an article discussing the activities of the National Fund for Rural Refinancing and the National Coordinator of Rural Credit, respectively.

³"Porco engorda mais com sal na ração," and "Boa cana da melhor aguardente," Coopercotia, October, 1964, pp. 11 and 32-34 are typical.

⁴"Alachofra fez muito sucesso," Coopercotia, December, 1964, pp. 10-11, discusses events of the First Artichoke Festival of the Sao Roque region, attended by 30,000 persons, in which an Artichoke Queen and Princesses of Japanese-ancestry were chosen.

in such American farm magazines as Wallace's Farmer or Country Gentleman.

In summary, these cooperatives function primarily as marketing organizations but also perform occasional political functions.¹ Cotia members are relatively invulnerable to cross pressures from outside opponents who have little access to the highly developed social infra-structure of the cooperative.

The Different Rural Sindicatos in São Paulo
Rio de Janeiro, and Paraná

Three groups struggled to organize and/or dominate the rural sindicatos of these three states: ULTAB, the Workers Circles (Círculos Operários or CO's) and a third group, functioning only in São Paulo, the National Labor Front (FNT) working in conjunction with an organization called the Paulista Agrarian Front (FAP).² Some of the same tactics observed in Rio Grande do Sul and Pernambuco can be observed in these states, nevertheless,

¹In reviewing back issues of Coopercotia (1962-1964), this writer could find no indication that the Cooperative publicly supported candidates for local, state, or national office. It is possible that the Japanese Brazilian colony uses the Cotia structure as a means of aggregating the necessary votes to elect Senate and Federal Deputies of Japanese descent such as Antonio Morimoto.

²Leda Barreto, op. cit., p. 108, notes that one Jofre Correia Neto, leader of some 13,000 squatters (posseiros), who sent a delegation to the São Paulo Governor's Palace to ask for welfare assistance to sustain their expulsions en masse but implies he was still being held by police in 1963--without any further identifying data. "Ferido o 'Fidel Castro' Paulista," Manchete, No. 384 (August 29, 1959), p. 32, indicates that Jofre Correia Neto was President of the Association of Laborers of Santa Fe do Sul, against whom a latifundista Zico Diniz reportedly organized a plot. However, this writer does not have any information as to Jofre Correia's links with the ULTAB or FNT or whether he was an "independent" operator at the time.

their organizational methods were different in some respects because these three states had a mixture of small farmers and rural workers different than the "model types" of Rio Grande do Sul and Pernambuco, respectively.

ULTAB Efforts

As noted in Chapter II, Communist-dominated ULTAB attempts to organize rural worker groups in 1954 made little impact because of their dependence on urban worker organizers and their lack of a bureaucratic or cell structure in rural area which functioned on a continuing basis.¹

Although Lindolfo Silva and Nesto Vera may have spent some time in the countryside before SUPRA was created in mid-1963, they spent even less time thereafter and left the more prosaic organizational work to José Portela Alves, a Rio de Janeiro naval shipyard worker,² whose organizational impact was limited in the 505 municípios of São Paulo and the sixty-two municípios of Rio de Janeiro, because of the lack of a structure at the local level. Hence, ULTAB-SUPRA proposals

¹Leda Barreto, op. cit., pp. 110-113, indicates that Communist Party attempts to send urban workers to the countryside who could not "identify with the peasants" backfired (falharam). Peasants had been inculcated with an image that to be a communist was to be a "diabolic destroyer of all that was Christian": "the principal pre-occupation of the communist agitators who went to the countryside was to recruit peasants for the PC [which organization] then remained entirely inoperative," and finally, the peasant, "poor as he may be, is owner of the means of his production, of his tools, such as the hoe, the scythe . . . and to possess land, to be the proprietor of his plot is among his most heart-felt aspirations. Extinction of private property is a thesis that frightens him as much as the petty bourgeoisie."

²Interviews with Personnel of Rio de Janeiro Rural Workers Federation, April 5, 1965.

to Circulo Operario Federation leaders in São Paulo in 1963 to unify their efforts in the rural sector were an attempt to take over the peasant sindicato movement from the top down rather than from the bottom up which was the basic method used in most Pernambuco peasant sindicato struggles.

FAP-FNT Efforts

The FNT and FAP were active principally in the Ribeirão Preto region of São Paulo, on the basis of efforts made by Padre Celso Ibson de Syllos and a São Paulo lawyer, Mario Carvalho de Jesus.¹ This writer has no date for the foundation of the FNT, although the FAP was organized in early 1962. Both groups felt a "class struggle" was necessary "to improve the welfare of rural inhabitants"; the FNT also was opposed to the clergy's participation in Sindicato organization although Celso Ibson's work obviously belied this doctrine.² The FAP-FNT groups held leadership training courses in various parts of the state but were never able to build up a strong organization-- basically because of personal differences between its few leaders and their lack of personnel; it collapsed soon after the April, 1964, Revolution.³

¹ Padre Celso Ibson apparently organized meetings in Altinópolis, Cravinhos, Jardinópolis, Batatais, and Sales de Oliveira municípios. However, apparently the only group successful in obtaining Labor Ministry recognition, Batatais, was taken over by ULTAB groups working with the São Paulo DRT.

² Celso Ibson's work with ULTAB leaders on occasion brought down upon his head various denunciations by landowners who charged he was a "Communist," even after he formally denounced ULTAB and Communist Party maneuvers in November, 1963.

³ Two JAC and São Paulo Federation leaders told this writer that

Workers Circle (CO) Efforts

In São Paulo, Paraná, and Rio de Janeiro, the principal efforts of moderate to left-of-center sectors of the Church were guided by Workers' Circle Leaders. In São Paulo, these were Frei Celso Maria de São Paulo, OFM, and José Rotta, a former President of the Workers Circles Federation, who began in early 1961. In Rio de Janeiro, the leaders were Padre Antonio de Costa Carvalho, SJ, and two small farmer-renters: Agostinho José Neto, active in the Workers Circle movement of Barra Mansa¹--a residential area for many of the Volta Redonda Steelplant workers--and Acacio Fernandes do Santos, a young man who helped his father establish a Congregational Church and school in São Gonçalo. In Paraná, the principal organizers were the Bishop of Maringá, Dom Jaime Luis Coelho,² and a sometime small farmer, José Lazaro Dumont, also active in the *Círculos Operários* movement, who organized a Paraná Agrarian Front (*Frente Agrária Paranaense* or FAP) in 1960.³

Padre Celso Ibson was an opportunist who wished to dominate the rural organizations he associated with. In addition, a Federation leader told this writer that Celso Ibson was a "rather shallow thinker in the matter of rural organization; all he thinks about are strikes and land division; he does not think about cooperatives, rural credit, and marketing. Agrarian Reform under the Castelo Branco government is an unexciting thing for him."

¹"Eleita a Nova Diretoria da Federação dos Pequenos Lavradores Produtores Autônomos do Estado do Rio," Democracia e Sindicalismo, Barra Mansa, Rio de Janeiro, January 31, 1965, p. 6.

²Price, op. cit., pp. 59-60, discusses the Bishop's efforts to form the Paraná Agrarian Front (FAP).

³"Frente Agrária Paranaense," Diário da Noite (São Paulo), August 3, 1965. See also: Manoel Silva, "I Congresso dos Trabalhadores Rurais do Paraná," Revista Brasiliense, No. 33 (January-February, 1961), pp. 56-62.

The ideological orientation of these groups was much more conciliatory than the radical Catholic groups:

It is appropriate to emphasize that the sindicato cooperates with the government and other associations for the development of social solidarity. He errs who thinks that the sindicato, because it is a class organ, ought to be an organ of the class struggle. The defense of the legitimate interests' by legitimate means does not justify in any fashion . . . a class struggle.¹

On the critical questions of agrarian reform, the Workers' Circles at first adopted a moderate position in their first manifesto by favoring expropriation "provided there is guaranteed just indemnification to the owner, in accordance with the actual value of the land, as prescribed in the Constitution."² Later, the CO's became more specific as to the goals and methods of agrarian reform when they supported passage of the Land Statute or Estatuto da Terra. On August 2, 1964, the Sao Paulo Rural Workers Federation issued a statement saying:

1. We support and call for a truly Democratic and Christian Agrarian Reform to give better living conditions to man, in the terms of the Proposed Land State, with the Amendment of the Federal Constitution in order to pay for expropriation of unproductive land through public bonds (titulos da divida publica) or stock in mixed companies. The lands that produce nothing ought to be taxed heavier than those which are producing to lower the cost of living. While an agrarian reform law is not yet approved, the Federal State and local Governments should give (prestar) greater assistance to agriculture, harmonizing their efforts. Incentivating the colonization of public lands.

11. Sindicato leaders energetically protest the action of those landowners who prefer to plant grass (capim) to transform their fazendas into pasture, solely to not pay minimum salaries to their employees. [Sindicato leaders] alert the government of

¹Os Cristãos e o Sindicato na Cidade e no Campo, pp. 18-19.

²Price, op. cit., p. 56, citing a Manifesto of the Circulo Operário of Lins, December 1961, p. 1.

the Nation against this practice that has as its object the blocking (impedir) of the improvement of the living conditions of workers, causing unemployment, misery, and agitation in the rural sector.¹

The reader will remember that the Ministry of Labor was still not disposed in mid-1961 to recognize Rural Sindicatos. Therefore, Workers' Circle (CO) groups operated in the following manner: A Professional Association of Rural Workers or Autonomous Workers was established in one município in each diocese friendly to the concept of rural unionism.² The designation "Autonomous Worker" was used

¹Federação dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura do Estado de São Paulo, "Conclusões Práticas do 1o Encontro dos Sindicatos de Trabalhadores do Estado de São Paulo, de 31 de Julho a 2 de Agosto de 1964" (mimeographed), p. 3. See also Press Release No. 3, National Conference of Brazilian Trade Union Leaders, June 5, 1964 (English-language translation of a Press Release of a Conference of trade union leaders sponsored by the National Confederation of Commercial Workers (CNTG) in Rio de Janeiro, which was to begin on June 6, 1964, pp. 2-3, for a statement on Agrarian Reform which Rotta had a hand in drafting; in addition, the publication discusses profit sharing, the labor court system, collective bargaining as a means of contributing to a more democratic trade unionism and 'the socio-economic emancipation of the Brazilian worker,' the right to strike, the Sindicato Tax, trade union elections, and government welfare plan.

²Although precise data are unavailable on the names of all those in the hierarchy in São Paulo favorable to rural unionization and a greater distribution of land, this writer compared the Dioceses in which Rural Sindicatos were formed in the 1961-1963 period with the names of eighteen Archbishops and Bishops going to Vatican Council meetings in September, 1965. Only two of them had spoken out against Rural Sindicatos: (1) Dom José Mauricio da Rocha of Bragança Paulista, who also opposed the use of Portuguese in the liturgy of the mass and banned discussion of several Papal Encyclicals dealing with labor-management problems, and (2) D. José Carlos de Aguirre of Sorocaba who circulated the book *Reforma Agraria, Questao de Consciencia*, by the Conservative Diamantina Archbishop, Dom Proença Sigaud; this writer had no information on the views of the other two. The implications are that Church officials in Rome favored or invited those Bishops who supported a greater participation by the Church in the Rural Sindicato movement.

in several municípios if ULTAB already had created an organization in the município.

In Rio de Janeiro, all fifteen rural sindicatos recognized by the Ministry of Labor prior to December 31, 1963, were organized in municípios with Workers' Circle organizations.¹ In São Paulo, nine out of the first fifteen recognized peasant sindicatos were organized in municípios with a Workers' Circle group and four of the six others were located in a município adjoining a CO group.² Organizational and other meetings were generally held on weekends when peasants were accustomed to coming to the município sede for mass, market-day, and entertainment. (See Table 17.) Principal speakers at the first meetings apparently included the Diocese Bishop, a local parish priest, and several of the state CO-affiliated leaders indicated above. Once the movement developed some momentum, newly elected rural worker leaders would also accompany Rotta, Frei Celso Maria, Padre

¹Determined by comparing Sindicatos recognized in SUPRA, Sindicatos Rurais, Relação No. 1, December 31, 1963, pp. 9-10, with Workers' Circle groups shown on a Map, "Federação dos Circulos Operarios Fluminenses, Plan de Ação no Setor Rural do Estado do Rio de Janeiro," n.d., given this writer by Padre Carvalho.

²Gathered by comparing data from Araguaya Feitosa Martins, "Alguns Aspectos da Inquietação Trabalhista no Campo," Revista Brasileira, No. 40 (March-April, 1962), pp. 135-139, with a list of Circulos Operarios in the State appearing in a pamphlet, "Circulos Operarios, Uma Organização Para Defesa Economico-Social, Elevação Cultura, Promoção Profissional, Progresso Cristao dos Trabalhadores da Cidade e do Campo," ca. 1963, pp. 9-10.

Indicative of the probable moral and political help the CO's could render is the fact that three of the four Associations which were not recognized were located in municípios without Worker Circle groups; the fourth, Campinas, is a large industrial city a short distance from Sao Paulo, which has its own Bishop and which was the scene of many conflicts between labor groups of differing ideology prior to April, 1964.

TABLE 17

THE CHRONOLOGICAL ORGANIZATION OF RURAL SINDICATOS
BY THE WORKERS' CIRCLE (CO) MOVEMENT IN SAO PAULO,
1961-1962

Date	Município	Diocese and/or Region	Bishop Participating in Organizational Ceremony
Aug. 20	Presidente Prudente*	Alta Sorocabana	José Aquino Pereira
Sep. 17	São João da Boa Vista	Alta Mojiana- Rio Pardo	Davi Picão
Sep. 24	São José do Rio Preto*	Araraquara- Rio Preto	Lafaiete Libanio; José Joaquim Goncalves
Oct. 8	Juquiá	Litoral	Idilio Soares, Santos
Oct. 14	Marília*	Alto Paulista	Hugo Bressano de Araujo
Oct. 29	Lorena* ^a	Paraíba River Valley	José Melhado
Nov. 27	Lins*	Bauru - Northwest Part of State	Henrique Gelain
Dec. 17	Campinas* NR	São Paulo	Paulo de Tarso ^b
Jan. 8	Matão	Araraquara	Rui Serra, Bishop of São Carlos
Jan. 12	Guariba	Jaboticabal	José Varani
Feb. 11	Chavantes -NR	Pirajú-Botucatu	Henrique Goulard Trindade, Botucatu
Feb. 25	Botucatu	Pirajú-Botucatu	Same as above
Mar. ?	Jales -NR	Paraíba River Valley	Artur

TABLE 17 (cont.)

Date	Município	Diocese and/or Region	Bishop Participating in Organizational Ceremony
Mar. ?	Assis*	Assis	José Lazaro Neves
Mar. ?	Itu -NR	Sao Paulo	Cardinal Carlos Carmelo de Vascon- celos of São Paulo

* Indicates CO in Município.

NR if Sindicato was not recognized later.

^a The Workers Circle group was planning to organize a Sindicato of Sharecroppers in March, 1962 in Lorena.

^b This writer does not know if this Bishop Paulo de Tarso is the same Paulo de Tarso who was a leader of the Brazilian Christian Democratic Party (PDC) in the early 1960 or the Paulo de Tarso who was Prefeito of Brasilia in 1962, or possibly all of these. In Victor Rico Galan, "The Brazilian Crisis," pp. 668-670, considered Paulo de Tarso, leader of the PDC as "the natural leader of a broad movement of the Brazilian Catholic left."

Carvalho, Agostinho José Neto, or their aides to additional meetings in neighboring municípios in order to bolster the impression that this was a movement with legitimate peasant roots.

Once six rural sindicatos were organized, the Rotta-Celso group formed a Federation of Rural Workers for the State of Sao Paulo on November 9, 1962.¹ By then, the Federation had a mixed-team of urban and rural organizers to compete with ULTAB-SUPRA groups. Additional momentum was achieved through several successful strike actions in the Guariba-Jaboticabal-Bebedouro sugar region that brought the following benefits to sindicato members:²

1. Payment of a minimum wage after February 1, 1962.
2. Payment on the 10th of each month.
3. Registration of workers--a move by the Sindicato to prevent employer use of worker-replacements.
4. Eight-hour days with overtime payment for more than eight hours of work in the fields.
5. Payment for holidays and delayed vacations.
6. Lodging, light and water would be free.³

¹"Sindicatos de Trabalhadores Rurais, Relação Organizada por Oton Monteiro de Deus," September, 1963, p. 11, indicates 46.

²"Democratas Paulistas Lutam Pela Sindicalização Rural," Ação Democrática, Ano 3, No. 36 (May, 1962), pp. 6-7, is an IBAD interview in which Rotta notes the Federation had founded "13 Sindicatos and a hundred delegacies," an indication that many sindicatos had not been recognized by November, 1962.

³Araguaya Feitosa Martins, op. cit., pp. 139-140, indicates that Rotta and Frei Celso participated in the bargaining for new wages after a strike broke out in Guariba. In Jaboticabal and Bebedouro, Bishop José Verani of Jaboticabal and Arnaldo Morelli, a lawyer for Bianchi and Company, proprietors of Fazenda Anhumas, were the principal outsiders brought in by Rotta to participate in the bargaining.

³Existing legislation permitted a 33 per cent discount from wages for housing, food items, etc., which might be furnished the rural worker. However, the law never specified the standards of housing, types and quantities of food, etc., which were to be furnished. Because these cut heavily into a family budget, the Federation sought to have all discounts of this type abolished. The Rural Worker Statute

7. Land would be made available at no cost for planting subsistence crops.
8. Transportation to a clinic at no cost in case of illness.
9. Medical assistance to be paid by the fazenda.
10. Partial payment of fazenda profits to employees.
11. A Christmas bonus in 1962.

In 1962, at least a dozen strikes by rural workers broke out on sugar plantations on sugar mills in São Paulo, over unknown causes, although, in Assis Municipio, the strike developed after the dismissal of a worker for joining an Association formed by the Workers' Circle Group.¹

Although the Workers' Circle Groups achieved various specific benefits for rural workers, both the ULTAB² and the radical Christian reformists or revolutionaries³ criticized the Worker's Circle Groups because the latter did not call for or act to overthrow the social and political systems linked to the economic system.

Functioning and Recognized Peasant Sindicatos

The political and ideological competition between the various reformist and revolutionary groups in the rural sector led to the

of 1963 permitted employers to discount up to 20 per cent of the minimum wage of each family member for housing which met "minimum requirements of health and hygiene" and up to 25 per cent of their minimum wage for "sufficient and healthful" (sadia) food--neither of these qualifications not spelled out (Articles 28-31).

¹ Ibiapaba Martins, "Proletariado e Inquietação Rural," Revista Brasiliense, No. 42 (July-August, 1962), p. 73.

² "Convenção Nacional dos Sindicatos Rurais Pede ao Governo Reforma da Constituição," Novos Rumos, No. 26 (July 26-August 1, 1963), p. 6, charges the Rotta group "was willing to serve (or "servile to") latifundistas, especially the sugar-mill operators" while Rotta himself was a "UDN gorilla."

³ Ibiapaba Martins, op. cit., p. 75.

creation of paper sindicatos by the ULTAB, SUPRA, and Church-sponsored groups who wanted dependable local leaders, bargaining power with state and federal officials, and exclusion of other groups from regions they hoped to control.¹ Table 18 shows this competition in terms of the sindicatos waiting for recognition in September and December, 1963, that included numerous real Church-sponsored groups whose existence is shown by the close comparison of the totals for recognized groups and those waiting for recognition with the total number of peasant groups functioning in August, 1965.

It is most probable that nearly all of the ULTAB, PCB, MASTER and Liga-infiltrated groups disappeared after the April, 1964, Revolution, along with some of the Church-sponsored paper sindicatos. Nevertheless, most of the real Church-sponsored sindicatos, not recognized prior to Goulart's fall, received Cartas Sindicais from the Ministry of Labor by the end of 1965. In fact, more peasant sindicatos were recognized by the Castelo Branco government in 1965 than had been recognized by the Goulart government on December, 1963, and possibly also by March, 1964 on the eve of the Revolution.²

¹"As Atividades da 'SUPRA' no Interior de São Paulo," Ultima Hora (Sao Paulo), February 18, 1964, is a public statement by Mario Donato, SUPRA State Delegate, denying SUPRA's role as an "agitator" or participant to "extreme measures" in Sao Paulo. "SUPRA's only role was to act as a catalytic agent and its officials were limited . . . to orienting the workers of the land as to the observances of the customary habits of creating class sindicatos."

²"Entusiasmo no Campo para Sindicalização," O Globo (Rio de Janeiro), October 1, 1965, indicates that Mrs. Natercia Silva, Director General of the National Department of Labor, said 139 new rural sindicatos had been recognized between July and September 1965 in Pernambuco, Minas Gerais, Paraná, and São Paulo.

TABLE 18

 RECOGNIZED AND UNRECOGNIZED RURAL SINDICATOS
 1963-1965

	Sindicatos Reportedly Organized ^a 1962-1964	Total Paper Sinds. ^b	September 1963 ^c Recog-Wait		December 1963 ^c Recog-Wait		Funct. Sinds. Aug. 1965 ^e	Municipios in State December 1964 ^d
Alagoas	80	46	2	6	4	22	--	93
Amazonas	45	29	-	-	-	1	--	167
Bahia	80	164	3	3	2	19	17	338
Ceará	72	73	10	11	21	22	11	176
Esp. Santo	41	45	--	--	--	11	--	42
Goiás	67	24	9	7	10	19	9	179
Guanabara	3	12	1	2	--	5	--	1
Maranhao	45	42	3	4	3	14	2	122
Mato Grosso	--	33	--	1	1	3	--	64
Minas Gerais	102	246	--	1	--	57	--	718
Pará	21	70	--	1	--	5	--	82
Paraíba	271	57	10	2	11	20	39	149
Paraná	140	93	25	52	47	71	47	250
Pernambuco	82	82	27	30	32	58	65	149
Piauí	87	54	2	--	2	16	7	102
R.G. do Norte	72	50	17	9	19	41	59	131

TABLE 18 (cont.)

RECOGNIZED AND UNRECOGNIZED RURAL SINDICATOS
1963-1965

	Sindicatos Reportedly Organized 1962-1964 ^a	Total Paper Sinds. ^b	September 1963 ^c Recog-Wait		December 1963 ^d Recog-Wait		Funct. Sinds. Aug. 1965 ^e	Municipios in State December 1964 ^d
R.G. do Sul	160	277	30	63	33	75	82	158
Rio de Janeiro	78	101	8	16	13	23	33	62
Sta. Catarina	40	102	2	3	2	5	--	177
São Paulo	188	641	53	46	61	60	111	505
Sergipe	50	34	9	2	9	9	9	65
	<u>1,604</u>	<u>2,268</u>	<u>211</u>	<u>259</u>	<u>270</u>	<u>555</u>	<u>490</u>	<u>3,719</u>

- Sources:
- a - From a list maintained in Federation of Rural Workers, São Paulo.
 - b - "Governo fecha os sindicatos do peaguismo," Tribuna da Imprensa (RJ), March 30, 1965. The National Labor Department of the MTPS considered 2,381 Sindicatos and federations recognized prior to April, 1964, were 'phantom' or paper entities. Some of these in the state of Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul and São Paulo were urban sindicatos. The 2,268 total does not include 39 paper sindicatos in the territories of Amapá, Rondonia, and Brasília.
 - c - SUPRA, "Sindicatos de Trabalhadores Rurais," September, 1963, pp. 10-11.
 - d - SUPRA, Sindicatos Rurais, Relação No. 1, December 31, 1963, p. 17.
 - e - Compiled by this writer. In those states with a dash, this writer was not able to determine the number of rural functioning and recognized sindicatos.



Figure 30.--Small farmer proprietors, members of a 'hunting' or 'shooting club' parade through the streets of Nova Petropolis, Rio Grande do Sul, celebrating the 100th anniversary of its founding September 7, 1858. In 1902, Padre Teodoro Amstadt of the nearby village of Linha Imperial founded the first Credit Cooperative in Brazil for small farmers.



Figure 31.--Home and family of Zulmiro Boff, President of the Sindicato of Small Farmers, Caxias do Sul, Rio Grande do Sul, April 22, 1965. In the background to the left is a grape arbor from which he earns his living.

SummaryThe Differing Techniques of Access
for Southern Peasant Sindicatos

As has been noted earlier in Chapter II, "access to one or more key points of decision in the government . . . becomes the facilitating intermediate objective of political interest groups."¹ In the North and Northeast, structured violence has been a part of the political process and achievement of access for many years and will probably remain so as long as there is a work situation with a large surplus of unemployed or under-employed workers. While a strike or demonstration could modify specific negative aspects of the work situation in the sugar regions of the South, other techniques were needed by the small farmers, renters, or sharecroppers to influence private and public decision-makers in the more advanced political and economic sub-systems of the region.² In Rio Grande do Sul, FAG-supported

¹Truman, op. cit., p. 264.

²"Federação de Trabalhadores rurais acusa proprietários," A Folha (São Paulo), May 19, 1965, indicates fazendeiros in the São Paulo cotton region of Auriflora seized cotton stocks of sharecroppers as payment for "rent of their homes" because the crop had not been as good as expected; "Rurícolas de Iapeva pedem providência as autoridades," A Gazeta (São Paulo), June 1, 1965, indicates landowners in Iapeva, São Paulo, were planting pasture grasses in the garden plots of agricultural workers despite a 1963 contract to the contrary.

"Subdelegado de Polícia Prende Dirigente Sindical no Interior," Última Hora (Rio de Janeiro), April 16, 1965, charged Messias Monteiro, Police Subdelegate in Casimiro de Abreu with imprisoning Ladislau Rodrigues, a director of the Federation of Small Farmers of the State of Rio, and for taking from him the printed forms necessary for the collection of the Sindicato Tax in that Município. Rodrigues was freed almost immediately after President José Agostinho Neto and Padre Antonio Carvalho made representations with State Government officials after word was received by the Federation officials in this writer's presence.

groups mobilized group pressures to influence state and federal government officials to raise the minimum prices paid for peaches, grapes, and yerba mate.¹ In both that state and Sao Paulo, potato growers influenced the National Food Supply Board (SUNAB) to purchase guaranteed quantities of potatoes to solve over-production and storage problems.

Sao Paulo was the only Federation with direct access to the State Assembly through José Rotta who was elected an Alternate UDN State Deputy in October, 1962.² Nevertheless, the lack of direct legislative access did not hinder the Church-sponsored groups in Paraná, Rio Grande do Sul, and Rio de Janeiro. These groups had access to state and federal government officials because many of their leaders and members were already involved in município and state politics prior to the formation of the FAG or the Workers' Circle-sponsored groups. In addition, they developed enough expertise and skills in the details of the CLT, the Rural Worker Statute, and the legislation governing SUNAB or the crop-regulating Institutos to be able to deal with the changed political atmosphere of the Castelo Branco regime.

¹Although several national congresses of peasants or rural workers were held during the Goulart administration which various of his Ministers attended, this writer has seen no published evidence that Goulart ever gave audiences to rural worker or small farmer leaders as his successor Marshall Castelo Branco did in Rio de Janeiro, Brasília, or during trips to various parts of the country.

²Rotta was not re-nominated by the ARENA or MDB parties in 1966. This writer does not know if he or anyone else asked for his nomination by one of the parties.

The next chapter, after some discussion of the events contributing to the formation of a National Confederation of Rural Workers (CONTAG), will discuss how different characteristics of the leadership of peasant groups have contributed to the use of different solutions to their problems.

CHAPTER VII

ORGANIZATION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NATIONAL, STATE, AND LOCAL LEADERSHIP OF BRAZILIAN PEASANT GROUPS

Introduction

Various attempts have been made to unify the peasant organizations into a national movement in order to deal with government agencies, landowner or industrial groups, and to help state and local peasant groups.¹ The principle of institutional unity or union monopoly gives considerable internal power to the Minister of Labor and a national confederation over the subordinate personnel, policies, and methods of groups at the state federation and municipio level. The principle of union monopoly which permits only one organization per occupational group in each municipio or state can be a real threat to the individual or group which dissents from the policies of the Ministry or a national confederation.²

In the 1960's, many groups sought to dominate the national organization which could be formed under the auspices of the Rural Worker Statute because this could help determine the personnel and policies

¹See Lipset, Political Man, pp. 357-397, for a discussion of the problems of bureaucratization and oligarchy in trade unions, including the conflict between democratic unionism and "responsible" unionism or the "dictatorial" tendencies of union officials that are a consequence of collective bargaining with management representatives.

²Price, op. cit., pp. 17-20, summarizes the different points of view on Ministerial recognition, appointment, and dismissal of sindicato, federation, and confederation leaders.

of subordinate groups for several years to come. Francisco Julião, ULTAB leader Lindolfo Silva, several Ministers of Labor, and several Church leaders convened Congresses or conventions in an attempt to create a National Peasant or Rural Workers Confederation. Finally, in December, 1963, delegates from groups in seven states formed the Confederation of Agricultural Workers (CONTAG) in Rio de Janeiro with a leadership dominated by a coalition of Communists and radical Catholics. In April, 1964, the Ministry of Labor appointed an interim Governing Junta, dominated by reformist Catholics of the CBTC which, in turn, gave way in April, 1965, to a group of reformist leaders headed by Jose Rotta of Sao Paulo.

The creation and maintenance of a national organization of small farmers and rural workers has been and is likely to continue to be a highly political matter. This chapter will examine the three conventions which preceded the formation of the CONTAG in December 1963, leadership characteristics in three Northeastern and three southern states, the oligarchic tendencies of the CONTAG leadership, and the problems of cohesion and rebellion within the peasant movement at the present time.

The Efforts to Create a National Peasant Confederation

When it became apparent in mid-1961 that the Brazilian Church was going to be successful in organizing peasant sindicatos on a widespread scale, ULTAB leader Lindolfo Silva and Francisco Julião agreed to hold the First National Congress of Agricultural Laborers and Workers (I Congresso Nacional de Lavradores e Trabalhadores

Agrícolas) in Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais, November 15-17, 1961.¹ One of the aims of the Congress attended by 1,200 delegates and subsidized by the Federal Government,² was unification of the left-ist and revolutionary groups organizing peasants, rural workers, sharecroppers, and squatters.³ Julião, Silva, and others could not agree on a formula to create a national organization probably because of their personal and ideological differences over control of such an organization. Silva propounded a two-stage theory of revolution: in the first stage, he proposed a unification of all progressive forces in favor of agrarian reform, extension of urban labor and welfare legislation to the countryside, federal expropriation of unused land over 500 hectares (1,235 acres), and the concession of new properties up to 500 hectares for lifetime use⁴--in effect, maintenance of the

¹"No Congresso de camponeses o assunto é reforma agraria," O Metropolitano (November 11, 1961), p. 4, indicates the Congress grew out of a meeting in Sao Paulo in 1959, although the participants in this meeting are not named.

²Ibid., José Tiago Cintra, Secretary of the Congress of Peasants as it apparently was originally to be called, said that Janio Quadros, while President, had suggested the theme of agrarian reform and would help finance it. Governor Magalhaes Pinto of Minas Gerais who apparently had promised aid earlier, had not given any aid but was going to boycott the Congress, probably because of the crisis of August-September 1961, which brought Joao Goulart to power. Similarly, Governors Cid Sampaio of Pernambuco, Carvalho Pinto of São Paulo and Carlos Lacerda of Guanabara refused to attend or help. Governor Brizola of Rio Grande do Sul promised to pay the cost of MASTER delegates from Rio Grande do Sul and of some delegates from São Paulo.

³Cesar Guimaraes, "Congresso Camponês é aliança de esquerda," O Metropolitano (December 9, 1961), p. 3:1-2.

⁴See Whetten, Guatemala, pp. 152-173, and Pearson, "The Confederación Nacional Campesina," pp. 150-196, for a discussion of the theoretical possibilities and actual results of what happened in Guatemala, 1952-1954, when land was distributed for lifetime use to peasants.

capitalist system of land use; in the second stage, a vague, undefined "socialization" would take place. On the other hand, Juliao called for a one-stage "global revolution" involving economic nationalism, nationalization of basic industry, state monopoly of foreign commerce, rigorous control of profit remissions abroad, votes for the illiterates, and defense of the Cuban revolution--all of which would "contribute," he said, to "an effort of socialist construction." In terms of an organization to represent the peasants, Juliao called for the creation of a Workers Central (Central de Trabalhadores) which would include urban workers, peasants, and students.¹

In the end, no compromise could be reached on a concrete organization and a "pact of peaceful co-existence" was signed between the two groups which one writer called a "plurality of leftists," whose divergencies would not hinder their becoming a "social vanguard for the future."²

¹"As duas faces do Congresso Camponês," O Metropolitano (November 25, 1961), p. 8:1-3, and Harding, op. cit., pp. 50-51, who said the ULTAB position was unpopular.

Another important speaker at the Congress was Alternate PTB Federal Deputy and peasant mobilizer Padre Francisco Lage Pessoa, who did not address himself to the creation of a national peasant organization but who soundly denounced the existing agricultural system and called for its overthrow. See "Palavras aos camponeses," O Metropolitano (December 16, 1961), p. 3.

²"As duas faces do Congresso Camponês," op. cit.

One indication of the disagreement of the Julia, ULTAB, and other groups is the absence of any references to the formation of federations, confederations, or other groups larger than the local sindicato in "The Declaration of Belo Horizonte," which is included in Juliao, Que Son las Ligas Campesinas?, pp. 89-97.

The First Congress of Rural Workers of
the North and Northeast, May 1962

Six months later, reformist Church leaders and Minister of Labor Andre Franco Montoro sponsored the Itabuna Congress which was briefly discussed in Chapter IV. The Congress called for establishment of a "National Confederation of Rural Worker Sindicatos" on the basis of "existing rural federations in union with the sindicatos existing in other states."¹ Formation of such a confederation by the existing federations in Bahia, Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Norte, and Sergipe would have placed control in the reformist laymen and priests of SORPE, SAR, MEB, and Archbishop Dom José Tavares of Arcaju. Because this threatened their own position, Julião, Lindolfo Silva (ULTAB), the PCB, and other groups opposed formation of this group until a later date.

The First Brazilian Convention of
Rural Sindicatos, July 1963

One year later, several hundred delegates from rural sindicatos in twelve states met for the First Brazilian Convention of Rural Sindicatos. It was one of the first so-called national conventions

¹"Carta de Principios é alavança de camponeses," Jornal do Brasil (May 18, 1962), p. 4.

Federation Charters were issued by the Ministry of Labor to groups in the following states on the dates indicated:

Pernambuco, October 17, 1962

Sergipe, June 11, 1963

Paraná, July 20, 1963

Rio Grande do Norte, August 14, 1963

São Paulo, August 17, 1963

Rural Worker Federations were also recognized between September and December 1963 in Ceará, Paraíba, and Rio de Janeiro, although the specific dates are not known. In addition, a second Federation in São Paulo was also given legal status but this writer does not know which of these groups was affiliated with ULTAB, and which was affiliated with the Workers Circle group. See SUPRA, "Sindicatos Rurais, Relação No. 1," December 31, 1963, p. 17, for dates of recognition.

to publish the names of the individuals and groups organizing a meeting of this nature.¹

In its final conclusions, the Convention made four demands: (1) expropriation of unused, abandoned, and badly used land which should be sold on long-range terms to legitimate peasants who would work the land; (2) formation of a National Confederation of Agricultural Workers; (3) peasant participation in the staffing of a Rural Social Welfare Institute, and (4) establishment of the Rural Labor Justice Councils provided for by the Rural Worker Statute.

In addition, the delegates emphatically rejected "individual or state capitalism" and those who would offer "solutions to Brazilian problems" based on the experience of "capitalist, socialist or communist countries." They also called for the abolition of cambao and condicao, the sharecropping arrangements by which peasants exchanged so much labor per week or month in return for the privilege of working a small plot of land.

¹Mensagem-Conclusões, I Convenção Brasileira de Sindicatos Rurais, Natal, Rio Grande do Norte, a booklet published in Natal by the Comissão Coordenadora da Convenção, indicated the following formal leaders: José Rodriguez Sobrinho, President of the RGN Federation; Manoel Gonçalo Ferreira, President of the Pernambuco Federation of Rural Workers; Joaquim Batista do Nascimento Sobrinho, President of the Sergipe Rural Workers Federation; Severino Manoel Soares of Pernambuco; one Sebastião from Rio Grande do Norte, and Rony Gerardi, one of the organizers of the FAG Regional Department of Caxias do Sul, Rio Grande do Sul.

Undoubtedly, informal leaders included Dom Eugenio Sales and Doctor Julieta Calazans who were present also.

The following agencies collaborated to support the convention: SUPRA, the Ministry of Agriculture, SAR, the Archdiocese of Natal, the Rio Grande do Norte state government; MEB, the Regional Labor Delegate, local Army and Navy Commanders, and several schools which probably furnished meals and lodging to the delegates. Natal merchants were even thanked for allowing "their windows to be used for propaganda."

This unanimity however did not mask some of the personality or other clashes between delegates. São Paulo and other Southern states were poorly represented at the convention on its different committees.¹ Several of these delegates, including José Rotta, issued a manifesto complaining that "extremist anti-democratic students" and other "outside elements" manipulated "the reins" of the convention and did not allow peasants to ask questions or make comments on many of the speeches made to the convention.²

Establishment of the CONTAG

Five months later, delegates from twenty-nine federations in nineteen states, reportedly representing 743 peasant sindicatos (263 of which were recognized), met in Rio de Janeiro to form the National Confederation of Agricultural Workers or CONTAG. However, the Natal reformist groups who called originally for the CONTAG, were outmaneuvered by the Communist ULTAB allied with leftist MEB leaders³ and Manoel Gonçalo Ferreira of Pernambuco, an AP follower.⁴ ULTAB

¹For example, the Second FAG Congress was meeting at practically the same time, July 19-21, in Porto Alegre.

²Flyer, "Manifesto dos Trabalhadores Rurais a Nação," published by "A Comissão, representando mais de 200 sindicatos de trabalhadores rurais do Brasil," Natal, July 1963, given this writer by a São Paulo peasant who attended the Convention.

³Therry, op. cit., pp. 38-39. For a PCB view of the elections, see Novos Rumos, No. 235 (December 27, 1963-January 2, 1964).

⁴In October 1963, Gonçalo Ferreira apparently agreed to modify the directorate of the Federation of Rural Workers of Pernambuco to include Antonio Guedes, PCB President of the Igarassu Sindicato as first Vice President and Jose Eduardo de Lima Filho of Palmares as Secretary of the Pernambuco Federation in return for Communist and MEB support of Gonçalo Ferreira as CONTAG First Vice President.

leader Lindolfo Silva was elected President along with the following officers:¹

Manoel Gonçalo Ferreira, Pernambuco, 1st Vice President
 José Leandro Bezerra da Costa, Ceara, a ULTAB member, 2nd
 Vice President
 José Gomes Navais, Alagoas, 3rd Vice President
 Sebastião Lourenço de Lima, Minas Gerais, Secretary General
 José Rodrigues do Santos, Paraná, 1st Secretary
 João de Almeida Cavalcanti, Paraíba, 2nd Secretary
 Nestor Vera, São Paulo, ULTAB Vice President, Treasurer
 Manoel Lito Muniz, affiliation unknown, 2nd Treasurer

In an interview published after the election by Liga, Julião's newspaper, Silva stated that the CONTAG would "struggle for agrarian reform . . . participate in the battle for urban housing and banking reforms at the side of urban workers and the people in general, in addition to [seeking] extension of the minimum wage, family bonuses, and the thirteenth month Christmas bonus for the peasants."²

Padre Melo and other Church leaders, however, were not dismayed over Communist control of the CONTAG or Ministry of Labor control of the Federations through the recognition process. The latter two groups did not have a "mass" following; therefore, non-communist groups should continue stressing the importance of building strong local peasant organizations for the future to meet the needs of the peasants.³

¹"Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura: Poderoso Instrumento de Luta," Liga (January 8, 1964).

²"Confederação Nacional," Liga (January 8, 1964).

"Desconhecer a CONTAG! Lutar Pela Organização da Central Campesina Revolucionaria," Frente Operaria (January 3, 1964), was a Trotskyite condemnation of the CONTAG elections as having nothing to do with the peasant movement. All of these officials were "bureaucrats who for a long time have never known what a hoe (enxada) was."

³Price, op. cit., p. 66, citing O Estado de São Paulo (February 26, 1964).

The 1965 CONTAG Elections

As the reader may have perceived in the previous section, an active ULTAB and Popular Action (AP) minority controlled the nomination and electoral machinery of the CONTAG election. Once the elections were over, ULTAB leaders Silva and Vera dominated CONTAG policy statements and represented it at various meetings.¹

However, Silva and Vera were removed by the Ministry of Labor after the 1964 Revolution and a moderate, reformist Workers Circle (CBTC),² leadership was named as Interventors in the CONTAG. This group, in turn, attempted to arrange the internal power hierarchy to prevent a succession conflict in the elections which were finally held in April, 1965, by limiting the federations who were to participate in the election process.³

¹For example, Silva and Vera were CONTAG representatives in a 232-man "peasant delegation" representing Brazil at the Communist-sponsored Congresso de Unidade Sindical de Trabalhadores de America Latina, in Brasilia, January 25-28, 1964. The Congress, which, originally was scheduled for Rio de Janeiro, January 10-12, 1964, was forced to move to the national capital because of opposition from Governors Lacerda of Guanabara and Magalhaes Pinto of Minas Gerais. None of the 230 other "peasant leaders" from 12 states and Brasilia was nationally known as an important local or state federation leader although it is possible some were leaders of ULTAB paper organizations.

²The CBTC was formed out of the CNCO in an internal re-organization in July, 1964. The organization was suspended by the Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unionists (CLASC) because the CNC refused to join CLASC in condemning the Brazilian military for the ouster of João Goulart.

³For example, this writer did not encounter any delegates from Bahia, Ceará, Minas Gerais, or Rio Grande do Sul. With respect to the last group, the telegram inviting them to participate in the elections did not arrive until April 16 and was delivered while this writer was talking with José Ary Grebler in the FAG offices.

In a series of meetings in early 1965 with leaders from Paraná, Rio de Janeiro, and one Pernambuco leader working in the National Labor Department, José Retta and Geronimo Silveira, Executive Secretary of the São Paulo Federation of Rural Workers, engaged in cambalacha, the Brazilian method of distributing Executive Committee positions in advance, to assure Retta the Presidency even before twenty-five voting delegates formally met April 12. After two days of bargaining behind closed doors, a single slate (chapa unica) was presented for formal use on April 14--dissenting or aspiring groups theoretically being allowed to present a slate also.¹ Nevertheless, when the formal ballots were cast, the Retta slate was unanimously approved. The nine regular and three alternate members of the Executive Committee (Diretorio) and the three regular and three alternate members of the Fiscal Council (an auditing body) were divided up among the state federations as follows:

Pernambuco	5
Rio de Janeiro	4
São Paulo	4
Paraíba	3
Sergipe	3
Rio Grande do Norte	3
Paraná	2

Although the one slate gave an appearance of unanimity, CBTC and Workers' Circle leaders present were aware of the factionalism in the organization and took steps to keep outsiders, including this writer, away from the premises until after pre-election maneuverings had been completed. The 1965 election, unlike those of 1963, was given very

¹A list of the positions and names is included in the Appendix.

little publicity in the Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo press and none, so far as this writer is aware, in Pernambuco, Paraíba, or Rio Grande do Norte. The removal several weeks later of at least one dissident member of the CONTAG Directory¹ was a further step in the Rotta's attempt to achieve the maximum possible cohesion and privileges that leadership status might provide in the future. In any case, Rotta has become the effective national spokesman for CONTAG and no one else has issued statements for the CONTAG either through news conferences or published articles in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo newspapers.

Notes on the Leadership of Small Farmer and
Rural Worker Groups in Brazil, 1962-1965

As has been noted in the preface, most of the literature on peasant groups in Brazil has been polemical rather than analytical. One of the greatest gaps concerns the background characteristics of the leadership of these organizations. Because the April, 1964, Revolution removed ULTAB, Communist, Trotskyite, and Liga leaders, there was little opportunity to gather data concerning the background characteristics of these leaders other than that which already has been noted in previous chapters. However, data gathered by Jose Chasin and a Sao Paulo group which interviewed 90 delegates to the Belo Horizonte Congress of November, 1961, can be used for

¹The dissident was Nobor Bito, a Japanese Brazilian born October 7, 1938, who was President of the Sindicato of Rural Workers of Presidente Prudentes, Rotta's home town, April 14, 1963, to April 19, 1965.

some comparative purposes.¹

In order to determine the individuals who were influential or knowledgeable about power relationships in existing peasant pressure groups, more than 200 persons were interviewed who held formal leadership posts in the CONTAG state federations, catalytic organizations such as SAR, SORPE, FAG, CNCO-CBTG, and peasant sindicatos, cooperatives, government agencies and knowledgeable in universities, landowner groups such as the SRB and Fornecedores Association of Pernambuco, and international trade union organization representatives.² Tables 16 and 17 are based on data gathered on 75 formal and informal influentials in sindicato federation, CONTAG, SAR, SORPE, Workers Circle, FAG, and CNCO, CBTG organizations in six states: Rio

¹ José Chasin, "Contribuição Para a Análise da Vanguardia Política do Campo," Revista Brasiliense, No. 44 (November-December, 1962), pp. 102-129. A sample of 120 persons was taken from the 1,036 persons attending the first two days of meetings. However, only ninety of the interviews used as a basis for his report which was composed of data on thirteen delegates each from Pernambuco, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo; eleven from Goiás; eight from Paraná, and five from Rio Grande do Norte. For some inexplicable reason, Chasin's sample did not include anyone from Alagoas or Rio Grande do Sul which furnished ten and 34 delegates respectively.

Chasin, op. cit., pp. 103-104, met "enormous resistance" from many delegates who did not want to be interviewed. One peasant more than 50 years old reportedly told him: "Why statistics? We don't want statistics, we want land!" Chasin felt such an attitude indicated peasant leaders were developing the "caution and prudence" necessary to "organized political work." This writer would say that it would be just as valid to say that such an attitude was a manifestation of a general peasant reluctance to discuss matters which might cause difficulties with the police or important politicians-landowners.

² The writer was well aware of the problems of determining "men of power in a community" and influentials from reading Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (Garden City: Anchor Books, Doubleday and Company, 1963, especially pp. 9-25 and 255-263; Kammerer, et al., op. cit., pp. 18-26, and Robert Dahl, Who Governs?

Grande do Norte (8); Paraíba (7); Pernambuco (19); Rio de Janeiro (7); São Paulo (10); and Rio Grande do Sul (24). Background data on twenty other persons from nine other states were not included because the data were insufficient to have a representative sample from these states.¹ Nevertheless, the data gathered on these twenty additional influentials tends to corroborate the data on the 75 persons included in the Tables.

The writer originally planned to use a mimeographed interview schedule with both structured closed-end and unstructured open-ended questions. However, after his arrival in Brazil, the writer discovered many formal leaders, influentials, and knowledgeable were reluctant to submit themselves to detailed interviews involving written questionnaires.² He soon perceived that it was impossible to secure the confidence of interviewees by recording their answers in their presence. Instead, a variety of techniques were designed to gain their confidence and to elicit information on power relationships and historical events. In general, this was done by talking about

Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), pp. 330-343.

¹ Excluded were persons from Alagoas, Ceará, Goiás, Maranhão, Minas Gerais, Paraná, Piauí, and Sergipe. However, several persons were included in the sample who were born in or worked in those states, e.g., Luis Ernani Torres, Executive Secretary of the CONTAG, who was born in Ceará, and Padre Melo of Cabo, Pernambuco, who was born in Sergipe.

² John F. Santos, "A Psychologist Reflects on Brazil and Brazilians," in Baklanoff, op. cit., pp. 239-248, notes "it is somehow difficult to imagine Brazilians giving [the] kind of highly personal information to an interviewer, even for purposes of a scientific study" if that person wanted to make a "Brazilian Kinsey Report," or study "sin" and "guilt feelings."

the writer's own life, especially as a farm worker in the United States whose summer pay and productivity in raising wheat and other crops astounded most Brazilians, about his reasons for being in Brazil, about rural and political conditions in the United States (racism in the South and coronelismo in Brazil make wonderful analogies), and by "dropping" the names of other Brazilian political and church influentials whom I had talked to. Other satisfactory results resulted from a willingness to eat peasant fare; visit peasant farms and homes; a willingness to observe and learn from local farm leaders at public meetings which sometimes resulted in spontaneous demands for a speech by the writer; after this "rite of passage," questions could be asked about many matters. In general, most formal leaders and influentials were sensitive to questions about their political activities¹ by an outsider from the United States, especially after "Operation Camelot"² was perceived by many Brazilian intellectuals,

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¹ Formal leaders, influentials, and ordinary peasant members were much more receptive to questioning in the South than in the Northeast. In part, this is probably a result of the great attention paid by foreign journalists and academicians to the Peasant Leagues and the Northeast which offered more "newsworthy" or flamboyant stories by virtue of its traditional techniques of proclaiming a "crisis," "emergency," or "violence" as a means of gaining recognition from state and national decision-makers.

For example, Padre Paulo Crespo of Jaboatao has been inundated by American politicians, professors, university students, journalists, and trade union leaders. When this writer first interviewed him at Jaboatao May 30, 1965, he refused to answer any questions on SORPE's activities until after I had spent a month or more in the Pernambuco countryside and had formulated some opinions and gathered some facts of my own--a reasonable request on his part and an excellent method of winning out those who would seek to become "instant experts."

² Kalman H. Silvert, "American Academic Ethics and Social Research Abroad," AUFS Reports, West Coast South America Series, Vol. XII, No. 3 (July, 1965), pp. 7-14, is among the better reports on the immediate implications exposure of the program and its funding had.

students, and journalists as a further attempt by the United States to impose its will on Brazil and other Latin American nations.

Questions from the original interview schedule were interspersed in general conversations with individuals when it seemed appropriate or relevant to the situation at hand. After an interview in a peasant sindicato, federation office, plantation, or sugar mill, the answers to these questions were written down. In addition, other information on these persons was gathered from books and periodicals.

Four Pernambuco and seven Sao Paulo peasant leaders who participated in training courses for middle-level sindicato leaders at the Instituto Cultural do Trabalho (ICT)¹ of Sao Paulo, between 1963-1965, were included in the sample. Thirty-seven Pernambuco peasant

¹Instituto Cultural do Trabalho, Primeiras Atividades, Sao Paulo, 1965, discusses the origins and work of the Institute which was a civil society formally registered June 1, 1963, as an entity to "prepare urban and rural workers, current sindicato leaders." The ICT was "against government or management (patronal) interference in sindicato life. Capital and Labor are two powerful forces that ought not and cannot be in antagonistic camps either in the process of making ugly faces at one another or in constant challenges (desafios)." Over the long run, the ICT--under the supervision of the well-known Brazilian sociologist and labor lawyer, J.V. Freitas Marcondes--has sought to bring about a greater use of collective bargaining arrangements.

On the Board of Directors (Conselho Consultativo) of the ICT are several prominent Sao Paulo labor lawyers such as A.F. Cesarino Junior and José Barbosa de Almeida and American labor officials Serafino Romualdi, George Meany, Joseph A. Byrne, and John F. Snyder. The AFL-CIO, through the American Institute for Free Labor Development, has helped significantly in financing ICT operations.

Courses of the ICT include the following: Brazilian Sindicato Legislation and Organization; History of Labor Law, Foundations of Social Law, Sindicato Administration, Agrarian Reform, the Brazilian Labor Justice Court System, Capitalism, Socialism and Communist, Co-operative Philosophy and Organization, Economic Development and Underdevelopment, Collective Bargaining Techniques and Content.

sindicato leaders participating in an ICT-aided training course in Recife, March 22-April 15, 1965,¹ were not included in the select sample of seventy-five persons, although this group is compared in Table 20 with delegates to the Belo Horizonte Congress and the eleven peasant leaders participating in the ICT training courses.

The background data used in Tables 19 and 20 are not as complete as this writer would have liked. On the other hand, it is this writer's judgment that the data are valid, based on cross-checking with other informants and sources whenever possible. Many respondents were proud, flattered, or at least pleased that they were picked for this study which would be for the use of students and "the people of the United States" but not for the CIA or United States Embassy! As indicated in the Preface, this writer was studying phenomena which, so far as previous studies go, were virgin.²

Occupational and Age Experiences

The Presidents and officials of the state federations and SAR-SORPE-FAG Workers Circle groups have had a wider occupational and

¹Agronomist Luis Goies Vieira, Supervisor of Courses of the ICT-Recife, was kind enough to give this writer access to ICT file cards on these men, August 11, 1965.

²Kammerer, et al., op. cit., p. 19 was adapted for the last two sentences.

TABLE 19

BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS OF DELEGATES TO THE FIRST
PEASANT CONGRESS, BELO HORIZONTE, NOVEMBER, 1961
AND INFLUENTIALS IN THREE SOUTHERN AND THREE
NORTHEASTERN STATES, NOVEMBER 1964-AUGUST 1965

	November Congress n-90 ^a	Southern n-41 ^b	Northeast n-34
Agricultural			
Squatters (Poseiros)	13%	--	--
Day Laborers	20	--	--
Renters	19	2%	4
Sharecroppers	19	--	--
Small Proprietors	14	28	41
Administrators	--	--	5
Other Rural	6	--	--
Skilled Blue Collar	5	2	--
Unskilled Blue Collar	3	--	--
White Collar Sindicato	1	12	9
School Teacher	1	17	3
College Student	1	5	12
Lawyer	1	7	6
Clergyman	1	9	18
Cooperative Official	1	9	6
Government Official-Deputy	--	17	6
Small Town Businessman	--	7	--
Retired Postal Clerk	--	2	--
Other	--	--	--
	100%	119% ^d	110% ^d

TABLE 19 (cont.)

	November Congress n-90 ^a	Southern n-41 ^b	Northeastern n-34
<u>AGE</u>			
Under 20	4%	--	--
20-24	17	12	26
25-29		12	38
30-39	28	31	29
40-49	22	34	--
Over 50	29	9	5
	<u>100%</u>	<u>98%</u>	<u>98%</u>
<u>EDUCATION</u>			
Illiterate	24-27%	--	--
Incomplete Primary-MEB	73-76	7%	35%
5 years Primary	--	24	15
Incomplete Secondary	--	12	12
Complete Secondary	--	29	6
Some College	--	5	15
Full College or Equivalent such as Seminar	--	22	20
	<u>100%</u>	<u>99%</u>	<u>102%</u>
<u>BIRTHPLACE</u>			
Rural farm	--	56%	32%
Hamlet-less than 5,000	--	--	9
Small town (6-20,000)	--	17	20
Medium city (21-100,000)	--	14	9
Large City (Over 100,000)	--	5	5
Unknown	100	7	23
	<u>100%</u>	<u>99%</u>	<u>98%</u>
<u>LENGTH OF TIME LIVED ON FARM</u>			
Never	--	2	5
Less than 5 years ^f	--	10	35
6-10 years	--	46	9
11-20 years	--	--	12
More than 20 years	--	34	35
Unknown	100	9	5
	<u>100%</u>	<u>102%</u>	<u>102%</u>
<u>PARTICIPATION IN PREVIOUS GROUP ACTIVITY</u>			
Military Service	28%	--	--
Recreation Groups	--	12%	3

TABLE 19 (cont.)

	November Congress n-90 ^a	Southern n-41 ^b	Northeastern n-34
Church Groups	52	68	64
Roman Catholic	17	2	--
Protestant	9	--	--
Atheists	19	--	--
Workers Circles	--	24	15
Political Parties	--	36	12
Peasant Sindicatos	83 ^g	31	44
Urban Sindicatos	--	9	5
Cooperatives	--	36	18
	191% ^d	224% ^d	161% ^d

^aJose Chasin, "Contribuição Para a Análise da Vanguarda Política do Campo," *Revista Brasiliense*, No. 44, November-December, 1962, pp. 102-129.

^bData on 41 Southern influentials include 12 Sindicato officials (29%), 7 who were both Sindicato and Federation officials (17%), and 22 FAG, CO, CNCO-CBTC influentials (53%). By states, they come from Rio de Janeiro (L&%), São Paulo (24%), and Rio Grande do Sul (59%).

^cData on 34 Northeastern influentials include 17 Sindicato officials (50%), 7 who were both Sindicato and Federation officials (15%), and 10 SAR or SORPE influentials (35%). By states, they come from Paraíba (20%), Pernambuco (55%), and Rio Grande do Norte (25%).

^dPercentages total more than 100% since some persons perform more than one function or were engaged in more than one activity.

^eChasin included data only on illiterates; these figures were separately for those who could perform arithmetical operations, read, and write.

^fIncludes those individuals who live in a city and commute to rural areas for sindicato or cooperative work as well as those who live in rural areas and commute to the city to perform sindicato or cooperative work.

^gChasin's survey indicated 83% belonged to a "class association" but the meaning of this term is not explained. It is difficult to know Chasin's meaning since the ETR was not proclaimed until after the Belo Horizonte Congress, it is also difficult to know the type of groups which the 52% who said they belonged to for more than five years since the first Peasant Leagues did not function until 1955 and thus the margin of error could be considerable.

TABLE 20

BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS OF DELEGATES TO THE FIRST PEASANT CONGRESS, BELO HORIZONTE, NOVEMBER, 1961, AND RURAL WORKER LEADERS IN ICT TRAINING COURSES IN SÃO PAULO (1963-1965) AND RECIFE, PERNAMBUCO (MARCH 22-APRIL 15, 1965)

	November Congress n-90	ICT São Paulo n-11	ICT Recife n-37
<u>AGE</u>			
Under 20 years	4%	--	8%
20-24 years	17	18	32
25-29	--	45	14
30-39	28	9	24
40-49	22	27	19
Over 50	29	--	3
	<u>100%</u>	<u>99%</u>	<u>102%</u>
<u>EDUCATION</u>			
Illiterate	24-27%	--	5%
Incomplete Primary-MEB	73-76%	9%	81
5 years Primary	--	36	11
Incomplete Secondary	--	18	--
Complete Secondary	--	18	--
Some College or Advanced Schooling	--	9	--
Unknown or Inexact	--	9	--
	<u>100%</u>	<u>99%</u>	<u>100%</u>
<u>LENGTH OF TIME ACTIVE IN RURAL WORKER SINDICATO MOVEMENT</u>			
Unknown or Inexact	--	--	24%
Less than 12 months	30%	--	--
12-23 months	14	9%	14
24-35 months	--	64	43
36-47 months	4	27	16
Over 4 years	52	--	3
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
<u>CURRENT EMPLOYMENT OR SOURCE OF INCOME FOR LIVING</u>			
Agricultural Squatter (Poseiro)	13%	--	--

TABLE 20 (cont.)

	November Congress n-90	ICT São Paulo n-11	ICT Recife n-37
Day Laborer	20%	--	57%
Renter	19	--	--
Sharecropper	19	--	8
Small Proprietor	14	--	--
Dismissed from Work	--	--	3
Other Rural Work	6	--	--
Federation white-collar	--	36%	--
Sindicato white-collar	--	36	--
Sindicato Officer	--	27	8
Others or Unknown	9	--	22
	<u>110%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>98%</u>

^a José Chasin, *op. cit.*, pp. 106-122.

^b Information gathered by this writer from ICT-São Paulo files.

^c Information gathered by this writer from ICT-Recife files, August 11, 1965.

Figure 32. --Delegates to the Third Congress of the Frente Agrario Gaucho (FAG), the Pontifical Catholic University, Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul, January 18, 1965.



educational background than the membership.¹ Participants in the ICT middle-level training course had a longer history of sindicato activity than the participants in the Recife training course--a natural difference in view of the fact that this was only the first or second leadership training course for all of the Recife participants.

The leadership of the Northeast groups is relatively younger--29 years of age--compared to the leaders of the South--35 years.² This lower age for the Northeast is a reflection of the roles played by high school graduates or college students with communications skills in SAR and SORPE programs. The higher age for the South is undoubtedly a reflection of the greater longevity in the South and the wider social and political experiences which seem to be criteria for sindicato and cooperative leadership selection by the members or higher-level influentials.

A significantly larger number of persons in the South (15 or 36 per cent), compared to 4 or 12 per cent for the Northeast, were

¹Chasin, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-121, found 23 per cent of his sample of 90 persons had been actively militant in peasant movements from 5-10 years, 9 per cent from 11-15 years, and 20 per cent militant for more than 20 years. It is hard to believe his figure that 52 per cent had been militant for more than five years--since, before 1956, the first peasant league at Engenho Galileia never really functioned until that year and Juliao never made an impact on the Brazilian press until 1959.

Chasin has no breakdown of age for the 39 per cent of his sample holding office in "class associations," the 44 per cent who said they were only members, and the 17 per cent who belonged to no "class associations" at all. Unfortunately, as noted previously, Chasin does not explain the meaning of "class association."

²The median age of delegates to the Belo Horizonte Congress was between 40 and 50 years of age--a rather high level considering the low average life span of most Brazilian peasants.

active in politics prior to or during their experience as leaders of influentials in the catalytic FAG/Workers Circle groups.¹ In the Northeast, the status differentiations between urban and rural classes and areas undoubtedly contributed to the fact that only one peasant leader had been a municipal councilman (vereador)--and this only after he was elected a sindicato president. Similarly, the status differentiations of the Northeast, including the lack of social ties between small town professionals and small farm proprietors, contributed to the absence of small-town businessmen and one retired postal official who were FAG influentials. However, the sample may have been too small to say that there were absolutely no small town businessmen with influence over peasant sindicato policies in the Northeast.²

Educational Background

While twenty to twenty-five per cent of the sampled delegates to the Belo Horizonte Congress were unable to do arithmetical

¹Chasin, op. cit., p. 111, found 75 per cent of his Belo Horizonte sample were registered to vote, 18 per cent were not, but 7 per cent did not respond. This writer did not ask any questions about voting behavior; nevertheless, none of those persons in the 1965 sample said he was unable to vote or participate in politics, probably because nearly all of them were literate and thus aware of the relationship between literacy and policy-making.

²For example, this writer met one merchant and small landowner in Bom Jardim, Pernambuco, who was sympathetic to the SORPE-sponsored sindicato and cooperative in that town. However, this writer did not visit Bom Jardim long enough to determine whether he was influential in policy-making, personnel decisions, or if his sympathy resulted from a longtime friendship with Dr. Djalmo de Melo, of the SORPE staff, who had lived in Bom Jardim many years ago.

operations, read or write,¹ the 311 delegates to the FAG Congress and all seventy-five leaders in the 1965 sample were literates, although three Northeast sindicato and federation leaders only recently learned to read and write through MEB-type programs. In the Northeast, the median level of education was between elementary and an incomplete secondary school level of education; half of the Northeast sample did not have five years of primary schooling. In the South, the median level of education was much higher: 51 per cent had completed secondary school or had further education. The seven Sao Paulo participants in the ICT training courses included in the sample had a higher level of education than did the four Pernambuco participants in the ICT courses. Moreover, all but one of the eleven ICT-course participants had a higher level of education than all thirty-seven peasant leaders in the ICT-aided Recife courses, an indication of the relationship of education to advancement in the sindicatos which need accountants, bookkeepers, and other persons who can complete government forms.

The Church as a Source of Leadership

Church groups have been an important source of leadership for peasant groups in both the Northeast and the South. The greater dependence in the Northeast on priests and lawyers is principally due to the lack of rural schools, especially rural schools with male school teachers of a peasant background. In the South, the

¹Chasin, op. cit., p. 113. The rate of illiteracy for wives was even higher: 51-53 per cent did not know how to do arithmetical operations or how to read and write.

greater diversity of the rural social structure, the greater number of rural schools, male rural school teachers, and cooperatives, has meant that these occupational groups have been available as a source of leadership not only at the municipio but also the regional and state level.¹ The importance of priests to peasant groups in the Northeast is indicated by the fact that this writer found municipios without priests and without sindicatos, municipios with a priest and no sindicato, but not one peasant sindicato which did not have a sympathetic parish priest helping the peasant leadership. On the other hand, in the South, several rural worker and small farmer sindicatos or cooperatives functioned with the apparent indifference, inattention, or distaste of local priests and pastors.

Finally, David Truman's generalizations about occupants of managerial positions tending to perpetuate themselves in office or taking advantages of opportunities to benefit themselves² appear valid for Brazil also by the fact that all eleven ICT Sao Paulo middle-level trainee leaders lived on their sindicato salaries in contrast to the three out of thirty-seven persons in the Recife course who had a sindicato salary and the twenty-four or 68 per cent who had no income other than what they could earn as rural laborers and who were thus, in a sense, dependent upon large landowners.

¹Chasin had no priests or schoolteachers in his Belo Horizonte sample although Padre Alipio de Freitas and several other clergymen are known to have attended the Congress. The seven non-peasant delegates interviewed by Chasin included a railroad worker, a painter, a factory worker (operário), a wagon driver or teamster (carroceiro), a market-stall owner, a salt-field worker, and one other person whose occupation was not declared.

²Truman, op. cit., pp. 143-155.

Characteristics and Sources of Group Leadership

On the basis of the data gathered, the following can be said of the various leadership elites of the various rural worker, small farmer, or peasant organization groups organized in Brazil since 1955.

Insofar as there has been a national leadership, it has been recruited from the urban middle classes, particularly intellectuals or members of related professions--clergymen, lawyers, politicians, and school teachers--who also deal in ideas.¹ Leadership further down the ladder is recruited increasingly from within the peasantry and not from outside the peasantry.² Insofar as there is a regional or state leadership, it is a mixture of outside urban middle class or a local rural middle class leadership--of clergymen, lawyers, school teachers,³ and small independent farmers,

¹Exceptions have been the ULTAB leadership of Lindolfo Silva, Nestor Vera, and José Pureza, who were urban factory workers when not working in the field and being supported by the Communist Party; several persons in Sao Paulo claim Jose Rotta, the Sao Paulo Rural Worker Federation, and CONTAG President, has never lived on a farm but came exclusively from a small town, white collar or merchant background. Rotta himself claims he comes from a family of rural workers. In any case he had been working in a white collar bureaucratic capacity with the Workers' Circle movement for several years prior to being asked by Frei Celso to head up the Workers Circle-sponsored rural workers movement in Sao Paulo.

²Henry Landsberger, "An Approach to the Study of Peasant Organization in the Course of Socio-Political Development," a paper presented in a Seminar on Latin American Peasant Movement, New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, December 8-10, 1966, p. 35, theorized that "the less modernized the society, the lower down the ladder is leadership recruited from outside the peasantry," e.g., local bourgeoisie, craftsmen, etc."

³Professor Landsberger, op. cit., p. 37, theorized that "at levels below the top leadership, particularly in the less modernized societies, leaders tend still not to be peasants, but tend to be drawn from local craftsmen, merchants, teachers, etc., though these

from sindicatos which had a strong financial base through collection of the Imposto Sindical or union tax.¹

In the beginning, Francisco Julião, a landowner-lawyer and politician, the priests affiliated with SAR, SORPE, and FAG, or the leaders of the ULTAB and MASTER organizations were not of peasant origins. As time went on, state federations and the CONTAG brought small proprietors and rural workers into the hierarchy of the Church-sponsored groups. Peasants undoubtedly exercise some influence over policy since the April 1964 Revolution, but the dominant influence in national policy-making probably comes from such non-peasants as Jose Rotta, Padre Pedro Velloso of the CBTC, and Frei Celso Maria of Sao Paulo.²

are sometimes of peasant origin." In the case of Brazil, clergymen need to be included.

¹The presidents of the Campos, Rio de Janeiro, and Palmares, Pernambuco, sindicatos have always been important in federation politics because of their command over sizeable sums of money collected from the sugar plantations and sugar mills in their regions.

Julião, Que Son las Ligas Campesinas?, p. 61, says that the Campos Sindicato which had been in existence since 1946 "united only 3,000 members despite the fact that there was . . . a rural population greater than 200,000 souls." Julião perhaps forgot the tendency of pressure group leaders in many societies to deliberately discourage greater membership participation in organization affairs in order to maintain their own control. If the Campos leadership benefitted from a check-off system for the "Imposto Sindical," it does not seem unreasonable to assume that the Campos leadership might be satisfied with only 3,000 members.

Truman, op. cit., pp. 146-150, is relevant for his comments on the influence of group financial structures and personal financial security on the development and maintenance of an active minority in the leadership of an interest group.

²Probably because of the distance involved, Archbishop Helder Camara and Paulo Crespo of Pernambuco are less influential in the day-to-day decisions of the CONTAG, although they undoubtedly have some type of veto power over certain types of policy action.

The ideologies of the movements and groups organized before and after the April 1964 Revolution were not formulated by small farmers, rural workers, sharecroppers, or other types of peasants. Rather, it is the outsider non-peasant leaders¹ who created the ideology of the Peasant Leagues, ULTAB, MASTER, SAR, SORPE, FAG, and Workers Circle groups¹--though some of these outside leaders have roots in the rural areas and the FAG has tried to include the grievances and proposals of small farmers and rural workers into its policy-statements and program of inter-action with state and federal officials.

The higher levels of the structures were dominated by individuals with greater amounts of education and social experiences than the general membership. Only the Church-sponsored groups have attempted to improve the educational background and managerial skills of members and lower-middle level leaders. As noted previously, there is no indication that the Peasant Leagues, ULTAB, or MASTER ever established leadership-training courses or that they ever articulated a need to do so. This, of course, tended to perpetuate the leadership of an active minority of non-peasants in these groups.

The ideology of the leaders from superior strata in the various peasant groups has varied with their own ideological background. The higher leaders have had greater differences of opinion as to the

¹In Bahia, several ex-communist rural workers in the Itabuna cacao region formed the core of the state's federation leaders. See Price, op. cit., pp. 60-61, and CIDA, op. cit., pp. 326-327, for data on this group.

tactics and ultimate goals than the members themselves, who have not been so ideologically sensitive.

In terms of occupational background, local peasant leaders in the Northeast Church-sponsored groups have tended to come from rural worker groups in the sugar and cacao zones or from small proprietors and sharecroppers in the agreste or transitional zone.¹ In the South, the leadership has come from both the small proprietor class and rural workers on sugar and coffee plantations. In both cases, leaders have been able to participate in peasant group activity because their relatively affluent status has given them leisure time² to participate in sindicato or federation activities--the small farmers because of their independent economic status and the rural workers because the strong financial structures of their sindicatos given them an income while they devote their time to sindicato or federation activities.³

¹See Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in Ideology and Discontent, David E. Apter (ed.) (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 206-261.

See Landsberger, op. cit., p. 39, for his comments on how ideological differences can be a cause for "disunity and weakness of peasant movements with some of the outsiders counselling moderation, other radicalism," a phenomenon which was manifested in the differences between Juliao and Silva at the 1961 Belo Horizonte Congress.

²Truman, op. cit., pp. 146-150, is relevant for his comments on the influence group financial structures and personal financial security have upon the development and maintenance of an active minority in the leadership of an interest group.

³The formal leaders of the Rural Worker and Autonomous Worker Federations in Bahia, Paraiba, Rio Grande do Norte, Rio de Janeiro, and Rio Grande do Sul are principally small farmer proprietors. The principal formal leaders of the Paraná, Pernambuco, and São Paulo Rural Worker Federations are rural workers although there are a few sharecroppers, renters, and small proprietors.

Upward Mobility and Internal Democracy

The Peasant Leagues, MASTER, and ULTAB all appointed outsiders to head local organizations or designated persons whom they felt were natural leaders of existing informal groups. In addition, Brizola used the structure of his faction of the PTB to build up MASTER and later, in turn, used MASTER to build up his faction of the PTB. Elections were never used in these groups in contrast to the Church-sponsored groups which sought to encourage the formation and selection of leaders at the local and federation level from the grassroots up. The Church-sponsored parallel SAR, SORPE, SORAL, FAG, and Workers Circle groups provided a measure of supervisory control over leadership recruitment that the other groups did not have. The ICT and CBTC middle-level leadership training courses also gave upper strata leaders an opportunity to select persons of talent to use in the parallel catalytic or supervisory groups. These formal educational or leadership training programs, especially in the North and Northeast, offer one of the few chances for rural workers and small farmers to learn the political skills of oratory, parliamentary procedure, organization, and administration. To the extent therefore that these leadership training courses continue to emphasize democratic norms and a commitment to service on behalf of the group, the greater the possibilities for selection of leaders with an idealistic commitment as opposed to the "careerists" or "porkchoppers" who see the peasant movement as an opportunity for upward mobility.

Institutional Cohesion and Rebellion

The institutional unity of Brazilian labor legislation reduces the opportunities for dissenting groups and individuals to assert that individual leaders do not speak for the general membership in an authoritative or legitimate fashion.¹ The principal legal opportunities for dissidence at the present time come through the parallel groups such as SAR, SORPE, FAG, and the Workers Circle Groups and at election time when dissident factions may offer a slate of candidates for office.² On other occasions, dissidents may refuse to pay their dues if there is no checkoff system in effect or refuse to vote in a plebiscite called by the leadership to support a given policy.³

¹It is difficult to measure the negative aspects of "bossism" in peasant sindicatos and organizations, especially to determine the extent to which a leader is more "self-oriented" although protecting the "general interest" than when he is "selfless" and promoting the "general interest."

²For example, this writer does not know the extent to which the Catholic Church in the United States, through the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists and Catholic Labor Schools, acts as a body to organize dissident Catholic workers to fight the incumbent leadership of a given union although the writer is aware that Catholics trained in these church groups often form the active core of opposition groups. In a similar vein, American and European trade union leaders belonging to the Methodist church and Socialist party have often gained the political skills to fight or oust an incumbent leadership because of a commitment of clergymen or party leaders to democratic norms. See for example, A. D. Belden, George Whitefield the Awakener (London: S. Low, Marston and Company, 1930), pp. 247-251.

³A good example is the absence of a quorum in at least eight Pernambuco sindicatos in the strike vote sponsored by Padre Melo and the DRT Furtado Veloso on August 8, 1965.

SummaryThe Self-Perpetuating Nature of the
Active Minority in Brazilian
Peasant Groups

The current leadership of the CONTAG and state federations has demonstrated a power-capability in mobilizing substantial numbers of peasants, be they small proprietors, day laborers, sharecroppers, or renters. The current leadership has demonstrated a willingness to abide by the "rules of the Brazilian political game" and not to seek elimination of other groups from the political process. Presuming that the Ministry of Labor of the Military government does not intervene in the CONTAG or state federations for other reasons, one could expect that the active minorities of managers of the federations and sindicatos will perpetuate their control for some time into the future.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

During the past thirty five years Brazil has been undergoing a series of inter-related economic, social, and political changes. A society which was basically agricultural has developed into a mixed industrial and agricultural economy in which differences in the levels of living and status differentials have widened not only between the Northeast and the South, but also between the urban and rural areas, especially in the North and Northeast. Within this period of time, the old idealized paternalistic relationship between the large landowner and his peasant tenants, sharecroppers, and hired laborers has broken down.

Landowners and small town industrialists in the more traditional areas of Brazil find themselves facing a rapidly changing economic situation. Having enterprises less modern than those of their counterparts in the large cities or small farm-holding regions of the South, both in the technological and organizational sense, they see their major advantage--cheap labor--and status positions being taken away from them. They have reacted by unsystematic and frequently non-rational means, such as trying to reduce their labor costs by substituting lower-wage minors and women for higher-paid adult male workers, by increasing housing rents or their equivalents in condiçao or cambao, by trying to increase labor productivity by speeding

up the work pace or by increasing work norms. Such reactions on the part of the employer represent a break with the traditional, paternalistic practices of concern for the welfare of their workers. This breakdown has led to greater tensions in worker and tenant-landowner relationships. In addition, peasants moved off the plantations and *engenhos* into nearby hamlets or into shacks lining the highways which had an unexpected effect of bringing new ideas and an awareness of federal labor and social welfare legislation. A cumulative circular process of change was established and behavior and relationships began to move farther and farther away from the old paternalistic patterns. The process was apparently irreversible.

In this situation, during the 1950's, the low-status agricultural population began to be organized into peasant leagues and sindicatos of various types, the very organization of which had been viewed in the past by landowners as "subversive" to the old system of "obligations and loyalties" to the landowner or his administrator and which normally the landowner, through his relationship to judicial and police officials, had been able to prevent or suppress. Violence by the landowners attempting to prevent the organization of these groups only accelerated the distance between landowners and workers or tenants. The new agricultural groups became quite aware of the inter-relationship of political and economic power. There was also an increasing awareness by many politicians, university students, and clergymen of the usefulness of these organizations as a springboard from which they could enter the governing circles of the elite or which could be used to close the gap between the wealthy and the poor.

Although some of the peasant organizations created after 1955 tended to monopolize the publicity given this attempt to integrate the lower agricultural strata into the political and economic process, many different kinds of organizations were developed. To sum up, by 1964, the following types of active agricultural worker and small farmer pressure groups were functioning in Brazil:

1. Church-sponsored sindicatos and cooperatives in many states which had been organized by catalytic rural development services (SAR, SORPE, SORAL, FAP, and FAG):

2. Peasant associations and sindicatos which are sponsored by individuals who belonged to Radical Catholic Action (AC) or Popular Action (AP) groups working in the MEB rural literacy programs. JAC and JUC members worked in both this group and the groups listed above in (1).

3. Peasant Leagues, first popularized by Francisco Julião, which developed out of the traditional Brazilian practice of poverty-stricken peasants following a charismatic leader or local landowner who could provide them with services and benefits of different kinds. Many of these organizations in the Northeast had state and local leaders who were non-peasant politicians, lawyers, or university professors. In Paraíba, for local reasons, the Peasant Leagues developed a leadership which appeared to genuinely represent the interests of the membership while also benefitting personally through election to public office or by appointment to bureaucratic positions.

4. Peasant Leagues or MASTER Groups which used the rhetoric of agrarian reform but which functioned as little more than springboards

to political advancement and which rendered minimal services and benefits to their followers. The Peasant Leagues of Rio Grande do Norte and many of the groups organized in Goiás, Minas Gerais, and Rio de Janeiro after 1961-1962 fit into this category as does the MASTER movement of Rio Grande do Sul taken over by Leonel Brizola.

5. The Communist-dominated groups in Pernambuco and São Paulo which occasionally developed into genuine pressure groups whose leaders brought increased benefits to their peasant followers. On the other hand, Gregorio Bezerra also brought in a measure of "union responsibility," i.e., an absence of strikes or violence to the Southwest sugar zones in Pernambuco.

6. A few Trotskyite revolutionary groups which made little impact outside of isolated attempts to foment social upheaval in Pernambuco.

7. Church-sponsored or DAC-supported cooperatives in Rio Grande do Sul and São Paulo which acted principally as a marketing or consumer-goods distributing mechanism but which occasionally have performed the functions of a political pressure group.

Of the seven types described above, the Peasant Leagues sponsored by Francisco Julião and Assis Lemos, the Rural Workers, Sharecropper, and Small Farmer Sindicatos organized by SAR, SORPE, FAG, and the Workers Circle groups, the Bezerra-dominated Palmares group, and the southern cooperatives have been the most successful groups achieving access to and benefits for their members.

A basic contribution of the peasant movements in Pernambuco, Paraíba, and Rio Grande do Norte has been admission of these groups in varying degrees to the decision-making processes governing minimum

wages, work norms, and social welfare benefits from which they had been excluded prior to 1955. Structured violence is a part of the conflict manipulation or political processes of the North, Northeast, and West Central Regions; violence will continue without a doubt in these regions for many years to come until a more integrated rural and rural-urban society is created. One can presuppose considerable military intervention in employer-employee relations in the rural sector pending the organization of peasants in those states into sindicatos, cooperatives, or other types of pressure groups.

In the traditional regions of the eastern and southern states (from Bahia south to Rio Grande do Sul and including Minas Gerais) rural worker and small farmer groups are midpoint in a process of organizing pressure groups to advance their interests to the extent achieved by the FAG-supported groups in Rio Grande do Sul or the Cotia Cooperative in Sao Paulo. Leaders have shown a power-capability in strike activity, bureaucratic expertise, and mobilizing voters which has enabled them to move into the political decision-making process. This does not mean that state federation leaders and influentials are able to achieve the same benefits as the FAG or Cotia groups, but rather that they are in a similar position of being able to improve the living levels and educational opportunities of their members. In this respect, the legislation governing the operation of these pressure groups gives power to the Ministry of Labor or the DRT to veto sindicato elections and to appoint and remove sindicato or federation officials. Brazilian legislation permits a "one-party" bureaucracy or oligarchy to recruit officers and employees for

organized interest groups at all levels. As Lipset, Michels, and Burnham and other students of unions and large-scale organizations have indicated, there is a need for bureaucratic centralization because of the centralization of the landowner interest groups.¹ The Brazilian landowner and government bureaucracies demand "responsible leadership" as their price for recognition of the peasant pressure groups. Landowners, the military, and government bureaucrats demand the elimination of "quickie" or wildcat strikes over grievances, open jurisdictional or factional fights, and militant demands by a membership in excess of those agreed to by sindicato, federation, or CONTAG officials which upset the routine of production or profit making. As in the United States, the insistent cry for "union responsibility" in Brazil also leads to undemocratic behavior by CONTAG or state leaders since it is also a demand that the small farmer and rural worker organizations coerce their members into compliance with contracts, grievance procedures, or government regulations.² Reflecting both the concerns of the old elite and the "developmentalists" who perceived stability was necessary to economic and social development, the military government of Marshal Castelo Branco ruled out the candidacies of many populist leaders. In fact, many populist leaders had their political rights suspended for five to ten years. The limits have narrowed considerably within which opposition by the

¹Lipset, *op. cit.*, pp. 356-361; Robert Michels, *Political Parties* (Glencoe; Illinois: The Free Press, 1949) and James Burnham, *The Machiavellians* (New York: John Day, 1943).

²Lipset, *op. cit.*, p. 361, is paraphrased for this sentence.

still formally free press and political-economic leaders may act. Although the Castelo Branco government could have abolished political parties, the Congress, and elections for new sindicato, federation, and confederation offices, neither that Government nor its successor, the government of Marshall Costa e Silva has done so but has maintained some of the outward appearances of democracy and attempted to control the political process through not very veiled pressures on Congress, the judiciary, the two new political parties (ARENA and MDB), and the formal rural worker and landowner structures.¹ There are enormous difficulties in doing this for elections without mass agitation in an increasingly urban society are not easy affairs.²

Why the need for elections to public and sindicato office?

Among the several possibilities looms the fact that the civilian and military participants in the 1964 coup were not completely united. For example, in June, 1966, Governor Adhemar de Barro of Sao Paulo was ousted while two months later, in August, Marshal Carlos Amaury Kruel resigned as commander of the Second Army and joined the MDB as a candidate for federal deputy from Guanabara. Moreover, the new governing elite also reflects the dominant economic groups in the society--a conflict made severe by the anti-inflationary policy of

¹"Dos Estados," Boletim de Noticias (Sao Paulo, Instituto Cultural do Trabalho), Ano IV, No. 38 (August 1967), p. 6, indicates several former ICT students were participating in elections at the local and state level, including Rotta's Federation of Rural Workers of the State of Sao Paulo, which means that legal requirements that bi-annual elections of officers be held was being observed.

²See Juarez B. R. Lopez, in Baklanoff, op. cit., pp. 75-77, for an excellent discussion of the problem of holding elections in a period in which the old "patrimonial" structure of Brazil is disintegrating.

the Castelo Branco government and a slow-down of the economic development process triggered by Kubitschek's "fifty years progress in five."

In this respect, the collective bargaining contracts and services provided by Sindicatos and Federations in the Northeast have re-established the paternalistic welfare services provided by the landowner which had dissolved under the impact of urbanization and industrialization. The new welfare relationships are less personalistic and more diffuse than the old relationships which existed in idealized form between employer and employee. The new system of welfare relations is also irreversible and common to all nations in the industrialization or modernization process. A major test of the legitimacy and effectiveness of a political system in this process, as Seymour Lipset has noted, is the manner by which its major conservative groups handle the entry of the lower social strata into "economic and political citizenship." In Brazil, many peasants adopted extremist ideologies when they discovered how alienated they were from the benefits of modern technology and participation in the decision-making process. This, in turn, did not encourage the more established groups to give them access. In the South, on the other hand, peasants in many areas have been given "economic" and "political citizenship" through universal suffrage, increased educational and medical services, and the right to form such groups as Cotia and União Popular. Hence, in the South, few peasant groups were alienated from the system and were thus willing to be mobilized to overturn the existing social structure or to be used as a springboard for political ambitions.

The death or ouster of José Rotta by the Ministry of Labor would

undoubtedly precipitate a crisis in the CONTAG leadership; the death or ouster of federation leaders would precipitate a crisis of succession in several states although not in others where the power-structure is not organized around personal allegiance to Rotta or some other "leader."

On the other hand, Rotta was elected through the operation of the cambalacha process. Presuming that many peasant leaders and influentials continue to participate in CBTC or ICT-sponsored leadership training courses, the more likely is the possibility for the creation of a common set of values and goals among the leadership at the municipio and state levels. Hence, if there is a succession crisis, new leaders may be selected through the cambalacha process who have a "sense of calling" and thus the more obvious negative consequences of bureaucratization and oligarchy in the peasant sindicato structure may be minimized. To the extent that Padre Crespo, Padre Veloso, Frei Celso of Sao Paulo, Bishop Dom Edmundo Kunz, and Archbishop Dom Eugenio Sales and Helder Camara are able to raise the funds necessary to maintain the CBTC, SORPE, Workers Circle, and FAG parallel organizations which act to dampen efforts at "empire building" or "careerism" a more democratic process of leadership selection and concern for the interests of the peasants may be maintained.

Especially important in this respect are the middle-level and upper-level CBTC and ICT training programs which generally attempt to select students on the basis of merit and not kinship or clientele relationships as well as to inculcate democratic values and bureaucratic expertise.

Hypotheses and Findings

In pursuing his field research, the writer found many of his hypotheses confirmed, others partially confirmed, and others have been modified.

The first hypothesis suggested was that:

1. The recently organized activity of peasants is a mixture of traditional Brazilian means of seeking relief or protection and of techniques used by pressure groups in all modern societies.

Brazilian peasants, accustomed to following a charismatic leader or local landowner who could provide them with services, protection, and benefits, had this relationship in mind when they joined the first Peasant Leagues organized by Francisco Juliao, Pedro Teixeira, and Assis Lemos, and the literacy, cooperative, and sindicato groups formed by clergymen or politicians. The rapid growth of these organizations was aided greatly by new means of communication (highways, radios, newspapers, and television) which spread the word rapidly of what might be justly called new "messianic movements" designed to benefit the peasants. The traditional troubadors were useful in re-interpreting or simplifying the messages brought in by these means to the peasant followers of the new groups.

The second hypothesis was:

2. The greater availability of highways, railways, and other forms of communication within a given region and with other regions, encourages and supports the formation of peasant pressure groups or other political groups using the peasant as a base or springboard for their own political or social advancement.

Other forms of communication contributed to the formation of a relatively modern society in terms of complex social structures. For this reason, the Rio Grande do Sul and Sao Paulo groups have had a greater resources of talent available than the Northeast groups. The southern groups also had to develop an ability to work with crop marketing, crop insurance, and other regulations which had side-payments in revealing additional points of access.

In this connection, the peasant groups and the individuals most likely to participate in peasant organizations are those whose traditional values have been modified through contact with education, participation in a market economy, and a greater interaction with new ideas and communication systems within the regions in which they live. Again, this is relative to the region and state. There are regions, for example, relatively close to Porto Alegre, where the FAG or MASTER made absolutely no impact because of the difficulties of transportation into and within municipios. On the other hand, small farmer and rural worker leaders in Santa Cruz do Sul, several hundred miles away could be in daily contact with officials in the state capital because of the great availability of transportation and communications systems. Likewise, in the Northeast, there was a positive correlation in the location of Peasant Leagues and the availability of bus, railroad, or jeep transportation over all-weather roads.

The third hypothesis was that:

3. Although cooperatives and other associations may originally have been formed for non-political ends, a principal reason for their continued existence and/or growth is their ability to resort to political action.

In the case of the Cotia Co-operative and the dairy and wine co-operatives of the South, field research confirmed this hypothesis. In the case of the Pindorama Cooperative near Penedo, Alagoas, political action has been necessary to protect it against the political maneuvers of the Ribeiro Coutinhos who want to take over the developed lands and fruit processing plant that the cooperative has established.

The fourth hypothesis was:

4. Peasant pressure groups have survived and functioned best in communities with a social infra-structure containing organized groups and poorest in those communities or regions without these groups.

Field research confirmed this hypothesis to a great extent. Perhaps the most effective and legitimate peasant organizations which this writer was able to study have been those established in the South where DAC, Cotia, Uniao Popular, and church leaders organized sindicatos and cooperatives in which local leaders rather than outsiders carry on the day-to-day activities of these organizations. In Paraiba, Assis Lemos probably did a better job than Francisco Juliao in discovering natural leaders from among the limited number of peasants with experience in formal groups. In Sape, the case of the illiterate Pedro Texeira might have been nothing more than a romantic tale to be told by the troubadors if his wife had been like the 51-53 per cent of the wives of delegates to the November 1961 Belo Horizonte Congress. Instead, Elisabete Teixeira helped her husband with correspondence and organizational activity.

The utter lack of a leadership training program and the almost complete dependence on upper level leaders such as Juliao and Assis Lemos undermined the ability of the Peasant Leagues to survive once the Brazilian military moved against them in April, 1964. On the other hand, the SAR and SORPE-sponsored groups were able to function despite military and landowner harassment because they had developed a reservoir of leaders who could take over when José Rodriguez Sobrinho, Manuel Gonçalo Ferreira, and others stepped down from office in April, 1964.

The fifth hypothesis was that

5. Leadership of peasant pressure groups will come from outside the ranks of the peasantry in less-modernized states or regions, although those leaders may have rural origins. Conversely, in modernized or modernizing regions, leadership of such groups will be made up of peasants and other persons of higher status and education. One important corollary is that the nature and origin of these groups will greatly determine the recruitment of middle and lower level leaders from among the peasantry or urban middle classes. In those groups organized by communists or urban politicians, few or no peasants will determine policy; in those groups organized by the church-sponsored groups (SAR, SORPE, SORAL, and state federations), outside leaders--clergymen, lawyers, students, and a few experts in cooperatives--interacted with peasants to make federation policy.

In Rio Grande do Sul, although livestock producers utilize many modern techniques of cross-breeding, artificial insemination, and improved pasture grasses, the social relationship governing the

employment of cowboys and other workers is still quite traditional. By and large, it appears that the MASTER organization recruited the bulk of its leadership from outside the peasantry; in fact, if the members of MASTER can be said to have had common rural origins, the "invasions" of public or private lands near cities and towns with a large in-migrant slum population showed that MASTER was much more a movement of urban slum elements seeking economic guarantees than a rural worker movement. Moreover, MASTER appears to have performed a much more important function for PTB leader Leonel Brizola as a voter mobilizing device than as a pressure group representing the shared interests of its members.

In the FAG organization, lower leadership was recruited from a variety of sources including small farm proprietors, rural school teachers, and farm cooperative officials. At the state level, although leadership was made up of both peasants and non-peasants, the outsiders exerted a greater influence in determining and carrying out policy.¹

The national leadership of the Peasant Leagues was recruited by Francisco Juliao from the urban middle class or as in Juliao's own case, from the local rural upper class. The ULTAB's national leaders Lindolfo Silva and Nestor Vera, although working class in origin, joined the ranks of the white collar middle class when they became

¹At the Third FAG Congress, State Deputy Puggina, Irmao Miguel Dario, Professor Schilling, and Rural School teacher Gentil Bonato were able to determine which committee resolutions were acted upon by the general membership at the closing business meetings because of their positions as presiding officers or as a small informal committee reviewing recommended resolutions.

Communist Party bureaucrats charged with organization of the rural sector, for there is no evidence that their salary came from the peasants, but, instead, it came from the party or, in the first quarter of 1964, from the CONTAG treasury. The formal national leadership of the church-sponsored groups is a mixture of white collar middle class persons (Jose Rotta and Luis Ernani Torre, CONTAG Executive Secretary), and peasants who range from local rural middle class to lower rural class.¹ On the other hand, outside influentials such as Padre Veloso of the CBTC, and Frei Celso Maria and Padre Carvalho of the Workers Circles are urban middle class intellectuals. To the extent Brazil is a modernizing society, its peasant leadership is mixed in accord with the hypothesis. Nevertheless, the lack of accurate statistical measurements to indicate when a society is modernized, modernizing, traditional, and so forth, in comparison with other societies make the hypothesis less accurate in terms of its validity as a predictor of future leadership sources.

The sixth hypothesis was that:

6. A comprehensive radical or reformist ideology for these peasant groups will be created by urban intellectuals and not the peasants themselves. The specific goals and grievances of the peasants themselves will normally not be a part of the comprehensive ideology brought in from the outside although their goals and

¹See Lipset, *op. cit.*, p. 369, and Irving Howe and B. J. Widick, *The UAW and Walter Reuther* (New York: Random House, 1949), p. 257, for a discussion on the respect workers give to their leaders "for [their] presumed superior knowledge and greater articulateness," for [their] comparatively flexible hours and enjoyment of that "great privilege and mark of social superiority . . . 'white collar' clothes rather than work clothes."¹¹

grievances may be included later at a certain stage of the organizational process.

Field research confirmed this hypothesis. However, Landsberger's work also contributes to a modification of the hypothesis to include the following corollary:

Granted that at certain stages of modernization, the peasants own goals and the ideologies in which these goals are set may be quite profound, yet the goals and ideologies of some of the outside leaders are often both more extreme and paradoxically less extreme than the average of the peasantry.

The basic ideas of the first Peasant League at Engenho Galilea and the first MASTER group at Encruzilhada do Sul were simple concepts designed to meet immediate problems. However, their immediate grievances and goals led to the creation of two wide-ranging movements whose leaders developed much more comprehensive ideologies and demands. Juliao's ideology was probably the simplest, vaguest, and most syncretic although one might perceive the phrase "radical agrarian reform" lent itself to a multitude of interpretations including those peasants and urban intellectuals who interpreted it as meaning an extreme and wholesale transformation of the landholding patterns of society. The church groups were much more precise in their ideology and offered specific solutions to specific problems, e.g., payment of the thirteenth month bonus or compliance with the minimum wage regulations in a given municipio or state. Outside of the Roman Catholic revolutionaries in AP and some MEB groups, the church programs did not suggest wholesale transformation of the existing system of land

ownership which was the key grievance of many peasants.

The Communists, who generally emphasize ideology and publish programs galore in many Latin American societies, never developed a comprehensive ideology or program to meet Brazilian circumstances. It seems reasonable to presume that this resulted from PCB dependence on a small group of urban factory workers in ULTAB who "spear-headed" their rural work and the party's inability to capture the imagination or enthusiasm of original thinkers with roots in the peasantry or rural sector. The PCB and PC do B depended on ideas generated elsewhere (Russia, China, or Cuba) and faced a dilemma in choosing how, when, and where to allocate their scarce personnel and resources in a nation whose developed urban industrial base was much more suitable for agitation and organization in terms of Leninist-Stalinist theory than was the rural sector. Hence, Lindolfo Silva, at both the 1961 Belo Horizonte Congress and the CONTAG elections of December, 1963, talked about a national peasant organization which would unite with the urban students and workers to speed up national development and solve urban problems as well as rural ones. His focus never remained solely on rural problems. The Brazilian countryside was too big for the Communist Party; therefore, it tried to take over the peasant movement from the top down at the national and selected state levels (Bahia and Ceara), rather than from the bottom up, with the exception of Pernambuco where both approaches were used.

The seventh hypothesis was that:

7. A peasant pressure group will be revolutionary or reformist depending on (a) the motives of the outsiders who allied themselves with the peasants, (b) the conditions under which the help of outsiders is rendered, and (c) the style and integration of the political sub-system under which a peasant group operated, in other words, whether or not the sub-system is open and other important pressure groups look upon the organization of the peasant group for the first time as "legitimate" or "revolutionary" and "subversive."

Field research confirmed this hypothesis to some extent but it needs to be modified to include (1) the creation of "company unions," to forestall the development of genuine peasant pressure groups; (2) the creation of peasant groups as a device to mobilize voters at election time or to punish political opponents; and (3) the creation of groups as a means of acquiring land through the traditional invasion technique. The first type includes the "Peasant League" of Deputy Odilon Ribeiro Coutinho in Rio Grande do Norte or Major Alva of the Alagoas Sugar Mill Operators Association. The second type includes the "Peasant League" of Deputy Floriano Bezerra in Rio Grande do Norte which obtained a subsidy of one million cruzeiros from the State Assembly. The third type includes the "peasant leagues" of State Deputy Jose Porfirio in Goias and the MASTER organization of Ruy Ramos and Leonel Brizola in Rio Grande do Sul.

The church-sponsored groups headed by Dom Eugenio Sales, Padres Crespo, Melo, and Carvalho, and Frei Celso of Sao Paulo, rendered help because it was they who had started these groups. Their reformist ideologies undoubtedly slowed down a possible radical course of action

by SAR, SORPE, and Workers Circle-sponsored groups. On the other hand, individual clergymen such as Padre Josephat and Alipio de Freitas were among the vanguard of the radical revolutionaries calling for massive social upheaval and change in both urban and rural life. The latter not only expressed their views as spokesmen for peasant groups but also as spokesmen for university student groups. Neither the reformist nor the radical revolutionary priests and laymen in AC or AP represented a distinct group of peasant allies. Francisco Juliao represented no particular group of allies because the landowners, lawyers, deputies, and professors to whose class or social strata he belonged, were divided or opposed to him for personal and political reasons. In Rio Grande do Sul, the absence of great status differentiation between rural areas and hamlets in the "colony" and towns and cities tended to slow down any possible radical tendencies by FAG-sponsored groups. In fact, the small farmers in this region were joined by many small town businessmen who perceived a community of interest in obtaining larger storage facilities for fruits, vegetables, and other perishables or in higher minimum prices for tobacco which was competing with Northeast Brazil, African, or Near Eastern suppliers who employed labor at wages and living levels much lower than those found in the South. In addition, the political style of the South, in contrast to the political style of the North and Northeast was one which supported voting by the general citizenry and provided a measure of educational and medical facilities for the rural lower strata which had a cumulative effect of spurring economic development through the years.

In the Northeast, it does not appear that many large plantation and sugar mill operators perceived that they had a common interest with their agricultural laborers in raising the minimum prices paid for sugar, cotton, or other crops which enabled the owners to maintain their profit levels as agricultural entrepreneurs but which also increased their profits as merchants who also sold food, clothing, and other household goods. For this reason, this writer is of the opinion that a change in the attitudes of the operators of the big plantation and sugar mills of the Northeast has been taking place since 1964 which will cause them to look gratefully to the threat of a strike by agricultural laborers. Landowners are not ready to affirm that they are in favor of peasant strikes or slow-down tactics, but they have perceived that these two phenomena do not necessarily hurt them as landowners but may in fact benefit them in their bargaining with the IAA or the Bank of Brazil.

Although Francisco Julião, the Communists, MEB, JAC, and many Catholic groups criticized the judges or police officials who served the large landowners or latifundistas,¹ this writer is not aware that they proposed abolition of the police or courts. If one presumes with Marx that the economic structure creates the super-structures of all institutions and that, by changing the land-system, a miraculous

¹ See the quotation from Julião's "Charter of Liberation of the Peasant," in Chapter IV or of the speech which he delivered April 21, to a university student gathering at Ouro Preto, Minas Gerais, on the anniversary of an abortive uprising by Tiradentes against Portugal. The speech is included by Horowitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-62, as "letter from Ouro Preto," and as "Brazil, a Christian Country?" in Leo Huberman and Paul Sweazy (eds.), Whither Latin America? (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1963), pp. 108-110.

change will occur in how the courts and police function, then one can presume that Juliao and the Radicals also accepted these changes. On the other hand, "there are many cases of the oppressed adopting the methods and philosophies of their exploiters"² or of politicians criticizing officials for actions which they too might have performed had they been in the position of the latter. One therefore needs to be suspicious of the extent to which all of the so-called "radicals" were truly radical. Considering the traditional behavior of many politicians in Brazil and other countries of using different groups as springboards for their own political advancement, one should not be too surprised that this phenomenon also occurred in Brazil with respect to the peasants.

In the one study--by Chasin--which this writer was able to find of the categories in which peasants placed their needs, the writer found differences among the delegates by region and by their relationship to the land. In any case, it is difficult to perceive that these "peasant" leaders were revolutionaries. (See Tables 21-24)

One can see that even among this relatively politicized group that "lack of land to work" was not the principal grievance by region although it was the first-ranked grievance of sharecroppers and squatters. Rather a complex of oppressive and violent actions by well-to-do landowners was perceived as their principal grievance along with a lack of sufficient clothing, food, medical attention and health facilities.

²Irving Louis Horowitz, Three Worlds of Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 8.

TABLE 21

PERCEPTIONS OF THE DIFFICULTIES FACED BY PEASANT (HOMEN DO CAMPO) AMONG DELEGATES TO THE FIRST RURAL WORKERS CONGRESS, NOVEMBER, 1962^a

Difficulties Mentioned	Number of Persons Citing n = 90	Percent
Lack of land to work for those wanting land to work	47	52
Illness or the lack of medical, hospital and pharmaceutical aid	45	50
Lack of technical assistance - implements, seeds, fertilizers	37	41
Oppression and the lack of juridical guarantees ^b	31	34
Illiteracy	30	33
Hunger, the lack of clothing, housing	29	32
Lack of credit and financing	25	28
Lack of highways and transport	11	12
Lack of cooperatives and the consequent exploitation by middlemen	10	11
Low wages or delay in payment of wages	4	4
Unproductive Latifundia	2	2
The System of private property	1	1

^a Source: Compiled and computed from Chasin, "Contribuição Para A Analise Da Vanguarda Política do Campo," Revista Brasiliense, November-December, 1962, pp. 102-129.

^b "Oppression and lack of juridical guarantees" is an abbreviated form of a series of statements or concepts given by the delegates which included denunciation of the oppression and violence of wealthy landowners, the commission of reprisals by government agencies, of the lack of labor laws in the countryside, and of the struggles to keep small properties against the activities of hired gunmen (grileiros).

TABLE 22

CATEGORIES OF IMPORTANCE OF THE DIFFICULTIES FACED BY THE PEASANT AS PERCEIVED BY DELEGATES TO THE FIRST RURAL WORKERS CONGRESS, NOVEMBER, 1962, BY RELATIONSHIP TO THEIR LAND HOLDINGS OR OCCUPATION^a

	Lack of Land	Illness, Medical Needs	Lack of Technical Assistance	Oppression	Illiteracy	Hunger, Lack of Clothing
Renters	2	1	3	8	5	6
Wage Laborers	2	1	4	1	5	3
Sharecroppers (Meeiros)	1	4	5	2	3	3
Proprietors	3	2	1	5	4	5
Squatters (poseiros)	1	2	4	6	5	4

Source: Chasin, op. cit., p. 151.

TABLE 23

CATEGORIES OF IMPORTANCE OF THE DIFFICULTIES FACED BY THE PEASANT AS PERCEIVED BY DELEGATES TO THE FIRST RURAL WORKERS CONGRESS, NOVEMBER, 1962, BY REGION FROM WHICH THE DELEGATES CAME^a IN PERCENTAGES

	North-Northeast ^b n = 23	East ^c n = 29	South ^d n = 21	Central-West ^e
Oppression and lack of juridical guarantees	43	59	100	65
Illness and lack of medical assistance	30	17	67	53
Hunger, lack of clothing, housing	48	28	52	24
Lack of land to work for those who want land	30	45	14	53
Lack of technical conditions or financing to exploit the soil	26	21	19	47
Illiteracy	26	21	29	29

^a Chasin, *op. cit.*, pp. 117-118.

^b Para, Maranhao, Ceara, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraiba, and Pernambuco.

^c Espiritu Santo, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, Guanabara, and Bahia.

^d Sao Paulo and Parana.

^e Mato Grosso and Goias.

TABLE 24

PERCEPTIONS OF WHAT COULD BE DONE TO TRANSFORM THE COUNTRYSIDE BY DELEGATES TO THE FIRST RURAL WORKERS CONGRESS, NOVEMBER, 1962, BY OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY AND PERCENTAGES^a

	Renters n - 16	Wage Laborers n - 17	Share- Croppers n - 12	Proprietors n - 13	Squatters n - 12
Unity of the Workers in Countryside	50%	29%	58%	31%	25%
Demands, through pressures that needs be attended	31	35	32	8	25
Organization in Class Associations	6	29	8	-	33
Seek Peaceful solu- tion of Problems; Negotiation with Owners of land and if not attended, force is necessary	13	6	8	15	8
Making a Revolution	19	-	17	-	8
Judicial and Legal Appeals	-	24	-	-	-
Debate the Problems with Others in the Category	6	6	-	8	-
Do Not Know (Direito)	6	18	-	46	33

Source: Chasin, op. cit., p. 125.

In late 1964 and early 1965, this writer perceived that rural worker and small farmer leaders in the South were concerned not only with the economic demands related to work norms, wages, housing, and medical assistance, but also in the case of small proprietors minimum crop prices, storage facilities, and social security arrangements.

In 1965, this writer perceived that the economic demands of rural worker, sharecropper, and small farm opinion leaders in the Northeast focused on work norms, wages, and housing but also on the dominance of foreign manufacturers or local political bosses operating cotton gins, sisal and other agricultural processing plants.

Chasin's survey also found differences among the different groups at the Belo Horizonte Congress as to what might be done to improve conditions in the countryside. (See Table 24.)

In addition, three other hypotheses suggested themselves to the writer after his return from Brazil because of the work done by Professor Landsberger of Cornell University on Chile and Mexico.

An eighth hypothesis therefore is that:

8. The goals of peasant organizations will touch the non-economic sectors of society when the institutions performing non-economic functions are also involved in the economic sector, i.e. when the church is a landowner. When the economic institutions perform non-economic functions designed to perpetuate the economic system, i.e. landowners act as judges, the peasant groups will also focus on the non-economic institutions as suitable targets.

In Brazil, the goals of peasant organizations focussed basically upon the economic and political institutions which supported the existing land distribution and land tenure systems. In the North, and Northeast the Peasant Leagues of Juliao and Assis Lemos, the Church-sponsored groups, and the Communist-SUPRA groups demanded that illiterates have the right to vote because these groups understood the correlation between the vote and access to office holders. In the South, voting for illiterates was not an important issue because most persons were literate and did vote. In fact, in Rio Grande do Sul and Sao Paulo, it appears that small farmers were accepted by the political sub-systems and allocated funds for rural schools and small town medical services.

The ninth hypothesis was that:

9. Peasant organizations may be organized when changes in crops, methods of cultivation, and the geographical "center of gravity" of agriculture is connected with the decline of one agricultural elite, the rise of others, especially in industry, and the greater incongruity in the status of the peasant.

In the Northeast, there appears to be a definite correlation between the attempts of many landowners to increase their sugar plantings in the 1950's, the displacement of peasants from their plots, or increased rents or conditions under which the land was worked, the slow growth of industry and the susceptibility of peasants to the appeals of the Peasant Leagues or the Church groups. Cid Sampaio's election as Governor of Pernambuco in 1958 appears to have been the watershed between a traditional state politics (dominated by a coalition of interior cotton and cattle "colonels" with coastal sugar barons)

and a new politics based on competition between (1) a coalition of agro-industrial groups and urban worker and peasant allies and (2) a coalition of the old style.

In the South, this writer does not know of any great changes in crops or methods of cultivation which gave rise to the growth of a small farmer or of a rural worker group. On the other hand, the geographical center of coffee growing has moved from the traditional southern zones of Sao Paulo, Paraná, and Rio de Janeiro to western Sao Paulo and western Paraná, settled principally by migrants from the Northeast, Rio Grande do Sul, and Japan. The Japanese and Gaucho homesteaders carried their old patterns of group behavior with them to the new regions which enabled them to establish a sense of community much faster than those groups or individuals migrating from regions with little or no formal social structures.

A leadership resource base was established in school, church, recreational, and cooperative societies which also contributed to the formation of small farmer and rural worker sindicatos. Unlike the more "traditional" zones, a closed society with close kinship or parentela relationships has not developed in the newer zones among landowner, school, church, and political leaders. Settlement of the new regions, per se, did not lead to the formation of sindicatos or cooperatives, but the type of settlement, type of settlers, and the involvement of church leaders combined to support group formation. On the other hand, this writer does not have enough evidence on the possible techniques resorted to by landowners in the older regions to be able to determine if there were attempts similar to

those which took place in the Northeast to decrease the cost of labor or increase the cost of land rentals. The time period in which coffee growing declined occurred between 1920 and 1930 and thus may have been too early to be affected by any attempts on the part of the workers to defend themselves.¹

10. It will be the better-off sectors of the peasantry who are more likely to organize, and certainly the most depressed sectors will be under-represented.

Corollary: Within each group, the better-off individuals, and certainly not the least well-off persons, will furnish proportionately the most leadership and activists.

This hypothesis is closely related to Hypothesis 3 regarding the sources of leadership of the peasantry. And like several other hypotheses, there are regional variations within Brazil and within the regions themselves. In the South, the FAG was much more successful in organizing the small farm proprietors than in organizing rural

¹Pasquale Petrone, "A Regiao de Sao Luis do Paraitinga, Estudo de Geografia Humana," Revista Brasileira de Geografia, Ano XXI, No. 3 (July-September, 1959), pp. 239-336, is a study of a municipio about 80 miles due east of Sao Paulo formerly well known for its coffee production but which has been "in decadence" since 1919-1929, due first to a frost which killed over a million coffee trees and then to the world-wide depression of 1929. In 1943 (p. 291), Carlos Borges Schmidt, inter-alia, said even the mutirao (cooperative work exchange) was "very rare."

workers. Nevertheless, the FAC was more successful in organizing both groups than the MASTER organization which worked with the landless migrants in the cities and towns who were probably the most disorganized or non-organized social group.¹

In the Northeast, it is difficult and probably very subjective to categorize sugar plantation workers as generally better off than the small sharecroppers, tenants, or renters of the Agreste and Sertao zones. In fact, one could probably construct an equally strong case that the sharecroppers, tenants, and small proprietors of the Northeast were better off than the sugar plantation workers. However, the sugar workers of Pernambuco are probably better off than other salaried Pernambuco or Northeast day laborers because the Communist and SORPE-sponsored sindicatos successfully established a mass organization, sense of class unity, and a financial structure which provided the legal and political expertise necessary in a group struggle. On the other hand, small proprietor farmers, sharecroppers, and tenant farmers in Pernambuco have not been as successful in establishing as strong a sense of class unity or a dues paying habit as these groups in Paraiba or Rio Grande do Norte. Presumably, the better-off sectors

¹ Schmitt and Burks, *Evolution or Chaos*, p. 52, is one of several books which pursue a theme that "Peasant leagues are open to Communist infiltration because the landless peasant has the greatest potential for violent and socially disruptive action." In fact, there is little evidence that the landless ever joined Juliao's group; rather it was based principally on sharecroppers, renters, tenants, or small proprietors who also rented or sharecropped land. On a point of logic, many were "landless," but in reality they were "landed" because they had "access" to land and this is the most relevant aspect of land tenure systems. In terms of groups aggregating the truly "landless" who had no access to land, the MASTER probably was more significant but its impact was much less than the Juliao or Assis Lemos groups.

of sharecroppers, renters, and small proprietors participated most in the Northeast Liga or Church-sponsored groups on the basis that these would be the most literate and most economically well-off and thus able to afford the leisure time necessary for the leadership tasks of these groups. Actually, the absence of adequate statistical data on land-holdings and personal income in Brazil gives one very little "hard" data on which to substantiate this hypothesis.

In Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, the small proprietors and renters who belong to the Cotia Cooperative are probably better off than the rural workers of many coffee and sugar plantations. The small proprietors and renters in the Cotia and other Southern Cooperatives are highly literate and live in a highly-organized social infrastructure that contributes to social solidarity and a readily available leadership resource pool, to meet "crises" or "equilibrium-disturbing situations," as David Truman calls them. Moreover, several Japanese-Brazilian small farm proprietors told this writer, Cotia was more meaningful in meeting their needs than a sindicato. Considering the history of governmental manipulation of formally organized groups and Cotia's success in performing the functions of a political pressure group, these people are quite rational in their attitudes.¹

¹The lack of hard statistical data and surveys on Brazilian population groups renders meaningless much of the discussion of the political activism of the "independent" peasant. An analogous situation might be the controversy surrounding the so-called "independent" voter in the United States: in recent years, survey data has shown the so-called "independent" voter not to be the informed voter who chooses candidates on the basis of their programs and issues; rather, the "independent" voter is generally the most un-informed, most active, and least interested in public affairs.

A Comparison of Brazil with other
Latin American Countries

The same breakdown in paternalistic relationships between the large landowners and their peasant tenants can be observed in other Latin American countries which have moved from a basically agricultural to a mixed agricultural-industrial society. It took place in Bolivia following the Chaco War and the 1952 Revolution,¹ in Colombia during the past fifteen years known as "la violencia,"² in Mexico during the Porfirio Diaz regime and exploded in the Revolution of 1910-1917;³ in Guatemala during the Arevalo-Arbenz regime (1945-1952), although there was a reaction or partial return to the status quo during the Castillo Armas regime (1954-1957);⁴ and to a degree in Argentina during the Peron Years, although the violence often took place in the cities and not the countryside.⁵ In all of these countries, urban-based politicians, industrialists, and even a few military officers

¹Richard W. Patch, "Bolivia: U. S. Assistance in a Revolutionary Setting," in *Social Change*, Adams, et al. (eds.), esp. pp. 119-128, is among the best discussions of this change.

²Richard S. Weinert, "Violence in Pre-Modern Societies: Rural Colombia," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LX, No. 2 (June, 1966), pp. 340-347.

³Oscar Lewis, "Mexico since Cardenas," in *Social Change*, Adams et al. (eds.), pp. 285-345.

⁴Richard N. Adams, "Social Change in Guatemala and U. S. Policy," in *Social Change*, Adams et al. (eds.), esp. pp. 231-273, and Pearson, "The CNCG and Peasant Unionism," *passim*.

⁵James W. Rowe, "A Note on Argentina," *AUFS Reports*, East Coast South America Series, Vol. XI, No. 3 (June, 1964), esp. pp. 21-23, and James W. Rowe, "Argentina's Durable Peronists: A Twentieth Anniversary Note, Part I: Some Preconditions and Achievements," *AUFS Reports*, East Coast South America Series, Vol. XII, No. 2 (April, 1966), esp. pp. 3-10.

tried to form coalitions which included low status or middle status rural elements that attempt to chip away at the power of the landed gentry.

Nevertheless, there were differences in Brazil from that which took place in other countries for a variety of cultural and historical reasons. There was no Brazilian equivalent to the peasant sindicatos growing up around Jose Rojas of Ucarena, Bolivia. There was no Brazilian equivalent to the Mexican peasant groups which were developed by Emiliano Zapata. There was no Brazilian equivalent to the peasant groups created by Premier Fidel Castro in Cuba after 1959 which are little more than relationships between a new-style landowner boss furnishing services and benefits to followers a la Peron and not services and benefits rendered because of pressures exerted by the peasants themselves.

The deliberate colonization of parts of Northwest Argentina with family or proprietor farmers has resulted in the creation of a rural middle class in several provinces, Cordoba, Santa Fe, and possibly Mendoza. These farmers have created two important groups of which little or nothing has been written in English: the Agrarian Federation (Federacion Agraria) and the San-Cor Cooperative which have their headquarters in Santa Fe city and Sunchales, Santa Fe province, respectively. Many of the members of these groups, which own from 50-250 acres of land, have moved upward by means of an agricultural ladder from their original status as rural workers, sharecroppers, or renters working off passage money from Italy or Turkey.

In all of those countries with viable small farmer or rural worker pressure groups, it appears that the same contributing factors have been present: (1) groups which are able to mix traditional means of seeking relief with modern propaganda techniques; (2) the greater availability of highways, telephones, and other communications networks; (3) complex rural social structures with a combination of formal and informal groups providing a resource pool of local leaders and a lesser dependence on outside leaders or influentials; (4) an ability to project an image that these groups are reformist-- with the obvious exception that the Zapata and Ucarena groups were considered "revolutionary" until after the Mexican and Bolivian revolutions, when they became part of the new governing structures; (5) changes in crops, methods of cultivation, or the geographical "center of gravity" of a crop frequently have been the cause for the growth of peasant groups in Peru and Chile but not in the other countries mentioned; (6) in all of these countries, the better-off and more literate sectors of the peasantry have been better able to organize or furnish the local and middle level leadership necessary to peasant pressure groups; and (7) the most depressed sectors have been under-represented and most difficult to organize.

Overall, the process of pressure or interest-group formation among Brazilian peasants is going to continue although some of the forms it takes may be different than the forms taken within the past fifteen years. And finally, many of these organizations which have little or no internal democracy may contribute ironically to a greater

democracy in the total society because they provide a means of articulating the interests of peasant groups which in the long run might otherwise seek millennial solutions.

Further Research Needs

It was noted in the Preface that "interest group analysis is neither an exclusive nor a complete method of evaluating the decision-making process." It was also noted that "case studies do provide concrete data upon which further generalizations can be constructed which may buttress or qualify existing hypotheses." Students of Brazilian politics or of the peasant and labor movements may be able to point out exceptions or inaccuracies in different aspects of this study. Nevertheless, the writer believes that a beginning has been made with this study in dealing with the many-sided determinants of specific behavior patterns which is a basic problem of the social sciences. As Lipset has noted, "the analysis of organizations is hampered . . . by the fact that comparable data are rarely collected for more than a few cases."¹ It is therefore important for additional data to be collected on Small Farmer and Rural Worker pressure groups in order to verify the hypotheses advanced at the beginning of this study. In particular, the writer feels that the following kinds of research need to be undertaken in order to fully understand what has happened in the past ten years and what may happen in the immediate future.

¹Lipset, op. cit., p. 398.

1. Case studies of such states as Minas Gerais and Goias which would address themselves to at least the following questions, which this writer was unable to undertake because of a lack of time. Why is it that not one Minas Gerais rural sindicato was recognized as of December 31, 1963, out of the 57 which were reportedly functioning and seeking recognition? The state was strongly represented at both the First Rural Workers Congress in Belo Horizonte in November 1962 and the Congresso de Unidade Sindical in Brasilia in January, 1964. Did a clientele or parentela relationship exist between Governor Magalhaes Pinto, the DRT and FARMIG or SRB leaders which effectively prevented all or most of these groups from being recognized? Or is there evidence that many or most of these groups were paper or phantom organizations or voter mobilizing devices?

In Goias, further west, ten sindicatos were recognized as of December 31, 1963, and nineteen more were waiting recognition. It would be useful to investigate the "peasant league" activities in this newly developing state and the "invasions" of which so little published data have been forthcoming.

2. Studies of the career patterns and value system of leaders and influentials at the local and federation levels. For example, the ownership of property by influentials, the conditions of employment of agricultural labor by these influentials if they own farm property, the voting and previous political participation of these influentials to determine possible differences between their publicly articulated code of values and their private conduct, the regional differences, and the differing expectations and perceptions of roles

by both members and leaders now that the peasant groups have been functioning under a relatively constant political system since 1964.

It would be relevant to discover if a relatively similar value system is shared by federation and CONTAG leaders, especially by the absence of a federation or confederation to represent the interests of the small proprietors who employ agricultural labor occasionally and who may in fact work as salaried laborers during certain periods of the year when there is little work on their own land or the economic opportunities are greater for temporary employment elsewhere. Chasin, for example, found important differences among the delegates to the 1962 Belo Horizonte Congress on both a regional and occupational basis; it would be useful to follow his program of questions as well as adding questions which might determine regional or state differences on peasant grievances and proposed solutions.

3. Studies of the election statistics at the Municipio level to determine the possible correlation between peasant group organization and the voting for Deputies Francisco Juliao, Assis Lemos, Jose Rotta, and Adolpho Puggina. In addition, it is interesting to note that the Paraiba Peasant Leagues were organized only in those municipios which Blondel in the late 1940's perceived were dominated by a "monarchical" or "one-family-dominant" political boss (chefe politico); there were no Peasant League groups in those municipios which were dominated in the 1945-1950 period by two or more families or in which competition among various groups existed.¹ There may

¹See Map VIII of Blondel, op. cit., p. 65.

therefore be political links between Julião or Assis Lemos and Paraíba politicians which none of the published literature or questioning by this writer was able to find.

4. Additional studies of the ULTAB and MASTER groups to determine the reasons for their failure to achieve any significant impact at the municipio level as well as to determine the extent in which these groups really had a mass following.

5. Additional in loco investigation of the various "invasions" in the several states to determine if they were related to local political phenomena or if they were related to state and national politicians; in addition it would be useful to see how closely they were related to traditional feuds between particular political families or clans.

6. Additional studies of the landowner pressure groups (SRB, CRB, Federations, and Rural Associations), military zone and regional commanders, and DRT officials to determine the existence of cliques or factions of "defensive modernizers" who may have wished to coopt peasant pressure group influentials or of the conservative status quo members who wished to fight and destroy the new groups seeking admittance into the decision-making process.

7. The relationship of municipio-size and population density to determine the influence of internal communications structures and rural social infrastructures. For example, in Chapter VI, MASTER had little success in the small farm holding municipios compared to the FAG but had some success in the very large municipios over 5,000

square kilometers in size. For example, Table 25 shows variations among five states discussed in this study which are explicable in part to the role played by the clergy and to relatively heavy bus and railroad transportation networks; nevertheless, size may be important in some states or size of landholding may be more important, however, statistics by municipios for each state were not available.

8. The extent to which leadership groups are composed of persons with a commitment to internal group democracy and service to the group in general as opposed to the "careerists" or "porkchoppers" who are active in peasant pressure groups only as a means of improving their social status. Included would be an attempt to determine if some groups are more careerist-prone than others.

9. Studies of the political and social philosophies of Ministers of Agriculture, Labor, the Development Agencies (SUDENE or IBRA), and the President, including content analysis of their speeches, to perceive their understanding and commitment to more modernized societies and the role of pressure groups within the Brazilian system. For example, why did Celso Furtado, the gifted economist who headed SUDENE in 1963-1964, speculate in April 1963 that "the rural landless" or the "Peasant Leagues of Francisco Juliao" were "more likely to be the instruments of violent change than are the labor unions in manufacturing"? According to Furtado it was obvious that urban unions could see possibilities for a significant improvement in their own welfare through a policy of gradualism rather than a policy of violent revolution; on the other hand, "the rural landless" were confronted with a "rigid,

TABLE 25
PEASANT SINDICATOS IN SELECTED STATES BY SIZE OF MUNICIPIOS
1965^a

Size in Square Kilometers	Percent of Municipios with Sindicatos				
	Ceará	Pernambuco	Rio Grande do Norte	Rio Grande do Sul	São Paulo
	n-132	n-101	n-123	n-150	n-464
0-99	50%	100%	18%	0	9%
100-199	33%	72	15	0	7
200-299	20	64	37	71	11
300-399	11	72	35	53	14
400-499	25	100	69	20	20
500-599	25	87	50	47	25
1-4,999	19	29	45	56	35
Over 5,000	--	50	--	36	--
	24%	64%	37%	49%	18%

^a Compiled and computed on the basis of data on the size of municipios gathered during the General Census of September 1, 1960, included in Anuario Estatístico do Brasil, 1961, pp. 31-44, and data collected by the writer which is included in Table 18.

TABLE 26

RECOGNITION OF PEASANT SINDICATOS BY LABOR MINISTERS
DURING THE GOULART REGIME, SEPTEMBER 8, 1961- DECEMBER
31, 1963^a

Minister Political affiliation and tenure in office	Months in Office	Peasant Sindicatos Recognized	Sindicatos Recognized Per Month
Andre Franco Montoro São Paulo, PDC Sep. 8, 1961-June 29, 1962	9	36	4
Paulo Lacerda June 29-July 7, 1962	1/2	20	40
Hermes Lima PTB left July 16-Sep. 14, 1962	2	2	2
João Pinheiro Neto Sep. 17-Dec. 3, 1962	2 1/2	22	9
Benjamin Eurico Cruz Dec. 4, 1962-Jan. 22, 1963	1 1/2	1	1
Almino Monteiro Afonso PTB radical nationalist who helped form FNL Jan. 23-June 17, 1963	5	53	11
Amaury de Oliveira Silva ^a June 17-Dec. 31, 1963	6 1/2	132	20

^a Compiled and computed from SUPRA, Sindicatos Rurais, Relação No. 1, p. 18.

^b This writer does not have any data on the sindicatos recognized during the January-March 31, 1964 period in which Silva held office also.

resistant class structure, bitterly fighting even minor changes."¹ It may be true that Furtado was speaking for American consumption or possibly the statement was a means of obtaining more funds for his own agency from a possibly Brazilian reluctant Congress influenced by representatives of the landowning elite? Nevertheless, it appears that Furtado's analysis of the leadership and policy makeup of various peasant pressure groups was exceedingly wide on the mark.

10. A study of the recognition policies of the various Ministers of Labor during the Goulart regime. There is little published explanation for the differential output of recognition of peasant sindicatos by men who did hold different views about the labor and peasant movements (see Table 26).

11. The extent to which peasant pressure groups have been instrumental as intermediaries in distributing land under the Estatuto da Terra or in integrating peasants into the Social Security system of the nation as envisaged in the Rural Worker Statute and subsequent legislation?

¹Celso Furtado, "Brazil, What Kind of Revolution," p. 533.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

Manifesto of the Movement of Landless Agricultors (MASTER), April 1960¹

Considering the morose conditions which have befallen the innumerable attempts at Agrarian Reform in Brazil, to the point that one of the highest prelates of the Church in Brazil has affirmed that Brazil will be the last [or ultimate] country to resolve this problem;²

Considering that the National Army itself, certain of the importance of rural production for the Security of the country, proposes³ the creation of a specialized Service with that patriotic finality in mind;

Considering that, within the best Christian doctrine, the land ought to belong to those who directly work it;

Considering that without a vigorous action of the rural masses from outside to oblige the Powers of the Nation and the Force of Parliament to consider the serious nature of the matter, procrastination will always be the result of those who have joined land interests to a feudal and capitalist exploitation;

Considering the urgency of the organization of rural multitudes without land, in order that they awaken and group themselves in an association capable of enlightening them and instructing them to defend their rights [rights which have] always [been] postponed from the colonial and slavocrat epochs;

Considering that, notwithstanding the fact that human quantities who two-thirds of the population of the country live on and from the land are always first in war and its sacrifices and the last in peace and the consideration of governments;

¹Translated from photostatic copy of typewritten manuscript, "Aos Agricultores Riograndenses e Ao Povo em Geral," April, 1960, in this writer's possession.

²The prelate is not known.

³The writer knows nothing of this military proposal.

The dignitaries resolve to found a civil society with the constitutional objectives of the Statutes that are annexed.¹

We convoke all of those interested to inscribe themselves in [the society of MASTER] and to lend it their cooperation and its high finalities (goals) that, departing from Rio Grande do Sul, it may cover all of the nation, to overcome, finally, the social drama of the 25,000,000 agricultors without land.

¹The names of these dignitaries are not known since there are no signatures at the bottom of this "Manifesto."

APPENDIX 2

Statutes of the "Movement of Landless Agricultors," April 1960

- Art. 1.- With the denomination of "Movimento dos Agricultores Sem Terra" (MASTER), remains founded on this date, its headquarters (sede) in Porto Alegre and with jurisdiction in the State of Rio Grande do Sul, a civil society, that will have the following fundamental objectives:
- a.- Combat all forms of exploitation of the rural worker, defending the producer and production, stimulating the productivity and valorizing the countryman by all means of protection (amparo) and of assistance.
 - b.- Develop the associative and cooperative spirit among the small agricultors and promote the union and politicization of rural populations, in the defense of basic revindications.
 - c.- Struggle (Lutar) for the institution of a type of autonomous government in rural areas (meios), elected by the vote of the peasants and capable of creating among them the spirit of public initiative and local leadership.
 - d.- Combatting high prices of rental and agricultural sharecropping (parceria) and promoting the access of the agricultor without land to the domination of a rural parcel, by financial purchase, by the concession of public lands, or by the expropriation of improductive and anti-economic latifundios.
 - e.- Promote the organization of colonial nuclei in the proximity of urban centers of consumption, for the supplying of the market of work of industrialized zones and to take advantage of the elements of rural life who have gone into exodus from rural life.
 - f.- Organized technical professional schools, industries and tractor and mechanic centers. In the zones of agro-pastoral production, with the end of creating work specialization for the zones of small rural producers.
 - g.- Combat the high cost and deficiencies of rural production - machinery, fertilizers, combustibles, land, taxes (tributos), transports, communications, etc.

- h.- Seek (Pleitear) the democratization of agricultural credit, domestic (or household) industrialization, and rural electrification.
 - i.- Struggle for the institution of the right to vote for the illiterate voters and for rural military service.
 - j.- Seek (Pleitear) the gradual reduction of importations of cereals and other foreign agricultural products and their substitution by similar national [products].
- Art. 2.- All rural producers without land will be admitted as members of MASTER, of both sexes, without discrimination of race, religion, or political party.
- Sub-par. 1 - Agricultors and livestock breeders who, although proprietors, accept the principles and objectives of the Entity may also participate.
- Sub-par. 2 - Suburban workers and marginal workers of the cities, who also have origin in rural districts or dispose of an agricultural experience and wish (pretendem) to dedicate themselves to the exploitation of land, may also be admitted.
- Sub-par. 3 - Persons who, not being agricultors, are disposed to collaborate with the Movement, will also be members, in the quality of collaborating members, in the criteria of the Directory.
- Art. 3.- Members, besides their facultative [?] contributions, will pay a contribution (joia) of CR\$ 100.00 and a monthly dues of Cr\$ 20.00.
- Art. 4.- A program of death assistance (auxilio-moto) is instituted which will pay for a pre-paid telephone call (chamada previa) of two hundred cruzeiros to the family of the deceased member.
- Art. 5.- MASTER will have a Federal-Delegate [in residence-junto] at the Federal Government, a State Delegate [resident] with the Government of the State and as many Delegates and Municipal Nuclei who are formed in the Municípios of the State.
- Art. 6.- As soon as possible, the activities of MASTER will be extended over the nation, for the creation of new entities in the states, with analogous objectives.
- Art. 7.- MASTER will promote the organization of District Unions of women, seek to integrate the rural family into the finalities of the movement, to stimulate sociability and Household (domestic) industrialization and to mobilize the feminine element for an effective educational contribution to infants and rural youth.

Art. 8.- MASTER will have a duration of indeterminate time and an unlimited number of members.

Art. 9.- The movement will be guided by a Directory composed of a , President, two vice presidents, a Secretary, a Treasurer, and a Consultative Council of five members, elected in assembly for a period of two years, with attributes common to all societies of this type.

APPENDIX 3

The Directory of Officers of the Confederation of Agricultural Workers (CONTAG) Elected April 14, 1965 Rio de Janeiro, Guanabara, Brasil

Regular Members of the Directory

- President - Jose Rotta, President of the Federation of Rural Workers of the State of Sao Paulo
- Secretary - Euclides Almeida Nascimento, Secretary of the Federation of Rural Workers of the State of Pernambuco, from Nazare da Mata
- Joaquim Batista Nascimento (Sobrinho) - President of the Federation of Rural Workers of Sergipe; Second Vice President at the Natal Convention
- Joao Almeida Cavalcanti - President of the Federation of Rural Workers of Paraiba; Elected Second Secretary at the December, 1963 CONTAG Elections; Assistant Secretary at the Natal Convention.
- Joao Lazaro Dumont - President of the Federation of Rural Workers of Parana
- Nobor Bito - Regional Representative of the Federation of Rural Workers of Sao Paulo; President of the Sindicato of Presidente Prudentes
- Agostinho Jose Neto - President of the Federation of Rural Workers of the State of Rio de Janeiro
- Joaquim Damasceno - President of the Federation of Rural Workers of the State of Rio Grande do Norte
- Antonio Joao de Faria - President of the Sindicato of Campos, Rio de Janeiro, a sindicato which was recognized in 1946 and had approximately 3,000 members in 1965.

Alternate Members of the Directory

- Marco Martins da Silva, Pernambuco
- Acacio Fernandes dos Santos, Treasurer of the Federation of the State of Rio de Janeiro
- Geraldo Francisco Miquelatti, Parana
- Ambrosio Ivo Aureliano, Pernambuco
- Jose Martins da Cruz, Rio Grande do Norte
- Severino Manoel Soares, President of the Federation of Rural Workers of Pernambuco; Elected to the CONTAG Directory in 1963
- Jose Vigita dos Santos, Sergipe
- Jose Inovcente, Jaboticabal, Sao Paulo
- Joaquim Francelino, Paraiba

Regular Members of the Fiscal Council (Board of Auditors)

Jose Feliz Neto, Sergipe

Jose Palhares, Rio Grande do Norte

Joao Jordao da Silva, Treasurer of the Federation of Rural Workers of Pernambuco; President of the Sindicato of Vicença

Alternate Members of the Fiscal Council

Severino Cassemiro Alves, Treasurer of the Federation of Paraiba

President of the Sindicato of Alagoa Grande

Osmer de Souza, Tapevi, Sao Paulo

Manoel Justino de Souza, a rural laborer from Nova Iguaçu, State of Rio de Janeiro.

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Personal Interviews

(Individuals Who Were Included in Survey of 75 Influentials
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Laécio Albuquerque, Afogados de Ingazeira, Pernambuco, June 25, 1965.

Amaro Teixeira Almeida, President of Rural Workers Sindicato, Ribeirão Preto, Pernambuco, June 13, 1965.

João Almeida Cavalcanti, President, Federation of Rural Workers, João Pessoa, Paraíba, June 3, 19-20, 1965.*

Dr. Paulo Almeida, Pelotas, Rio Grande do Sul, February 27, 1965.

Salvio P. de Almeida Prado, President of the Brazilian Rural Society (SRS), São Paulo, December 22, 1964.

Severino Casemiro Alves, President, Sindicato of Rural Workers, Alagoa Grande, in João Pessoa, Paraíba, June 3, 19, 1965.*

João do Amaral, President of Sindicato of Rural Workers, Guariba, São Paulo, November 30, 1964, August 17, 1965.*

Nivaldo Alves de Amorim, Instructor, Federation of Rural Workers, Recife, Pernambuco.

Agronomist Mario Coelho de Andrade Lima, USAID, NE, Recife, Pernambuco, June 7, 1965.

- José Andrade do Nascimento, Member of FNT Organizational team, Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul.
- José dos Anjos, President of Sindicato of Rural Workers, Jaboatão, Pernambuco, May 30 and June 23, 1965.*
- Francisco Antas, Retired postal employee, FAG office, Santa Maria, Rio Grande do Sul, March 20, 1965.*
- Padre Deulio Antonini, Military Chaplain, Cruz Alta, Rio Grande do Sul. January 15-17, 1965, in Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul.*
- Francisco José Aranha, Fazenda Ypê, Bragança Paulista, São Paulo.
- Frei Tarciso Arruda Fontes, Goiana, Pernambuco, August 7, 1965.
- Ivo Ambrosio Aureliano, Vice President, Federation of Rural Workers, Recife, Pernambuco, in Rio de Janeiro, April 5, August 19, 1965.*
- Amaro José Bandeira, President, Junta, Rural Workers Sindicato, Palmares, Pernambuco, April 20, 1965.*
- Alziro Benetti, President, JAC Nucleus, Linha Nova, Gramado, Rio do Sul, January 29, 1965.
- Amadeus da Silva Barreto, Regional Labor Delegate, Salvador, Bahia, May 17, 1965.
- Rene Bertholet, Superintendent, Pindorama Cooperative, Alagoas, July 10, 1965.
- Nobor Bito, Regional Delegate, Federation of Rural Workers of the State of Sao Paulo, Sao Paulo, April 12, 1965.*
- Zulmiro Boff, President, Sindicato of Small Farmers, Caxias do Sul, Rio Grande do Sul, April 22, 1965.*
- Gentil Bonato, Director of Rural Education and FAG leader, Gramado, Rio Grande do Sul, January 19-20, 29-30, 1965.*
- Adalino De Borba, Linha Santo Antonio, Venâncio Aires, Rio Grande do Sul, February 20, 1965.
- Rev. Jayne Alfredo Borges, Santana do Livramento, Rio Grande do Sul, March 16, 1965.
- Padre Bosco, Coordinator, Social Action Programs, Caruaru, Pernambuco, June 9, 21, 1965.*
- Prof. Argemiro Jacobo Brum, Ijuí, Rio Grande do Sul, in Porto Alegre, January 17, 1965.*

- Pastor Wilfredo Buchweitz, Venâncio Aries, Rio Grande do Sul, March 24, 1965.*
- José Bueno da Costa, State Team JAC, São Paulo, at Itaparíca, Bahia, May 15, 1965.
- Dr. Francisco (Chico) Cabral, PSD Chefe Político, São Paulo Potengi, Rio Grande do Norte, August 3, 1965.
- Srta. Dr. Julieta Calzans, Serviço de Assistência Rural (SAR), Natal, Rio Grande do Norte, June 15, 1965.*
- Archbishop Dom Helder Camara, Recife, Pernambuco, August 11, 1965.*
- Heli Cantalice, Employee, Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, João Pessoa, Paraíba, June 3, 18, 1965.*
- Padre Antonio da Costa Carvalho, Spiritual Adviser, Federation of Christian Workers of the State of Rio de Janeiro, Niterói, Rio de Janeiro, March 31, 1965.*
- Prof. Orland M. Carvalho, Universidade de Minas Gerais, in Rio de Janeiro, March 30, 1965.
- Bach. Benjamin de Moraes Cavalcanti, Officer in Sociedade Auxiliadora da Agricultura and former First Vice President, Federation of Rural Associations of Pernambuco (FARPE), Recife, Pernambuco, August 9, 1965.
- Caiu Lins Cavalcanti, President, Sociedade de Recuperação da Agricultura de Pernambuco, May 25, 1965.
- Frei Celso Maria, Spiritual Adviser, Federation of Circulos Operarios, Sao Paulo, August 18, 1965.*
- Padre Celso Bastos Cortes, Guaríba, São Paulo, November 30, 1964.
- Prof. Alto de Costa, Faculdade de Filosofia, Salvador, Bahia, May 19, 1965.
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Irmão Miguel Dario, FAG Regional Coordinator, Pôrto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul, January 19, 1965.

Monsignor Federico Didonet, Cathedral, Santa Maria, Rio Grande do Sul, March 23, 1965.

Ronaldo Dietrich, ASCAR Agronomist, Rio Pardo, Rio Grande do Sul, February 17-18, 1965.

Dr. Dellacorte, President, FAG Regional Committee, Santa Maria, Rio Grande do Sul, March 20, 22, 1965.*

Lauro Diehl, Member FAG Council, Linha Santo Antonio, Venâncio Aires, Rio Grande do Sul, February 20, 1965.*

Padre Ignacio Eidt, Linha Arlindo, Venâncio Aires, Rio Grande do Sul, February 17, 1965.

Vilibaldo Ertel, Secretary, Rural Association, Venâncio Aires, Rio Grande do Sul, March 24-25, April 25, 1965.

Irmão Francisco Evans, Santana do Livramento, Rio Grande do Sul, March 17-18, 1965.

Pastor Paulo Evers, Superintendent, Ginasio Bom Pastor, Linha Brasil, Nôva Petropolis, Rio Grande do Sul, January 26, 28, 1965.

Francisco Falcão, President, Associação dos Fornecedores de Cana de Pernambuco, Recife, Pernambuco, July 27 and August 9, 1965.

Padre Luis Feracine, Sociedade Brasileira de Cultura, São Paulo, August 18, 1965.

Jose Inacio Ferreira, Sindicato of Agricultural Workers of Ares, Natal, Rio Grande do Norte, August 4, 1965.

Severino Manuel Ferreira, President, Sindicato of Rural Workers, Agua Preta, Pernambuco, July 10, 1965.

Dr. Luis Ferreira, Regional Agronomist, São Paulo Potengi, Rio Grande do Norte, August 3, 1965.

Laécio Figueiredo Pereira, President, Brazilian Confederation of Christian Workers (CBTC), December 6, 1964.

Dr. Milton Fonseca Lima, Regional Agronomist, Secretary of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce, Goiana, Pernambuco, August 7, 1965.

Manoel de Freitas, Instituto Treinamento e Aprendizagem, Olinda, Pernambuco, June 5, 1965.

- Dr. Moacyr de Brito Freitas, President, Fabrica Peixe, Pesqueira, Pernambuco, July 20, 1965.
- Prof. J. V. Freitas Marcondes, Instituto Cultural do Trabalho, São Paulo, November 24, 1964, February 20, August 17, 1965.
- Ernesto Fujita, Interventor-President, Federation of Autonomous Agricultural Workers, São Paulo, May 8, 1965.*
- Haroldo Veloso Furtado, Regional Labor Delegate, Recife, Pernambuco, June 4, 1965.
- Padre Giordani, Igreja Pelegrino, Caxias do Sul, Rio Grande do Sul, April 21, 1965.*
- Luis Goês Vieira, Agronomist, Supervisor, ICT-Recife, Pernambuco, May 21, July 30, August 11, 1965.
- Daniel Griffin, A Ordem, Natal, Rio Grande do Norte, August 2, 4, 1965.
- Humberto Granja, SORPE, Garanhuns, Pernambuco, June 9, 1965.*
- Jose Ary Griebler, President, Federation of Rural Workers, Pôrto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul, January 17, March 26, April 27-28, 1965.*
- Osmar Guti  rrez Carvalho, Linha Santo Antonio, Ven  ncio Aires, Rio Grande do Sul, February 20, 1965.
- Pedro Hagetop, Chief, ASCAR Office, Santa Cruz do Sul, Rio Grande do Sul, February 15, March 21, 1965.
- Nestor Hamm, former Prefeito, Vera Cruz, Rio Grande do Sul, April 19, 1965.
- Deputy Alfredo Hoffman, State Assembly, Pôrto Alegre, February 12, 1965.
- Alipio Huffner, Vice Prefeito, Lajeado, Rio Grande do Sul, April 23-24, 1965.
- Pedro Avelino Junges, Accountant, Caixa Rural, Santa Cruz do Sul, February 15, 20, 1965.
- Otavio Klafke, President of Sindicato of Small Farmers, Ven  ncio Aires, Rio Grande do Sul, February 17-20, 1965.*
- Padre Arno Antonio Klein, Secretary to the Bishop, Santa Cruz do Sul, February 14, 1965.
- Prof. Protassio Moreira Knemnitz, Candelaria, Rio Grande do Sul, February 18, 1965.*

- Dr. Carlos Kraft, Agronomist, Rio Grande Tobacco Company, Venâncio Aires, Rio Grande do Sul, April 26, 1965.
- Dom Edmundo Kunz, Auxiliary Bishop, Pôrto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul, February 6, April 28, 1965.*
- Dr. Edson Lucena, Legal Adviser, Federation of Rural Workers, Natal, Rio Grande do Norte, August 4, 1965.
- Jack Liebof, Assistant Labor Attache, American Consulate General, São Paulo, April 17, August 17, 1965.
- Willibaldo Lentz, President FAG Sectional Organization, and Rural Association Treasurer, March 24-25, 1965.*
- Guido Lermer, Legal Adviser to Rural Sindicatos, Taquarí Valley Region, Lajeado, Rio Grande do Sul, April 23-25, 1965.
- Emiliano Limberger, School Teacher, MTR Activist, former Vereador in Santa Cruz do Sul, lawyer in Pôrto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul, January 25-26, February 17, 26-27, April 28, 1965.*
- Padre José Candida Lira, Instituto de Treinamento e Aprendizagem, Olinda, Pernambuco, June 7, 1965.
- Augusto Locatelli, Regional Delegate, Federico Westphalen, in Pôrto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul, January 17, 1965.*
- Dona Maria Angelina de Paulo Lopes, Aide to the President of the Cooperativa dos Usineiros, Recife, Pernambuco, July 27, 1965.
- Manoel de Lopes Filho, Asistente Sindical, Federation of Rural Workers, São Paulo, November 28, 1964.*
- José César Magalhaes, Office Worker, Federation of Rural Workers, São Paulo, April, 1964.*
- Padre Vigario Luis Manes, Gramado, Rio Grande do Sul, January 29, 1965.*
- Itaboraí Martins, Labor Columnist, O Estado de São Paulo, May 4, 1965.
- Monsignor Expedito Medeiros, São Paulo Potengi, Rio Grande do Norte, August 3, 1965.*
- Prof. Laudelino Medeiros, Faculdade de Filosofia, Universidade do Rio Grande do Sul, Pôrto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul, April 27, 1965.
- Antonio Meinherz, Treasurer, FAG Nucleus, Linha Avila, Gramado, Rio Grande do Sul, January 23, 1965.*

- Padre Antonio de Melo Costa, Cabo, Pernambuco, June 29, 1965.*
- Djalmo Augusto de Melo, Coordinator of Cooperative Activities, SORPE, Recife, Pernambuco, June 10, July 24, and August 8, 1965.*
- Padre Gerardo Augusto de Melo Carpina, Pernambuco, July 24 and August 8, 1965.*
- José Paulino de Melo, President, Sindicato of Small Farmers and Co-operativa Mista, Tabira, Pernambuco, July 26, 1965.*
- Valdenor Melo Robin, Treasurer, Sindicato of Rural Workers, Ribeirão, Pernambuco, June 13, 1965.*
- Dom Francisco Mezquite, Bishop, Afogados de Ingazeira, Pernambuco, June 25, 1965.*
- Euclides Almeida do Nascimento, President, Sindicato of Rural Workers, Nazaré da Mata, Pernambuco, April 14, June 8, August 8-9, 1965.*
- Sebastiao Aloe Nepomuceno, JAC Representative in Terezina, Piauí, Itaparica, Bahia, May 15, 1965.
- Dona Aliete Neri, Riacho das Almas, Pernambuco, June 22, 1965.
- Agostinho Jose Neto, Federation of Rural Workers, Niteroi, Rio de Janeiro, April 5, 10-11, 1965.*
- Josue Neumann, Director, Caixa Rural, Nôva Petropolis, Rio Grande do Sul, January 25, 1965.
- Geronimo Oliveira, Executive Secretary, Federation of Rural Workers, Sao Paulo, November 27-29, 1964.*
- Rogelio Luis de Oliveira, Coordinator, Social Action Program, SORPE, Afogados de Ingazeira, Pernambuco, May 25-26, 1965.*
- Dr. José Prieto Pinheiro Passos, Usina Catende, Catende, Pernambuco, July 10, 1965.
- José Pereira Da Silva, Secretary, Sindicato of Agricultural Workers, Palmares, Pernambuco, July 9-10, 1965, July 10, 1965.*
- José Francisco Perrini, Prefeito, Gramado, Rio Grande do Sul, January 19, 1965.
- Emil Peter, Agronomist, Papal Volunteers, Natal, Rio Grande do Sul, August 1, 1965.
- Antonio Pires, JAC Representative in Campinas, São Paulo, at Itaparica, Bahia, May 15, 1965.

- Dona Severina Porpina, SAR Cooperative Work, Natal, Rio Grande do Norte, July 28-29, 1965.*
- Paulo Brandao Rebello, Agronomist, Instituto Gaucho de Reforma Agrária, Pelotas, February 26-27, and Porto Alegre, April 28, 1965.
- Ladyr Angelo Rech, Fazenda Souza District, Caxias do Sul, Rio Grande do Sul, February 6-7, April 22, 1965.*
- Bruno Riegel, Accountant, Gramado, Rio Grande do Sul, January 29, 1965.
- Dr. Noriberto Riegel, Regional Agronomist, Venâncio Aires, Rio Grande do Sul, March 24, April 25, 1965.
- Srta. Elsa Loss, JAC member in Ribeirão Preto, São Paulo, at Itaparíca, Bahia, May 15, 1965.
- Dr. José Artur Rios, Sociedade de Pesquisa e Planejamento, Rio de Janeiro, Guanabara, January 4, August 19, 1965.
- Dr. José Marano Rocha Filho, Rector, University of Santa Maria, Santa Maria, Rio Grande do Sul, March 23, 1965.
- Dom Acacio Rodriguez Alves, Bishop, Palmares, Pernambuco, July 10, 1965.*
- José Rotta, President, Federation of Agricultural Workers of São Paulo, and President, CONTAG, November 25, 1964, May 8, August 17, 1965.*
- Miss Lúcia Sá Barreto, SORPE, Recife, Pernambuco, April 1, June 11, July 24, August 16, 1965.*
- Cid Sampaio, Usina Roçadinho, Catende, Pernambuco, July 10, 1965.
- Dom Eugenio de Araujo Sales, Apostolic Administrator, Salvador, Bahia, May 19-20, 1965.*
- Padre Salomão, Chaplain, Fernao Velho Textile Factory, Maceió, July 11, 1965.
- Dr. Nelson Sampaio, Faculdade de Direito, Universidade de Salvador, Salvador da Bahia, May 19, 1965.
- Acácio Fernandez dos Santos, Treasurer, Federation of Small Proprietors, Niteroi, Rio de Janeiro, April 5, 7-8, 1965.
- Dinaldo Bizarro dos Santos, Recife, Pernambuco, May 25, July 24, and August 8, 1965.
- Feliciano Satiro, President Federation of Autonomous Agricultural Workers, Recife, Pernambuco, June 7 and August 6, 1965.*

- Orlando Schaefer, President, Sindicato of Rural Workers, Santa Cruz do Sul, February 15, 1965.*
- Alfredo Scherer, Former Prefeito, Venâncio Aires, Rio Grande do Sul, February 13 and April 25, 1965.
- Padre Arsenio Scmitz, Linha Imperial, Nôva Petropolis, Rio Grande do Sul, January 20-31, February 1, 1965.
- Decio Roque Schmidt, Linha Pinhal Alto, Nôva Petropolis, Rio Grande do Sul, January 31, 1965.
- Walter Seeger, Linha Pinhal Alto, Nôva Petropolis, Rio Grande do Sul, January 27-29 and April 29, 1965.*
- Padre Joao Sehnem, Provincial Head, the Jesuit Order, and Ecclesiastical Assistant, União Popular, Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul, February, 1965.
- Rubem Antonio Seibt, Prefecture Secretary, Nôva Petropolis, Rio Grande do Sul, January 25-27, 1965.
- Sam Shapiro, Assistant Labor Attache, Rio de Janeiro, Guanabara.
- Amoro, Antonio da Silva, Member Jaboatão Rural Workers Sindicato, Jaboatão, Pernambuco.
- Gersino Antonio Silva, SORPE Instructor, Recife, Pernambuco, May 28, 1965.
- Joao Jordao da Silva, Treasurer, Federation of Rural Workers, Recife, Pernambuco, July 1-2, August 10, 1965.*
- Padre José da Silva, Pesqueira, Pernambuco, July 20, 1965.*
- José Inacio Silva, President, Sindicato of Rural Worker's and Cooperative, Bom Jardim, Pernambuco, June 10, 12, 1965.*
- Padre José Maria da Silva, Pesqueira, Pernambuco, July 20, 1965.*
- Manoel dos Santos Silva, President, Sindicato of Rural Workers, Vitória de Santo Antao, June 14, 1965.*
- Francisco Damião da Silva, President, Sindicato of Autonomous Workers, Pesqueira, Pernambuco, July 19-20, 1965.*
- Eloi Pedro Silva, Treasurer, Cooperative of Rural Workers, Palmares, Pernambuco, July 9, 20-25, 1965.*
- José Pereira da Silva, Secretary, Sindicato of Rural Workers, Palmares, Pernambuco, July 9, 20, 25, 1965.*

- Padre Arsemio Smetzer, Linha Imperial, Nôva Petropolis, Rio Grande do Sul.
- John Snyder, Regional Representative, Postal, Telephone, and Telegraph Workers International, Rio de Janeiro, Guanabara, March 29, April 2, 1965.
- Dr. José Alberto Sousa, Santa Maria, Rio Grande do Sul, March 20, 1965.
- Mario Souto Maior, Bom Jardim, Pernambuco, June 16-17, 1965.
- Alonso Nascimento de Souza, President, Sindicato of Rural Workers, Também, Pernambuco, June 1, 1965.*
- Captain Flavio Jorge Souza, Serviço de Embarque, Divisao de Infanteria, Quartel Geral, Recife, Pernambuco, August 10-11, 1965.
- José Francisco de Souza, Engenho Galiléia, Vitória de Santo Antão, Pernambuco, July 7, 22, 1965.
- Tociyuki Takaki, Secretary of the Federation of Rural Workers of the State of Rio de Janeiro, April 9, 1965.
- Sumiko Tamura, Member JAC State Team, São Paulo, at Itaparica, Bahia, May 16, 1965.
- Luis Alvaro Teixeira, Administração Técnica Contabil Sindical Ltda., Rio de Janeiro, Guanabara, April 10-11, 13, 1965.
- Angelino Thomazzi, President FAG Nucleus, Linha Avila, Gramado, Rio Grande do Sul, January 20-21, 1965.*
- Luis Ernani Torres da Costa e Silva, Executive Secretary, CONTAG, April 13, August 13, 1965.*
- Reynaldo Umann, President, Sindicato of Small Proprietors, Rio Pardo, Rio Grande do Sul, February 17, 1965.*
- Padre Pedro Veloso, National Director, Brazilian Confederation of Circulos Operarios (CNCO), December 9, 1964.*
- Padre Orlando Viana, Santana do Livramento, Rio Grande do Sul, March 17, 1965.
- Edson Vigal newspaperman, São Luiz, Maranhão, in São Paulo, November 24, 1964.
- Jose Edson Wanderley, União dos Palmares, Alagoas, at Instituto Treinamento e Aprendizagem, Olinda, Pernambuco, June 5, 1965.
- Rev. Arno Wrasse, Nôva Petropolis, Rio Grande do Sul, February 2, 1965.

Jose Luis Whitman, Picada Cafe, Nôva Petropolis, Rio Grande do Sul,
January 25, 28, 1965.*

Frei Xisto, Goiatuba, Goiás, at Itaparíca, Bahia, May 16, 1965.

Idorly Zatti, Industrialist, Caxias do Sul, Rio Grande do Sul, February
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Padre Joao Batista Zachin, Editor, A Voz de Bragança, Bragança Paulista,
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH


Neale John Pearson was born August 30, 1930, in Akron, Ohio. He graduated from Lakeland High School in June, 1948. After receiving the degree of Bachelor of Arts from Maryville College, Maryville, Tennessee, in May, 1952, he served in the United States Army for three years. He received a Special Bachelor of Science degree in Foreign Service from Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., in August, 1956, while working for a United States Senator as a clerk. He was a member of the Foreign Service of the United States of America from August, 1957, until April, 1961, and served as Vice Consul in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, 1959-1960. He pursued Graduate Studies at Georgetown University in 1957-1958 and 1961 and was awarded the degree of Master of Science in Foreign Service in June, 1964. He enrolled in the Graduate School of the University of Florida in February, 1962. In 1964-1965, he spent a year in Central and South America pursuing research on the dissertation under a Fulbright-NDEA Fellowship.

Neale John Pearson has been a member of the faculty of the Department of Government at Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, since January, 1966. He is married to the former Jeanette Shinkle. He is a member of the American Political Science Association, Southern Political Science Association, Midwest Conference of Political Scientists, American Sociological Association, Association of Latin American Studies, Southeast Conference on Latin American Studies, Pi

Sigma Alpha, and Sigma Delta Pi. He has published articles in several professional journals and his Master's Thesis for Georgetown University is being translated for publication by the University of Guatemala.

This dissertation was prepared under the direction of the chairman of the candidate's supervisory committee, and has been approved by all members of that committee. It has been submitted to the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate Council and accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.


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
Dean, College of Arts and Sciences


Dean, Graduate School

Supervisory Committee:



Chairman







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